Plato and Xenophon

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Plato and Xenophon

Comparative Studies

Edited by

Gabriel Danzig
David Johnson
Donald Morrison

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Finally, I wish to thank my wife Rachele for her words of wisdom at every bend and turn.

Gabriel Danzig
February, 2018
Efrat

Abbreviations

DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz. 1906. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Wiedmann (republished 1985).
DL	Diogenes Laertius
LSJ	H.G. Liddell and R. Scott. 1968. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. Revised and augmented by H.S. Jones with a supplement. Clarendon Press.
OCD	S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, and E. Eidinow. 2012. *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 4th edition. Oxford University Press.
PCG	R. Kassel and C. Austin. 2001. *Poetae Comici Graeci*. Walter de Gruyter.
SSR	G. Giannantoni. 1985. *Socratic et Socraticorum Reliquiae*. Edizione dell'Ateneo.

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Introduction to the Comparative Study of Plato and Xenophon*

Gabriel Danzig

This is the first collection of papers comparing the work of Plato and Xenophon ever to be published, as far as I know. Its publication reflects a growing recognition of the value of Xenophon's writings in general and of the mutual importance of bringing his Socratic writings into more fruitful contact with those of contemporary Socratic writers such as Plato. These papers move the comparative agenda forward by considering complex kinds of interaction between the two writers, including Platonic reactions to Xenophon, by focusing more on the comparison of ideas than on the value of the writings as evidence for the historical Socrates, and by enlarging the range of comparative studies to include the non-Socratic writings as well. They also reflect the growing recognition that the "Socratic" writings of both Plato and Xenophon need to be treated as expressions of their author's own spirit, and hence that they must be treated within the context of their author's work as a whole and not merely through the lens of Socratic studies.

Most of the papers in this volume were presented, sometimes in a very different form, at a conference held at Bar Ilan University in 2014. The idea for this conference occurred to me while attending another conference in 2011. Dustin Gish had invited Louis-André Dorion, Dave Johnson, James Redfield, and Michael Stokes, obm, to assess my recent book on the portraits of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon at a session of the Northeastern Political Science Association conference in Boston.[1] Since I knew Louis-André was then finishing his massive commentary on the *Memorabilia*, I thought I should return the favor by organizing something on a larger scale in honor of that.[2] Louis-André's work has been an inspiration for everyone working on Xenophon's Socratic writings

* I thank Dave Johnson, Don Morrison, and Louis-André Dorion for valuable comments on this introductory essay.

1 G. Danzig 2010.

2 The second part of Dorion's commentary was published in 2011. In 2010 another important commentary was published by Fiorenza Bevilacqua in Italian (*Memorabili di Senofonte*, Torino). Both of these commentaries include extensive critical introductions to the literature on Xenophon's Socrates which differ in such a way that they provide invaluable supplements one to the other.

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for the past fifteen years, including me. I was not able to organize anything in time for the publication of the commentary, but I asked him if he would agree to my organizing a conference in honor of his subsequent collection of essays, *L'autre Socrate*. Louis-André's reaction was typical: he said he did not want the conference to be devoted to a critical review of his previous achievements. He preferred that it be devoted to new studies furthering the project of comparative studies. And that is what we did. The papers collected here were written by junior and senior scholars from a wide variety of academic backgrounds, all sharing an interest in using the comparative study of Plato and Xenophon to clarify the teachings of both of these great writers.

In this introduction I will review the field of comparative studies of Plato and Xenophon and consider some of the central methodological issues that entails, suggesting also directions for the future. In the second introduction, Dave Johnson will discuss the papers contained in this volume.

Chronology and Conversation

As the two students of Socrates who left us significant literary productions, Plato and Xenophon offer a particularly rich and fruitful field for comparative study. Since antiquity, scholars have discussed the alleged conversation between the two authors, focusing in particular on same-named compositions (*Apology* and *Symposium*) and emphasizing the rivalry between them. Scholars today agree that in at least one instance, Xenophon refers quite openly, although not explicitly, to the work of Plato (X. *Symp*. 8.9–11, 8.32–34; see P. *Symp*. 178a–185e).[3] It seems likely that Xenophon refers to Plato's *Apology* in the opening of his own composition by that name (X. *Ap*. 1).[4] There is also a reference to Plato's Socratic conversations, or to something very like them, in Xenophon's programmatic statement in *Memorabilia* 1.4.1.[5] These references, if they are references, show not merely that Xenophon read Plato, but that his Socratic writings aimed to respond to Plato and to his portrait of Socrates. Xenophon attacks the shameless speeches of Plato's characters Phaedrus and

---

3 See John Cooper 1999: 16–21.

4 Von Arnim 1923: 11 and M.H. Hansen 1995: 32, deny that Xenophon refers to Plato. J. Cooper answers Hansen in detail (1999: 11–12, n. 16). M.C. Stokes (2012: 249–250) leans toward accepting the reference.

5 For further discussion of these passages see David Johnson's paper in this volume esp. 78–81. See G. Danzig 2017a; A.H. Chroust 1957; M. Bandini and Dorion 2000–2011 introduction; K. Joël 1893–1901.

Pausanias (mentioning only the latter) in *Symposium*; he corrects Plato's portrait of Socrates' behavior in court, informing us of his suicidal intentions and altering the tone and content of his speech in *Apology*; and he also corrects or supplements Plato's portrait of Socrates' conversations, devoting his *Memorabilia* to portraying the kind of unconventional, useful advice Socrates offered his friends. In none of these cases does he name Plato. But if this is the right way to understand these references, the entire agenda of Xenophon's *Socratica* was deeply affected by his reading of Plato and his desire to react.

Most scholars agree that Xenophon has read Plato.[6] But his critical references and corrections to Plato's writings would be pointless if Xenophon did not expect that some of Plato's readers, and perhaps even Plato himself, would read what he had to say. These references are never absolutely explicit—they never contain the name Plato—so if Xenophon expects his audience to notice them, he must be addressing an audience that is quite familiar with Plato's writings. This does not imply that Xenophon is addressing only the close circle of Plato's students, however; it must be an audience that, in Xenophon's view at least, is willing to entertain the kind of criticism and correction he has to offer. While Plato's close students were quite possibly part of the audience, Xenophon must have aimed also at a wider, more neutral audience whose opinions could be swayed. Most likely Xenophon was addressing the same broad audience that all the Socratic writers addressed, and if this was an appropriate context in which to correct Plato, it follows that Plato was read by this larger audience as well.[7] The commonality of the audience raises a question about Plato's relationship to Xenophon. If Plato's readers read Xenophon's writings, including his criticisms and corrections of Plato's portrait, Plato would have heard about it. Did Plato also read them?

6 However, H. Thesleff 2002a doubts that many of the passages cited as evidence of Xenophon's reliance on Plato are really good evidence, pointing out that the passages in Xenophon frequently show little awareness of the content of the alleged Platonic sources: "Though many of the persons Xenophon introduces as Socrates' interlocutors are known from the Platonic dialogues, they are almost never discussing the same themes as in Plato … If Xenophon had just reshuffled Plato's material to make his own pieces look more personal, we should perhaps have expected him to take some account of the central ideas too" (145). He suggests that common sources may be an explanation in many cases.

7 H. Thesleff 2002b argues for a more restricted audience for Plato's dialogues, primarily because of the lack of any explicit reference to them in contemporary literature prior to Aristotle. In constructing this argument from silence, Thesleff does not consider the Xenophontic references.

The literary conversation that the ancient critics describe clearly implies a give and take over time. But how would that square with our chronological evidence? On the basis of apparent references to contemporary events, scholars today date most of Xenophon's writings to the period of 368–354.[8] If Plato's so-called early and middle dialogues preceded this period, they could not very well respond to Xenophon. Xenophon may have read early Plato and responded, and then Plato in his turn may have responded to Xenophon in his later writings such as *Laws*, but earlier influence would hardly be possible. Indeed, *Laws* contains the one passage (*Laws*, 694c–695b) in which scholars, ancient and modern, suspect that Plato is reacting, critically, to Xenophon's writings, as it happens, to *Cyropaedia*.[9]

If this is the right scenario, Plato may have influenced Xenophon's agenda and portrait of Socrates, but there is little room for genuine give and take prior to Plato's late period. This conclusion, however, assumes a degree of certainty in our chronological picture that is unwarranted by our evidence.

We cannot really be certain that Xenophon's works are as late as we assume they are. One reason for assigning a late date to Xenophon is the assumption that when Xenophon treats themes that are found in Plato, this reflects Platonic influence on Xenophon. But in some cases the reverse may be true. Xenophon's references to contemporary events in some of his writings, including *Memorabilia*,[10] provide more objective evidence for a late date for his writings. These references would provide a powerful reason for dating Xenophon after Plato, if we knew that Plato wrote at least some of his writings earlier than this. However, it is notoriously difficult to date Plato's dialogues.[11] And Xenophon's seemingly conclusive references to historical events are not necessarily as con-

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8 See W. Higgins 1977: 131–132, Kahn 1996: 29–30. For a defense of an early dating of Xenophon and his independence of Plato see Thesleff 2002a: 152, note 23. The fact that much of *Memorabilia*, as well as *Apology* and even *Symposium*, appears on the basis of its content to be closely related to the controversy over Socrates that emerged in the wake of his trial and execution suggests a relatively early date on the face of it. As M. Flower says, the chronology of Xenophon's writings is not known (2017: 8–9).

9 See G. Danzig 2002. In this volume 547–575, Noreen Humble explores a second possible reference to Xenophon in the *Laws*, focusing on the description of the Spartan ephors, and Carol Atack 510–543 explores common themes in these later writings, bringing *Statesman* into the picture.

10 Hobden and Tuplin provide a comprehensive list of references to contemporary or historical events. See introduction to 2012: 25–26, n. 34.

11 The questions of absolute and relative chronology for the early and middle Platonic dialogues are extremely complex, and no consensus has emerged. See H. Thesleff 1982; C. Kahn 1996: 42–48.

clusive as they seem. In some cases, a seemingly late reference may refer to events that are not so late.[12] Aside from this, there is considerable evidence to show that ancient authors frequently rewrote their compositions, producing new editions with revised contents.[13] Could all the references to late events be late additions by the author? Such an assumption would not be as arbitrary as it may seem. One likely reason for authors to revise is that they felt a need to respond to new developments. So it makes sense that later additions would refer to later events, not only historical ones but also literary ones. The implication is clear: even a reference to a literary work produced by another author may be a late addition and, hence, does not provide proof of posteriority for the composition as a whole.

For this reason, the evidence used to assign a late date to Xenophon's writings is not as compelling as it may seem. While references to late events do set a *terminus post quem* for the work as we have it, they say nothing about the date of publication of any previous editions. I do not mean to suggest that we throw all our chronological assumptions into the waste bin, but recognizing that our chronological picture is tentative may help offset the tendency to transform chronological hypotheses into facts and then to interpret the texts within the limits they set. We should not limit the range of intertextual studies by means of chronological assumptions that are not facts; rather we should allow the evidence of the texts to speak for itself. While it is legitimate to suspect that Xenophon's writings postdate Plato's, this is only a probability, and transforming it into more than that will inhibit rather than advance further study.

If Xenophon published substantial writings earlier than we think, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Plato reacts to Xenophon even in his so-called early and middle dialogues. Similarly, if Plato revised his early and middle dialogues toward the end of his life, they may well contain passing references even to Xenophon's latest writings, although on this scenario the influence would not run as deep.

Mutual Intertextuality

Revision would have offered an ideal means of responding to other works on a similar topic, particularly works that are critical of one's own. The phenomenon of revision, therefore, raises the possibility of a more complex kind of liter-

12 See Dave Johnson's argument that *Mem.* 3.5.2–4 does not provide evidence of a late date (2018, 484, n. 3).

13 On rewriting in the ancient world, see H. Thesleff 1982: 83–85 and 1997: 149–174; H. Tarrant 1982; D. Nails 1995: 116–122; D. Nails and H. Thesleff 2003.

ary intertextuality than we usually have in mind: a single pair of works may be mutually intertextual, each containing responses to the other.

Such a situation may have arisen in the case of the two *Symposia*. Clearly the two compositions stand in some relationship one to the other, but which one preceded which?[14] Xenophon's *Symposium* contains clear references to Plato's—but only in the penultimate chapter. The many other correspondences between the works can be explained alternatively as Platonic responses to Xenophon. While in *Apology* (1) Xenophon seems to refer to Plato's *Apology*, in *Symposium* the situation looks to be the reverse: Plato's reference to an oral version of a Socratic symposium told by one "Phoenix son of Phillipus" looks like a derogatory reference to Xenophon's work by the same name. Bury believed it was a reference to a written composition, but because he assumed that Xenophon wrote later than Plato he postulated that Polycrates was the target.[15] But the relative dating of the two *Symposia* is far from certain. Aside from the general doubts I have raised above, there are particular reasons to doubt the generally accepted date for Plato's *Symposium*. Contrary to Dover, Plato's *Symposium* must have been published after 378 or even after 371.[16] The reference to Phoenix, whose name is almost a misspelled Xenophon, and whose father's namesake (Phillipus) is an insipid clown appearing in Xenophon's *Symposium*, may indeed be a reference to Xenophon's *Symposium*. At the very least, we know of no other Socratic *Symposium* to which this comment could refer, if it is indeed a veiled reference to a published work.

Obviously, both compositions cannot have been published after the other. The possibility that Plato is referring to Xenophon would therefore be prohibited as long as we discount authorial revision of Xenophon's chapter eight. But if there was revision, we can easily envision either 1) Plato wrote first and then, after Xenophon reacted to him in chapter eight of Xenophon's *Symposium*, added these derogatory remarks to his preliminary introductory scene (indeed, this might explain his motive for introducing this part of the unusual double-prologue) or 2) Xenophon wrote first and then added his criticisms of Plato in chapter eight as a response to Plato's derogatory reference to "Phoenix, son of Phillipus" and to Phaedrus' vile distortion of Critobulus' innocent suggestion concerning the benefits of beauty in a military commander.[17] In fact

14 For the similarities see H. Thesleff 1978 and B. Huss 1999: 449–453.

15 R.G. Bury 1932: xviii.

16 For the former date, see G. Danzig 2005: 337. For the latter, G. Ryle 1966: 38.

17 For further arguments for Xenophontic priority see H. Thesleff 1978: 157–170; G. Danzig 2005. I no longer believe that it is impossible to explain Critobulus' speech as a reaction to Phaedrus' speech—Xenophon may be correcting Plato simply by toning it down.

there is room for several rounds in this exchange.[18] The study of this kind of phenomenon is of interest primarily not for its implications for establishing a better chronological picture, but for the light it sheds on the relations between Plato and Xenophon and on the modes of literary interaction between them.

There are other cases of potential Xenophontic influence on Plato. In *Memorabilia* 1.4.1 Xenophon refers to the bad impression made by portraits of Socrates as someone who merely refutes others: 'If some people, relying on what some write and say about him, think that Socrates was most capable of turning men towards virtue but was not able to lead them to it, let them examine (*dokimazontōn*) whether he was able to make his companions better after considering not only the refutations he inflicted for the sake of chastisement (*kolasteriou*) by interrogating those who think they know everything, but also the things he said on a daily basis to his companions.'

It has been suspected that this is a reference to Plato's early dialogues.[19] Leading people to virtue, or making them better, is something that Socrates arguably fails to do in Plato's early dialogues. Here Xenophon suggests a new path for Socratic writers: instead of presenting only Socrates' aporetic conversations, they should highlight his success in improving others. Xenophon does this himself in *Memorabilia*; and in fact one finds a similar effort in Plato's middle dialogues such as *Gorgias, Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus*, and *Republic*, as well as in a supposedly early dialogue like *Crito*, where Socrates expounds positive doctrines concerning virtue. From this, one thing seems clear: Xenophon is not referring to those dialogues. And since his criticism would be superfluous if the middle dialogues were already circulating, he has probably not read them, and they may not have been published yet.

No one knows why Plato changed his direction and began writing dialogues with positive Socratic teachings. The profundity of the ideas he develops in these dialogues and the intimations of them found already in the earlier dialogues, show that he has contemplated these ideas for a long time. But what stimulated him to begin publishing them in an open manner and to attribute them, implausibly, to Socrates? It is certainly possible that Xenophon's critique of the earlier portrait of Socrates played some role, whether as a direct stimulus or as reflecting a more widespread critique attested also in *Clitophon*.

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18 Xenophon's positive but superfluous reference to another Phoenix in his *Symposium* (X. *Symp.* 8.23) may be evidence of a further round.

19 See Bandini and Dorion 2000–2011: vol. 1, CXXXVII. The terms *graphousi* and *legousi* are plural, and the latter term refers most naturally not to literary compositions, but to ordinary speech. So Xenophon may be referencing a wider conversation on Socrates, and this makes it possible that he is not referring to Plato at all, even though one suspects that he is.

Similarly, the introduction of largely passive interlocutors who agree to Socrates' every claim, in dialogues like *Republic*, may reflect the influence of Xenophon's Socrates, who is notorious for his ability to win assent from his interlocutors (*Mem.* 4.6.15; *Symp.* 4.56) and for his harangues. The greater stress on good character traits, as opposed to theoretical knowledge, in accounts of virtue in the later Platonic dialogues may also represent a Xenophontic influence.

These and other directions in intertextual research should not be dismissed on the basis of uncertain chronological theories. Once we cease to allow these theories the power of veto, other considerations become more prominent. Are the simpler writings of Xenophon evidence of priority, of misunderstanding, of a different audience or literary sensibility, or even of a false-naïve response? Is a shorter statement in Xenophon a summary of a longer passage in Plato or the inspiration that led to a Platonic expansion?[20] Each case must be judged on its own merits. And if the literary case is strong, we may have to complicate our chronological scheme in accordance.

The Socratic Question

In modern times, the comparative study of Plato and Xenophon has focused mainly on the "Socratic question." Readers have asked themselves which of these two accounts of Socrates reflects the historical Socrates with greater fidelity? What can we learn from them about Socrates and his characteristic philosophical methods and doctrines?

Nowadays, those scholars who seek the historical Socrates tend to identify him with Plato's portrait in the early dialogues. Aside from other virtues, this makes Socrates into a fascinating figure, a tempting lure for the intellects of bright young university students. It also creates an easily formulated explanation for the differences between what we call early Platonic dialogues and middle and late ones.

Beginning with Schleiermacher, scholars have argued that Socrates *must* have resembled Plato's brilliant portrait because otherwise he could not have had such a huge influence on ancient philosophy.[21] This argument was never

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20 For example, H. Thesleff argues that Xenophon's portrait of Hippias does not depend on Plato's because "*Hp Ma* represents a clear advance from the position of Xenophon (or his source), rather than vice versa, which would imply that Xenophon had read his Plato with almost stupid carelessness" (2002a: 153). See Altman in this volume 99–114

21 F. Schleiermacher 1818.

very cogent. The huge influence on ancient philosophy to which its proponents refer was effected largely by means of Plato and his influence on Aristotle. If the Platonic dialogues misrepresent the historical Socrates, then it would be false to say that Socrates himself had an enormous influence on the history of philosophy: it would be Plato who deserves the credit for the influence of "Socrates." Moreover, this argument ignores the fact that other Socratic writers, including Xenophon, also had a great influence on important schools such as Stoicism.[22] If Plato's influence demonstrates the accuracy of his portrait, why wouldn't Xenophon's influence show the accuracy of his? It should be obvious, in fact, that influence is no proof of historical accuracy at all: an accurate but dull portrait might have no influence just as an inaccurate and fascinating one might have great influence. It is the quality of the portraits that is responsible for their influence, so Plato's extraordinary portrait would have been influential regardless of its relation to the historical Socrates.

Scholars insist: if Socrates resembled the portrait in Xenophon, he could never have attracted a student like Plato in the first place. If this were convincing it would show only that Xenophon got it wrong, not that Plato got it right. But it is not convincing. We do not really know very much about Plato's youthful tastes, and what we do know does not support this argument. There is really no evidence that Plato was attracted to Socrates for the sake of his philosophical discourses. He may have been attracted to him for his charismatic personality, dramatic behavior, and verbal virtuosity. He may have thought, like Alcibiades and Critias (*Mem.* 1.2), that associating with Socrates would help him succeed in the political career he was so devoted to at the time (see the *Seventh Letter*, 324b–d).

In fact, we cannot even be certain that Plato was a close companion or student of Socrates in the first place. Unlike Xenophon, Plato never portrays himself in conversation with Socrates. Moreover, when he offers a list of Socrates' associates in *Apology* he mentions "Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present" (34a). If Plato had associated personally with Socrates, why would his Socrates, in listing his associates, refer to Plato as the *brother* of an associate rather than as an associate himself? This is almost a proof that Plato was not a close companion of Socrates. In *Republic* Plato portrays his brothers as associates of Socrates, and Xenophon too portrays Socrates in conversation with Glaucon rather than with Plato (*Mem.* 3.6.1).[23] As far as we know, the other Socratic writers fail to take notice of Plato also.

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22 See A.A. Long 1988.

23 It is true that Xenophon says that Socrates held this conversation, which resembles Plato's *Republic* in its effort to turn Glaucon away from a career in politics, on account of Plato

It is possible that neither Plato nor Xenophon were close students of Socrates. They certainly cannot be counted among the older generation of Socrates' closest associates such as Aeschines, Antisthenes, and even Aristippus. Their contact with Socrates, if they had any, may have been extremely superficial. This would only serve to emphasize the importance of treating their writings as expressions of their own views rather than as reflections of the historical Socrates. But it is worth noting that there is more evidence of Xenophon's connection with Socrates than there is of Plato's. Plato's failure to mention Xenophon can be attributed to his general tendency to efface rival Socratic writers—he barely mentions Aeschines, Antisthenes, or Aristippus (noted by Vander Waerdt 1993: 3, n. 11). Xenophon too is selective in his references to rival Socratic writers: he gives prominent place to Antisthenes, but does not mention Aeschines, Phaedo or Euclides (see S. Prince 2015, 14). He does mention Plato, but only once, and he never portrays him in conversation with Socrates (or anyone else). Nor does Plato present himself in conversation with Socrates. Xenophon at least claims (problematically) to have been present at many of Socrates' conversations and is able to portray himself in conversation with Socrates twice (*Mem.* 1.3.8–13, *Anabasis* 3.1.4–7). And it is worth noting that our meager fragments of Aeschines attest to Xenophon's presence in the Socratic circle but not to Plato's.[24]

Although Plato spent most of his literary career depicting Socrates, this is not in itself evidence of a close philosophical relationship with him. *Sokratikoi logoi* were the genre in which philosophical writings were published in his day, and this alone, bolstered by his brothers' association with the man, would provide a sufficient explanation for Plato's joining the crowd. This is not to say that Plato had no connection at all with Socrates. Most of the authors of *Sokratikoi logoi* had some connection with Socrates, and Plato probably had some connection

(*Mem.* 3.6.1). So Xenophon testifies to a close relationship between Socrates and Plato. But he may have been wrong about that. Xenophon may have been taken in by Plato's literary productions and assumed on their basis that Plato had associated closely with Socrates. The fact that he never portrays Plato as present in any conversation he records, despite the fact that, unlike Plato, he does include other Socratic rivals, indicates that Xenophon had no relevant memories of Plato. But unless he was inseparable from Socrates this would not have been a reason to doubt that Plato may have known him as well. His mention of Glaucon, as I indicated above, may derive from his reading of Plato's *Republic* and thence too his assumption that Plato knew Socrates.

24 In his *Aspasia*. See Bandini and Dorion 2000–2011: vol. 1, Introduction, xxv. For a different view of Xenophon's relations to the Socratic circle, see the paper by James Redfield in this volume 115–127.

as well. But his connection may not have been a very close one, which makes it perilous to assume that his writings accurately reflect the ideas of Socrates.

Plato's personal references to Socrates suggest that he was a family friend and a moral exemplar rather than a philosophical inspiration (*Seventh Letter*, 324d–325c). Philosophically, Plato's writings show the influence of a wide variety of philosophic schools—Pythagorean, Parmenidean, Heraclitean, Sophistic. We don't know what elements, if any, from his dialogues can be attributed to the influence of Socrates. Even the technique of interrogation that he emphasizes so frequently, and which is found also in Xenophon and Aristophanes, may reflect a common contemporary eristic practice. We certainly don't know that the theoretical orientation of Plato's Socrates, which is what most distinguishes him from the Xenophontic Socrates, was inspired by Socratic philosophy, or that an interest of this kind underlay his purported youthful association with him.

The claim that a Socrates like that portrayed in Xenophon's writings is too unphilosophical to have attracted a young man like Plato faces a reverse objection at least as strong: if Socrates resembled Plato's theoretical Socrates, how would he have ever attracted a practical-minded man like Xenophon, who claims, among other things, that Socrates heaped ridicule on those who engaged in useless theorizing (see *Mem.* 1.1.14; 4.7.2–9)? All things considered, it may be easier to imagine that Plato, who was undoubtedly a creative thinker of the first rank, has embroidered vastly on the historical Socrates than it is to imagine that Xenophon was unaware of what kinds of subjects he discussed.[25]

The most recent and influential attempt to defend the historicity of the Platonic Socrates was made by Gregory Vlastos, widely recognized as a seminal figure in the contemporary study of Socrates. Vlastos argued that there is a high degree of philosophical coherence among the dialogues commonly regarded as early as opposed to those regarded as middle or late. He also argued that these dialogues present the same picture that we get in Plato's *Apology*, a work that he regarded as being faithful to the spirit of the historical Socrates. If *Apology* is reasonably accurate, and the other early dialogues agree with it, then it follows that the early dialogues present a reasonably faithful portrait of the historical Socrates.[26]

This impressively neat argument has faced serious criticism. Scholars have rejected the claim that *Apology* is accurate even to the spirit of the histori-

25 See J. Cooper 1999: 14.

26 1971: 3–4. In 1991 he argues that the writings of Aristotle and Xenophon help confirm the historicity of Plato's early Socrates but does not seriously consider the very likely possibility that that these writers were influenced by their reading of Plato's early dialogues.

cal Socrates, seeing it more as an expression of Plato's own vision of Socratic philosophy (D. Morrison 2000).[27] Others have argued that the early dialogues already contain the seeds of the later teachings, so that the division between the teachings in the early and middle dialogues is not as clear as it seems (C. Kahn 1996). In fact, aside from a recognizable late period, there is no consensus on the order of the dialogues (H. Thesleff 1982). As a result, few scholars today have the temerity to claim Plato's Socrates as the historical Socrates.

Even supporters of Vlastos have retreated from some of his stronger claims. Brickhouse and Smith (2010) have recently defended the historicity of the Platonic Socrates by arguing merely that it is *possible* that the Socrates represented in early Plato is true to life.[28] Of course almost anything is possible; and it is notoriously difficult to disprove historical claims. But we do not ordinarily reach conclusions on the basis of the absence of a decisive refutation of any given claim. Brickhouse and Smith argue that it would be impossible in principle to demonstrate any divergence between the portrait and the original since we do not have independent evidence about the original: "Plainly, however, such a conclusive refutation of this thesis would require precisely what most critics claim we *cannot* have: an accurate knowledge of the historical Socrates, or at least a source whose testimony about him was demonstrably reliable" (15). In fact, however, we do not need to know what the historical Socrates said in order to know that Plato's portrait is non-historical. We only need to know what he could not possibly have said. And much of what appears in Plato's *Apology*, at least, falls in that category, as I have shown elsewhere.[29]

Even when conceived as a literary investigation of the philosophy of Plato's Socrates, the Vlastonian enterprise remains problematic. The effort to piece together a consistent philosophy from the Platonic dialogues implies a degree of literary esotericism not far distant from those of the Straussian and Tübingen schools, but without any theoretical justification. Proponents of this systematizing approach would need to explain why Plato failed to present his ideas as a coherent system but scattered them in dialogic compositions that seem to contradict each other.

It is no coincidence that Vlastos' scheme for recovering the teachings of Socrates went hand in hand with the disregard or denigration of Xenophon's

27 Morrison responds also to K. Döring 1992, who argued for substantial historicity in Plato's portrait of Socrates in *Apology*.

28 Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 11–42.

29 Plato's *Apology* responds to post-trial controversies, and these are issues that Socrates could not possibly have addressed during the trial. See G. Danzig 2003 (rev. 2010).

writings. Xenophon represents an essential piece in the puzzle for anyone considering the Socratic problem or the literature about Socrates. But as Morrison has shown, Vlastos' appreciation of Xenophon was extremely superficial,[30] and this is true as well for students of Vlastos, many of whom fail to consider Xenophon at all except in cases when he can be recruited as evidence for the historical validity of Plato's Socrates.[31]

Xenophon has also had his partisans (for a discussion of them, see Bandini and Dorion 2000–2011: introduction viii–xii). They have tended to argue that since Xenophon had some interest in historical writing, he was more likely to have attempted to be faithful to Socrates. They also argue that Plato was too caught up with his own brilliant philosophical agenda to even attempt an historically accurate portrait. This latter argument has, to my mind, considerable merit, but it serves more to invalidate Plato's portrait of Socrates than to validate Xenophon's. The former argument has some merit as well, but when we consider the leeway that ancient historians took with their material, the didactic intentions they so often reveal, the fact that Xenophon himself was a self-acknowledged didactic historian, mentioning both didactic and apologetic aims in his Socratic writings, we are forced to recognize the limits of his historical reliability as well.

As most scholars recognize, the Socratic writers were engaged in writing fiction, and that means that their readers did not even expect a portrait that would be faithful to the original. This has been well-known at least since the time that O. Gigon published his *Sokrates, Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte* in 1947, even if it did not always impact the English-speaking world. If the Socratic writers were writing fiction, it seems obvious that their texts cannot be used as historical evidence, at least not without huge qualification.[32]

This argument is sometimes taken too far, however. Although fiction, the Socratic writings are historical and apologetic fiction, and this means that they do bear some significant relationship to the historical Socrates or at least to public perceptions of him. While Plato and Xenophon may have great room to distort the portrait of Socrates, the very fact that they are addressing a public debate about an historical figure sets some limits to their creativity. In order to

30 D. Morrison 1987: 9–22.

31 See Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 12, n. 1.

32 For a more detailed review of this question, see Bandini and Dorion 2000–2011: vol. 1, introduction, xviii–cxviii. Although Dorion ultimately reaches the conclusion that Xenophon's writings do not offer an accurate portrait of the historical Socrates, he also shows that most of the arguments against the accuracy of Xenophon's portrait are baseless.

be recognizable, the figure they create must bear some significant relation to the historical figure. So some of the elements in these portraits are undoubtedly historical; the trouble is we do not know which ones they are.[33]

The apologetic element takes us a bit further. Xenophon is explicit about his apologetic aims, and although Plato cannot make his apologetic aims explicit, since he does not employ an authorial narrative voice, it seems obvious that the image of Socrates he presents in works such as *Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic*, and others is designed in part to reply to popular criticisms of Socrates. These apologetic aims almost guarantee distortion in the portrait of Socrates, but they also provide a clue for reconstructive research. At the very least the apologetic efforts respond to a common core of historical accusations against Socrates. Once we are aware of the apologetic tendencies of our two authors, we are in position, in theory, to get closer to the historical Socrates by discounting or neutralizing these tendencies. It should be possible to say something substantial about the historical Socrates by focusing on the issues addressed by both Plato and Xenophon rather than on their responses, identifying and eliminating the apologetic and imaginative elements in their portraits, and arriving at some Ur-Socrates. But it would be a Herculean task, and there is no guarantee that it would yield results even remotely proportional to the effort that would be necessary to reach them.

Scholars have sometimes thought that agreements between the two writers must reflect a common experience of the historical Socrates. Unfortunately, however, these agreements rarely concern philosophical concepts. The writings we have agree that Socrates was a colorful figure, a sharp talker, abrasive but charismatic, uninvolved with political office or serious economic enterprise in Athens. He was an Athenian citizen, of the Alopeke deme, was involved in the trial of the Athenian generals in 406, was married to a woman named Xanthippe, had some children by her, and was executed by the Athenians for religious offense and corruption of the youth in 399. Clearly too, he did not give public lectures or charge fees for teaching. Most of this is probably accurate, but how far does it get us? Skeptics have doubted almost everything apart from this basic biographical material.[34] And it says nothing about his thinking. As Chroust put it in his most positive formulation, "the *Socratica* of Xenophon offer some promise of definite success in establishing, not what the historical Socrates actually had been—this would be too much to expect—but what he

33 See Bandini and Dorion 2000–2011, vol. 1, introduction, 8–9.

34 See, especially, Karl Joël 1893–1901; Olof Gigon 1947, Anton-Hermann Chroust 1957, Mario Montuori 1981; 1992.

probably might not have been" (Chroust 1957: 3) The Platonic Socrates is no better, since he only expresses "the highest possible view of Socrates' personality and thought—the maximum potentialities of Socrates" (Chroust, 42; see Momigliano's similar formulation 1971: 46).

Undoubtedly, Socrates did discuss many of the topics that are reflected in the writings of his students. But we have no way of knowing what he said about those topics. Even when we find agreements in our sources, we do not know if they reflect common experiences with Socrates, or common themes in the literary endeavor known as Socratic literature. John Cooper has argued that Xenophon only accepts Platonic claims that accord with his own experience of the historic Socrates (1999: 13). But that is only a convenient hypothesis, and plausible only if we assume both that Xenophon knew Socrates personally, and that he was pursuing historical truth in *Memorabilia*.

Vlastos has argued that when Xenophon contradicts his own portrait of Socrates in order to agree with Plato he must be telling the truth (1991: 105–106). Thus when Xenophon has Hippias criticize Socrates for always asking questions and never giving answers (*Mem.* 4.4.9), qualities that are rarely if ever displayed by Xenophon's know-it-all Socrates, he is reflecting the truth about Socrates. In effect, he is admitting that Socrates was more like Plato's Socrates than like his own. This argument has more weight than Cooper's, since it seems valid even on the assumption that Xenophon is a creative writer. But it is still problematic. It seems arbitrary to credit statements by Xenophon only when they are convenient for establishing the validity of Plato's portrait. If Xenophon is reliable on some issues, why not trust him on others? To this Vlastos replies that it is reasonable to trust Xenophon in cases where he contradicts his own general portrait, since only in those cases can we discount agenda-driven distortion. But there is a more substantial objection. Here is where intertextuality affects the Socratic question. Since Xenophon has probably read Plato, he may have been influenced in these statements not by his recollection of Socrates, but by his reading of Plato. To return to our example, *Mem* 4.4.9 appears on other grounds to be a response to Plato, and this suggests that Xenophon is *not* reporting his own experience of Socrates, and that his agreement with Plato cannot serve as independent evidence.

This kind of argument can be employed in two directions, however, and it seems somewhat more forceful when used to confirm Xenophon's portrait. While no one will deny that Xenophon read Plato, even those who believe that the reverse is true do not generally claim that Plato relied heavily on Xenophon for his portrait of Socrates. It follows that while Xenophon's slips cannot be adduced in support of Plato, since Xenophon has certainly read Plato, Xenophontic elements in Plato may have some weight as supporting Xeno-

phon.[35] While it is certainly possible to deny the independent validity of Plato's testimony by attributing it to the influence of Xenophon and others, this would be to acknowledge a level of influence that has rarely been suspected.

Plato and Xenophon provide two very different portraits of Socratic philosophy. While both attribute to Socrates a question-and-answer method, Plato has a tendency, particularly in the early dialogues, to portray Socrates in eternal disagreement with his interlocutors, while Xenophon highlights Socrates' ability to gain assent from his interlocutors (*Mem.* 4.6.14; *Symposium* 4.56).[36] While Plato does show Socrates reaching agreement in some dialogues, these are mainly middle period dialogues such as *Republic, Phaedo*, and others, which may show Xenophontic influence, as I suggested above. In terms of doctrines, Plato's Socrates focuses on definitions and concepts, while Xenophon's offers unconventional practical advice.[37] There could be no greater contrast than that between Plato's star-gazer (*Rep.* 448d–449a) and Xenophon's Cyrus as opposing images of the ideal political leader, and Xenophon's Cyrus bears a close resemblance to his Socrates, who completely rejects theoretical speculation as a worthless waste of time (*Mem.* 1.1.14, 4.7.2–9). While Plato's Socrates is an idealistic speculator, Xenophon's is a master of practical political, military, and even economic advice.

The most decisive argument against the historical reliability of either author in portraying Socrates' views is the fact that they each attribute such different, incompatible, but internally cohesive views to Socrates.[38] It is mainly a lack of understanding of the comprehensiveness and cohesiveness of Xenophon's vision that misleads readers into thinking his is a hodge-podge account that includes genuine impressions of Socrates.[39] In fact, Plato and Xenophon disagree in the most fundamental ways, not only in their attitudes toward theoretical contemplation, but also in their attitudes toward virtue, education,

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35 For example, Alcibiades' insistence that Socrates used common vocabulary in his philosophical discussions (Plato, *Symposium* 221e; the passage seems to contain a reference to *Mem.* 4.4.6–7) supports Xenophon's portrait against those places where Plato's Socrates makes use of highly abstract terms, and argues against any Socratic interest in the forms or in "Parmenidean" speculation generally.

36 See the discussion of this in D. Morrison 1987.

37 See G. Danzig, "Nature, Culture and The Rule of the Good in Xenophon's Socratic Theory of Friendship: *Memorabilia* book two" 2018.

38 I do not mean to claim that either author offers a consistent view, but merely that each one is generally cohesive in his range of interests and the kinds of solutions he proposes.

39 See, for example, J. Cooper who justifies Xenophon's account as reflecting Xenophon's memories of Socrates on the grounds that he was incapable of understanding what Socrates was really saying (1999: 13).

happiness, wealth, and virtually every other fundamental issue in Greek ethical and political thought. Although they may both have been influenced by the same Socrates, their views cannot be brought together into a single composite portrait of Socratic philosophy. Although there are many commonalities, in the most essential matters Socrates is a mouthpiece for two rival views of human flourishing.

What little knowledge we have of Socrates' other students does not tend to support one or the other of these portraits, but rather to suggest still more variety in the depiction of Socratic philosophy. Beside Plato the idealist and Xenophon the *euergetist*, we have to consider Aristippus the hedonist and Antisthenes the ascetic. This variety of views suggests that the Socratic writers used Socrates as a mouthpiece for their own ideas, a notion that has been dismissed out of hand by some interpreters of the Platonic dialogues, who insist that a character cannot be identified with an author and then draw the false inference that a character cannot express the views of an author.

But if these Socratic writers were students of Socrates, inspired by his conversations in one way or another, this variety of views may have a more interesting implication and one which does reflect, paradoxically enough, on the historical Socrates. I referred above to Schleiermacher's famous dictum:

> The only sure path seems to be to ask instead what else could Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon says about him, without however contradicting the character-traits and the practical maxims which Xenophon presents as specifically Socratic, and what must he have been to give Plato a right, and an inducement, to present him as he has done in his dialogues?[40]

As Dorion points out, this formulation assumes a fundamental compatibility between the two portraits, a subject that is a matter of dispute in this volume.[41] Given the fictional character of the Socratic writings, we can no longer

40 See note 23 above.

41 See the chapters by Dorion and Johnson 55–70, 71–98. In his article on Schleiermacher (2001b), Dorion points to two fundamental contradictions between the portraits: (1) Xenophon's Socrates does not use the false-modesty that characterizes Plato's Socrates (but his student Alcibiades does in *Mem.* 1.2.40–46, and so does Xenophon's Socrates on some occasions; see Johnson in this volume 83–84. (2) Xenophon emphasizes *enkrateia*, a virtue or semi-virtue that hardly appears in Plato at all. In fact, all twenty-one of the contradictions Dorion finds between Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates undermine Schleiermacher's approach (see Introduction to L.-A. Dorion, 2013).

assume that the character traits and practical maxims of Xenophon's Socrates are authentically Socratic. Nor can we assume that Socrates was the inspiration for Plato's dazzling speculations. Today, therefore, the question is a simpler one: what can Socrates have been to have inspired such a wide variety of followers, including not only the philosophic types listed above, but also political figures like Critias and Alcibiades? One likely answer is that he was someone with extraordinarily flexible views and arguments, someone who questioned the kinds of lives that people can lead without imposing a single answer. Such a Socrates would not be identical to the portrait in either Xenophon or Plato: Xenophon's Socrates has definite opinions that underlie all his conversations, and Plato's Socrates also shows a clear interest in a particular range of questions and characteristic kinds of answers. The historical Socrates must have had wider interests if he was the inspiration and instigator of speculations that lead in so many different directions. Once the fundamental divergence between Plato and Xenophon is recognized, it is possible to acknowledge the full diversity of Socratic philosophy, to compare the remaining portraits of Socrates from a broader perspective, and to give adequate expression to those areas in which the portraits do agree.[42]

Plato and Xenophon

Further than this we probably cannot go in our effort to recover the teaching of the historical Socrates. But we turn away from this enterprise not merely because the search for the historical Socrates is a wild-goose chase (wild geese are sometimes caught, after all), but also because whatever we may be able to find out about him would be far less interesting than the Socratic literature we have before us. At best we would find that some fraction of the material we have reflects the historical Socrates, but why would we be better off with a fraction than with the whole? With two fat geese in the hand, why go chasing a scrawny bird in the bush?

42 As Don Morrison has pointed out to me, Socrates may have presented different facets of his thinking to different people at different phases of his career. See the formulations in Morrison 1987: 19–20 and 2000: 245. While not impossible, I find it hard to believe that Socrates would have been able to departmentalize his conversation in this way, even if he was interested in doing so, since so much of his conversation was held in public areas with numerous interlocutors and overhearers present, as is usual in the Mediterranean world. As far as changing his opinion over time, Xenophon and Plato were both about 25 or so when Socrates was killed, which would not have left Socrates a lot of time to change his opinions between meeting the one and the other.

As long as the Socratic question dominated, it diverted attention from the more interesting and no less historically or philosophically important questions of the diverging attitudes, opinions, theories, and methods of the two writers themselves, Plato and Xenophon. As long as the Socratic question dominated, contradictions and divergences between the two authors could reflect their mistaken impressions of Socrates or at most their subjective tendencies in describing him. But once we leave the Socratic question aside, these contradictions and divergences become valuable clues for understanding the writers themselves.

I have referred above to places where Plato and Xenophon seem to refer or react to one another. This is an interesting and potentially valuable subject, but it is also an extremely elusive one in the absence of a reliable chronology. There are other kinds of comparative studies that do not depend on chronology and are in some ways more interesting. These kinds of studies compare treatments of similar themes, literary, biographical, or philosophical, as a means of understanding the two authors.

The treatment of the two *Apologies* may serve to illustrate the evolution of this form of comparative study. An early study by L. Shero (1927) treated Socrates as a quasi-historical figure and tried to redeem Xenophon's portrait by reducing some of the seeming contradictions with Plato's *Apology*, denying suicidal intention and reducing the appearance of excessive boastfulness.[43] Thomas Pangle (1985), a student of Leo Strauss, was the first to treat Xenophon's *Apology* as an expression of its author's own vision of Socrates, although he did so in a highly speculative and idiosyncratic manner. Paul Vander Waerdt (1993) took the challenge further, offering a theoretical defense of a program of comparative study and a detailed treatment of the two *Apologies*. He showed that the two portraits of Socrates' speech should not be seen as recollections of the actual trial, but as divergent visions of the behavior of Socrates confronting this challenge. The differences in tone and content, especially the two versions of the story of the oracle of Delphi, reflect philosophical differences between Plato and Xenophon themselves. But Vander Waerdt could not completely free himself from the presumption that Plato's portrait is essentially right, and in interpreting Xenophon he continued the trend of denying or marginalizing suicidal intent and boastful arrogance, proposing elevated martyr-like aims for Socrates, and attributing to him a concern with the future of an enterprise he calls "philosophy" where none is evident.

43 L. Shero 1927. J. Cooper takes a similar view.

There is more work to be done in the comparison of same-named compositions, the *Apologies* and the *Symposia*. Despite its brevity, Xenophon's *Apology* is one of his most revealing works, precisely because it has proved so hard to appreciate. It portrays a Socrates who, in contrast to Plato's portrait, fulfills Xenophon's own ethical ideals.[44] Xenophon's *Symposium* is a rich treasure of Socratic behavior and conversation, in some ways more revealing than *Memorabilia*.[45] These works are not only interesting in themselves; their study also promises to shed light on the Platonic works of the same names, not only because of their almost palpable intertextuality, but even more so because the divergent treatment of a single *topos* reveals so much about what is distinctive to Plato and to Xenophon.

Louis-André Dorion extended the range of comparative study beyond same-named compositions to focus on common terms in Plato and Xenophon, such as the kingly art, the *daimonion*, and, in his commentary on *Memorabilia*, a host of other terms. A similar kind of study focuses on characters who are common to Plato and Xenophon.[46]

There is a limit, however, to the range and effectiveness of studies that concern common terms, despite the convenience of such research in the computer age. We know that Plato and Xenophon (and also Aristotle) are not consistent in their use of terminology within their own writings, so why should we expect another author to discuss a topic in the same terms that were used by his or her rival? In the clearest example of a reference by Xenophon to Plato (*Symp* 8.9–11, 8.32–34), he uses none of Plato's vocabulary, and this is a place where he evidently wanted the readers to notice the reference. In places where Xenophon or Plato simply discusses a topic that the other had discussed without intending to offer a direct response there is even less reason to expect them to deviate from their personal vocabulary and adopt that of their rival. So comparative studies demand an extensive reading familiarity with the writings of both authors and an ability to perceive common themes even where common language is lacking.[47]

One particularly sharp way of engaging in thematic comparison is by investigating the contrasting reasons for a common behavior in the portrait of

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44 See G. Danzig 2016.

45 See G. Danzig 2005, 2017a.

46 For an example of this kind of study, see G. Danzig 2014b. D. Nails' book (2002) contains brief but detailed studies of such figures and can serve as a basis for more far-reaching studies.

47 For lists of apparent Xenophontic allusions to Platonic writings compiled by modern scholars, see D. Johnson, this volume 81, n. 18.

Socrates. In this kind of study the single, common behavior provides a constraint under which the two authors must construct their contrasting explanations. The very existence of a constraint suggests some connection to the historical Socrates, while the contrasting explanations reflect the visions of the two authors. The contrasting portraits of Socrates' behavior in court, discussed above, is an example of this kind of study. Louis-André Dorion has investigated the contrasting reasons for which both Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates decline to participate in political life.[48]

Another kind of thematic comparison focuses on philosophical issues and methods that are treated differently by the different authors without regard to Socrates' behavior. This is an area of research that deserves much more attention. We are held back in part because we are still in need of more detailed and careful studies of Xenophon's philosophical positions. Xenophon does not provide the kind of abstract philosophical arguments that we find in Plato and Aristotle, and in order to clarify his philosophical commitments we need to take account not only of the brief philosophical comments he presents in his Socratic and Socratic-style writings, but also of the descriptions and exempla found in his historical writings. For the same reason, it can be useful to make use of the more fully articulated philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle to shed light on Xenophon. I will consider this point further in the following section.

Non-socratic Writings

One of the innovations of this volume, reflected in its title, is the decision to move beyond the Socratic context and explore the interrelation of the other Platonic and Xenophontic works. Xenophon's non-Socratic writings are easy to identify: although some reference or image of Socrates appears in all his major compositions, including *Anabasis* (3.1.4–7), *Hellenica* (1.7.15), and even *Cyropaedia* (3.1.38–40), these works are clearly different in character from the truly Socratic works, *Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium*, and *Apology*. So too are the very interesting short compositions. *Hiero* is anomalous in taking the form of a philosophical dialogue without Socrates. The situation is more delicate with Plato. Socrates is absent from *Laws*, but there are other dialogues as well in which Socrates is present but barely participates, or in which he par-

48 See "Socrate et la politique: les raisons de son abstention selon Platon et Xénophon" in Dorion 2013: 171–193. In this volume, he offers a further investigation of this type, asking why Plato and Xenophon offer such different explanations of the reasons why Socrates obeyed the law 487–509. Also in this volume, Tazuko Angel van Berkel explores the contrasting explanations for Socrates' economic behavior 391–430.

ticipates in a largely passive way. Taken together, these "non-Socratic" works have rarely been subject to comparative studies.

The ancient critics indicated the validity of this kind of research when they suggested that *Republic*, *Cyropaedia*, and *Laws* are somehow interrelated.[49] In the last two of these works both Plato and Xenophon seem to have outlived their interest in Socrates and to be turning in new directions. But this does not mean that they are no longer reacting to each other's work or that they are not addressing common themes. It is possible that the common turn away from Socrates is itself a sign of influence one way or another.

This direction of research is valuable in its own right for the light it sheds on these writings and their mutual relations, and on public conversation about political issues in the fourth century generally. And it may have some implication for our understanding of the portraits of Socrates as well. If the Socratic writings are products of the two authors' spirits rather than reflections of the historical Socrates, won't similar ideas be found in their non-Socratic writings as in their Socratic ones? On the other hand, if we can identify differences between the ideas contained in the Socratic writings and those contained in the non-Socratic writings, at least in the case of Xenophon where the distinction is clearest, would this enable us to distinguish between Socrates' ideas and those of Xenophon? Or would such differences merely reflect the difference between the ideas Xenophon *attributes* to Socrates and those he reserves for himself? Or would they reflect Xenophon's own evolving views?

The study of Xenophon's non-Socratic writings is valuable in another way. Those who read Xenophon's Socratic writings solely in relation to the writings of Plato and the other Socratics stand in constant danger of assimilating Xenophon's Socrates to the more familiar portrait in Plato. Errors of this sort are unfortunately common: for example, as I mentioned above, there are those who assume that Xenophon's Socrates, like Plato's Socrates, was on some kind of mission, divine or otherwise, to promote the study of philosophy.[50] The problem is not merely that Xenophon refers so rarely to philosophy (a mere twenty-two times in his entire corpus) and that when he does refer to it the context is frequently humorous or ironical,[51] but also that he never speaks of any kind of mission that Socrates might be engaged in. No one who came to Xenophon's Socratica without having read Plato would make such a mistake. And while it is impossible to erase all one's memories of Plato, a familiarity with Xenophon's historical writings can provide an effective antidote for this kind of speculation.

49 See G. Danzig 2002, L.-A. Dorion 2002.

50 T. Pangle 1985; P. Vander Waerdt 1993; R. Waterfield 2004.

51 See C. Moore's contribution in this volume 128–164.

Placing Xenophon's Socratic writings within the context of his writings as a whole is vital simply for understanding them correctly. Despite the possibility that Xenophon evolved and changed his ideas over time, there is a great deal that is the same across his diverse catalogue of writings, and knowing what he says in one place is often crucial for understanding what he says somewhere else. This project is made difficult by the division of Xenophontic scholars into philosophers and historians. This division causes damage to both halves of Xenophon studies, for Xenophon's historical writings—didactic writings emphasizing the role of virtue in political life—can be illuminated by reference to his Socratic writings just as much as his Socratic writings can be illuminated by reference to his historical writings. Vivienne Gray's recent volume *Mirror of Princes* (2011) shows how essential it is to understand the general teachings of Xenophon when approaching any particular passage, especially since Xenophon is an author with certain fixed conceptions that he never tires of promoting in ways both varied and otherwise.

This kind of study is a necessary preliminary to the study of Xenophon's philosophical ideas. It is often said that Xenophon is not really a philosopher, and by modern standards that is certainly true. But philosophy in the ancient world was not merely a commitment to a program of theoretical research. One of the central questions that philosophers asked was: what is the best life? The question of whether theoretical speculation is or is not the best way to spend one's life is itself a philosophical, or perhaps a meta-philosophical, question. It is a question that Xenophon was uniquely able to address, and which he does address, at least by implication, in almost every one of his writings. Xenophon clearly advocates a life that is not devoted to theoretical speculation, but he does so consciously, in awareness of the contrary opinion of Plato. He is not a pre-philosophical writer simply describing his own preferences, but someone with experience in philosophy and awareness of its issues. His construction of a coherent view of the good life in which theoretical speculation plays no role gives him a special interest, if not to professional philosophers, then at least to those for whom the questions of philosophy, including the question of the best life, are important.

Because our understanding of Xenophon's views lags far behind our knowledge of Plato, a special effort is needed to reconstruct the terms and positions that Xenophon adopts before we can engage in comparative analysis. Valuable work has been done on his leadership theory[52] and on some of his cen-

52 See esp. A.B. Breebart 1983, B. Due 1989, G. Danzig 2007, V. Gray 2011, G. Danzig 2012, N. Sandridge 2012.

tral political and ethical concepts. Helen North treated *enkrateia* and *sophrosune* in a chapter on Xenophon and the orators.[53] Bodil Due investigated traits such as *philanthropia, enkrateia, sophrosune, philomatheia*, and *philotimia* in *Cyropaedia*.[54] L.-A. Dorion, and more recently Olga Chernyakhovskaya, have written on *enkrateia*, *philia*, and *sophia*, basing themselves primarily on *Memorabilia* but referring also to material in Xenophon's other writings.[55] Vincent Azoulay has treated *charis* as a central theme in Xenophon's corpus.[56] Pierre Pontier has studied concepts of order in Plato and Xenophon.[57] Norman Sandridge has treated fundamental virtues such as *philanthropia, philomatheia*, and *philotimia*, basing himself primarily on *Cyropaedia*.[58] No one has done more than Donald Morrison to clarify Xenophon's philosophical positions.[59] His article on justice and the law, for example, has provoked a continuing controversy.[60] Michel Narcy and David Johnson have produced valuable literary-philosophical studies.[61] L.-A. Dorion has investigated numerous topics, including the role of the *elenchos* in Xenophon, arguing that its relative lack of prominence does not reflect Xenophon's unawareness of this Socratic mode of investigation, but rather his conviction that it is not the most useful method of education.[62]

The investigation of Xenophon's philosophical views is a particularly tricky endeavor. Although he is obviously an important witness to philosophical debates in fourth-century Greece, Xenophon does not address these issues in a detailed, expository manner but offers a variety of material related to the virtues: short definitions and discussions in his philosophical writings (*Memorabilia* and scattered elsewhere), longer descriptions of virtues in his encomiastic and instructional writings (*Agesilaos*, *Cynegeticus*, and scattered encomia) as well as illustrations of exemplary behavior in his extended narratives (*Anabasis, Hellenica, Cyropaedia*). Because the philosophical material in Xenophon is so terse, and conducted in such simple terminology, there is often a

53 H. North 1966.

54 B. Due 1989.

55 L.-A. Dorion 2003, 2006, 2008; O. Chernyakhovskaya 2014.

56 V. Azoulay 2004.

57 P. Pontier 2006.

58 N. Sandridge 2012.

59 See D. Morrison 1987, 1994, 1995, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2010.

60 D. Morrison 1995; L.-A. Dorion 2001a; D. Johnson 2003; A. Stavru 2008, G. Danzig 2009.

61 M. Narcy 1995, 2004; D. Johnson 2003, 2009.

62 Bandini and Dorion, 2000–2011, Introduction, CXVIII–CLXXXIII. See the responses by D. Johnson 2005 and by G. Danzig 2014a, 2017b.

need to explicate it by reference to philosophical conceptions and discussions outside of Xenophon's writings. This is also a form of comparative study. To do that, exponents of Xenophon's philosophy must be deeply familiar with the ethical and political writings of Plato and Aristotle.

This familiarity, however, brings its own danger. The temptation to import basic notions from the Platonic-Aristotelian milieu can barely be resisted. Are all virtues necessarily acquired character traits? Is happiness an activity? Is virtue something to be pursued for its own sake or for the sake of other more valuable ends? Such philosophical heresies must be seriously considered before any conclusions can be reached. One can explore the possibility of agreement, of course, but few writers of any distinction publish works in order to repeat what has been said better by others. However much he may react to other writers, we should presume that Xenophon published what he published because he thought he had something new to say. We may call this the presumption of originality. But the originality or non-originality of Xenophon's views is not the crucial question. Clarifying his views would not be a less important task if it turns out that they derive from Antisthenes or others, or even if they reflect common opinions in Athens or Sparta. Whatever name we give to these views, it is important to understand what they are and to evaluate the degree to which they are coherent and sensible.

Whether they are original to him, or merely reflective of opinions he absorbed from Socrates and others, Xenophon's views are clearly very different from those of Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, the study of Xenophon promises to open a window on an alternative ancient account of ethical and political questions, one that has never been fully explored. In pursuing this question, we can probably gain a great deal by bringing Aristotle more fully into the picture.[63] If Xenophon wrote many of his works toward the end of his life, as most scholars believe, they may be more or less contemporary with Aristotle's writings. Aristotle's views are closer than Plato's in some ways to those of Xenophon, and, most importantly, he offers an expository account of ethical and political issues that contains a conceptual apparatus useful for analyzing any Greek thinker. It is particularly valuable for investigating a thinker like Xenophon, who seems to have a coherent set of ideas, but who does not provide the kind of detailed exposition that is needed for modern analytic purposes.

Plato represents a different challenge. His works have been subject to far more scrutiny, and treated with far greater charity, than Xenophon's works. Plato's interpreters make extraordinary allowances for what seem to be deeply

63 See Roslyn Weiss' contribution in this volume 277–317.

flawed arguments, but rarely if ever extend the same courtesy to Xenophon. Plato's works remain elusive largely because Plato wanted it that way, and it is a question how much further we can go in clarifying what exactly Plato "thought" about any particular question. Given the continuing perplexities occasioned by Plato's writings, the best way forward may be by pursuing comparative studies. By placing Plato's works in contrast with those of Xenophon some of the more salient and characteristic aspects of his work can be put into relief. Of course it is always useful to contrast writers with their contemporaries, and our understanding of the uniqueness of Plato can certainly be improved by contrasting him with writers such as Isocrates or even Demosthenes. But as a rival author of Socratic writings, Xenophon is probably the best place to start.

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Introduction to This Volume

David M. Johnson

Essays in this volume apply a great range of approaches to a variety of topics. Our authors include classicists, philosophers, and historians, and they represent various national traditions in scholarship (Britain, English- and French-speaking Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United States). We engage in some depth with questions of methodology, as the first part of this introduction has already shown, but for the most part, we avoid old questions like the value of the Straussian approach or the relative merits of analytical versus literary readings of Plato.[1] Socrates certainly receives all due attention, but mainly our essays skirt what have been the standard terms of comparative study of Socrates: the Socratic Question, comparison of *Symposia* or *Apologies*, and the all but certain cross references—Xenophon's reference to (Plato's) Pausanias at *Symposium* 8.32–35 and Plato's reference to (Xenophon's) Cyrus at *Laws* 3.694a–695b.[2] Instead, we include essays on Socrates' approach to philosophy, on central issues in ethics and politics, as well as laughter, Socratic physiognomy, *eros*, and Socrates' refusal to take payment for his services. And a number of essays consider the relationship between Xenophon and Plato outside of Socrates or Socratic works: Humble and Tuplin study how Xenophon and Plato made use of Sparta and Persia; Atack studies post-Socratic political thought, and Thomas spots Plato lurking in Xenophon's *Cynegeticus*. Even papers devoted to issues discussed at length by Socrates draw from Xenophon's non-Socratic works, as Danzig and Chernyakhovskaya do when making use of the *Cyropaedia*. Nor do our authors hesitate to compare Xenophon's Socratic works to Platonic works often considered to date from Plato's post-Socratic phase, particularly *Republic* and *Laws*. So this volume is about Plato and Xenophon, not just about two portraits of Socrates. Given how much more is written on Plato than Xenophon, we make no apology for the fact that most essays here are rooted in a Xenophontic perspective, from which they consider Plato. This also no doubt reflects the brute fact that while all scholars

1 For varied takes on Straussian readings of Xenophon, see Gray 2011; Johnson 2012; Dorion 2013: 51–92; for recent accounts of Platonic interpretation, see McCabe 2008 and (with particular attention to "Socratic Studies") Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 11–42.

2 For recent work on the *Symposia*, consider Danzig 2005 and see Jazdzewska in this volume 187–207; on the *Apologies*, see Danzig 2010: 19–68 and Stokes 2012. For Plato's *Laws* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, see Dorion 2013: 393–412.

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who work on Xenophon read Plato, many work on Plato with nary a glance at Xenophon—a situation we hope this volume will make some progress in remedying.

There are several possible ways to classify these essays. One would be to consider their different approaches to comparative study. Among the variables would be whether one sees more similarities than differences between Xenophon and Plato, or whether one sees the two as being in direct conversation, and, if they are conversing, who is responding to whom. About half the essays in this volume stress differences between Xenophon and Plato. For the most part, these essays show that Xenophon and Plato had different views but do not raise the question of which author was responding to the other, or indeed whether the authors were responding to one another at all (Chernyakhosvkaya, Danzig, Dorion, Jazdzewska, Moore, Pentassuglio, Redfield, Tamiolaki). In this volume only Danzig (in his introduction) and Thomas make a point of identifying an explicit criticism made by one author of the other. There are good reasons for not attempting to unravel the direction of influence, given difficulties in identifying publication dates, the possibility of revision, and possible interaction with other authors, many now largely lost to us. There are also theoretical disadvantages with making authorial intent the locus for intertextuality; it is safer and perhaps more prudent to emphasize the intertextuality constructed by readers of the texts, including today's readers. We can use one author to contextualize the other without identifying the direction of influence or even positing that any influence took place. Of the papers that stress similarities between Plato and Xenophon, almost half identify an overt conversation between the two authors (Altman, Atack, Humble, Johnson, Tuplin), while the others find similar views in our authors without positing a direct relationship between them (Bevilacqua, Edmunds, Stavru, van Berkel, Weiss). Perhaps, given a tendency of late to identify disagreements among our authors, those who see agreement between the two find a need to buttress their views by authorial intent. Among those who lump Plato and Xenophon together, Johnson takes the traditional tack of seeing Xenophon as responding to Plato, but Altman, Humble, and Tuplin identify influence flowing in the other direction, while Atack argues for a more complex give and take along the lines suggested by Danzig in his introduction. Of course any attempt to classify essays as lumpers or splitters will oversimplify things in multiple ways. All comparisons are based on some similarity—generally a shared topic—and some essays attribute the same or at least similar views to Xenophon's and Plato's Socrates but find that view supported by different arguments, or leading to different ramifications (Dorion, Edmunds, Pentassuglio, Stavru, van Berkel). In these cases, the question as to whether to lump Xenophon together with Plato

or split them apart will be a matter of whether one stresses the position taken by Socrates or emphasizes the arguments with which he supports that view or the consequences he draws from that view. And agreement or disagreement, overt or implicit, hardly exhausts the gambit of comparative study. Agreement or disagreement may be rooted in our texts' adherence to or independence from history, be it historical Sparta, historical Persia, or the historical Socrates. We, in fact, considered grouping essays according to whether or not they were "Socratic," but to do so we would have to beg the central questions of how Socratic Xenophon's Socratic works are and how much of Xenophon's worldview outside his Socratic works was shaped by Socrates. Most of the essays in this volume study what we might call the propositional content of our texts (for example, Socrates' view on *akrasia*, or Xenophon's and Plato's views on Sparta), including the reasoning behind Socrates' behavior (e.g., his decision not to escape from prison). But we may also ask what sorts of rhetorical goals Xenophon and Plato were trying to accomplish by discussing these views. Thus Redfield suggests Xenophon wasn't really playing the same game as the Socratics, and Moore argues that Xenophon, unlike Plato, did not want to limit his Socrates to what philosophers do; but Humble and Tuplin show Xenophon and Plato making similarly critical use of history for philosophical ends, while Altman suggests that Plato was inspired by Xenophon to collect his dialogues into a single reading order, and to split off Xenophontic jokes into separate dramatic gems. If we look beyond Xenophon's Socratic works, this question broadens to one of genre: is the *Cyropaedia* really in the same genre as the *Republic* and, if not, how should generic differences inform comparative study?

Thus the various takes on comparative study include:

1. Do Plato and Xenophon agree or disagree about a given topic?
2. Do they agree or disagree *with each other*, as opposed to merely staking out different positions?
3. Do they agree or disagree about *propositions*, *arguments in support* of propositions, or *consequences* of those propositions?
4. Or do the differences result from differences in *rhetorical goals*?
5. Are both authors doing philosophy, or does that only describe Plato, while Xenophon more often aims to provide advice, teaching, or models for emulation?

So much for other possible ways of organizing (and navigating) this volume. We've chosen the tried and true route of organizing our essays via subject matter. Part 1 leads off with questions about method, both comparative methodology and Socratic Method. Part 2 includes essays on a range of ethical topics,

from laughter and Socratic physiognomy, to questions of the virtues, pleasure, wrongdoing, *eros*, and wealth. Part 3 covers politics, starting with politicized friendship and moving on to political theory. Part 4, on history, considers our authors' takes on Persia and Sparta, and ends with an effort to uncover the historical target of Xenophon's criticism in the *Cynegeticus*. For an overview of topics covered, consider the brief thematic index; we hope a more selective list of themes, terms, and persons that are discussed at some length in a given essay will be at least as much use as a more detailed (and therefore cluttered) index would be.

Methods

LOUIS-ANDRÉ DORION describes how a suspension of judgment regarding the Socratic Question opens up possibilities for comparative study of Socrates. The Socratics, he suggests, wrote not to capture the historical Socrates but to defend Socrates and, above all, to promote their own portrayals of Socrates in opposition to those of their rivals. Comparative analysis of differing accounts of shared Socratic themes is thus far more in keeping with the original intent of the Socratics than making their works out to be sources for the historical Socrates. Furthermore, comparative study allows one to see a multitude of differences not as one-off failures or successes in capturing the historical Socrates, but as coherent parts of rival portraits of Socrates, each of which forms a unity of its own. Comparative study, which puts all Socratic works on an equal footing, will counter the tendency of past scholarship to marginalize all Socratic works outside of Plato; it does not "excommunicate" certain authors as unreliable sources for the historical Socrates. Rather, one can learn to appreciate each work in its own terms, instead of judging Xenophon in terms of a Platonic ideal he did not aim to reach. Dorion confesses himself a radical skeptic regarding the Socratic Question but notes that comparative study is an indispensable first step even for those who wish to seek the historical Socrates. Those who wish to reconsider the Socratic Question will however have to address the numerous differences between the two authors that have been uncovered thanks to comparative scholarship freed from the old fixation on the historical Socrates.

DAVID M. JOHNSON argues for a different understanding of intertextuality in the study of Xenophon and Plato. Both Dorion and Johnson employ an intertextual approach, as both find meaning in the relationship between the texts; but where Dorion finds meaning in the differences between Xenophon and Plato, Johnson finds meaning where the two overlap. And where Dorion argues that skepticism about the Socratic Question has allowed for a renaissance in

the study of Xenophon's Socratica, Johnson worries that emphasis on contrasts between Xenophon and Plato may provide a new reason for scholars in Socratic studies to ignore Xenophon. Johnson argues that when Xenophon alludes to other Socratics, he generally says that he is adding to the conversation, rather than replacing their views with his. Moreover, Xenophon's occasional "slip-ups," in which he characterizes his Socrates in ways we find more characteristic of Plato's, suggest that he did not regard his Socrates as distinct from Plato's. Rather, Johnson argues, when Xenophon says "Socrates" he means not "my Socrates" but "our Socrates," i.e., the Socrates shared by the Socratic authors, as reshaped by Xenophon. To show the relevance of this broad claim, Johnson examines the ways in which Xenophontic *enkrateia* replaces Plato's *sophia* as the chief item in Socrates' ethical vocabulary. In Johnson's view, the two Socratics are more compatible here than Dorion and others have suggested, as *enkrateia* can provide a foundation for intellectual virtues. Johnson hopes to rediscover an intertextual Socrates who, regardless of his precise relationship to the historical Socrates, offers us a coherent philosophy that supports Platonic intellectualism with a Xenophontic foundation in self-control.

WILLIAM H.F. ALTMAN argues that Xenophon had a profound influence on Plato's conception of his works, inspiring him to fashion them as an interconnected series of dialogues, leading the reader from the introductory *Alcibiades* to Socrates' death in the *Phaedo*. Altman's own inspiration comes, at least in part, from a passage in Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights* 14.3), which rejects the notion that Plato and Xenophon were rivals and replaces it with the image of the two authors as teammates running the same race, toward the same goal. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Cyropaedia* proved models for what Altman calls "collection," the process of combining separate conversations into a literary whole. If we have collection, we'll also have division, and Altman sees this in Plato transforming Xenophon's quick jokes about escaping death at the end of his *Apology* into the dramatic masterpieces of the *Crito* and *Phaedo*. Plato may be *il miglior fabbro*, but in Altman's reimagining of their relationship, Xenophon is no longer a second-rate copyist but a pioneer.

JAMES REDFIELD suggests that we set aside our pursuit of the historical Socrates and consider the historical Xenophon instead. Xenophon, Redfield argues, probably wrote his Socratic works after those of the first-generation Socratics had been published. While the works of the so-called minor Socratics are largely lost to us, Redfield suggests that the spurious dialogues attributed to Plato may provide one guide to the genre. Redfield argues that the *spuria* and, therefore, presumably, the works of the other Socratics resembled Plato more than Xenophon. Plato and the *spuria* feature quick, dialectical argumentation where Xenophon prefers a more didactic mode; Xenophon largely avoids

interlocutors common in other Socratics, including Alcibiades and the great sophists; and we find nothing in other Socratic writings much like Xenophon's continuous authorial presence in the *Memorabilia*. Plato's Socrates, whom Plato seems to have resembled in this respect, has an adversarial relationship to other intellectuals and is not shown in conversation with other major Socratics. Xenophon's Socrates is no isolated genius but rather a practical man quite at home both with other Socratics and with interlocutors from all walks of life. Plato is "ironic all the way through," forcing readers to evaluate his arguments for themselves; Xenophon would play Boswell with Socrates' Dr. Johnson and present himself as the authoritative guide to Socrates. But Xenophon, Redfield argues, became a Socratic only in his old age and was interested not so much in defending or remembering Socrates as in demonstrating his own claim to be a Socratic, by presenting idealized memories of "his youth as it was and as he wished it had been."

Our first four essays thus introduce rather different takes on the relationship between Xenophon and Plato. At the risk of some simplification, we may say that Dorion and Johnson argue primarily about whether Plato and Xenophon offer philosophically compatible portraits of Socrates, while Altman and Redfield offer contrasting literary analyses. Johnson and Altman agree in seeing Plato and Xenophon more as partners than rivals, but Johnson sees Xenophon as providing a missing foundation for Plato's Socrates while Altman argues that Xenophon inspired Plato to imagine his corpus as a coherent whole and provided him with the seeds for the *Phaedo* and *Crito*. Dorion and Redfield both emphasize differences between Xenophon and Plato and reject efforts to uncover the historical Socrates. But where Dorion thinks that Xenophon's portrait of Socrates is a rival to Plato's, a rival we can better understand by studying contrasts between the two, Redfield sees Xenophon as more of an outlier, with a goal distinct not only from Plato but from other Socratics. Redfield's Xenophon is interested not so much in producing a rival vision of Socrates as in demonstrating his own personal connection to Socrates; in this Redfield differs not only from Dorion but from Johnson and Altman, all of whom see Plato and Xenophon as engaged in the same sort of literary enterprise.

CHRISTOPHER MOORE argues that Xenophon subtly distanced Socrates from the philosophers of his day. Xenophon's usage of *philosophos* and its cognates shows that he did recognize philosophers as a distinct group of individuals who practiced abstract reasoning about ethical matters, and whose teaching was supposed to enable their students, who paid them, to speak well and achieve practical results. But the philosophers were also controversial, and Moore argues that Xenophon, unlike Plato, had no interest in refuting the general attacks on philosophy, promoting philosophy as a way of life, clarifying

what counted as true philosophy, or distinguishing philosophy from sophistry. Xenophon's interest was in defending Socrates as a moral exemplar, and associating Socrates with a controversial contemporary group would only have complicated matters. Hence, while others in Xenophon's Socratic writings imply that Socrates is a philosopher, Xenophon never calls him one in his own voice; nor, Moore argues, does Socrates ever clearly claim the name for himself. Moore carefully analyzes each of the uses of *philosophos* and its cognates in Xenophon, aiming to show that despite Socrates' affinities with the philosophers, Xenophon consistently passes up the opportunity to identify his Socrates as one. Xenophon's Socrates is his own man.

GENEVIÈVE LACHANCE studies the logical form of the Socratic *elenchos* in Xenophon, comparing it with its much more frequent use in Plato. As she notes, there has been a tremendous amount of formal study of the *elenchos* in Plato, and some comparison with Xenophon, but the comparison has focused on Xenophon's attitude toward the usefulness or propriety of the *elenchos*, rather than on its logical form. By Lachance's count, there are only two examples of the *elenchos* in Xenophon, Alcibiades' refutation of Pericles (*Mem.* 1.2.41–46) and Socrates refutation of Euthydemus (*Mem.* 4.2). The first consists of three examples of *reductio ad absurdum*, a technique we also find used twice in *Memorabilia* 4.2. Like Plato, Xenophon often leaves it to readers to draw the final explicit conclusion of the argument after the basic absurdity has become clear. While she raises questions about the validity of Xenophon's arguments—and suggests Xenophon may have knowingly attributed an equivocation to the irresponsible Alcibiades—Lachance sees his use of the *reductio* as being similar in form to that of Plato. Xenophon's other technique is the use of a counter-example to defeat a universal claim, as the claim that stealing is always unjust. Plato too uses counter-examples, Lachance notes, but more often in clusters and as part of more complex arguments. Lachance argues that Xenophon's refutations do not resemble the model of the *elenchos* influentially articulated by Gregory Vlastos (1994), in which an initial proposition is found to conflict with multiple other propositions the interlocutor agrees to. Nor does the *elenchos* play a positive role of the sort Vlastos assigns to the Socratic *elenchos* in Plato. Xenophon would thus limit it to the initial phase of education, as that of Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* 4.2, rather as Plato limits the use of the *elenchos* by the time of the *Sophist*.

We might pause to ask whether Lachance's account of the *elenchos* is in tune with Moore's view that Xenophon's Socrates was not (really, or at least explicitly) a philosopher. Moore argues that Xenophon did have a fairly specific understanding of what philosophy entailed, and Lachance would presumably agree that Xenophon had a fairly sound grasp on the *elenchos*. But at least if

Vlastos' account of the Socratic *elenchos* is on the right track, the absence of any positive *elenchos* in Xenophon could be taken to imply that Xenophon's Socrates was not really in the philosophy business at all.

Ethics

KATARZYNA JAZDZEWSKA studies the terminology of laughter in the two *Symposia* and finds important differences in the ways Plato and Xenophon characterize it. The relaxed atmosphere of the symposium provides a natural venue for laughter, but laughter tends to be ambiguous in Greek literature, as it so often shades over into ridicule or derision and tends to reflect poorly on the one who is laughing. There is not much actual laughter in Plato's *Symposium*, but a fair amount of discussion of laughter or the ridiculous; one key passage is Aristophanes saying, with a laugh, that he is eager to say humorous things (γελοῖα) but not things that would make him a butt of ridicule (καταγέλαστα; *Symp*. 189b). In fact, a certain concern about appearing ridiculous or contemptible characterizes the discussion of laughter in Plato's *Symposium*, though Aristophanes, Socrates, and Alcibiades all pride themselves in different ways on being willing to risk appearing somewhat ridiculous. Xenophon's *Symposium* contains both more examples of laughing and more discussion of laughter. What is missing, Jazdzewska notes, is any worry about seeming ridiculous; καταγέλαστος and related terms do not appear. Speakers instead appear happy to arouse laughter at their own expense. Plato's relative severity makes sense given his views on laughter, expressed in the *Republic* and *Laws*: laughter is often based on ignorant misunderstanding, and strong laughter is a sign of the dominance of emotion over rationality. Plato allows for more laughter in the *Phaedo*, where it lightens the mood and there is no risk of derision among a group of committed Socratics. Xenophon, for his part, shows in the *Cyropaedia* both an appreciation for Cyrus' ability to mix laughter with seriousness and a willingness to allow Aglaïtadas to question the proper role of laughter (2.2.1–2.3.1). Jazdzewska concludes that while Xenophon appears less concerned about the risks of laughter than Plato, both recognize its ambiguity; while it serves as a healthy social cohesive in some circumstances, it can also result in antisocial derision (Plato), upset the rule of reason (Plato), or distract one from more somber lessons (Xenophon's Aglaïtadas).

ALESSANDRO STAVRU studies the famous descriptions of Socrates' physiognomy in Xenophon and Plato. Both describe Socrates as a satyr (or silen, a term not clearly differentiated from satyr), albeit one with large protruding eyes, which were not a typical feature of satyrs. Stavru suggests, as have oth-

ers, that actors playing Socrates on the comic stage likely wore satyr masks. But Xenophon and Plato were the only Socratics, to the best of our knowledge, to describe Socrates as a satyr, and their descriptions were the basis for all subsequent representations of Socrates' physique, including those in art. Xenophon and Plato found different meanings behind Socrates' strange features. In the beauty contest of his *Symposium*, Xenophon has Socrates argue that his features are beautiful because they are useful. His bulging eyes provide a wide field of vision, his broad nostrils take in smells from all directions; Socrates' interlocutor, himself volunteers that Socrates' big mouth allows him to eat more efficiently, and suggests that his thick lifts make for softer kisses. This is in keeping with Xenophon's emphasis on how Socrates was useful and on defining the good and beautiful in terms of use. Xenophon caps these utilitarian arguments with a mythological one: where Plato's Socrates never compares himself to a satyr, Xenophon's does, the better to lay claim to an unseen divine beauty—for lovely nymphs do give birth to satyrs, after all, and thus Socrates has a hidden, beautiful divine lineage. Plato's Socrates, as described by Alcibiades, is not so much ugly—though that is the implicit contrast with the beautiful Alcibiades—as strange, out of place. And Alcibiades stresses the contrast between Socrates' coarse, silenic exterior and the divine wisdom hidden inside. Stavru also considers what Xenophon tells us of Socrates' belly, which he suggests may mark a change in habits from the austere and skinny Socrates of the *Clouds* to the more comfortable Socrates of Xenophon's *Symposium*, who says he dances to work on his waistline. Finally, Socrates' bulging eyes enable not only stronger vision, but a gaze that shows his imperturbability on the battlefield or while awaiting the hemlock. As Stavru puts it, both authors transform the satyr's *persona*, mask, into a philosophical *paradeigma*. The comparison is more than skin deep. Socrates' physiognomy is thus, in Stavru's hands, a case study in how the Socratics transformed the comic image of Socrates, one with no small element of ridicule, into a positive and serious lesson about the depths of Socrates. They thus meet the risk posed by the sort of derisive humor Jazdzewska discusses by turning the joke inside out and revealing its incongruity. We laugh at Socrates' silenic appearance precisely because he is no lustful, gluttonous beast.

LOWELL EDMUNDS reexamines Socrates' *enkrateia* ("self-mastery"), *karteria* ("endurance"), and *autarkeia* ("self-sufficiency"). Edmund's starting point is Dorion's view that while these traits are all but ignored in early Plato, in Xenophon they form a Socratic triad of virtues, in which *enkrateia* provides the foundation in mastery over our desires, *karteria* enables us to withstand external threats like heat and cold, and the two traits combined produce self-sufficiency. Edmunds notes that in Xenophon *enkrateia* and *karteria* are closely

connected and even overlap in meaning. Such traits are also repeatedly attributed to Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*, even if Socrates does not subject these traits to examination in the early dialogues. But Edmunds thinks we should remove *autarkeia* from the so-called triad, as Xenophon also connects it to intellectual ability (*Mem.* 4.7.1–3, 4.8.11): since *autarkeia* can be based on something other than *enkrateia* and *karteria*, the triad is really just a dyad. To understand *autarkeia*, Edmunds suggests, we need to consider the discourse surrounding Socrates' poverty. Xenophon and Plato alike reject the charge that Socrates' poverty forced him to practice self-control; rather, Socrates' choice to train himself in living an austere life resulted in him living the life of a pauper. For Plato's Socrates, austerity avoids any distractions from philosophy. Xenophon's Socrates chooses self-sufficiency because it is godlike (*Mem.* 1.6.10), and his self-sufficiency is enabled by his deliberate choice to live an austere life. Edmunds argues that Socrates' interest in self-sufficiency can be seen as part of a conversation aimed at addressing the archaic conception of human incapacity. Where Periclean Athens, at least in Thucydides' telling, aimed for a political self-sufficiency only to come up against the plague, Hippias, Aristippus, and Socrates all made individual self-sufficiency a goal, if in very different ways.

ROSLYN WEISS studies how Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates, and Aristotle apply pity, pardon, or both to those who deliberately do wrong. To do so, she must first show that Plato's Socrates did, in fact, believe in deliberate wrongdoing, contrary to the common scholarly position that Socrates denied *akrasia* and thus found all wrongdoing to be unintentional. Plato's Socrates, Weiss notes, is a champion of justice—an odd position for one who thinks that all injustice is involuntary. Socrates explicitly denies the possibility of *akrasia* only in the *Protagoras*, and Weiss argues that the argument there is an ad hominem demonstration of the hollowness of sophistry. When Socrates denies that anyone willingly does wrong outside of the *Protagoras*, he means that when people deliberately choose evil over good, they unwillingly damage their souls and thus fail to live the good life that all people truly want. Weiss examines the two passages in Xenophon that have been taken to deny *akrasia*—*akrasia* in our sense of knowing what is right but doing otherwise, rather than *akrasia* in Xenophon's sense, the failure to be in control of one's desires (via *enkrateia*). In one of them, *Memorabilia* 4.6, Weiss finds an intentionally weak argument offered to a simpleminded interlocutor (Euthydemus) after Socrates was forced to provide a worthless answer to a pest of a sophist (Hippias). Weiss finds it incredible that Socrates could simply equate justice with obeying the law, or claim that everyone who knows the law follows it. The other passage, *Memorabilia* 3.9.4, is more complex. Here Weiss argues that Xenophon says that some know what should be done (ἃ δεῖ πράττειν) yet fail to do it—*akrasia* in our sense.

But they do so because they lack the wisdom to see that the right thing to do is always to one's advantage; knowledge of what should be done, she argues, is different from wisdom, knowledge of the fine and good (τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθά). Such men lack wisdom because they lack *enkrateia*, which is a precondition for acquiring it.

Weiss now argues that it is actually Aristotle who is the closest thing to a moral intellectualist. Aristotle insists that the wicked must be ignorant of what should be done (ἃ δεῖ πράττειν)—as otherwise knowledge would be dragged around like a slave. The Aristotelian *akratēs*, who is merely half-wicked, wants to do what is right and knows what should be done but is momentarily confused because he does not actualize his relevant knowledge. Aristotle thus attempts to square the phenomenon of *akrasia*, which he thinks Socrates was wrong to deny, with a highly intellectualist stance. His position ends up being close to the *ad hominem* position Socrates adopts in the *Protagoras*, a position that Aristotle, wrongly in Weiss's view, takes to be genuinely Socratic. Weiss also suggests that Aristotle was wrong to follow the hedonism of the *Protagoras* not only because it isn't Socratic but because it isn't sensible; a more commonsensical approach, following Xenophon, would have allowed him to see the value of *enkrateia* rather than to seek out minute distinctions between various subcategories of knowledge. But for her Plato's Socrates has the most subtle view, as he can distinguish between pity and pardon: wicked men who voluntarily choose injustice cannot be pardoned, but because no one willingly pursues a self-destructive way of life, even the wicked can be pitied.

Edmunds and Weiss differ from most others in this volume in casting their comparative nets rather wider than our two title authors, Plato and Xenophon. Where Edmunds shows how the two Socratics participated in a discourse about self-sufficiency dating to Socrates' own day, Weiss considers Aristotle's take on Socratic *akrasia*. In Edmunds' essay, the external perspective helps show that the *autarkeia* of Xenophon's Socrates is more than the result of his *enkrateia*, despite the importance of that term for Xenophon. In Weiss's account, Aristotle provides a sort of bridge between antiquity and the standard intellectualist reading of Plato's Socrates, a reading she endeavors to reject with the help of her reading of Xenophon.

OLGA CHERNYAKHOVSKAYA studies the workings of pleasure and happiness in Xenophon's Socratic works. Xenophon's Socrates, unlike Plato's, is often held to believe that happiness is based on one's practical, material success. Chernyakhovskaya grants that this appears to be the case for collective happiness but argues that individual happiness instead functions much as pleasure does. To be happy, the individual must work, must engage in *ponos*; this toil is undertaken to meet a need, and must meet with success that the individual

is aware of. One must, therefore, choose a form of activity within one's capabilities, but Chernyakhovskaya argues that for Xenophon's Socrates all people have access to *enkrateia* and knowledge. Unlike Plato, then, the "one man one job" rule is not settled at birth, based solely on innate qualities; people may choose, and change, their own tasks. For Chernyakhovskaya's Xenophon both pleasure and happiness are subjective, as what pleases you, with your needs, your capabilities, and your choice of tasks, may well not please me. Higher pleasures differ from bodily ones in requiring propitious external circumstances, as bodily needs can be met with limited resources and provide pleasure so long as they follow upon deprivation. But happiness is generally within our own power, so long as we secure the aid of the gods, which allows us to choose the right tasks to undertake. Happiness also requires self-awareness; to be happy we need to be aware of our success, and to believe that our success is worthy. It is this last condition that makes old age intolerable for Socrates: he has chosen a life of intellectual self-improvement, which is no longer possible for him, and cannot imagine enjoying a lesser life. Others might adjust their goals and find happiness in other ways. Yet Xenophon's Socrates does not, as Plato's Socrates does in the *Republic*, present any argument to back up his claim that his philosophical way of life is superior to others, so he has no good reason to believe his pleasure in self-perfection is any greater than that of other happy people. Finally, given the dynamic nature of pleasure and happiness in Xenophon's view, Chernyakhovskaya argues that *autarkeia* cannot be the ultimate goal for Xenophon's Socrates, though he certainly does prize activities that allow for success even in the absence of external goods that are beyond our control. In any event, in Chernyakhovskaya's view, happiness, as the highest form of pleasure, is firmly rooted in Socratic moral psychology and no mere matter of material success.

GABRIEL DANZIG considers the relationship between virtue and happiness in Xenophon, distinguishing it from the better known views of Plato and Aristotle. Xenophon's ethics have frequently been characterized as utilitarian, in contrast with the virtue ethics of Plato and Aristotle. Danzig refines this distinction on both sides. He first notes that even for Plato and Aristotle there is a sense in which virtue is not its own reward, but rather the quality which allows us to engage in the highest form of activity, theoretical contemplation. But he also argues that for Xenophon practical ends are not the only rewards of virtuous activity. Xenophon is certainly no fan of theory for theory's sake; his Socrates urges his companions to avoid useless theoretical study, and he frequently stresses the usefulness of the virtues. In a key passage for Danzig, Cyrus tells the Persians that their forefathers were foolish to practice virtue but not to enjoy its rewards: while fine warriors themselves, they failed to make war and

so saw no profit from their valor, but were like farmers who sowed and toiled but failed to harvest their crop (*Cyr.* 1.5.8–10). But Danzig argues that practical ends are not the only things that justify virtuous activities in Xenophon's view. Virtuous toil in pursuit of a practical goal is pleasant in itself, rather as running while on the hunt is more pleasurable than just running. So too reflection on one's accomplishments is the highest sort of pleasure. Returning with a hare killed on the hunt brings a greater reward than simply buying one in the market. So there is something to be gained from virtuous accomplishments above and beyond the practical results: pleasure, pride, and honor. But for Xenophon any activity, even a virtuous one, is unrewarding and frivolous if it doesn't produce material rewards.

Both Danzig and Chernyakhovskaya reject the common view that Xenophon's Socrates is interested solely in practical, material results, while retaining the idea that success of some sort is required for the best sort of life. Even with this more refined sense of success, Xenophon's Socrates remains distinct from Plato's Socrates, for whom the essential element in happiness appears to be virtue; this virtue may enable theoretical contemplation, but that is presumably not a telic activity at which one can succeed or fail. For both Chernyakhovskaya and Danzig, Socrates' words provide a guide to Xenophon's thought, but for both, Socrates' life presents us with something of a conundrum. Chernyakhovskaya finds Socrates' privileging of what she calls "the Socratic pleasure" unjustified, and Danzig's view raises questions about Socrates' lack of interest in the practical goals he spent so much time promoting to his followers. Given Xenophon's emphasis on Socrates' example as a guide,[3] a contrast between Socrates' words and his deeds raises important questions. Perhaps we see here some hint of what has been a sort of Holy Grail for Xenophontic scholarship, the search for daylight between Xenophon and his Socrates. Xenophon could perhaps have managed to assimilate Socrates' views fully to his own (or developed his own views to be in keeping with his sense for the core teachings of Socrates), but not have been able to reconcile these views with undeniable facts about Socrates' life. Alternatively, of course, we might question whether we are missing a coherence that lies beneath the surface. Or we may be picking the wrong Xenophontic character to contrast with Xenophon. Both Danzig and Chernyakhovskaya believe we can look to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* to help us understand Xenophon's views; but it is conceivable that the odd man out in Xenophon is not Socrates but Cyrus.

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3 See Bevilacqua's paper in this volume (462, n. 3) for a full set of references to relevant passages in Xenophon.

FRANCESCA PENTASSUGLIO examines Socratic eros in Xenophon, Plato, and Aeschines. Common to all, she argues, is the belief that mutual love can inspire the pursuit of virtue. While the notion of role-reversal in Plato has been long appreciated, less attention has been paid to the parallel concept of mutuality in Xenophon's Socratic writings. Both portraits of Socratic *eros* thus represent a break with the common concept of the one-sided erotic relationship. Pentassuglio shows the central role that the demand for mutuality plays in Xenophon's theory, and how this demand serves as the engine for sublimating erotic desire between men. While Plato's concept of role-reversal allows room for sexual relations between men, even while consigning such relationships to a lower rank on the ladder of love, Xenophon's Socrates demands complete abstention. While both seek to sublimate the erotic relationship, Xenophon characteristically bases the highest erotic attachment on mutual admiration of noble communal achievements, while Plato channels erotic passion into philosophic pursuit. Pentassuglio supports her interpretation with a careful analysis of the terminology of love, clarifying distinctive uses of *philos* and *eros* terminology. Xenophon breaks with the standard asymmetrical language of homosexual *eros* by altering the role of the lover, whose feelings he characterizes most often as *philia*. Plato, on the other hand, attributes desire (*epithumia*) to the beloved, whose feelings were generally limited to *philia* terms. Plato makes the beloved more like the lover, where Xenophon makes the lover more like the beloved.

TAZUKO ANGELA VAN BERKEL examines why Socrates refuses to be paid by those who benefit from his conversations, showing how Plato's and Xenophon's distinct understandings of money led to rather different justification for Socrates' refusal to accept payment. Both thinkers characterized wealth as something relative to an individual's needs and knowledge: nothing, not even money, is valuable, unless one knows how to use it aright. They differ in what they find problematic about wealth. For Plato, wealth is dangerous because it ties us to the body rather than the soul. And the goods of the soul are different in kind from those of the body; the latter can be quantified, and hence measured by money, while the former cannot. So you cannot buy wisdom. This is the point of the joke about just how much one learns in Prodicus' forty-drachma course as compared to his one-drachma one, though Plato never explicitly integrates Socrates' rejection of pay with his ontology of body and soul. For Xenophon, an interest in wealth can lead us to privilege short-term gain over our more essential interest in the shared goods we can achieve when partnering with friends in long-term relationships. Thus Xenophon's Socrates rejects pay on formal grounds, because it conflates the friendship between Socrates and his companions, based on trust, generosity, and gratitude (χάρις),

with a one-off commercial transaction. Taking pay is also wrong on substantive grounds, as healthy relationships with friends constitute part of the virtuous life for Socrates. Hence, too, Xenophon's emphasis on *enkrateia*, as the trait that allows us to overcome momentary desires and pursue our long-term interest. While Plato on occasion speaks of the sophists' failure to win χάρις, he is more calling attention to a sophistic euphemism—they speak of gratitude but care only about pay—than attempting to promote a contrasting analysis of student-teacher relationships like that offered by Xenophon. So the two thinkers share fundamental ideas about economics, with each rejecting the commodification of wisdom, but where Plato's understanding is rooted in his ontology, Xenophon's is based on his understanding of reciprocity on human relationships.

Van Berkel and Pentassuglio thus show that the relationship between Socrates and his followers can be misunderstood by analogy to commercial transactions or by assimilation to a conventionally asymmetrical view of love. While Socrates for the most part rejects characterizing his relations with his companions as a sort of commerce, he appears to welcome language drawn from the erotic realm, if only on his own terms. This is presumably because mutuality and reciprocity are key themes for both authors, and while commerce seems to allow for no possibility of real mutuality, *eros* can be reconceptualized so as to feature it. Plato's rejection of the commodification of wisdom and relegation of sex to the lower rungs of his ladder of love are further based on his insistence on the qualitative divide between body and soul. Conventional *eros* and commerce lead us astray because they serve the body, which stands in the way of philosophy. Xenophon's Socrates sees no such body/soul dualism, but rejects commerce and conventional *eros* because they stand in the way of friendship. Friendship and philosophy can be joined in the shared pursuit of virtue, though in Plato's *Symposium* philosophical relationships culminate in the vision of Beauty Itself, something utterly distinct from the political aspirations of Socrates' lover, Alcibiades. Xenophon in his *Symposium* instead imagines, realistically or not, that a man as flawed as Callias could put his love for Critobulus to political use. For Xenophon, Socrates' views are rooted in ethics and politics; for Plato—at least by his middle period—ontology provides the foundation.

Politics

MELINA TAMIOLAKI argues that we can better understand Xenophon's account of friendship if we view it as a projection of ideas about leadership into the realm of friendship among peers. She confirms this political turn by

contrasting Xenophon's most extended treatment of Socratic friendship, *Memorabilia* 2.6, with Plato's *Lysis*. Xenophon's Socrates, unlike Plato's, says rather little about the affective side of friendship. Tamiolaki suggests that Xenophon's *kaloikagathoi*, who are a political rather than a moral class, have more in common with the "neither bad nor good" men of the *Lysis*, the sole type of men who are capable of friendship in the *Lysis* scheme, than with the simply good men, who need nothing, including friends. Xenophon's moral imagination rests in practical political connections rather than some idealized notion of philosophical perfection. And when he wants to provide examples of the right way to promote friendship, Xenophon's Socrates thinks of how Themistocles and Pericles won over the Athenians. Xenophon also has Socrates argue that one should praise would-be friends, but only truthfully, whereas Plato's Socrates advises against praise of any sort, calling upon the lover to humble his beloved instead; Tamiolaki finds Xenophon's attitude in keeping with the role of the encomium in public life. A political explanation also sheds light on Xenophon's rather odd comment that the *kaloikagathoi* can enjoy moderate good fortune without toil (*ponos*); Xenophon was an advocate of toil on the private level, but was thinking here of the toil associated with Athenian imperialism. Xenophon may have fallen prey to the temptation to promote his own political ideas under the guise of Socratic talk about friendship, Tamiolaki concludes, but in so doing he makes an original contribution to the discourse about friendship.

Fiorenza Bevilacqua argues that Xenophon's Socrates is even more of an oligarch than he has usually been made out to be. She thus counters the tendency in recent years to argue that Plato's Socrates and even Xenophon's Socrates were what we might call loyal critics of Athenian democracy.[4] Certainly Xenophon's Socrates is a political teacher, providing lessons about success in the public arena to a wide variety of people. Bevilacqua notes that the beneficiaries of Socratic advice include the future oligarch, Charmides, whom Socrates urges to enter politics by arguing that he has nothing to fear from the ignorant masses that make up the Athenian Assembly (*Mem.* 3.7). But it is above all in *Memorabilia* 2.6, Socrates' long conversation with Critobulus, that Xenophon's Socrates presents a positive political program, Bevilacqua argues, as he there openly promotes an oligarchic regime at Athens. Socrates observes that politics, unlike Greek athletics, is a team sport; thus nothing prevents the *kaloikagathoi* from working together in pursuit of honor, to promote their mutual benefit, and benefit their cities. Socrates notes that a team of top athletes would win all prizes; thus the *kaloikagathoi* should also win all public

4 For Plato's Socrates, see Ober 2011; for Xenophon, Gray 2004.

offices. As Socrates' moral vocabulary has clear connections to social class, he is calling for a restricted group of socio-economic elites to dominate Athens, sharing the goods among themselves. This amounts to a call for a revival of the political program of the Thirty, which was itself inspired by the Spartan model. Bevilacqua next discusses whether Socrates himself would count as a *kaloskagathos* and, hence, be part of such a regime, and why Xenophon does not even hint at how this radical political program should be carried out. She concludes that Xenophon's political views here got the better of his desire to defend Socrates; but he did bury this political bombshell in a chapter on friendship, and he may have thought that the *kaloikagathoi* should use only peaceful means to dominate Athens, perhaps even leaving the democratic constitution intact, while dominating it from within. Bevilacqua then looks at two key passages to dispute the view that Plato's Socrates was relatively friendly to democracy. In *Apology* 31c–32a Socrates notes the mortal danger faced by anyone who stands up against the injustices of the multitude, and while in the *Crito* (51c–53a) the personified Laws argue that Socrates choose them over other regimes, voting for them by his very decision to remain in Athens, they also grant that he frequently praises oligarchies. Thus Bevilacqua identifies an oligarchic Socrates lurking beneath the apologetic facades of both authors, a figure who may well accurately reflect the historical Socrates.

Both Tamiolaki and Bevilacqua see political issues lurking behind the language of friendship. But where Tamiolaki would presumably say that Xenophon is using political terminology and political ideas to talk about friendship, Bevilacqua sees at least some discourse about friendship as euphemistic talk about oligarchy. We see a similar slipperiness in moral and political vocabulary, where good men are both virtuous and anti-democratic. Much here will depend on what one means by "political." The question is particularly tricky in the case of an author like Xenophon, who insists that the same qualities will produce the proper relationship with one's self, one's friends, and one's fellow citizens. For the Platonic analogue one need only consider whether the *Republic* is really a work of ethics or of politics. Both authors see continuity between ethics, which includes a teaching on friendship, and politics, areas that we as readers are accustomed to separate—as we have tried to do with the very arrangement of essays in this volume. There is, then, at least some risk here that when we see Xenophon or Plato conflating politics and friendship they may have been doing nothing of the sort, precisely because in their world politics and friendship had never been separated from one another in the first place.

LOUIS-ANDRÉ DORION argues that while both Xenophon and Plato defend Socrates by stressing his obedience to the law, they do so in very different ways. Neither Socrates is willing to break the law by escaping from jail, but while

Plato's Socrates defends this choice to Crito based on his obedience to the law, Xenophon offers no explicit explanation. Presumably his Socrates does not escape from prison for the same reason he does not attempt to secure his acquittal: he is ready to follow the gods' advice that it is time for him to die. The two authors also credit Socrates with different understandings of the law, as Xenophon's Socrates is a legal positivist who identifies justice with the law, while Plato's Socrates holds a more idealistic conception, as he allows for persuasion when a law is unjust. Both authors speak of an expert regarding justice, but where Xenophon's Socrates is himself the expert, in the *Crito* it is the laws that play this role. In both *Memorabilia* 4.4 and the *Crito*, there are arguments in favor of obeying the laws, but while Xenophon's Socrates speaks of the benefits of obeying the law, Plato's personified Laws convince Socrates of the disadvantages of disobedience. Thus despite the multitude of distinct arguments for obedience in each text, no individual argument is shared. Other political disagreements include the fundamental claim made by Plato's Socrates that it is never just to wrong anyone, even an enemy; Xenophon's Socrates holds the traditional view that the virtuous man helps friends and harms enemies. So too the role each thinker assigns to exemplary political leaders differs, as Xenophon, in keeping with his view on the educative power of examples, argues that good leaders make for good regimes, while Plato suggests if anything that good regimes are required for good leadership. In other areas, the two authors are arguably more in sync. Dorion suggests that in both authors Socrates' disobedience of the Thirty is based on the fundamental illegality of their regime, and that both believe that divine laws are in harmony with human ones. Finally, each Socrates refuses to stoop to rhetorical tricks to secure approval in part because doing so is illegal, though while Xenophon implies rhetorical tricks are *ipso facto* illegal, Dorion argues that Plato's Socrates would consider them illegal only inasmuch as they violate the juror's oath.

CAROL ATACK discusses the shared discourse on political thought she finds in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and Plato's *Statesman*. While the chronology of these works is uncertain, Atack suggests that *Cyropaedia* responds to *Republic*, and that Plato responds to *Cyropaedia* in *Statesman*. The Socratic authors here both move beyond Socrates in their analysis of monarchical rule, leaving behind the Socratic concept of the *basilike techne* in pursuit of a new understanding of monarchical rule. Xenophon in *Cyropaedia* appears to resuscitate the image of the shepherd-king as a positive ideal after Thrasymachus had rendered it so problematic in *Republic* 1. But Plato, by projecting the shepherd king back into mythological time, suggests this is no longer a plausible ideal. Xenophon perhaps came to agree, at least by the time he wrote the final chapter of *Cyropaedia*, which portrays contemporary Persia as inalterably corrupt, thus

placing Cyrus in an unrecoverable past. Both authors also stress the importance of the *kairos* to any real-world leader. Thus Plato's contemporary *politikos* must master the *kairos*, whereas a king in the golden age of Cronus did not have to worry about the proper amount in an age of abundance or proper timing in an essentially atemporal era. Xenophon's Cyrus for his part shows increasing sophistication in his understanding of the *kairos* as he develops. Thus while the clearest evidence for intertextuality is between *Laws* and *Cyropaedia*, the similar discussions of the themes of the shepherd king and *kairos* suggest that the political conversation between Xenophon and Plato was far richer than previously thought.

These two papers on political thought obviously differ in many ways, as Atack studies post-Socratic ideas in both authors, while Dorion is firmly rooted in early Plato and Xenophon's Socratica. Noteworthy from a methodological or perhaps rhetorical standpoint is how differently Atack and Dorion characterize the relationship between Xenophon and Plato. Dorion finds numerous differences between the two, while not explicitly discussing whether the two were in conversation. For Atack, on the other hand, the fact that the two are in conversation is central—central, among other things, to the rehabilitation of Xenophon's status as a political thinker. For Atack, agreement about the identification of vital topics for political discourse overrides differences in how those topics are handled, whereas for Dorion the shared interest in defending the rule of law is much less worthy of note than the different arguments for the rule of law, and different understandings of law itself.

History

NOREEN HUMBLE suggests that Plato was a "perfect reader" of Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*. Plato and Xenophon both see the Spartan educational system as too obsessed with military affairs and too reliant on fear and force rather than persuasion, Humble argues; as Sparta failed to teach her citizens that virtue was intrinsically rewarding, they retained a covert desire for wealth which ultimately burst into the open and degraded the Spartan regime. This shared analysis of flaws in Sparta could be the result of discussion of these issues in the Socratic circle, the result of Xenophon reacting to Plato, or of Plato reacting to Xenophon. If Xenophon was reacting to Plato, Humble would argue that Xenophon, far from being a knee-jerk laconophile, gave a more critical portrait of Sparta than Plato's portrait of the timarchic regime, which was, after all, the second best on Plato's scale of constitutions. But she finds it most likely that Plato, recognizing Xenophon's greater expertise on Sparta, made use of

his mixed portrait of Sparta, but reshaped it to fit his purposes in the *Republic*. Humble argues that Plato rather clearly made use of Spartan material from Xenophon in his *Laws*, making it more likely that the influence flowed from Xenophon in this case as well. Humble closes by noting that while the consensus view is that Xenophon reacts to and differs from Plato about Socrates, when it comes to Sparta, it is Plato who is influenced by Xenophon, and the two authors are essentially in agreement.

CHRISTOPHER TUPLIN compares the use Plato and Xenophon make of Persia. Xenophon's Persian connections are obvious enough from *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia*, but Plato also had significant biographical connections with Persia, thanks to the famous Persian embassy of his uncle and stepfather Pyrilampes. References to Persia are actually more numerous in Plato than in Xenophon's Socratica; Xenophon rarely mentions Persia in the *Memorabilia*. *Persika* are thus not just background noise, part of the mental armature of someone like Xenophon who spent so much time engaged with Persia, but were deliberately introduced to serve some particular function. Tuplin catalogs and comments on the appearances of Persian institutions, Persian characters, and events from Persian history, and endeavors to determine the role played by the Persian material in each case. Persia can certainly be used as part of a serious argument, as the history of Persia from Cyrus to Xerxes serves as evidence in the *Laws*. But on other occasions the tone and purpose behind Socratic *Persika* is trickier. Tuplin argues that Plato, inspired by Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, deliberately garbled and undermined his account of Persian royal education in the *First Alcibiades*, in hopes of leading Alcibiades to drop Cyrus and Xerxes as his models. Xenophon had earlier made strange use of *Persika* to question Ischomachus' status as a model. In both cases there are other historical anomalies—Spartan education is also oddly treated in the *First Alcibiades*, and Ischomachus' biography undermines his claim to be the ideal *kaloskagathos*. Thus readers should not assume that Xenophon and Plato, who were after all writing a creative form of historical fiction, were not playing games with their references to historical Persia.

Both Humble and Tuplin, it is perhaps worth pointing out, see what we might characterize as "darker" Xenophontic takes on history (Xenophon being critical of Ischomachus and Sparta) as inspiring similar approaches in Plato (Persia as a flawed model in the *First Alcibiades*, Spartan inspired timocracy as flawed regime type in the *Republic*). Save in the case of the timocratic regime, whose flaws are evident, many readers do not see darkness here;[5] we might

5 For a general critique of such dark or ironic readings of Xenophon, see Gray 2011.

wonder whether a darker reading in one author supports the presence of a similar reading in another, particularly where the subject matter is the same. For example, does Plato's criticism of Sparta in the *Republic* support Humble's position that Xenophon made similar criticisms in his *Spartan Constitution*?

DAVID THOMAS attempts to track down the anonymous enemies of hunting Xenophon attacks near the end of the *Cynegeticus*. Thomas follows others in considering the work relatively early (probably before 388). Xenophon's brand of hunting involved use of nets and hounds to catch hares, rather than hunting larger prey ultimately brought down by the huntsmen themselves, without nets; Thomas suggests that Xenophon's opponents thought that it was only the pursuit of big game that was a manly enough pastime to be worthwhile. Xenophon depicts opponents of hunting in terms that would be surprisingly strong were the disagreement only about hunting itself, and Thomas argues that the crimes attributed to the enemies of hunting resemble those of the Thirty. Thomas finds it easy to imagine Critias unfavorably contrasting tough Spartan hunting with effete hunting of hares. In the midst of his vigorous attack on the enemies of hunting, Xenophon attacks the sophists of his day (οἱ νῦν σοφισταί 13.1–9). Xenophon's phraseology here, his Gorgianic style early in the *Cynegeticus*, and his positive treatment of Prodicus in *Memorabilia* 2.1 show that he cannot be attacking the sophists of the previous generation. The Socratics Aristippus and Phaedo have been suggested as possible targets, but Thomas argues that the key to the identification is a connection to the Thirty, which leaves him with only one plausible candidate: Plato. Plato's only explicit response to Xenophon, at *Laws* 3.694a–695b, is hardly scornful, but the relationship between the two could have been less cordial early on. Plato does attack hunting with hounds in *Laws* (7.824a) and tells us that he was initially hopeful about the Thirty (*Seventh Letter* 324d). Moreover, Xenophon's attacks on sophists for failing to provide moral maxims and for engaging in eristic argumentation could be taken to apply to Plato's early dialogues, and the attack on their hedonism is compatible with Xenophon taking an adverse reaction to the hedonism of the *Protagoras*. If Plato was Xenophon's true quarry, he failed to catch him in his nets, as Plato distanced himself from hedonism in the *Gorgias* and elsewhere, and painstakingly distinguished himself from sophistry in the *Sophist*; so complete was Plato's escape that it is only now that he has been rediscovered as Xenophon's target.

It is perhaps fitting that we close the volume with the essay that posits the most direct confrontation between Plato and Xenophon, albeit a rather critical one from Xenophon's youth. If Thomas is correct, Plato fills a gap in our understanding of Xenophon, solving a long-standing mystery in Xenophontic interpretation. Indeed, if the essays from this volume have any shared thesis, it

would be that we will best understand Plato and Xenophon when we consider them together, whether as rivals, as partners, or simply as contemporaries who were both informed by their youths spent together in Athens with Socrates, and who, for all their disparate experiences and efforts thereafter, both contributed to a larger conversation inspired by the philosophical and political questions of their age.

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PART 1
Methods

Comparative Exegesis and the Socratic Problem*

Louis-André Dorion

Allow me to begin by expressing my gratitude. First of all, to Gabriel Danzig, our host, not only for giving me the honor of making this keynote speech, but also, and above all, for organizing this colloquium that has brought us together and that will contribute a great deal—I am certain of this—to promoting a renewed understanding of the relations between Plato and Xenophon. I should also like to honor the memory of Alain-Philippe Segonds, former managing editor of *Les Belles Lettres*, who passed away in May 2011, just a few days before the publication of the last two volumes of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (Bandini and Dorion 2011a and 2011b). I have an immense debt to Alain-Philippe Segonds. Indeed, it was he who asked me to do the translation and to write the commentary for the edition of the *Memorabilia* in the *Budé* collection, at a time when nothing justified his offering such a project to me. That was twenty years ago, in 1994; I was only thirty-four years old and had just completed a dissertation on Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* (Dorion 1995), and I knew absolutely nothing about Xenophon. Despite my incompetence, he had confidence in my abilities, and he was always very patient with me. In fact, he had an apparently infinite supply of patience: for it took me seventeen years (1994–2011) to complete the translation and the annotated commentary for the *Budé* edition of the *Memorabilia*. It was also Alain-Philippe Segonds who generously offered to publish all my studies on Socrates in a single volume in the *L'âne d'or* collection that he edited at *Les Belles Lettres* (Dorion 2013). Unfortunately, he did not live to see this book either, which he called with affection my *Kleine Schriften*, and this is why it is dedicated to his memory.

When I began to translate the *Memorabilia* in 1994, I rapidly understood that the repudiation of this work during the twentieth century was closely connected to the Socratic problem and that, as a result, I had to quickly take a position in the formidable debate about the historical Socrates. I read dozens and dozens of studies devoted to the Socratic problem, and I could see no position, among those proposed, that provided a satisfactory solution to it. And I myself

* The text that follows is a revised version of the keynote speech that I gave at the conference on Plato and Xenophon in Jerusalem in June 2014. For the most part, I have retained the text of this speech as it was originally written; however, I have added some footnotes, a list of cited works, and some critical observations on G. Danzig's introduction to the present collection (1–30) and on D. Johnson's article "Xenophon's Intertextual Socrates" (71–98).

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could find no new solution, for I soon realized that all the possible solutions had already been explored from every angle. The arguments that finally indicated to me the direction to go, the ones that also convinced me that it was better to give up the Socratic problem altogether, were those put forward by Paul A. Vander Waerdt in a magnificent article, which had just been published in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (1993). Faced with the two versions of the oracle's response, the one in Plato and the one in Xenophon, Vander Waerdt refuses to fall into the trap of raising the question of which of the two is the most faithful from a historical perspective—a question that Vlastos had seen as still completely legitimate just a few years earlier.[1] Instead, he tries to show that the oracle's response, in Xenophon's *Apology*, restates the main virtues that Xenophon attributes to Socrates in all his Socratic writings. If the oracle's response makes no mention of *sophia*, this is not because Xenophon was an imbecile who understood nothing in Plato, but because *sophia* does not play as important a role in the ethical reflections of Xenophon's Socrates as it does in those of Plato's Socrates.[2] The article by Vander Waerdt had the effect on me of a veritable liberation: freed of an insoluble problem, I could finally devote myself to the commentary on the *Memorabilia*, not in order to find the historical Socrates or, just the opposite, some completely inexact version of him, but in order to look for a different Socrates, a distinct Socrates, *another Socrates* who has his own coherence and who cannot be properly understood unless he is constantly compared and confronted with Plato's Socrates.[3] Bracketing the Socratic problem or, if you prefer, *epokhê* with respect to the Socratic problem, had an effect on me similar to the one that results, according to Sextus Empiricus (*Pyr.* 1.28–29), from the suspension of judgment. Just as happiness is the unexpected result of *epokhê*, there is also a form of happiness or, more exactly, a renewed diversity of promising research possibilities, which results from *epokhê* with respect to the Socratic problem. My only merit, if I have one, is to have applied to other Socratic themes the method or, perhaps better, the approach to texts,[4] which Vander Waerdt had developed and which he had applied to the oracle's response. In his 1993 article, Vander Waerdt already refers to this approach

1 Vlastos 1991: 288–289. (Additional note 6.3: "The Oracle Story in Plato and in Xenophon").

2 I have tried to demonstrate this (Dorion 2012a); however, Johnson (87–96) contests my position.

3 By constantly comparing the two Socrates, it is possible to avoid marginalizing Xenophon's Socrates, although Johnson (76–78) criticizes me for doing just that. I shall return to this issue below.

4 In fact, it is a more or less open-ended approach to texts, not a method. For comparative exegesis should not been seen as a recipe for obtaining immediate results.

to texts as "comparative study" (4–5) or "comparative treatment" (12).[5] Deeply convinced that comparative exegesis offers a wealth of interpretative possibilities, I set to work without delay, beginning with the introduction that I wrote for the *Budé* edition of the *Memorabilia*. This introduction contains a long study in which I try to show why Xenophon's Socrates makes use of refutative dialectic (*elenchos*) much less frequently than his Platonic counterpart.[6] After the publication of the first volume of the *Memorabilia*, I used comparative exegesis to shed light on several Socratic themes (the *basilikê tekhnê*,[7] the *daimonion*,[8] Socrates' abstention from politics[9]); and my next book, which focuses on self-sufficiency as it is treated by Plato and Xenophon in their Socratic writings and by the Cynics, also uses this approach to texts. Comparative exegesis is especially appropriate for analyzing philosophical and literary themes common to many authors, and it can be applied to themes that are not necessarily Socratic, since it is also possible to use it to interpret topics and issues common to Plato's *Dialogues* and to Xenophon's non-Socratic writings.[10] Indeed, many of the studies published in this very book use comparative exegesis to analyze concepts and ideas that are not Socratic—further proof, if such were needed, of the wealth of interpretative possibilities offered by this approach to texts.

I shall briefly present what I see as the four main advantages of comparative exegesis. The first one is a historical advantage. For it seems to me that comparative exegesis is the most appropriate approach to texts for appreciating the actual historical content of *logoi sokratikoi*. If the various Socratics wrote *logoi sokratikoi*, not only from an apologetic perspective, but also to promote their own respective portraits of Socrates in opposition to those of the other Socratics,[11] then only comparative exegesis, liberated from the Socratic problem, can effectively grasp and interpret the differences among them. It is important to add that these differences are, to a large extent, the very reason that *logoi sokratikoi* were written and that there was such a diversity of them. If the philosophy of the historical Socrates is definitely out of our reach, all that

5 Vander Waerdt's importance is also stressed by D. Johnson (73–74).

6 Bandini and Dorion 2000: CXVIII–CLXXXIII ("Xénophon et l'*elenchos* socratique").

7 "Socrate et la *basilikê tekhnê*" in Dorion 2013: 147–169.

8 "Socrate, le *daimonion* et la divination" and "Le *daimonion* et la *megalêgoria* de Socrate dans l'*Apologie* de Xénophon" in Dorion 2013: 275–300 and 301–316.

9 "Socrate et la politique: les raisons de son abstention selon Platon et Xénophon" in Dorion 2013: 171–193.

10 See "La responsabilité de Cyrus dans le déclin de l'empire perse selon Platon et Xénophon" in Dorion 2013: 393–412.

11 Pace Johnson (81–87).

we can grasp in *logoi sokratikoi* is the "diffraction" of the character and thought of Socrates, that is, the different and often conflicting interpretations that his disciples gave to his life and thought. Only comparative exegesis appears to be able to identify the Socratic themes that were the object of such "diffraction" and, above all, to be able to determine the whys and wherefores of the divergent interpretations that we come across, for one and the same theme, in the Socratic literature. Comparative exegesis does not seek to determine, with respect to a Socratic theme common to both Plato and Xenophon, which version is the most exact or the most faithful from a historical perspective; it seeks instead to record the differences and interpret them with a view to understanding how, in Plato as well as in Xenophon, they fit into a philosophically coherent representation of the character of Socrates. I am willing to wager that this type of comparative exegesis, which re-establishes the pertinence of all the testimony that has been proscribed and ostracized in the name of the Socratic problem—I shall come back to this "ostracism" later—will considerably enrich our understanding, not only of the reception of Socratism, but also of the authors themselves who express their own points of view through the character of Socrates. By confronting these different portraits with each other, we can better grasp how, and possibly why, one and the same theme gave birth to a multitude of interpretations that may or may not be compatible with each another. Without falling prey to the excesses of *Quellenforschung*, we must push the analysis of the themes common to the *logoi sokratikoi* as far as our sources allow, for it is precisely this intertextuality[12] that makes it possible for us to hear the echo of the debates that raged in the Socratic circles.[13]

Before discussing this first main advantage of comparative exegesis further, allow me to insist on the disastrous consequences of what I have just called "the

12 My conception of intertextuality differs from the one defended by Johnson in his text "Xenophon's Intertextual Socrates," (78–87). I clarify this point below.

13 C. Kahn (1990: 287) makes the same point: "I suggest that this comparative study of the Socratic literature can be a useful substitute for that old but ultimately fruitless attempt to define the relationship between the Platonic and the historical Socrates. The historical Socrates certainly existed, but to a very large extent the fifth-century figure escapes our grasp. What we have instead is the literary Socrates of the fourth century, in a diversity of portraits." So does Morrison (2000: 780): "Plato and Xenophon were not the only authors of Socratic dialogues. Many of Socrates' followers contributed to this genre. The conventions of the genre seem to have allowed authors considerable freedom to reshape Socrates, idealize him, and put their own views in Socrates' mouth. Therefore the cautious and reasonable view is that certainty about the historical Socrates is lost to us—and, in a way, not very important. The most important fact about Socrates was his influence: the extraordinary fertility of his ideas and the moral example he set for his followers."

excesses of *Quellenforschung*." Nineteenth- and twentieth-century philologists often devoted more attention to the search for sources than to the interpretation of the ancient texts themselves, as if the meaning of a text had more to do with influences and borrowings from other texts than with its actual content. I have no hesitation in calling this philology "hubristic" to the extent that it claims to reveal textual links and borrowings that it has no way of proving, given that the supposed sources are no longer extant or amount to no more than a few meager fragments. The exasperation that I feel when I read studies claiming to adhere to the principles of *Quellenforschung* prompts me to be extremely prudent and careful in my use of comparative exegesis to interpret texts. Since we know almost nothing about the chronology of Plato's *Dialogues* and Xenophon's Socratic writings, and since there is little hope of making any progress in this area, in my view it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether Plato is responding to Xenophon in a given passage, or vice versa. In other words, comparative exegesis, at least as I see it, in no way presupposes the necessity of taking a position on the chronology of Plato's *Dialogues* and Xenophon's Socratic writings. There are, of course, passages in Xenophon where it seems correct to assume that his goal is to respond to Plato or to other Socratics,[14] but they remain exceptions. No doubt, such passages are important to the extent that they provide an essential justification for comparative exegesis; however, they remain exceptions because it is almost always impossible to determine, in all the other cases where we can compare Plato's and Xenophon's positions on the same theme, who is responding or replying to whom. My comparative studies of various Socratic themes, including the one in the present collection,[15] do not depend in any way on the chronology of Plato's and Xenophon's writings. For once it has been determined that a Socratic theme is common to both authors, it suffices to compare the texts and to record and interpret the differences. When Plato and Xenophon have different positions on the same Socratic theme, this is a clear indication that the theme in question was debated among the Socratics. However, in order to shed light on what was at stake in such a debate, it is not necessary to know or to try to determine the chronology of their Socratic writings. Of course, we would like to know who was first to expound a given philosophical theme, and how the sequence of replies to this initial exposition played out, but I believe that we must give up

14 See *Ap.* 1, *Mem.* 1.4.1, 4.3.2, *Symp.* 8.32–35. On the importance of these passages, see D. Johnson, "Xenophon's Intertextual Socrates" (78–79).

15 See "Plato and Xenophon on the Different Reasons that Socrates Always Obeys the Law" (487–509).

on using comparative exegesis to establish textual chronologies.[16] Doing otherwise could be taken as a sign that we are just as hubristic as the adepts of *Quellenforschung*.

Coming back to the first main advantage of comparative exegesis, I think that it would be wrong to accuse this approach to texts, as I conceive of it, of being a kind of literary divertissement taken up by those who have completely renounced the goal of achieving a historical understanding of the texts and of the character of Socrates—as if the Socratic problem were the only paradigm that satisfies the requirements of historical understanding! On the contrary, I think that the Socratic problem itself is historically inadequate, especially to the extent that it attributes a project to the authors of *logoi sokratikoi* that they probably never had: that of providing a faithful exposition of Socrates' teachings. In reality, comparative exegesis is the most appropriate approach to the texts themselves of the remaining *logoi sokratikoi*. As such, it is the only reliable way of developing a historical understanding of them.

The second main advantage of comparative exegesis is that it makes possible a better grasp of both the specificity and the coherence of the different portraits of Socrates. Taking on the basic assumptions of the Socratic problem, interpreters have the tendency, when faced with themes common to both Plato and Xenophon, to be rapidly satisfied by superficial agreements and to jump to the conclusion that they have identified one of the historical Socrates' authentic character traits (see, among others, Luccioni [1953: 48–56]). The advocate of comparative exegesis is more prudent about historical claims and, above all, more sensitive to the differences and variations that betray, in the treatment of a certain theme, the specificity of the Platonic or the Xenophontean portrait of Socrates. Thus it was comparative exegesis that allowed me to show that many themes common to Plato and Xenophon had variants and differences that could not be fully understood except in the light of Plato's and Xenophon's overall portraits of Socrates. Through comparative exegesis I was able to show how Xenophon had systematically re-elaborated certain Socratic themes by giving self-control (*enkrateia*) the central role that *sophia* has in Plato's Socratic writings.[17] The practice of comparative exegesis refines our viewpoint; that is, it allows us to grasp more quickly, and more acutely, the features that are specific to one particular portrait of Socrates. Although some of my studies are not direct applications of comparative exegesis, it is, nevertheless, the practice

16 Therefore, I attribute much less importance to chronology than G. Danzig does in his Introduction (see "Chronology and Conversation" (2–5)).

17 Dorion 2013: xx–xxvi. However, this position is discussed and criticized by D. Johnson in his article "Xenophon's Intertextual Socrates" (87–96).

of comparative exegesis that has allowed me to identify, by contrasting them with other portraits of Socrates in which they are absent, themes that are specific to or characteristic of Xenophon's Socrates. For example, this is how I have approached the use of the metaphor of the procurer in Xenophon's Socratic writings,[18] the question of Socrates' economic competency in Xenophon's portrait of him,[19] and the problem of why Plato does not attribute self-sufficiency to him.[20]

The third main advantage is that comparative exegesis, precisely because of its ambition, provides an "ecumenical" method, in the sense that it takes into consideration all the testimony concerning Socrates. For it is on the lookout for every difference and variation that can be noted, either in texts that are contemporary with each other or, diachronically, in texts that allow us to retrace the evolution of the reception of Socrates through the centuries. This does not mean that the "ecumenism" in question amounts to some form of uncritical eclecticism, for it is not a matter of granting later sources the same importance as the testimony of Plato and Xenophon. On the contrary, the goal is to investigate the connections and relationships between the different portraits of Socrates, as well as the transformations that these portraits reflect in the way that he was understood over time, starting with the depictions of him by the first "witnesses" (Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon), and moving on through the later sources who appropriate him for themselves by proposing new representations of his life and philosophy on the basis of their interpretations of older sources. As an interpretative approach, this is the exact opposite of the research orientation that legitimizes the Socratic problem. The latter has the effect of excluding a great deal of testimony under the pretext that it does not conform to the so-called "reality" of the historical Socrates. Some will object that attempting to solve the Socratic problem does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of testimony, since it is easy to imagine that a solution to the Socratic problem might involve reconciling the texts by the main "witnesses" (Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle) and not favoring one of them to the detriment of the others. This is true, but only in theory. In reality, from Schleiermacher all the way to Vlastos, those who attempted to solve the Socratic problem had a strong tendency to favor the first dialogues of Plato, to disparage Aristophanes, to ignore, even to scorn Xenophon, and then to see in Aristotle's testimony a mere confirmation of the greater historicity of the Platonic

18 "Socrate entremetteur," in Dorion 2013: 347–368.

19 "Socrate *oikonomikos*," in Dorion 2013: 317–345.

20 "L'impossible autarcie du Socrate de Platon," in Dorion 2013: 429–448.

testimony. Of course, consideration of all the texts that provide testimony concerning Socrates is not an end in itself. In other words, we cannot conclude that comparative exegesis provides a better approach to the texts simply because it allows us to take into consideration all of them; however, if it turns out that the hope of solving the Socratic problem is illusory and that pursuing this illusion has led to the exclusion of a great number of texts, then comparative exegesis appears to me definitely superior to continuing on with the Socratic problem. Let me mention in passing one of the important consequences of the ostracism of which Xenophon has been a victim: the knowledge of his Socratic writings profoundly regressed during the twentieth century, and it has been necessary for us to engage in a lengthy effort to reappropriate these texts in order to attain the same level of understanding of them as the interpreters in the nineteenth century. Thanks to the monumental work of G. Giannantoni (1990), we now have access to all of the ancient testimony concerning Socrates and the Socratics in a single four-volume collection. It matters little that Giannantoni did not see his work from the skeptical perspective of comparative exegesis. Since Plato, we have known that often the destiny of a book is not in the hands of its author; and I believe that the *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* constitute, despite the omissions and oversights, a tremendous tool that those who use comparative exegesis to study Socratic themes should exploit to the fullest.

The fourth and final main advantage that I want to mention is that comparative exegesis seems to me much less *risky*, both as an overall approach to texts and in terms of obtaining lasting results, than any possible position on the Socratic problem. For the results obtained through comparative exegesis remain valid and relevant in themselves, independent of any efforts to find a solution to the Socratic problem, whereas research on the Socratic problem is exposed to a much higher risk of being contested and rendered null and void. Anyone who attempts to solve the Socratic problem must either disqualify the testimony of some texts, to the advantage of others, or grant some testimony much less importance, under the pretext that it is supposedly less authentic or less true, in a word, less faithful to the historical Socrates. If an attempt to reconstruct the historical Socrates on the basis of the "testimony" of certain texts proves to be mistaken—and given the lack of consensus on the identity of the historical Socrates, who could deny that the vast majority of attempts to solve the Socratic problem have failed in one way or another?—the interpreter will have excluded—even "excommunicated"—authors whose testimony is no less interesting and relevant than the testimony given favor for the wrong reasons. This risk obviously does not exist with comparative exegesis, since—for the interpreter who adheres to this approach—no testimony can be excluded.

Such an interpreter takes into consideration the testimony from all the texts, as long as there is hope that the confrontation of testimony from different texts will make it possible to obtain more insight into the Socratic themes, some of which were already giving rise, among the ancient authors of *logoi sokratikoi* themselves, to multiple interpretations.

The practice of comparative exegesis has never had the stated objective—or the unexpected consequence—of isolating Xenophon's Socrates from his Platonic counterpart, which is why I have trouble understanding Johnson when he claims in his thought-provoking article "Xenophon's Intertextual Socrates" that one of the paradoxical consequences of this approach to texts is to marginalize Xenophon's Socrates, the latter being so different from Plato's Socrates that he cannot be understood outside of the hermeneutical confines of Xenophon's texts. But let me be clear: no matter what the specific content of any particular representation of Socrates in Plato or Xenophon happens to be, comparative exegesis has nothing to do with marginalizing it. The key point for comparative exegesis is that a Socratic theme common to both authors cannot be adequately understood unless their positions on this theme are confronted with each other, which means that the goal is to specify the extent of the differences and discrepancies, and to clarify their precise meaning. Is it necessary to mention that, by definition, *comparative* exegesis involves *comparing* one author to another, so that the texts of *both* authors are essential to the interpretation? That Xenophon's Socrates is different from Plato's, I would be hard put to deny, but contrary to what Johnson claims, the emphasis that I place on this difference does not entail the marginalization of Xenophon's Socrates. The essential goal of comparative exegesis is just the opposite. Before reading Johnson's article, I was under the perhaps naïve impression that doing comparative exegesis went hand in hand with recognizing intertextuality. For comparative exegesis presupposes that the themes common to Plato and Xenophon constitute points of contact where their texts echo each other, intersect, and become intertwined to form an intertext, a text woven through with allusions and references to other texts. As an interpretative approach, it highlights the ways that texts by different authors resonate with the same or similar philosophical issues, and brings these authors into more or less explicit dialogue with one another. Consequently, I have no difficulty accepting Johnson's definition of intertextuality: "Intertextuality is the approach to texts that privileges their interconnectedness" (78). On the other hand, I am rather astonished that Johnson should present intertextuality as an alternative to comparative exegesis that does not share the latter's main disadvantage—that of marginalizing Xenophon's Socrates. Johnson's intertextuality leads him to posit what is probably best described as an "ecumenical" Socrates, a Socrates common to all of

the Socratics and with whom all of them could probably identify.[21] However, if such a Socrates were possible, it would be necessary to assume that the authors of *logoi sokratikoi* did not intend to propose different, perhaps even conflicting, portraits of Socrates, but instead portraits of the philosopher that would repeat or complete the ones put forward by the other Socratics. In fact, Johnson states more than once[22] that Xenophon's project is not to propose a different, a rival, or an alternative Socrates, but to supplement the other portraits of him and complete them. But what basis does Johnson have for understanding Socratic intertextuality as necessarily involving an overall consensus about Socrates among the different Socratics and their collaboration in a common project? Does he believe that they somehow worked together to promote an image of a multifaceted Socrates who could help them reconcile their philosophical differences? Is it not rather the case that the differences in position on the same themes are a sign of fundamental disagreement and intense rivalry? Johnson sees intertextuality as a space for dialogue between the Socratics in their common effort to create a shared image of Socrates, whereas I see it as a space where interpreters can hear the echo of the different, even conflicting, philosophical positions that the Socratics held on the same themes. For me, the task is to take the initiative in confronting the texts and setting up a more or less explicit dialogue among their authors, in order to make clear the meaning and the extent of the differences or discrepancies among their positions. Having said that, I should like to offer a friendly criticism of Johnson's conception of intertextuality. In my view, this conception of intertextuality is idyllic and completely irenic, because it fails to take into consideration the agonistic character of Greek philosophy. As a form of *agôn*, Greek philosophy was inherently polemical from its very beginnings, and it is implausible to suggest that this did not hold true for the Socratics, many of whom founded rival schools that each laid claim to Socrates' philosophical heritage. The rivalry between Plato and Xenophon is just one particular case illustrating the agonistic atmosphere that reigned among the Socratics. Indeed, the ancient texts provide ample evidence that such rivalry was generalized.

Moreover, I am not sure whether Johnson realizes it, but his position could be taken as an inverted version of the position defended long ago by Schleiermacher. Faced with the insufficiency of Xenophon's portrait of Socrates, Schleiermacher asks what ideas and character traits Socrates must have had *in addi-*

21 According to Johnson (85), this "intertextual Socrates" is "the character who consists of the amalgam of different images of Socrates projected by the Socratics."

22 See 80, 82 and 85.

tion to those that Xenophon attributes to him, which amounts to saying that Xenophon's portrait of Socrates must be incomplete. Johnson does just the opposite: he maintains that it is Xenophon who brings additional information to supplement the other portraits of Socrates and complete them, which amounts to saying that Xenophon enriches these other portraits of Socrates. Now if it is true that Xenophon's project is to complete the work of the other Socratics, his portrait of Socrates cannot be fundamentally incompatible with the ones painted by Plato and the other Socratics. And in fact, Johnson appears to be convinced of the fundamental compatibility of the philosophical views that Plato and Xenophon attribute to Socrates, which is, of course, an essential point of contention between us.[23] To demonstrate the compatibility of the philosophical views of the two Socrates, Johnson devotes the last section of his article to a patient critique of the explanation that I offer, in the foreword to *L'Autre Socrate*, of the main philosophical difference between the two Socrates, namely the prominent role that Xenophon's Socrates gives to *enkrateia*, a concept which has little importance for Plato's Socrates (see Dorion 2013: XIV–XVIII). This is not the place to discuss in detail Johnson's attempt to reconcile the views of Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's Socrates on *enkrateia*. I shall limit myself to reminding readers that Plato, after having paid no attention at all to *enkrateia* for quite some time, finally grants it a rather insignificant role when he at last deigns to mention it.[24] If it were true that the two Socrateses actually have compatible positions, not only on the question of *enkrateia*, but also on the majority of the other philosophical issues that they discuss, then it would be necessary to demonstrate that the twenty-one important differences, which I have identified between Plato's and Xenophon's portraits of Socrates (see Dorion 2013: XIV–XVIII), are not philosophically insurmountable

23 I entirely agree with the position that G. Danzig argues for in the introduction to this collection: "The most decisive argument against the historical reliability of either author in portraying Socrates' views is the fact that they each attribute such different, incompatible but internally cohesive views to Socrates … In fact, Plato and Xenophon disagree in the most fundamental ways, not only in their attitudes toward theoretical contemplation, but also in their attitudes toward virtue, education, happiness, wealth, and virtually every other fundamental issue in Greek ethical and political thought. Although they may both have been influenced by the same Socrates, their views cannot be brought together into a single composite portrait of Socratic philosophy" (16–17).

24 To highlight the importance of *enkrateia* for Xenophon's Socrates, I have taken pains to show that it plays a very negligible role in the ethics of Plato's Socrates. I refer readers to the two studies that I have published on the concept of *enkrateia* in Plato (Dorion 2007 and 2012b).

and do not make it impossible to claim that the two Socrates are essentially compatible. And yet, Johnson says almost nothing about these differences, despite the fact that some of them consist in glaring contradictions. For example, when Xenophon's Socrates states that it is necessary to be good to one's friends and to harm one's enemies (*Mem.* 2.1.28, 2.2.2, 2.3.14, 2.6.35, 4.2.15–17), whereas Plato's Socrates states that one must never harm anyone (*Cri.* 49c–d, *Resp.* 1.332d–336a), this does not supplement or "complete" Plato's portrait of Socrates—it plainly contradicts it. Or when Xenophon's Socrates acknowledges that the divinity can harm men (*Mem.* 1.4.16), whereas Plato's Socrates claims that the divinity cannot be in any way harmful (*Resp.* 2.379b), Xenophon "adds" absolutely nothing to Plato's portrait of Socrates—he simply contradicts it. Or again, when Xenophon's Socrates refuses to propose a penalty after being found guilty by the people of Athens (*Ap.* 23), whereas Plato's Socrates agrees to propose one (*Ap.* 36e–37b), Xenophon is not completing Plato's testimony—he is openly contradicting it. I am still waiting for someone to demonstrate, either that these differences are not actual differences, or that they do not represent insurmountable obstacles that stand in the way of the claim that these two portraits of Socrates are essentially compatible. In any event, it is clear that the burden of proof rests with the advocates of the compatibility thesis.

I come now to the question of the connection, or perhaps I should say instead, the question of a possible *future* connection, between comparative exegesis and the Socratic problem. First, I must remind you that interpreters of Xenophon have every reason to be wary of the Socratic problem. This is because the paradigm of the Socratic problem, as it was first elaborated by Schleiermacher, then further developed through a period extending all the way to Burnet and Taylor, before being taken up again by Vlastos, is directly responsible for massively discrediting Xenophon's *logoi sokratikoi* during the twentieth century. As I tried to show in the introduction to the *Budé* edition of the *Memorabilia* (Bandini and Dorion 2000: XVIII–XCIX), most of the objections that were raised against Xenophon, and that finally provoked the eclipse of his *Socratica*, were elaborated in the context of a search for a solution to the Socratic problem. From this perspective, Xenophon is the main victim of the paradigm of the Socratic problem. Now if the Socratic problem is badly formulated or unsolvable, as I continue to believe it is (see Dorion 2011), nothing stands in the way of the rehabilitation of Xenophon's *logoi sokratikoi*. Here I want to clarify something: my becoming skeptical with respect to the Socratic problem had nothing to do with seeking to bring Xenophon's Socratic writings back into favor. On the contrary, when I began to translate the *Memorabilia*, I shared most of the common prejudices going around about Xenophon, and in particular, the one according to which his mediocre mind could never have understood the sub-

tleties of the philosophical positions defended by Socrates. By dint of reading Xenophon, I happily came to change my opinion, and I developed a real fondness for the text of the *Memorabilia*. To my great surprise, I realized that the more I liked this text, the better I understood it, and vice versa, so that I am now persuaded that it is impossible, if one has not taken a strong liking to a text, to come to a profound understanding of it. I also realized that most of the criticisms addressed to Xenophon were not based on an attentive and charitable reading of his writings, but instead on considerations for the most part external to his work—e.g., he was not a "true" disciple of Socrates, he was not a philosopher, etc.—which aimed above all at discrediting his testimony from the perspective of a search for a solution to the Socratic problem. But given that the Socratic problem had reached an impasse and that the criticisms addressed to Xenophon betrayed, above all, a profound ignorance of his work, it seemed preferable to try to find a different approach to his Socratic writings, one that would allow me to interpret them impartially. Is this to say that the interpreter has no choice but to choose between two mutually exclusive and irreconcilable approaches to texts? In my view, no.

At the third *Socratica* colloquium, which was held in Trento in February 2012, and whose proceedings were published under the editorship of Alessandro Stavru and de Fulvia de Luise (2013), some pleaded in favor of reopening debate on the Socratic problem (see, among others, Narcy 2013: 416–418). In the present collection of essays, D. Johnson follows suit when he states that the Socratic problem "is not unanswerable in principle."[25] For the time being, the idea of reopening debate on the Socratic problem is more something wished for than a rigorous and detailed account of how another attempt at a solution may be possible, but I am certain that old interpretative strategies dressed in new clothes will continue to be put forward as potentially successful approaches to the Socratic problem well into the foreseeable future. I have never had any illusions about the impact of my texts on the Socratic problem; that is, I have never believed that my radical skepticism would be effective enough to put a definitive end to the Socratic problem. Far from it! Indeed, the Socratic problem resembles the Lernean Hydra: one believes that one has cut its head off once and for all, then dozens of other ones grow back in its place immediately afterward. For my part, I remain skeptical, preferring to devote myself to comparative exegesis. It is a fruitful approach whose interpretative possibilities have not yet been fully exploited—and I hasten to add that Xenophon's Socratic writings remain almost completely unexplored territory! I am delighted to see

25 Johnson (95).

that a great many of the studies published in the present collection also draw their inspiration from comparative exegesis, and I am sure that I will be the first to benefit from them. Although I may have better things to do than making the umpteenth attempt to find a solution to the Socratic problem, I realize that serious intellectual efforts have been made to find a viable approach to it—and who am I to postulate the *a priori* impossibility of discovering some completely new way of formulating it? Nevertheless, I fail to see how anyone attempting to solve the Socratic problem could possibly ignore the differences and discrepancies between the different portraits of Socrates. As I mentioned above, comparative exegesis has allowed me to identify twenty-one major points of disagreement between Plato's Socrates and Xenophon's Socrates—and I make no claim that my list is exhaustive (Dorion 2013: XIV–XVIII). In my view, the interpreter seeking a solution to the Socratic problem must either demonstrate that these points of disagreement are not, in fact, points of disagreement, or show that it is possible to reconcile the positions of Plato's Socrates and those of Xenophon's Socrates, or, having acknowledged that these points of disagreement do exist, explain the reasons that would justify accepting certain positions and rejecting others. *Therefore, comparative exegesis should be the first task*, because the interpreter has no choice but to start by identifying and listing, as exhaustively as possible, the differences and discrepancies between Plato's and Xenophon's portraits of Socrates. If the interpreter somehow succeeds in showing that the differences and discrepancies that have been revealed are not insurmountable obstacles to the project of solving the Socratic problem, then so be it! In that case, comparative exegesis will be a preliminary step that precedes any attempt to solve the Socratic problem, but that means an indispensable step that no interpreter can afford to neglect. Thus Johnson tries to show, in his article (87–96) in this collection, that Plato's and Xenophon's positions on *enkrateia* are not as fundamentally different as I maintain and that it is possible to interpret them in a way that does not compromise the compatibility of the two Socrates. But claiming that the two Socrateses are compatible with each other is just a short step away from claiming that it is possible to solve the Socratic problem, so that it is no surprise that Johnson should take this step at the end of his article. For my part, I have no intention of heading down that road, which leads beyond comparative exegesis, because I am far from having finished my inventory of the differences and discrepancies between the portraits of Socrates in the texts. New variations and points of divergence continue to come to light, and I am entirely taken up with the task of interpreting them.

To conclude, I shall do my best to respond to a question that all those who enjoy reading Xenophon might ask me: If it is true that the Socratic problem is directly responsible for the eclipse of Xenophon's *logoi sokratikoi*, then should

we not fear that reopening debate on the Socratic problem would lead to the same result? In a word, would it not be *suicidal* for interpreters of Xenophon to consent to reopening debate on the Socratic problem? While I admit that such a risk is theoretically possible, I do not believe that we should be overcautious and refuse out of hand any new attempt to reopen debate on the Socratic problem. *Amicus Xenophon, sed magis amica veritas*. Having said that, I also believe that we have no reason to fear a new eclipse of Xenophon's Socratic writings. I say this for two reasons: (1) the rehabilitation of Xenophon's Socratic writings is well under away, and the work being done in this direction has already allowed Xenophon to regain his respectability, so that the tendency seems to me irreversible, if not for all-time, at least for the foreseeable future; (2) to reduce Xenophon to silence, those who venture to discredit his testimony concerning Socrates should try to think up objections other than the ten criticisms that have been tirelessly and lazily repeated since the nineteenth century, the same old ones that I hope to have "neutralized" in the introduction to the *Budé* edition of the *Memorabilia* (Bandini and Dorion 2000: XVIII–XCIX). These criticisms die hard, I know, since they continue to be penned, even today, by interpreters who are hostile to Xenophon; however, I hope that soon no one will be misled by them any longer. In any case, we must congratulate ourselves on the wealth of current research and the renewed diversity of interpretative perspectives in the field of Socratic studies. For my part, I am deeply convinced that the inexhaustibly rich complexity of Socrates has to do, in large part, with the diversity of portraits of him that his contemporaries and heirs have left us. François Mauriac, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1952, is credited with the following witticism: "I like Germany so much that I prefer having two of them." In the same way, I am tempted to say, about Socrates, that I like him so much that it would be difficult for me to console myself if there were only one.

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Xenophon's Intertextual Socrates*

David M. Johnson

L'Autre Socrate

Not that long ago, most work on Xenophon began with an apology. Now the standard opening gambit is to note how far Xenophon's stock has risen in recent years. Xenophon has gotten well beyond his former status as an author you cite when he happens to agree with you and otherwise write off as a third-rate hack. Work on the wider Socratic circle has begun to break through even in English language scholarship, dominated as it long has been for so long by Gregory Vlastos and his followers, who concentrate their formidable analytical energies almost entirely on Plato. Many scholars have helped show the way to a more informed, sympathetic, and productive approach to Xenophon's Socrates and, indeed, to the wider Socratic movement. But there is no doubt that Louis-André Dorion's *L'Autre Socrate* and his magisterial commentary on the *Memorabilia* are central works in the Xenophontic renaissance. Indeed, despite, as a patriotic Québécois, writing only in French, Dorion's work has been translated into English and published in prominent English language volumes on Socrates, alongside work by scholars who have written dozens of essays on Socrates with nary a glance at Xenophon.[1]

Dorion approaches Xenophon's Socratic works expecting to find them a philosophically coherent whole, rather than looking to uncover the flaws in a second-rate text. As we tend to find what we are looking for, and the discovery of a philosophically rich text is a more productive event than a scholar's demonstration that he is cleverer than the author he is studying, Dorion's approach is very welcome indeed. Dorion does all he can to discover solutions to problems raised by Xenophon's text. While I sometimes think he abandons the search for consistency earlier than he should, he always helps us formulate the questions

* I have retained much of the tone from the original version of this paper as delivered at the *Plato & Xenophon: Comparative Studies* conference in June 2014. At that meeting I delivered my argument seated next to Louis-André Dorion, who is the target of a good deal of criticism here; it is a testimony to his *kalokagathia* that he endured this criticism so patiently. Gabriel Danzig and Donald Morrison have provided valuable comments on subsequent drafts.

1 Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar 2006; Morrison 2011.

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raised by Xenophon's text. And his painstaking collection of parallel passages and careful analysis has laid the groundwork for all subsequent work on the *Memorabilia*.

Readers of Xenophon face two main sorts of problems, which we might characterize as Xenophontic problems and Platonic problems. Xenophontic problems are the sorts of problems that affect any text, issues of internal consistency. We might ask whether Xenophon's position on *sophia* is consistent, for example, as at *Mem.* 4.2.33 his Socrates denies it is always beneficial, while elsewhere he suggests that *sophia* is infallible (as at *Mem.* 3.9.4). Platonic problems, for readers of Xenophon, are inconsistencies between Plato and Xenophon. Let us take *sophia* again. Dorion thinks, with good reason, that if we come to Xenophon expecting to find Plato's version of *sophia*, we are going to be disappointed. Plato's *sophia*, in Dorion's view, is an architectonic science with its own special subject matter, the good; Xenophon has no such conception. For Dorion's Xenophon, there are lots of individual varieties of *sophia*, none with anything like the leading role that wisdom has for Plato. But that's not a problem for Xenophon, it's our fault for expecting his Socrates to conform to his false twin, the Platonic model, in the first place. Thus Dorion cures Xenophon of Platonic problems by denying that we have any reason to expect consistency between Xenophon and Plato (Dorion 2013: 123–146). There are, however, a number of difficulties with this approach. The first is that it does not always solve the problem at hand. Dorion not infrequently ends up concluding that Xenophon was, in fact, confused or inconsistent about something. On some specific occasions Dorion may not be sensitive enough to the dramatic context of a passage, or other literary features, and thus finds philosophical incoherence when what we really have are two different literary contexts. More often, I think, Dorion replaces criticizing Xenophon for not being Platonic enough with criticizing him for not being consistent enough: type 2 problems are ultimately redescribed as type 1 problems. This may be because we expect philosophers to conform to a Platonic model of what philosophy should be even when we are not explicitly comparing them to Plato—perhaps, in some sense, Dorion isn't true enough to his own convictions. He can't get Plato off his mind. Who can? But rather than arguing that Dorion hasn't quite freed his Xenophon from Plato, I'm going to suggest we shouldn't even try to do so. I don't think it's what Xenophon had in mind. I don't think Xenophon intended his Socrates to be a free-standing rival to Plato's Socrates.

Much recent scholarship on Xenophon's Socrates, following an ancient but not unanimous tradition, has indeed characterized Xenophon and Plato as rivals, and emphasized differences between the two versions of Socra-

tes.[2] Those ancient readers who saw the two as rivals had no more evidence than we did, but that doesn't mean they weren't on to something.[3] Dorion begins his *L'autre Socrate* with a list of some twenty-one principal differences between Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's Socrates—and that before getting to the most important difference of all, over the role of self-mastery (*enkrateia*; Dorion 2013, XIV–XVIII). Some of Dorion's differences are more convincing than others, but there is no doubt that there are important contrasts to be drawn. In Xenophon's *Symposium* (8.32–35), Socrates overtly corrects a character in Plato's *Symposium*, and I would argue that the whole of Xenophon's *Symposium* is, at least among other things, a response to Plato's. Xenophon defends Socrates against the implicit charge that he corrupted the youth through sexual intercourse[4] by having him explain at length why sex with boys is wrong (*Symposium* 8), while Plato meets this charge only implicitly, by having Alcibiades tell the tale of how Socrates rejected his advances (*Symposium* 217a–219e). Xenophon's *Apology* begins with a statement of how Xenophon will improve on previous accounts, which must at least include Plato's; he then explains why Socrates spoke in an arrogant way guaranteed to lose him votes with the jury. At *Memorabilia* 1.4.1, a key passage for understanding the goals of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon also corrects Plato, or at least provides a response to the central charge made in the *Clitophon*, whether that work be by Plato or not. (More on that passage later.) And while Xenophon's explicit rivalry with Plato is fairly limited, there are many more passages that appear to allude to Plato, and many other cases where we may not have direct allusions but still have good reason to contrast Xenophon's Socrates with Plato's, as the two offer strikingly different accounts of elements in Socrates' life and thought. To mention only two of the most obvious cases regarding Socrates' life, Xenophon and Plato give us very different accounts of Socrates and the Delphic oracle and also differ on Socrates' divine sign.

In 1994 Paul Vander Waerdt hesitantly laid out what has become the mainstream agenda for the study of Socratic literature, at least when that study amounts to more than the study of early Plato.

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2 Examples of scholarship emphasizing differences include Vander Waerdt 1994, Narcy and Tordesillas 2008: 8–9, and Dorion 2013.

3 For the rivalry see Danzig 2005: 331, n. 1, with citations of ancient sources, including Gellius (14.3.2–4), who argues that a personal rivalry was beneath Plato and Xenophon; and Danzig 2014.

4 Danzig (2010: 151–153) argues convincingly that corruption via sex was one element in the controversy about Socrates.

> It might be preferable, given the character of and limitations imposed by our surviving evidence about Socrates, to regard our chief objective as the understanding of the Socratic movement in all its diversity—in which case conflicting accounts among different Socratics arguably provide an excellent guide to authorial intent, even if they tell us little about Socrates himself.
>
> VANDER WAERDT 1994: 3

In his next sentence, Vander Waerdt granted that another alternative approach was entirely legitimate: "the recovery of the most philosophically brilliant of the portraits of Socrates without regard to its historical status." The most brilliant portrait of Socrates is, of course, that of Plato, and "Socratic Studies" as practiced in the Anglo-American world still usually means philosophical analysis of the early Platonic dialogues.[5] But Vander Waerdt's heart was clearly with the first option, which still remains, as it was twenty years ago, an option that is not often taken, particularly in the English-speaking world.

A great achievement by those who have, like Dorion, worked in the comparative mode advocated by Vander Waerdt, has been to treat Xenophon as an author with his own agenda, rather than a would-be Plato who wasn't up to the job. For most of the last century, whether a scholar's interests were primarily historical or philosophical, Plato's portrait of Socrates was the touchstone, and Xenophon's Socrates simply failed to measure up. Save when he was selectively and uncritically invoked as a partial witness, Xenophon was not so much read as judged. We have now come to see that Xenophon's Socrates is different because Xenophon wanted him to be different, not because Xenophon failed to understand Plato, or Socrates. His portrait of Socrates is largely coherent in its own terms. Specific differences between the authors can be explained not as one-off errors, but as parts of two distinct but internally consistent portraits of Socrates. For example, it is not at all surprising that the oracle story in Xenophon's *Apology* says very little about wisdom, whereas wisdom is central to Plato's version because wisdom plays a far less important role in Xenophon than it does in Plato. In Xenophon the divine sign gives good advice not only to Socrates himself but to Socrates' friends; this too is hardly surprising in light of the emphasis Xenophon places on how beneficial Socrates was to his companions. Xenophon's Socrates is different not because Xenophon tried to do what Plato was doing and failed, but because Xenophon's goals in writing about Socrates differed from Plato's.

5 As in Brickhouse and Smith 2010 and Bussanich and Smith 2013.

This comparative approach is essentially an attempt to replace the old-fashioned effort to recover the historical Socrates with study of the earliest stages in the reception of Socrates. There has been an outburst of fine work on Socratic reception in the last few years, including Socrates' impact on ancient philosophy, especially Hellenistic philosophy, as well as his impact and broader cultural role in literature, art, and philosophy from antiquity to today.[6] But when does reception begin—or when should it begin? Perhaps these are naïve questions: depending on how one defines reception, the reception of Socrates began with Socrates. Socrates was always only reception, particularly as his refusal to write anything himself complicates the usual distinction between an original text and the reaction to it. But as a matter of practice, few scholars treat Plato's Socrates as evidence for the *Nachleben* of Socrates, at least in the sense of an afterlife that can be contrasted with what we know or surmise about the life of the historical Socrates.[7] Philosophers writing about Plato's Socrates profess agnosticism about the historical Socrates but then blithely go on to write about "Socrates" as if he were a historical personage with consistent, recoverable views, rather than a mere character in a set of writings by Plato. Plato is largely absent from the discussion, despite being the only source for "Socratic Studies." This is in part because Plato elides his presence as an author so successfully, but also in part because his portrait of Socrates has been so dominant that his Socrates is taken to be the real Socrates. There are important and influential exceptions to this tendency, especially among scholars who identify more as classicists than as philosophers and consider their work as much literary as philosophical.[8] But the English language scholarship on Socrates still predominantly talks about Socrates, rather than about early Plato.

Most writing on Xenophon, on the other hand, remains very cognizant of Xenophon's role as author and his distance from Socrates. There are some good reasons for this. The narrator of the *Memorabilia*, whom we are presumably

6 On reception, see Trapp 2006a and 2006b, Nehemas 1998, and a forthcoming volume from Brill edited by Dustin Gish and Christopher Farrell. Reception also plays a growing role in more general volumes on Socrates: 40 percent of Ahbel-Rappe and Kametkar's 2006 *Companion to Socrates* is devoted to reception. For Socrates' philosophical reception, see Long 2011.

7 Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013, which I had not seen before drafting this essay, is a major and salutary exception to the privileging of Plato. Their presentation of translated passages from various Socratics, grouped thematically, should be of great value in helping readers navigate the conversations among the Socratics.

8 For important (and rather different) exceptions to this approach, see Wolfsdorf 2008 and Danzig 2010.

to identify with the author Xenophon himself,[9] sometimes makes arguments in his own voice and regularly comments on, summarizes, and introduces the Socratic conversations of that work. There is nothing like this narrative voice in Plato. And Xenophon both introduces major Socratics as characters (Aristippus and Antisthenes) and alludes to the wider Socratic circle in ways Plato never does. He thus recognizes that he is not the only voice in the conversation about Socrates. But too often scholars have relied on poor arguments to distance Xenophon from Socrates.[10] While Xenophon's Socratic works reveal the influence of other Socratic writers, and Xenophon missed the last two years of Socrates' life, if he joined Socrates' circle as a young man, he could have spent a decade in that circle. And while it is true that Xenophon made use of other Socratic writings in addition to his own memories and imagination, the use of multiple sources ought to be regarded as a virtue rather than a defect, even from a historical perspective. While I don't believe that Xenophon's numerous claims to autopsy were ever meant to be taken at face value (there are too many glaring anachronisms for this to be the case), he does use such remarks to stake a claim for his responsibility for his Socratic works. As John Cooper has argued, Xenophon's account of Socrates is "controlled by his personally acquired sense of who Socrates was and what he stood for" (Cooper 1999: 14). In other words, Xenophon claims that his Socratica are something other than a study in reception. When he says, "I was there" on such and such an occasion, he intends, I would suggest, to lay claim to first-hand access to Socrates, whether or not he was actually present at a given conversation, and whether or not a given conversation ever took place. The least that can be said, I think, is that there is no better reason for treating Xenophon solely as a stage in the reception of Socrates than there is for treating Plato thus.

Paradoxically enough, the renaissance in the study of Xenophon's Socrates may have unwittingly contributed to his continued marginalization. If we consistently emphasize the differences between Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's Socrates, adopting handy shorthand of the likes of Dorion's Socrates^{X} and Socrates^{P}, we can learn a good deal about each of these superscripted figures, but may miss out on what the two figures share. And where Xenophon's Socrates does not share things with Plato's, he becomes rather less interesting. One problem is that while the philosophical depth of Xenophon's Socrates

9 Bevilacqua (2010: 18–20) attempts to divorce the narrator from the author in the *Memorabilia*, but there is much less purchase for this distinction than we have in the *Anabasis*, where Xenophon's increasingly dominant presence in the third person, from book 3 onwards, arguably reshapes the meaning of the work: see Bradley 2010.

10 Dorion (2000: XVII–XCIX) gives a full account of such criticisms, most of which he rejects.

has often been underestimated, his is by no means the most philosophically brilliant of the portraits of Socrates, to revert to Vander Waerdt's formulation. That is, of course, Plato's Socrates. Now I hasten to add that there are important areas where Xenophon's Socrates covers philosophical ground untouched by Plato's early Socrates. Take the argument from design as it appears in *Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3 or the early version of natural law in 4.4. These passages played an important role for the Stoics, but they rarely make much of a showing in contemporary accounts of Socrates or ancient philosophy. There seems to be an implicit assumption that the theodicy in 1.4 and 4.3 can't be Socratic, because it isn't Platonic, so it must have originated with pre-Socratic thought, or perhaps already be implicit in popular thought, rather than being original to Socrates.[11] The early account of unwritten, natural law is simply ignored—though it is true enough that Xenophon buries it in a chapter otherwise dedicated to positive law.[12] These major developments in philosophy will likely continue to be marginalized so long as the dominant trend in Xenophontic scholarship is to divorce Xenophon's Socrates from Plato's. And while I would argue that Xenophon's literary merits have also often been underestimated, I cannot claim that Xenophon's Socratic works consistently rise to the literary level of Plato's. If Xenophon's Socrates differs so much from Plato's that the pursuit of a common Socrates is chimerical, and Xenophon's Socrates is only worth studying for his own, independent philosophical or literary merits, then, given Xenophon's literary and philosophical limits, Xenophon's Socratica would remain of interest primarily to students of fourth-century literary and intellectual history and those with interest in the reception of Socrates. This is a rather smaller circle than those interested in the philosophy of Socrates. Hence, even though the 2011 *Cambridge Companion to Socrates* was edited by a leading student of Xenophon's Socrates, Donald Morrison, and began with an essay on the Socratic question by none other than Louis-André Dorion, there was rather little about Xenophon in the volume itself.[13]

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11 For Stoic interest in Xenophon's theology, see DeFilippo and Mitsis 1994. Xenophon's account of the argument from design is given due prominence by Sedley (2007: 75–86 and 2008), who argues that it does originate with Socrates.

12 See Johnson 2017 for an effort to reevaluate in just what sense the unwritten laws of *Memorabilia* 4.4 are positivistic or natural.

13 Gabriel Danzig correctly points out that I am here making a "political argument"; i.e., it is an argument premised on the idea that we should be making Xenophon less marginal, rather than one simply aiming to capture the truth. But scholars routinely make a case of the relevance of their work—we must make a play for an audience. If you think

An Intertextual Socrates

Thus the rule that Xenophon is to be interpreted from Xenophon and only from Xenophon frees Xenophon's Socrates from Platonic contamination and enables us to read him without faulting him for failing to be Socratic, i.e., Platonic enough. But it may also solidify his marginal status. Is there a way to read Xenophon's Socratic works without falling into the old trap of judging them by a Platonic standard or reducing them to a stage in the reception of Socrates? Well, yes: intertextuality. Intertextuality is the approach to texts that privileges their interconnectedness. Like most valuable developments in literary theory, this one has ancient roots—and roots in common sense. Rivalry, emulation, and influence are all aspects of intertextuality that have been recognized as long as literature has been read. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* wasn't the only book its readers or author knew, and, of course, their prior reading and prior conversations, including reading and talk about Socrates, provided the context for their understanding of the *Memorabilia*. What's new about intertextuality is the concept that texts do not only speak to one another, but that meaning is to be found in this conversation, rather than in any individual text, just as no individual sound is meaningful unless it is part of the phonemic system of a given language. This is hardly the place to debate the general value of this approach; what I will suggest here is that it is a particularly valuable insight for helping us to understand the figure of Socrates in Xenophon.[14]

Let us start with some evidence from Xenophon himself.

> It seems to me worthwhile also to recall how Socrates deliberated, when he had been charged, about his defense and about the end of his life. Others have also written about this, and all of them captured his boasting, which makes it clear that this is how he really spoke. But they have not

Xenophon's Socrates tells us only about Xenophon and not about Socrates, you will have considerably less reason to read this volume.

14 For one introduction to intertextuality, see Allen 2011. It is only fair to add that Dorion's comparative approach is intertextual as well, inasmuch as he finds meaning in the differences between Xenophon's and Plato's portraits of Socrates. My claim is that we miss much if we only find differences and consider the two versions of Socrates autonomous rivals rather than distinct but often complementary reimaginings of a shared figure. We might say that for Dorion one cannot fully understand Xenophon's Socrates without Plato's Socrates in the same sense that one cannot fully understand Epicureanism without understanding Stoicism, whereas I would argue that Xenophon and Plato are both members of the same sect.

> made it clear that he believed that death was preferable to life for him, and as a result his boasting appears rather foolish.
>
> *Ap.* 1.1

> And if certain people, conjecturing on the basis of what others have written and said about him, believe that he was the best at turning people toward virtue, but not capable of leading them to it, let them consider not only what he said to those who thought they knew everything when, for the sake of correcting them, he refuted them by questioning, but also what he said all day long with those who spent their time with him. And let them then judge whether he was capable of making those with him better.
>
> *Mem.* 1.4.1

> He was in no hurry to see his companions become skilled speakers, capable of getting things done, and resourceful, but thought that that they needed to have moderation first. First off, then, he attempted to make his companions moderate concerning the gods. Others have related conversations he had with people about this; I for my part was present when he had the following conversation with Euthydemus.
>
> *Mem.* 4.3.1–2

These are, to the best of my knowledge, the only explicit references Xenophon makes to other accounts of Socrates.[15] But there are several passages in Xenophon that directly allude to Plato and Aristophanes (*Symposium* 8.32–35 to Plato's *Symposium*; *Symposium* 6.6 and *Oeconomicus* 11.3 to Aristophanes' *Clouds*), and other passages so similar to passages in Plato or Aristophanes that they must count as indirect allusions. And while the most explicit references, the passages quoted above, are not particularly abundant, they do play crucial programmatic roles in the works involved. The first passage introduces Xenophon's *Apology*. *Memorabilia* 1.4.1 helps to characterize the bulk of the *Memorabilia*, all that follows the direct defense of Socrates in the first two chapters of that work and precedes the education of Euthydemus in the fourth book. And *Memorabilia* 4.3.2 introduces the first phase in the positive education of Euthydemus. All three passages give us some indication of the content

15 Most scholars would count references to "the accuser" in *Memorabilia* 1.2 as references to the *Accusation of Socrates* by the Athenian sophist Polycrates, but see Gray 1998: 60–73; Livingstone 2001: 28–40.

to come: Socrates' motivation at his trial, Socrates' positive methodology, and the Socratic curriculum. They do so while also suggesting how Xenophon's contribution differs from that of others.

The rhetorical structure of each of these three passages is similar. Xenophon is going to improve on other accounts about Socrates, but he does so not by rejecting them but by adding to them. Others have noted that Socrates was arrogant: Xenophon agrees that Socrates must indeed have been arrogant but will go a step further by explaining why Socrates was arrogant. Readers will be aware of how Socrates refuted know-it-alls; Xenophon does not deny that Socrates punctured the pretensions of know-it-alls and, in fact, shows Socrates in conversation with such types on a few occasions. But he calls readers' attention to another, more explicitly productive sort of conversation, which features far more prominently in his own work. Others have given accounts of how Socrates made his interlocutors moderate concerning the gods; Xenophon will take up another such case, that of Euthydemus. In all three passages, what Xenophon is doing is adding to his readers' knowledge of Socrates; he is not starting with a *tabula rasa*.

What did Xenophon's readers know about Socrates? They will not have known all of what we know, or only what we know—Plato's early dialogues, as they are interpreted today. But in the first of the passages above, Xenophon must at least include Plato's *Apology* among works on Socrates' trial. In the second passage, the criticism of Socrates is that raised in the *Clitophon*, though the Xenophon passage is not necessarily an allusion to the *Clitophon* itself, especially if that work is non- and, therefore presumably post-Platonic. On most readings of this passage, Xenophon is addressing criticism of Socrates for relying too much on the *elenchos*;[16] this is a problem one could well attribute to Plato's Socrates. The Socratic conversations Xenophon alludes to in the third passage are tougher to pin down. As the topic is piety, the first Platonic parallel to come to mind is the *Euthyphro*, but it is not a very close match, as Euthyphro was not a companion of Socrates, and Socrates' avowed intention in that dialogue is not to make Euthyphro more moderate about the gods but to learn from him about piety.[17] A more likely source for this passage is the sort of criticism

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16 Most readings include Johnson 2005: 41–43 and Dorion 2000: cxliv; contrast Slings 1999: 77–82.

17 As Gabriel Danzig reminds me, Socrates' deeper goal is to teach Euthyphro that he does not know enough about piety to prosecute his father. But this is still a very distinct program from the more positive agenda Xenophon's Socrates takes with Euthydemus. At least in Xenophon's case, I do not think that "moderate about the gods" simply means "recognizing the limits of one's knowledge about the gods"; Xenophon's Socrates has a positive

leveled in Plato's *Gorgias* at practitioners of rhetoric whose students become powerful speakers but may misuse their power. In that work, though, we do not so much see Socrates defending himself against that charge as prosecuting Gorgias in the same terms. But certainly Plato was prominent among the other sources Xenophon's readers had for Socrates, even if their sources also included texts now largely lost to us, and a living tradition of oral controversy about Socrates.

In addition to these explicit references to other accounts of Socrates, there are numerous passages in Xenophon that seem to allude to Plato. Gabriel Danzig, in an account of what he calls "Intra-Socratic polemics" between the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon, points us to two scholars who compiled, between them, thirty-four such parallels between Xenophon's Socratic writings and Plato's.[18] While neither of these scholars aimed to gather a comprehensive list, it is noteworthy that their two lists overlap in only two instances. This confirms both that it is difficult to determine what counts as an allusion and that there are numerous allusions to be found. Still harder to pin down, in any particular case, is which Socratic is alluding to the other, though it is most commonly thought that when this can be determined, Xenophon is usually referring to Plato, rather than vice versa.[19] In some cases, rather than Xenophon reading Plato (or the reverse), we may also be dealing with common sources: lost works by other Socratics, or even actual, historical Socratic conversations. For lost works by other Socratics, consider Aeschines' *Aspasia*, which featured Aspasia's marriage counseling for Xenophon and his wife. Were the whole of that dialogue extant, it might significantly alter our picture of Xenophon, especially his *Oeconomicus*, in which Socrates promises (3.14)—but mysteriously fails to deliver—marriage advice from Aspasia. It is clear that we are dealing here with a particularly rich variety of intertextuality, among a wide circle of Socratics who conversed in writing and in person and produced a large number of Socratic works.[20] At least in Xenophon's case, the intent was not to pro-

theology (see in particular *Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3). Dorion (2011b: 20, n. 6) argues that the *Euthyphro* is not a close match.

18 Danzig (2005: 333, n. 8) points us to Chroust 1957: 230, n. 39 and Kahn 1996: 393–401. See also Waterfield 2004: 107–110; Huss 1999 (for the *Symposia*); and, for the *Memorabilia*, Annexe 2 in Dorion 2011a and the annexes and indices in Dorion 2011b.

19 For examples of influence flowing from Xenophon to Plato, see Morrison 2003: 32 and the contributions by Altman, Humble, and Tuplin in this volume.

20 Rossetti (2011: 31) estimates that some 300 *logoi Sokratikoi* were written by the first generation of Socratics.

duce a free-standing, rival account of Socrates but to complement the accounts already in circulation. We must, therefore, be careful not to too readily assume that parallel passages reflect a colloquy between Xenophon and Plato. If I here focus on the relationship between Xenophon and Plato, that is because our evidence for the other Socratics is so fragmentary and difficult to digest (especially before Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013) and because their special relationship is, after all, the theme of this volume.

More evidence for the conversation between Xenophon and Plato comes in a few passages in which Xenophon seems, at least at first glance, to have forgotten that he is writing about his Socrates and instead to be writing about Plato's. In the first, Xenophon says that Socrates did not talk about the nature of things like the sophists did—sophists we would call pre-Socratics. What did Socrates do instead?

> He himself was always discussing human things, investigating what is pious, what impious, what noble and what base, what just and what unjust, what moderation is, what madness, courage, and cowardice are, what a city is, what a statesman, what rule of men is, what makes one capable of ruling men, and anything else which, being known, makes one noble and good and which, if one is ignorant, leads one to justly be called slavish.
>
> *Mem.* 1.1.16

It has often been remarked that the pursuit of definitions—pursuit of the "what is x" question—is far more characteristic of Plato's Socrates than Xenophon's. Dorion notes that while all of these topics are eventually defined, the definitions take up only three of the *Memorabilia's* thirty-nine chapters (2000: 63 n. 45). It is, therefore, odd to see Xenophon saying that Socrates was always doing what Plato's Socrates often does, but his own Socrates does so rarely. Yet Xenophon's Socrates does define these items, as Dorion notes; and Dorion's count of definitional chapters (*Mem.* 3.8, 3.9, 4.6) oddly leaves out two very substantial efforts to define justice (*Mem.* 4.2 and 4.4). Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* also begins with a very substantial effort to define the household (οἶκος) and property (χρήματα). And it is certainly fair to say that Xenophon's Socrates routinely discusses human matters, rather than the typical subject matter of the pre-Socratics. But the emphasis on definitions here is most coherent if we assume that Xenophon meant readers to understand something more by "Socrates" than what he tells us about Socrates. They had read Socratic literature other than Xenophon's writings, and Xenophon takes this into account. Indeed, his argument here would be spoiled if our only evidence for Socrates

were Xenophon's writings, as those writings do not support his claim that Socrates was always investigating these things.

We hear something similar when Socrates confronts Critias and Charicles about their law forbidding teaching the "art of words." When Socrates asks them to clarify their law, Charicles tries to make it simple by telling Socrates not to speak to the young at all. When Socrates asks if he can ask a youth selling something how much the item costs, Charicles responds as follows:

> "Yes, you may ask that sort of thing," said Charicles. "But you, Socrates, have a habit of asking questions about things you already understand for the most part. So it's this sort of question you're not to ask."
>
> *Mem.* 1.2.36

Critias clarifies further a bit later on:

> Critias said, "But you have to keep away from these men: cobblers, builders, and smiths. For I think they have already been talked to death by all your chatter."
>
> "So too," said Socrates, "am I to keep away from what follows upon those questions, justice and piety and other things of that sort?"
>
> *Mem.* 1.2.37

This too sounds more like Plato than Xenophon. Xenophon's Socrates rarely professes ignorance at all, so can hardly make a habit of ironically pretending not to know things he actually understands very well. But in this very passage Socrates pretends not to understand that Critias and Charicles have passed an *ad hominem* law against him and asks innocent-seeming questions to force them to reveal as much. And in *Memorabilia* 4.2, Socrates will effectively use questions about justice and other topics to show how little his interlocutor knows, demonstrating along the way that he knows enough about justice to refute interlocutors about it. Xenophon's Socrates does make analogies to craftsmen (as at *Mem.* 4.2.22, 4.4.5), but this is hardly as prominent as in Plato (see in particular *Grg.* 490e–491a, *Symp.* 221e). Socrates' interest in "justice and piety and things of that sort" looks rather like the list of definitions we just discussed. Once again Xenophon's Socrates is said to do things habitually that Xenophon only shows him doing occasionally.

The sophist Hippias makes a related point. Socrates has just claimed to be eager to have Hippias reveal his understanding of justice. Hippias instead vents at Socrates as follows:

> "No, by Zeus," he said, "you won't hear it until you yourself reveal what you think is just. You're content with laughing at others, questioning and refuting all of them, while being unwilling to supply your account or opinion about anything."
>
> *Mem.* 4.4.9

Here again it sounds like Xenophon has forgotten which Socrates he is writing about; Hippias' complaint is essentially the same complaint Thrasymachus makes about Plato's Socrates, who will not give his own account of justice in the first book of the *Republic* (336b). Robin Waterfield (2004: 109) says that "this a blatant borrowing from Plato, because it is such an inappropriate complaint to bring against the Xenophontic Socrates, who rarely withholds his opinion." Xenophon, in fact, introduces 4.4 with the comment that Socrates did not hide his view about justice, and he elsewhere stresses how public a life Socrates led (*Mem.* 1.1.10).

Here too the seeming oddity of a Platonic intrusion into Xenophon fades away once we look more closely at Xenophon's Socrates and consider the possibility that he was not meant to be an entirely autonomous figure. Xenophon's Socrates is indeed far less apt to end a conversation in *aporia* than his Platonic namesake. But on at least one occasion he refuses to define key terms: in *Memorabilia* 3.8.3 he says he "neither knows nor wants to know" what the good is, or what is fine, unless it is something good or fine for one purpose or another. And *Memorabilia* 4.2 is a substantial aporetic conversation about justice, the good, and other terms—as well as being the clearest example of an *elenchos* in Xenophon. The transparency of Xenophon's Socrates raises larger questions than we can address here. Suffice it to say that even in *Mem.* 4.4, Socrates' first response to Hippias is not to deny the charge that he prefers refuting others to revealing his own views, but to try to satisfy Hippias with an account of just deeds. It is only after Hippias continues to push that Socrates gives his own definition of justice. Just so, as we have seen, Xenophon himself did not deny that Socrates refuted people who believed they knew it all (*Mem.* 1.4.1); he instead showed us another side of Socrates as well.[21]

21 Donald Morrison reminds me that Xenophontic interlocutors tend to differ from Plato's, and have different, normally more practical, interests; Morrison suggests this shows that the two accounts are meant to supplement one another. It is noteworthy in this regard that when Xenophon appears to conflate his Socrates with Plato's, the interlocutors are prominent, hostile members of the thirty tyrants (Critias and Charicles) and a skeptical sophist (Hippias); such interlocutors are rather uncommon in Xenophon, who far more commonly shows Socrates dispensing advice to friends and friendly acquaintances.

These passages present us with two options, it seems to me. We may conclude that Xenophon has ineptly mistaken his Socrates for Plato's Socrates, presumably because he has taken over a description of Socrates from Plato without altering it to fit its context.[22] Or we can more charitably assume that Xenophon knew what he was doing, and that what he was doing was not presenting an entirely separate, rival version of Socrates, but writing about the same Socrates that Plato and the other Socratics were—an intertextual Socrates, whose origins are no doubt some mixture of history and fiction. It is this intertextual alternative that I will embrace here, as it is more in keeping with the explicit programmatic statements we considered above, and, I argue, will produce a richer interpretive yield. My claim is that Xenophon was attempting to reshape the view of Socrates held by his contemporaries, rather than presenting them with an all or nothing choice between his Socrates and rival versions. The rivalry between the Socratics was not one that required that radical a choice. Their Socrates is therefore an intertextual Socrates, the character who consists of the amalgam of different images of Socrates projected by the Socratics. "Xenophon's Socrates" is not the Socrates who appears in Xenophon and only in Xenophon, but rather Socrates as he is reshaped by Xenophon.

If, when Xenophon says "Socrates," he means not "my Socrates" but "our Socrates," this has important consequences for how we read him. Silence in Xenophon about something Plato attributes to Socrates will not justify the conclusion that Xenophon rejected that aspect of Socrates—though neither can we, of course, assume that Xenophon accepted it. There is a risk that our reading of Plato will contaminate our reading of Xenophon. This is a risk many a scholar, this author included,[23] has fallen prey to. We also cannot be certain that Xenophon read Plato as we do, even in the very limited sense of saying that he took the same Platonic dialogues to be Socratic that we do. But the fact that Xenophon's Socrates sounds much more like the character of early Plato than the figure from middle Plato provides some confirmation that Xeno-

22 Thus Bevilacqua (2010: 136) describes *Memorabilia* 1.2.36 and 4.4.9 as examples of an "oversight" (*svista*) on the part of Xenophon, who mistakenly alluded to the Platonic Socrates, whom she thinks is historical. Dorion (2011b: 29, n. 3) more charitably argues that Xenophon's point at 4.4.9 is precisely to show that *his* Socrates is not open to this attack. But Socrates' immediate response in 4.4.10–11 is still to avoid giving an account, irritating Hippias, who does however succeed in getting Socrates to define justice. Thus Xenophon's Socrates both avoids and does not avoid revealing himself.

23 In Johnson 2005: 68 I assumed too much about the meaning of wisdom (σοφία) for Xenophon's Socrates; cf. Dorion 2013: 125, n. 8 (though I am hardly in complete agreement with Dorion on this matter).

phon's view of Plato's relationship to Socrates was similar to the standard view today. We can, moreover, perhaps rely on the help of scholars hunting for differences between Plato and Xenophon to help us avoid sloppy assumptions of similarity. At any rate, the danger of contaminating Xenophon's Socrates with Plato's Socrates is no greater than the danger of maiming him by putting him in a Xenophon-only quarantine.

Xenophon's Socratic writings do not only feature intertextual connections with other Socratics, but internal, intratextual connections within his individual Socratic works, and intertextual connections among his Socratic works. The individual conversations in *Memorabilia* are clearly not meant to be freestanding independent units. Xenophon provides us with a number of programmatic statements (*Mem.* 1.1.1, 1.3.1, 1.4.1., 2.7.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1, 4.3.1), but more often his interventions are limited to expressions such as "I once heard him discuss X with Y." Such introductory formulae serve mainly to remind us that individual conversations are part of some greater whole; they leave it to readers to piece together that whole. Xenophon thus expects readers to emerge with a picture of Socrates they construct themselves from a number of different conversations, rather than for them to treat each conversation as an independent account of a distinct aspect of Socrates' thought. Vivienne Gray's valuable work on amplification in the *Memorabilia* has helped us see the importance of reading Xenophon this way.[24] Looking across Xenophon's Socratic works, we find that Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and his *Symposium* begin as if they were part of some larger conversation about Socrates. This is quite explicit in the *Oeconomicus*, which begins with the same sort of formula that introduces many chapters in the *Memorabilia*: "And I once heard him having this sort of a conversation about X."[25] The *Symposium* a bit more vaguely notes that not only the serious actions of worthy men are worth remembering, but their playful ones also; presumably most of Socrates' other Xenophontic (and Platonic?) conversations are serious. When it comes to references across their own works, Xenophon and Plato are more clearly akin, as Plato does provide explicit cross-references between some of his dialogues. Thus, while one may fruitfully read one Socratic work in isolation—and it certainly simplifies matters for a critic to do so—we must recognize that the decision to isolate individual texts is ours, not one somehow

24 Gray 1998. It is only fair to point out that Gray treats the introductory formulae somewhat differently, as structural tools and elements derived from the wisdom literature tradition (1998: 113, 123–158).

25 *Memorabilia* 2.4.1 begins with precisely the same words as the *Oeconomicus*. As Gabriel Danzig reminds me, Xenophon also famously begins the *Hellenica* with a complex intertextual reference to Thucydides: "after this" (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα).

inherent in the texts themselves. Xenophon's penchant for connections within and among a variety of works—his own and others—shows that he expected readers not to be passive recipients of the discrete passage or even individual text he was delivering to them, but active participants in an effort to construct a portrait of Socrates. He knew that the materials at their disposal included not only his works but other accounts—written and oral—of Socrates.

While readers of Socratic literature could no doubt benefit from greater attention to modern critical understandings of intertextuality, the Socrates I have sketched is not a theoretically fraught individual. No authors have been harmed in this pursuit of intertextuality. I have relied on some rather old-fashioned soundings into authorial intent to argue that Xenophon's project was intentionally intertextual, rather than employing a modern view of intertextuality to deconstruct the conception of authorial intent. It is quite possible that Plato's Socrates is not intertextual to the same extent. Plato, of course, does not provide first-person narration of the sort we saw in the most explicitly intertextual passages in Xenophon, but Plato can, within his seemingly naturalistic frame, include reference to his other dialogues, and there were certainly other ways to make more overt references to contemporaries. Aeschines was daring enough to write Xenophon into one of his dialogues as a character (*Aspasia*, SSR VIA.70), and while doing so was anachronistic, it was no more anachronistic than Plato's *Menexenus*, with its account of Athenian history down to 387. The dialogue form thus allowed for as much intertextuality as an author was willing to put into it, even if it did not allow for direct cross-references to other works and sources of the sort we have been studying here.

Self-Control Replacing Wisdom?

In my view, then, Xenophon believed that he was talking about the same Socrates as Plato was; that his view of Socrates complemented, supplemented, and, in part, corrected Plato's, but that it was not meant to replace Plato's version of Socrates or stand independently from the accounts of Socrates in Plato and other authors. This Socrates does not exist in Xenophon or in Plato but in the intertext, the conversation between them—to restrict ourselves to the two voices in the Socratic movement that are still most audible to us. Even should you grant me this much, though, there are several serious questions left open. One is the extent of the compatibility between Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's: at some point supplements and corrections become transformative. And while I've argued that Xenophon's rhetoric and technique suggest that he believed his portrait of Socrates was largely compatible with Plato's, we must judge this

for ourselves. Perhaps Xenophon's Socrates is indeed profoundly different from Plato's, but Xenophon was blind to this. There were limits to Xenophon's philosophical acuity, as is true of all of us.[26]

To address this disconcerting possibility, and study the degree of compatibility between our two authors, I suggest we take on what Dorion has identified as the most substantial difference between Plato's Socrates and Xenophon's. What *sophia* is for Plato's Socrates, Dorion argues, *enkrateia* is for Xenophon's. This point runs through many of the essays collected in Dorion's *L'Autre Socrate*, but for convenience's sake I'll focus on his introductory chapter.

> Analysis of many Socratic themes common to Plato and Xenophon reveals that Xenophon's Socrates each time gives to *enkrateia* the central role that Plato's Socrates reserves for *sophia*. The systematic character of this substitution of *enkrateia* for *sophia* leaves no room for doubt: Xenophon seeks in this way to preserve the philosophical coherence of his portrait of Socrates, who is not only the supreme embodiment of *enkrateia* but also the tireless champion of an ethics which makes *enkrateia* the foundation of the virtuous life. This shows how unjust and reductive it is to present Xenophon as a poor imitator of Plato, for even if we assume that he has in effect borrowed certain Socratic themes from Plato, one must grant that he has always worked to reformulate them so as to integrate them into his own portrait of Socrates.
>
> DORION 2013: xxvi—my translation

There is much truth to this view, but a great deal is going to depend on just what we mean by saying that *enkrateia* "replaces" *sophia*. There are at least two broad senses in which *enkrateia* could replace *sophia*:

1. as the chief lesson Socrates has to teach
2. as the foundation of Socrates' philosophy

I think that Dorion is essentially right about (1). But whether he is right about (2) depends on how we interpret that claim. Let's take each of these two in order.

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26 In addition to the possibility that he was blind to differences between his Socrates and Plato's, Xenophon could be playing a very deep game, pretending he was talking about the same individual while actually introducing someone very different indeed. While more open to the idea that Xenophon plays a deep game than most, I find this a stretch, and I hope my account of *enkrateia* will suggest we needn't resort to this speculative a reading.

Enkrateia is certainly among the most important topics in Xenophon's work on Socrates, while the root does not even occur in Plato until the *Gorgias* (ἐγκρατῆ 491d). *Sophia* and related terms, on the other hand, are mentioned considerably less often in Xenophon than in Plato. As a topic of conversation, then, one can reasonably say that in Xenophon, *enkrateia* replaces *sophia*. Dorion is, however, making a more interesting claim than noting that *enkrateia* and related terms would dominate a subject index to Xenophon's Socratic works much as *sophia* and related terms would dominate such an index to early Plato. *Enkrateia* is, if not the chief item, then at least a chief item in the Socratic curriculum in Xenophon. But a good teacher prioritizes topics not solely due to their intrinsic importance, or their interest to the teacher, but in accordance with how vital they are for students to learn. Thus differences in sense (1) do not require differences in sense (2).

"Priority" also comes in different senses. In the temporal sense, the first thing our teacher covers may not be the most important thing, but that which is indispensable for further progress. Priority in the sense of relative amount of class time may also not directly reflect intrinsic importance. Hard lessons take longer, either because matters are difficult in themselves, or perhaps because they are particularly difficult for one set of students. Thus, if we stop by introductory physics classes taught by two different professors, and find those professors covering rather different material, we cannot assume that they disagree about physics. Perhaps we have come upon one earlier in the semester than the other. Or perhaps our two professors may offer very different introductory courses on physics all told, depending on their view of what students need. They may disagree about the best way to teach physics in general, or one may be teaching students who differ considerably from their peers. Xenophon was interested in an audience broad enough to include people skeptical of Socrates—people who needed convincing that he did not deserve the death penalty, and that he was a most useful companion. Plato's audience is very difficult to pin down, but while his works are often rather popular in style and content, they generally feature a philosophical core that is presumably restricted to those with philosophical interests. If Xenophon and Plato had different audiences, we would expect their lessons to differ even if they had the same basic view of Socrates' philosophy.

As I argued above, however, Xenophon and Plato are in a sort of conversation. If that conversation was to be intelligible and substantive, it must share some basic assumptions. Xenophon, after all, criticizes Plato's account of the trial of Socrates and supplements it with his own. For this to have been intelligible to readers, at least some of Xenophon's readers must also have been readers of Plato. We as scholars are used to mixed audiences, after all, claim-

ing (especially for publishers and deans) that our work has a wide reach, while also including much that will be of greatest relevance only for those in our own scholarly niche. So correcting for differences in audiences and teaching methods will only take us so far. Differences above a certain level will be noticed by shared readers and will be taken as differences about the substance of Socrates' philosophy.

Now the term "philosophy of Socrates" is not exactly transparent and univocal. For present purposes, I'll have to provide a cursory working definition that begs lots of questions. Socrates, in both Xenophon and Plato, is concerned above all with questions of ethics, ethics of a virtue ethics type, with well-being (*eudaimonia*) as the goal. This is in itself a pretty striking similarity between the two figures—but these terms are broad, and on this level a wide range of thinkers influenced by Socrates were in agreement.[27] For a virtue eudaemonist of this stripe, the most important doctrinal element will be either his conception of virtue or his conception of *eudaimonia*. Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's Socrates may well differ about *eudaimonia*, but neither of them is particularly clear on that topic, so let us bracket it for now. Other differences will be about virtue or the virtues, the quality or qualities that make it possible for one to prosper—and each has much more to say about this. If *enkrateia* is replacing *sophia* in this second sense, we would be saying that for Xenophon *enkrateia* plays the same role in securing happiness that *sophia* plays for Plato's Socrates. What sort of role is that?

The role is *fundamental*, as, in a passage Dorion often cites, Xenophon's Socrates says that *enkrateia* is the foundation of virtue (*Mem*. 1.5.4). Let us first distinguish two senses which *enkrateia* could be "fundamental."

A. *Enkrateia* provides the necessary basis, the foundation, for all other valuable ethical traits and states (including the virtues, freedom, and happiness).
B. *Enkrateia* is the trait to which all other valuable traits and states can be reduced.

I'm quite sure that Dorion sees *enkrateia* as foundational in sense A—and that he is right to do so. But there's a long way from A to B, and this gap complicates comparison with Plato. I don't know whether Dorion would go so far as to say that *all* valuable traits can be reduced to *enkrateia* for Xenophon's Socrates, that it would be essentially what one ends up with once one unifies the virtues—but I'm pretty sure that he shouldn't go that far.

27 See, however, Morrison 2003 for doubts about eudaimonism in Plato.

Here is the foundation passage from the *Memorabilia*:

> So is it not necessary that every man, taking *enkrateia* to be the foundation of virtue (τὴν ἐγκρατείαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπῖδα), make it the first thing he constructs in his soul? For who, without it, could learn anything of value, or concern himself with anything worthwhile? Who, enslaved to pleasures, would not put himself in a poor condition in both body and soul? I think, by Hera, that a free man should pray not to gain a slave of this sort, and if he is enslaved to such pleasures, he should beseech the gods to give him good masters—for that is the only way such a man could be saved.
>
> *Mem.* 1.5.4–5

Enkrateia is the foundation of virtue, so it is the first thing one should go about acquiring for one's soul. Without it one is no better than a slave. It is clear that *enkrateia* was a very important part of the teaching of Xenophon's Socrates—and that this lesson is not one that Plato's Socrates bothers with in the early dialogues. So we can say that *enkrateia* replaces *sophia* in sense 1 above, as the highest priority item, or at least a very high priority item, in Socrates' teaching. Furthermore, it is clear that *enkrateia* is foundational in the first sense I give above (A), as a foundation to build on. But it is not clear that it is also fundamental in the second sense (B). After all, if all other worthwhile things could be reduced to *enkrateia*, why note that one can't learn anything without it, or concern oneself with anything? What would there be to learn or concern oneself about, if one was already self-controlled? Nothing in this passage is inconsistent with an ethics that held that something other than *enkrateia* was also necessary for the good life. As Leo Strauss somewhat perversely put it, *enkrateia* could be not so much the foundation as the "basement of virtue" (Strauss 1939: 514). Now even if *enkrateia* is necessary for a good life, while another trait (say, wisdom) is not only necessary but sufficient, one might think that a teacher need only worry about the second. But what if wisdom cannot be acquired, or retained, in absence of the first trait? And what if *enkrateia* is in fact in short supply among the ambitious young men one speaks with? Which of these traits should a teacher emphasize?

A second passage where Xenophon seems to have replaced *sophia* with self-mastery will be familiar, but I'll quote it for reference. It is the last passage Dorion discusses before making the remark on page xxvi that I quoted above.

> "Chaerephon once asked at Delphi about me in the presence of many others, and Apollo proclaimed that no man was more free than me or more just or more moderate (σωφρονέστερον)."

> When the jurors heard this, they made even more of an uproar, naturally enough, and Socrates again spoke.
>
> "Well, the god said something more in an oracle concerning Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver, than he said about me. For it is said that when Lycurgus was entering the temple the god hailed him thus: 'I wonder whether I should address you as a god or a mortal.'"
>
> "The god did not liken me to a god, but judged me far superior to men. Nonetheless, don't just trust the god like that about this, either, but consider each one of the things the god said."
>
> "Who do you know to be less of a slave to bodily desires than I am?"
>
> "What man is more free than I, who take no gift or pay from anyone?"
>
> "Who could you reasonably consider more just than one so well adjusted to his circumstances that he needs nothing that belongs to anyone else?"
>
> "And how could anyone reasonably say that I was not a wise man, given that, ever since I began to understand what was said, I never ceased seeking to learn anything valuable (ἀγαθόν) that I could?"
>
> *Ap.* 14–16

The Platonic counterpart to this passage is too well-known to bear citation here. The differences between Plato's account and Xenophon's are striking and significant. Dorion analyzes this passage as follows:

> The explanation of this oracle provided spontaneously by Xenophon's Socrates in effect shows that these three qualities really can be reduced to one, *sophrosune*, which is almost always synonymous with *enkrateia*. As we have already seen, Xenophon's Socrates presents moderation in the area of pleasures and desires as the foundation of his irreproachable justice and his unparalleled freedom. The oracular response is thus a sort of summary or distillation of the grand principles of the ethics endorsed by Xenophon's Socrates, with the result that one is tempted to conclude that "Xenophon has reformulated Plato's account of the oracle's response in the service of his own understanding of Socratic ethics."[28]

I think that Dorion, following Vander Waerdt, is right to conclude that Xenophon is responding to Plato. In this case, then, I cannot cite differences in audiences and claim that Xenophon's Socrates is different because he's talk-

28 Dorion 2013: XXVI, citing Vander Waerdt 1993: 39.

ing to different sorts of people. While Xenophon's Socrates is fond of rhetorical questions, it seems likely to me the parallel between his questioning the jury about the oracle and Plato's account of Socrates' questioning others about the oracle is intentional. We are meant to contrast the sorts of questions Xenophon has Socrates ask with those Plato had him ask. Xenophon's Socrates here is really talking to readers of Plato.

Dorion is also certainly right that control over desire plays a prominent role, one that explains, at least in large part, Socrates' freedom and his justice. That is, mastery of desire plays some sort of larger organizing role in Socrates' thought. After asking the jurors to question each of the god's points, Socrates first says that he is no slave to his bodily desires; this we naturally assume shows how he is free, the first thing the god said of him. But he then tells us that he is free because he takes no gifts or pay from anyone. This is presumably because he controls his desires so well that he is essentially self-sufficient. And it is once again presumably his self-sufficiency that leads him not to require others' possessions, removing the main temptation to injustice. Socrates then says that he is wise—not that he is wiser than others, though the structure of the rest of the passage, including what follows, implies as much. I'm not quite sure what to make of the sudden appearance of wisdom in what is supposed to be an examination of what Apollo said about Xenophon's Socrates, as Apollo did not mention wisdom—whereas it was the only quality the god attributed to Plato's Socrates. Some have gone as far as to amend the text so as to replace "more moderate" (σωφρονέστερον) in the oracle with "wiser" (σοφώτερον). This I think goes too far. But Dorion, here as elsewhere, goes too far in the other direction in eliding the distinction between *sophrosyne* and *enkrateia*. Xenophon's Socrates, after all, does not equate these two terms; rather, Xenophon tells us that Socrates made no distinction between *sophrosune* and *sophia* (*Mem.* 3.9.4). As we saw above, then, Xenophon's Socrates does leave room for something on top of the foundation of virtue, *enkrateia*, and that something is wisdom.

Enkrateia, therefore, is not the whole story for Xenophon's Socrates, though it is a big part of the story. The story also contains wisdom. Dorion denies that Xenophon has *sophia* play anything like the role it does in Plato, and again I would say that there is a sense in which he is right and a sense in which he is not. Clearly Xenophon spends far less time discussing the importance of knowledge than Plato does. Wisdom is therefore a far more important lesson for Plato's Socrates than for Xenophon; in this sense *sophia* is indeed for Plato what *enkrateia* is for Xenophon. But I would not follow Dorion in denying that *sophia* plays a similar role in the philosophy of both versions of Socrates. There is not time here to demonstrate as much, and I will have to content myself with citing Morrison's two articles making this point (2009, 2008). Wisdom is indeed

"the greatest good" for us, but if we lack self-control we can lose it (*Mem.* 4.5.6). If we know the right thing to do, we always do it; but we will not learn what the right thing to do is in the first place if we lack self-control.

I claim, therefore, that Xenophon's Socrates is compatible with Plato's on this count. *Enkrateia* is necessary, but not sufficient, and Xenophon leaves plenty of important work to be done by *sophia*. Let's take a quick look at things the other way around. Is Plato's Socrates' compatible with Xenophon's? Dorion certainly doesn't think so, and neither, at least until recently, would most other readers of Plato's Socrates. This is because, to revert to the metaphor Xenophon used for *enkrateia*, Plato's Socrates has no foundation. That is, Plato's Socrates never considers whether wisdom must rest on something else. It isn't surprising that Plato does not consider the preconditions for wisdom, though, because as it turns out, no human is really virtuous in early Plato, as no one is truly wise. On the other hand, wisdom is fundamental in the sense of being the quality to which all other valuable qualities can be reduced—at least if we take Plato's Socrates to hold to some version of the unity of the virtues. There are, of course, all sorts of complications here, but few would deny that for Plato *sophia* is, if only one could get it, pretty much all one needs to succeed—at least all of success that is under one's control. Alas, the problem is, no one is wise. No surprise there—from a Xenophontic point of view—for Plato's version of Socrates' philosophy is built on a foundation of sand, or, rather, built on nothing.

But there is controversy about this aspect of Plato's Socrates. In a seminal 1995 article, Daniel Devereux observed that the orthodox understanding of Plato's Socrates denied not only incontinence but continence. Devereux observed that this orthodoxy ought to be surprising, given the emphasis Xenophon placed on self-control. "While it seems clear that Xenophon's portrait of his revered mentor lacks the subtlety and depth of Plato's, it is difficult to see how he could have placed self-mastery at the center of Socratic ethics if in fact Socrates believed there was no such thing" (Devereux 1995: 381). Worse still for the standard view; Aristotle seemed to confirm the then heretical view that Socrates recognized that not all of our desires are for the good, and that even those with knowledge of the good must battle against such unruly desires (*Eudemian Ethics* 2.11.1227b12–19). Devereux argued that in Plato, too, we could find reason to believe that Socrates held such a view. Devereux's article has in recent years been expanded on and refined by Brickhouse and Smith, including in their 2010 book on Socratic moral psychology. I think it is fair to say that Brickhouse and Smith have been utterly uninfluenced by Xenophon, of whom they can be rather contemptuous; on the basis solely of the Platonic evidence, they have come to believe that non-rational desires play a significant role for Socrates. But it seems to me that the Xenophontic evidence ought to provide us

not only one impetus for questioning Platonic orthodoxy, as it did for Devereux, but an important source of evidence for helping us decide between alternative readings of Plato.

The consequences of this possible compatibility on issues where Xenophon and Plato had seemed so incompatible are difficult to overstate. I think there are two major possibilities here. The first is reframe our approach to the Socratic Question. For the supposed incommensurability of Xenophon and Plato has been the single greatest impediment to any attempt to recover the philosophy of the historical Socrates. English language scholars have largely abandoned any effort to make serious comparative work the basis of the recovery of the historical Socrates; even those who are open to drawing historical conclusions about Socrates focus almost entirely on Plato's Socrates. Xenophon is used by such scholars only to support the general notion that the Socratic writers worked under historical constraints, or to help separate the historical Socrates in early Plato from Plato's own ideas in middle and late Plato. Where Xenophon's more detailed reports on Socrates appear to contradict early Plato, Xenophon is dismissed as a second-rate source. I've argued that Xenophon can be a much richer source of evidence. Evaluation of his evidence will be difficult, even if the renaissance in interest in Xenophon allows for a far more sympathetic reading of his works. And we will face difficulties not only when our sources disagree, but when they agree, as we cannot be sure of the source of that agreement: we are dealing with a "contaminated" tradition, in which our sources, even those who had direct access to Socrates, were influenced not only by Socrates but by other Socratics. Nor can Aristotle save the day, as most or even all of Aristotle's testimony will have come from Plato, either from his texts or from conversations at the Academy. So reevaluation of Xenophon's aims and his relationship with Plato will not make the Socratic Question easy to answer, but it may show that it is not unanswerable in principle.[29]

The second consequence brings me back to a phrase from Vander Waerdt, cited above, as one goal for the study of the Socratic movement: "the recovery of the most philosophically brilliant of the portraits of Socrates without regard to its historical status." I submit that the soundest, psychologically most plausible, and most beneficial version of Socrates' teaching, if perhaps not the

29 Brickhouse and Smith (1989: 6–7) cite Xenophon in support of their argument for the historical nature of Socratic literature. Vlastos (1991: 99–106) uses Xenophon to help him separate genuine Socratic matter in Plato; but see Beversluis 1993. Continental work on Socrates has of late attempted to recover not so much the doctrines of Socrates but his characteristic way of interacting with others, what we may very loosely call his method; see Stavru 2013: 25–26, citing Rossetti 2011.

"most philosophically brilliant" one, may not be that of Plato's Socrates or of Xenophon's Socrates, but that of the intertextual Socrates. Xenophon's Socrates provides us with the foundation, *enkrateia*, but says too little of the superstructure of Socratic philosophy—*sophia*. Plato's Socrates suffers from the opposite flaw: all top and no bottom. Only the intertextual Socrates gives us the whole package. A defense of this suggestion would obviously go beyond the scope of this paper. But I hope to have shown how an intertextual Socrates may prove every bit as worthy a figure for our consideration as Xenophon's Socrates or Plato's Socrates. We may have much to learn from this intertextual Socrates, even if his teachings are not demonstrably those of Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, of the deme Alopeke.

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Division and Collection: A New Paradigm for the Relationship between Plato and Xenophon

William H.F. Altman

This essay emerges from an ongoing attempt to effect a paradigm shift in the study of Plato: to displace the modern hegemony of reading the dialogues exclusively in relation to chronological order of composition by reviving an ancient concern with a pedagogical "Reading Order of Plato's *Dialogues*" (Altman 2010a; cf. Lamm 2005). Thinking along these lines has led to a reconsideration of the relationship between Plato and Xenophon, and here an alternative paradigm—once again, both old and new—will be applied to it. Based on "Order of Composition" in the form of the modern question of who wrote first, the current paradigm has for the most part assigned to Xenophon the unenviable role of being both second in time and second-rate in quality,[1] and there is a problem here: while taking Plato's side in what I will show to be an ancient argument about the comparative excellence of Plato and Xenophon, the currently dominant paradigm goes too far by depicting the son of Gryllus as Plato's inept imitator. No ancient claimed anything like this, and although my present purpose is ultimately to show how ancient testimony can help us replace an image of literary rivalry with a more cooperative model, the current hegemony of a winner-take-all approach undermines the ancient evidence that serious people found good reason to debate the comparative merits of two roughly contemporary Athenian admirers of Socrates.

Following Aulus Gellius, one of three ancient authorities for the literary rivalry between Plato and Xenophon, I will offer an alternative to a zero-sum battle over the chronological priority of one dialogue to another. While those still fascinated by order of composition will perhaps find evidence here that supports theories about multiple editions that tend to replace the simple priority/copyist dyad with a more dialogic approach (Danzig 2005), more conservative defenders of the strictly chronological approach will discern that I am

1 For a recent example, see Patzer 2010: 255–256 (emphasis in original): "all his [sc. Xenophon's] recourses to Plato must miscarry and likewise his concept of Socratic dialectic, which in all places comes from Plato. Seen in this way, the dialectic of the Xenophontic Socrates is an interesting document for an early, if mistaken, reception of Plato; as evidence for Socrates—the historical Socrates—it does not come into consideration .... *We must abandon Xenophon as a genuine source for the historical Socrates*."

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more sympathetic to casting Plato in the role of copyist and Xenophon in the role of pioneer than is currently fashionable. Nevertheless, my actual purpose is rather to re-examine the relationship between these two Socratics in the context of an alternative pedagogical conception of Plato's *corpus* that discovers in it a story-like curriculum that arises from collecting into a higher unity a series of discrete and self-contained dialogues, a "reading order" that begins with the elementary *First Alcibiades*—as many ancients believed (Segonds 1985 and Denyer 2001)—and ends with *Phaedo*.[2] It is in relation to this τέλος that the relationship between Plato and Xenophon will be reconsidered, and my ongoing claim is that their relationship is best understood as cooperative, not antagonistic.

There are three ancient authorities for the rivalry between Plato and Xenophon: Aulus Gellius, Athenaeus, and Diogenes Laertius. One of Diogenes' two brief discussions of their presumed rivalry is found in his *Life of Plato*: both having unquestionably written about similar things (τὰ ὅμοια), they have done so ὥσπερ διαφιλονεικοῦντες ("as though thoroughly strife-loving"), and here he emphasizes Xenophon's apparent want of friendly feelings toward Plato (ἔοικε δὲ Ξενοφῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχειν οὐκ εὐμενῶς);[3] these feelings have already been presented as mutual in the *Life of Xenophon*.[4] The longer account in Athenaeus is less nuanced: although the two men "were very competitive from the start" (τάχα φιλονείκως εἶχον ἀρχῆθεν), Plato's ζηλοτυπία[5] toward Xenophon is mentioned first,[6] and this priority probably explains why the passage eventually evolves into a general and intemperate attack on Plato.[7] But despite these variations regarding balance or partisanship, there is one striking detail that both accounts have in common, and that they share with Aulus Gellius: all mention the Athenian Stranger's dismissive comment about the education of Cyrus in Plato's *Laws*.[8] As far as the ancient evidence for the modern concern with order

2 Serious consideration of "fictional chronology" has been made possible by Nails 2002: 308–323; for results, see Zuckert 2009. For my review of this important book, see Altman 2010b.

3 Diogenes Laertius 3.34.

4 Diogenes Laertius 2.57: ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ καὶ Ἀττικὴ Μοῦσα γλυκύτητι τῆς ἑρμηνείας· ὅθεν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ζηλοτύπως εἶχον αὐτος τε καὶ Πλάτων.

5 LSJ: "jealousy, rivalry, envy"; cf. previous note.

6 Athenaeus 11.112–114.

7 Beginning in earnest with Athenaeus 11.114: Ὅτι δὲ καὶ δυσμενὴς ἦν [sc. Plato] πρὸς ἅπαντας δῆλον.

8 Aulus Gellius *Attic Nights* 14.3: *eo facto scriptoque eius* [sc. Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia*], *usque adeo permotum esse Platonem ferunt, ut quodam in libro, mentione Cyri regis habita, retractandi levandique eius operis gratia, virum quidem Cyrum gnavum et strenuum fuisse dixerit.* παιδείας δὲ ὀρθῆς οὐχ ἧφθαι τὸ παράπαν *haec enim verba sunt de Cyro Platonis*; Athenaeus 11.112:

of composition goes, it is principally Plato who responds to Xenophon, not Xenophon who responds to Plato, or rather, as the more intemperate versions of the current paradigm would have it, who copies Plato, and does so poorly.

In order to introduce the alternative paradigm in an ancient context, consider the relationship between three pieces of evidence preserved by Diogenes Laertius: the first that Plato attacked Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in *Laws* (3.34), the second that Plato was writing *Laws* at the end of his life (3.37), and the third that Xenophon was the first (πρῶτος) who brought the sayings of Socrates to men by "having written *Memorabilia*."[9] While rejecting the last of these out of hand, I maintain that the chronological paradigm has valorized the second without devoting much attention to the implications of the first (but see Danzig 2003). One might think that a paradigm that confines the attention of an eighty-year-old Plato to *Laws* might still be willing to accord Xenophon, in relation to that τέλος at least, a certain degree of relative priority.

But this is not the kind of priority in which I am interested, and that is because I do not regard the writing of *Laws* as the true τέλος of Plato's literary career. Even if *Laws* is the last dialogue he wrote,[10] we cannot know, particularly on the basis of a "some say" in Diogenes Laertius (3.37), that writing it was the last thing that he did, least of all that he died while writing it.[11] Both older and more persuasive is the claim of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that it was not a single dialogue, but rather "his dialogues" in the aggregate on which Plato was working until the end,[12] and that he was then, moreover, particularly concerned with the question of putting things in the right order.[13] It is, therefore, not the

καὶ περὶ τοῦ Κύπου οὖν ὁ μὲν λέγει ὡς ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἐπεπαίδευτο πάντα τὰ πάτρια, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ὥσπερ ἐναντιούμενος ἐν τρίτῳ Νόμων φησί· 'Μαντεύομαι δὲ περί Κύρου τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' αὐτὸν στρατηγόν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φιλόπονον, παιδείας δὲ ὀρθῆς οὐχ ἧφθαι τὸ παράπαν, οἰκονομίᾳ δ' οὐ δή τινι οὖν προσεσχηκέναι. ἔοικε δ' ἐκ νέου στρατεύεσθαι, παραδοὺς τοὺς παῖδας ταῖς γυναιξὶ τρέφειν' [cf. *Laws*]; and Diogenes Laertius 3.34: καὶ ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις ὁ Πλάτων πλάσμα φησὶν εἶναι τὴν παιδείαν αὐτοῦ· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι Κῦρον τοιοῦτον.

9 Diogenes Laertius 2.48: καὶ πρῶτος ὑποσημειωσάμενος τὰ λεγόμενα [sc. of Socrates] εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἤγαγεν, Ἀπομνημονεύματα ἐπιγράψας.

10 As the presupposition on which stylometry is based, it cannot be used to prove anything about *Laws*.

11 Cf. the delightful *scribens est mortuus* at Cicero, *De senectute* 13. See also Altman 2016b: 262 n. 197 and 321.

12 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De compositione verborum*, 3.16: ὁ δὲ Πλάτων, τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων, καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων, οὐ διέλιπεν ὀγδοήκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη.

13 As in the famous anecdote about the first words of Plato's *Republic*, also at *De compositione verborum*, 3.16.

relative priority of *Cyropaedia* to *Laws* in relation to order of composition, or the absolute priority of *Memorabilia* to all other Socratic discourses, but rather the relative priority of both *Cyropaedia* and *Memorabilia* to the final ordering of Plato's dialogues on the basis of reading order—the project that I regard as the true τέλος of his literary career and one that presupposes the prior writing of all his dialogues, including *Laws*—that concerns me.[14]

Particularly with respect to the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon's originality is seldom denied, but it is insufficiently noticed that his *Memorabilia* is the only surviving example of a *collection* of Socratic dialogues, apart, that is, from the edifice I am claiming that Plato had completed by the end of his life. Indeed the word "surviving" is misleading: among the titles preserved in Diogenes Laertius' account of the eleven Socratics he discusses between Xenophon and Plato, none would have been suitable for a collection of Socratic dialogues.[15] Whatever may have been the principle or principles that guided Xenophon in constructing his *Memorabilia*, it is, therefore, only the indisputable fact that he gathered numerous Socratic conversations into one literary work that proves to be relevant here; and even those who would minimize its level of integration must admit that the biographical features of the *Cyropaedia*, especially the fact that it ends with a deathbed discourse,[16] give that work, at least, a clear structuring principle.

Since I regard *Phaedo*, not *Laws*, as the logical and dramatic τέλος of Plato's Socratic story,[17] the collection I am calling "the Reading Order of Plato's dialogues" owes as much to *Cyropaedia* as it does to *Memorabilia*: it is a collection of Socratic dialogues that ends with its hero's death. The important point is, then, that if Plato came to organize his Socratic dialogues into a synthetic whole that ended with *Phaedo*, there is no literary precedent for such a project except what we find in his older contemporary Xenophon. And it deserves emphasis that even if Xenophon had finished both *Memorabilia* and *Cyropaedia* only on

14 The argument that this project embraced and subsumed both *Laws* and *Epinomis*—despite Diogenes Laertius 3.62—can be found in Altman 2016b.

15 For the organizing principle governing his treatment of the Socratics beginning with Xenophon and ending with Plato, see Diogenes Laertius 2.47. For the titles known to him, see 2.61 (Antisthenes and Aeschines), 2.84 (Aristippus), 2.105 (Phaedo), 2.108 (Eucleides), 2.120 (Stilpo), 2.121 (Crito), 2.122 (Simon; note πρῶτος at 1.123), 2.124 (Glaucon and Simmias), and 2.125 (Kebes). The collective formula ἐν ἑνὶ βιβλίῳ (2.122 and twice in 2.124) clearly refers to later editors; in the case of Aristippus, the collective ἓν δὲ ἐν ᾧ διάλογοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν (2.83) does not apply to τὰ λεγόμενα of Socrates.

16 Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 8.7.

17 See Altman 2010c and 2016b, § 13.

the very last day of his life—an absurd hypothesis[18]—Plato still had a good many years during which he had ready access to the entire *corpus Xenophonteum* while still in the process of writing, completing, and arranging his own dialogues.

Despite the fact that it required displacing *Sophist* and *Statesman* from their rightful place between *Euthyphro* and *Apology of Socrates*, Thrasyllus' decision to begin his edition of Plato with the *First Tetralogy* indicates an ancient awareness that at least some of the dialogues, properly arranged, could be integrated into a coherent and dramatic story. Although the dialogues about the trial and death of Socrates would seem to be the best evidence for my synthetic approach to Platonic collection, I will use them here to introduce division, which I regard as the correlative and coequal example of how the relationship between Plato and Xenophon can be reconsidered as cooperative and synergistic. In this essay's title, "division and collection" refer to Xenophon's influence on two complementary aspects of Plato's Socratic dialogues: before Plato could collect them into a greater whole, he first needed to have divided them into discrete works so artfully constructed that each could stand alone. Having begun by suggesting that Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Cyropaedia* gave Plato a positive precedent for how to collect his dialogues, I now want to show how Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates* created a negative precedent that may have inspired Plato to divide his dialogues along dramatic lines before he then set about arranging them in a well-ordered collection for a pedagogical end.

This use of the word "pedagogical" deserves emphasis: in interpreting Plato's dialogues, it has apparently become too easy to forget that the founder of the Academy was, after all, a teacher, and it is, therefore, worth considering the possibility—as I am in the process of doing—that the dialogues, when properly arranged, constitute a coherent and progressive curriculum that entertains with a dramatic story of a hero's life and death while it simultaneously instructs. Since most everyone who has taught them regards the dialogues of Plato as superior teaching tools, and since we know their creator also created a school in which he taught, it seems odd to ignore the plausible possibility that it was his own dialogues that he taught there.

In a recent paper, Boris Hogenmüller (Hogenmüller 2015) has argued that Xenophon's *Apology* depends not only on Plato's *Apology*, but on *Crito* and *Phaedo* as well; in response, I suggest that whatever the relative priority may

18 For a useful discussion of the problems associated with the chronology of Xenophon's writings, see Huss 2010: 278–279 n. 64; dates for *Memorabilia* range between 371 and 354, for *Cyropaedia* between 362–359. See Nails 2002: 245 for 348–347 as the date of Plato's death.

be where the two versions of *Apology of Socrates* are concerned, Hogenmüller goes too far here and does so in a revealing manner. Since Xenophon's thesis in his *Apology* is that the explanation for Socrates' μεγαληγορία during the trial was his belief that the time was ripe for him to die,[19] it is remarkable that the passages Hogenmüller uses to show Xenophon's dependence on Plato's *Crito* and *Phaedo* both involve Socrates making witty remarks that perfectly illustrate his contempt for death. When his friends proposed that he escape from prison, Socrates asked them, "if perhaps they knew some place outside of Attica which is off-limits for death."[20] And when the emotional Apollodorus lamented that Socrates was being put to death unjustly, Socrates asked: "And you, dearest Apollodorus, would you have rather wished to see me die justly than unjustly?"[21] Since Hogenmüller's purpose is to disjoin narratives relating to post-trial events from Xenophon's account of the trial, and thereby to prove that he is inserting Platonic material where it scarcely belongs, he mentions these high-minded—yet comic—Socratic responses only in passing. Instead, he emphasizes the dramatic setting of the *Crito* (Hogenmüller 2015: 130–132) and the role of the weeping Apollodorus in the context of Phaedo's soon-to-be-shorn hair in *Phaedo* (Hogenmüller 2015: 132–134).

What Hogenmüller fails to consider is that it is only for the sake of Socrates' responses that Xenophon narrates these post-trial events. They are best understood as memorable "punch lines" to well-told jokes,[22] and both of them illustrate perfectly—and thereby prove—Xenophon's principal thesis: Socrates "believed that death was preferable to life." And it is this thesis that points to the Achilles' heel of Hogenmüller's argument. Announced in the opening words of his *Apology*, Xenophon's thesis is that although others have written about

19 Xenophon, *Apology* 1.

20 Xenophon, *Apology* 23: εἴ που εἰδεῖέν τι χωρίον ἔξω τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἔνθα οὐ προσβατὸν θανάτῳ.

21 Xenophon, *Apology* 28: σὺ δέ, ὦ φίλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε, μᾶλλον ἐβούλου με ὁρᾶν δικαίως ἢ ἀδίκως ἀποθνῄσκοντα;

22 Consider the structure of the *Apology* 23: ἔπειτα τῶν ἑταίρων ἐκκλέψαι βουλομένων αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐφείπετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπισκῶψαι ἐδόκει ἐρόμενος εἴ που εἰδεῖέν τι χωρίον ἔξω τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἔνθα οὐ προσβατὸν θανάτῳ. Here Xenophon prepares for the Socratic punch line—it is the first joke in the piece, and the set-up for the best one to come—by putting the reader on alert with ἐπισκῶψαι ἐδόκει. In *Apology* 28, the high point of the piece as a whole, the "punch line structure" is even more evident: παρὼν δέ τις Ἀπολλόδωρος, ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ὢν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως δ' εὐήθης, εἶπεν ἄρα: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαλεπώτατα φέρω ὅτι ὁρῶ σε ἀδίκως ἀποθνῄσκοντα. τὸν δὲ λέγεται καταψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν: σὺ δέ, ὦ φίλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε, μᾶλλον ἐβούλου με ὁρᾶν δικαίως ἢ ἀδίκως ἀποθνῄσκοντα; καὶ ἅμα ἐπιγελάσαι. Here the last three words function as "the canned laughter" that follows a joke in televised situation comedy.

Socrates' μεγαληγορία during the trial, "that he already believed death to be preferable to life for him, this they have not made plain [διεσαφήνισε]."[23] But as Nietzsche realized so clearly,[24] it would not be easy for someone who had read Plato's *Phaedo* to make this claim: by his advice to Evenus,[25] his definition of philosophy,[26] and his last words[27]—to name but the most salient examples—Plato's Socrates made it diaphanously plain (διεσαφήνισε) in *Phaedo* why he regarded death to be preferable to life.

Leaving aside, then, the strictly chronological problems that arise from making what is presumably the earliest of Xenophon's Socratic writings dependent on one of Plato's middle-period dialogues, it is unlikely that Xenophon could have written his *Apology* after reading *Phaedo*. More relevant to the question of division, the connection between *Crito* and Xenophon's *Apology* suggests that Plato is advancing beyond Xenophon here by building a discrete and stand-alone conversation around one dramatic incident. In short, where Hogenmüller finds evidence that Xenophon synthesized what he found in *Phaedo* and *Crito* in his *Apology*, it is not only unlikely that Xenophon could have claimed that no other author had depicted Socrates as having come to prefer death to life if he had already read *Phaedo*, but it is easy to see that the skill Plato showed in *Crito* by building an entire direct dialogue around an incident of which Xenophon was fully aware, but whose dramatic potential he clearly failed to tap, suggests instead that long before a retrospective Plato profited from his colleague's positive example by creating a synthetic work that collected many discrete Socratic dialogues, he had found in Xenophon's *Apology* a negative example, one that pointed toward the necessity of employing skillful dramatic division.

The little direct dialogue *Second Alcibiades* provides ancient evidence for the kind of process I have in mind. In his account of their rivalry, Athenaeus records the fact that there were some who believed that Xenophon, not Plato, was its

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23 Xenophon, *Apology* 1: ὅτι ἤδη ἑαυτῷ ἡγεῖτο αἱρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ βίου θάνατον, τοῦτο οὐ διεσαφήνισαν.

24 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* 4.340 ("Der sterbende Sokrates"): "Sokrates hat *am Leben gelitten*!" and *Götzen-Dämmerung* ("Das Problem des Sokrates," §12): "Sagte er [sc. Socrates] sich das zuletzt [sc. in *Phaedo*], in der *Weisheit* seines Muthes zum Tod? … Sokrates *wollte* sterben."

25 Plato, *Phaedo* 61b8–9.

26 Plato, *Phaedo* 67e5–7.

27 Plato, *Phaedo* 118a7–8; for an attack on Plato that makes dismissals of Xenophon seem almost congenial, see Most 1993.

author.[28] To begin with, there certainly are some echoes of Xenophon in the dialogue; in addition to Socrates' valorization of "the Spartan prayer"[29]—the probable origin of the ascription—there is a more compelling basis: the plaintive lament of the beautiful Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* 4.2 that he no longer knows what he should pray for.[30] This is the very conclusion toward which Socrates is leading Alcibiades in *Second Alcibiades*; the youngster is on his way to prayers at the start of the dialogue and decides not to proceed there at the end.[31] On the other hand, the same passage in *Memorabilia* 4.2 that contains the embryo of *Second Alcibiades* also contains the embryo of *First Alcibiades*: Xenophon's Socrates traces Euthydemus' newly discovered hesitation about prayer to the fact that the young man had previously failed to examine his goals because he firmly believed that he already knew them.[32]

Within the foregoing paragraph, there are three good reasons why Xenophon did not write and could not have written *Second Alcibiades*, all of which suggest that he lacked Plato's skillful capacity for dramatic division. The first involves the connection between Critias and Alcibiades in *Memorabilia*: Xenophon is at considerable pains to show that Socrates was not responsible for the subsequent misdeeds of either, and it would have defeated the work's underlying apologetic purpose to depict Socrates persuading Alcibiades not to pray.[33] The writer of *Second Alcibiades* therefore presupposes the success of previous Socratics in distancing Socrates from Alcibiades to such an extent that it is no longer necessary to deny, but sufficient merely to depict. The entrance of Critias and Alcibiades in *Protagoras*,[34] whether presupposing or anticipating Xenophon's pairing in *Memorabilia*, is, therefore, best understood as "post-

28 Athenaeus 11.114: ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος [sc. περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου] ὑπό τινων Ξενοφῶντος εἶναι λέγεται.

29 Named as such at *Second Alcibiades* 150c7–8, although the relevant passage begins at 148b9. But as indicated by 148b5–8, the crucial moment, to which discussion of the Spartan prayer recurs, is 142e1–143a5. After reading this important passage, Plato would have asked his students to identify the poet to whom Socrates refers here. The frequent citations of poetry in *Second Alcibiades* point forward to *Lesser Hippias* and *Ion*, and a firm grounding in literature was, no less than geometry—and in any case prior to it—a *sine qua non* for progressing through the Platonic curriculum.

30 Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.2.36 (quoted below).

31 Cf. *Second Alcibiades* 138a1–3 and 150c3–7.

32 Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.2.36: ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη [sc. Euthydemus], εἴ γε μηδὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπαινῶν ὀρθῶς λέγω, ὁμολογῶ μηδ' ὅ τι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὔχεσθαι χρὴ εἰδέναι [this is the embryo of *Second Alcibiades*; cf. 142b2–4]. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι οὐδ' ἔσκεψαι [cf. *First Alcibiades* 109e1–7 and 118a15–b2].

33 Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.2.12–28.

34 See Plato, *Protagoras* 316a4–5.

apologetic," i.e., no longer requiring from Plato any explicit apologetic claims, and thus opening up a safe space for the far more subtle critiques of both men that can easily be found in *First Alcibiades* and *Charmides*,[35] and possibly *Critias* as well.[36]

The next point follows from the first: what makes it possible for Xenophon's Socratic writings to achieve a frankly apologetic end is that Xenophon speaks to the reader in his own voice throughout all of them. Like *Crito*, by contrast, *Second Alcibiades* is a direct dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades with no authorial introduction, i.e., exactly the kind of thing that Xenophon himself never wrote.[37] But it is not just that Xenophon could not have written *Second Alcibiades* because he never wrote a direct dialogue without including his own authorial voice; the more interesting corollary is that at least part of the reason that Plato *did* write such dialogues is that by doing so he was drawing a deliberate contrast with Xenophon. Plato's ability to write self-concealing dialogues with no author-introducing frames is best understood as a dramatic improvement on Xenophon's considerably more natural approach to telling in his own name the story of a man whom both writers clearly knew from personal experience.

Finally, and most importantly, the very existence of *Second Alcibiades* points to its author's willingness to divide Socrates' story into discrete parts in a manner demonstrably foreign to Xenophon's methods.[38] As already mentioned, the embryo of both *Alcibiades* dialogues can be found in a single chapter in *Memorabilia* 4. And the author of *Second Alcibiades* clearly possessed the same literary gift that made it possible to conceal himself while allowing his characters to supply all necessary background information contributed to his ability to delineate and separate pivotal actions such as Socrates speaking to Alcibiades for the first time, as in *First Alcibiades*, or stopping him on the way to prayers:

35 Although Tuozzo 2011 as a whole is apologetic or revisionist with respect to Critias, cf. 278 with Altman 2016a: 121–122.

36 For the latter, see Altman 2016a, section § 5.

37 Cf. Xenophon, *Hiero* 1: Σιμωνίδης ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφίκετό ποτε πρὸς Ἱέρωνα τὸν τύραννον. σχολῆς δὲ γενομένης ἀμφοῖν, εἶπεν ὁ Σιμωνίδης.

38 Note that since *First Alcibiades* is the first conversation Socrates and Alcibiades have ever had (cf. 104e1–2 and 106a2–3), *Second Alcibiades* necessarily presupposes it. Although Alcibiades comes to Socrates' aid in *Protagoras* (cf. 309b6 and 335b7–d5) they never actually speak to each other in that *earlier* (and therefore first) dialogue; for further discussion, see Bartlett 2016: 226–227 n. 4. With Socrates' positive teaching in *Second Alcibiades*, cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.3.2.

> *Socrates*: Alcibiades, are you on your way, then, to the god so as to make some prayerful request?
> *Alcibiades*: Very much so, Socrates.[39]

This opening makes it appear to be considerably simpler than it is: a dramatist's eye for a discrete and unifying action is required in order to achieve so natural an effect.

Although Xenophon didn't write *Second Alcibiades*, he may help us to identify who did. While Xenophon did not employ Plato's principle of dramatic division in either his *Apology* or *Memorabilia*, the latter work in particular points the way toward a Platonic dyad like *First Alcibiades-Second Alcibiades* or, less controversially, *Hippias Major-Hippias Minor*. As well as Xenophon's own depiction of a dialogue between Socrates and Hippias,[40] there are, in addition to the series of conversations with Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* 4,[41] three separate dialogues with Antiphon collected in *Memorabilia* 1.6[42] and two dialogues with Aristippus, one in 2.1, the other in 3.8.[43] By collecting many short dialogues into one unified work, Xenophon avoided the danger of any partial transmission: if *Memorabilia* survived, so too, presumably, would its parts. This would not be the case with Plato: by writing a series of discrete works—the result of division—there was always the danger that one or even several of them would be lost or, as was the case with *Second Alcibiades*, deemed spurious. And since Athenaeus was the first to cast doubt on its authenticity—the only one in antiquity to do so[44]—it is he who bears the greatest responsibility for the dialogue's present status. But the suggestion of Xenophontic authorship that gave rise to that status proves to be a red herring, and those who originally made it ignored the obvious differences between Plato and Xenophon outlined above. While it is too much to say that Plato wrote *Second Alcibiades* because Xenophon didn't, it is revealing that the only ancient evidence that he didn't write it depends on the false claim of "some" that Xenophon did; the only ancient evidence, that is, aside from *Second Alcibiades* itself.[45]

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39 *Alc.* 2 138a1–3.

40 Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.4.

41 On which, see Johnson 2005.

42 Note that these "dialogues" are arranged according to size, with the longest first: 1.6.1–10, 1.6.11–14, and 1.6.15; cf. Plato's two *Hippias* and *Alcibiades* dialogues.

43 In comparing *Memorabilia* 2.1.1–34 and 3.8.1–10, see previous note.

44 Note that the young Cicero echoes *Second Alcibiades* 144d4–7 in *De Inventione* 1.

45 See Johnson 2003: xviii–xx, especially xviii n. 9.

And this is where the positive example of Xenophon's capacity for collection can come to Plato's aid: the authenticity of *Second Alcibiades* need not be assessed only in relation to itself—i.e., in the hermeneutic isolation that originates from dramatic division—but also when considered as a small but integrated part of the collection into which Plato, once again following Xenophon's lead, would organize his dialogues for a post-apologetic purpose: the step-by-step Socratic education of his readers embodied in a pedagogically plausible conception of reading order.[46] Naturally, this is not the place to show how the reading order paradigm can be used to show why Plato wrote both *Epinomis* and *Second Alcibiades*,[47] but the very notion of reading order, predicated as it is on the basic idea of collecting a number of discrete dialogues into a coherent story for a pedagogical end, indicates the relevance of Xenophon's precedent no matter how much further Plato may have carried the Socratic torch.

Of the three ancient reports about the relationship between Plato and Xenophon, Aulus Gellius offers the most detail, and his sane and balanced account—replacing rivalry with the recognition that they were both great men, cooperating in preserving Socrates' legacy—creates a template for the byplay of division and collection that I am using here to reimagine their relationship.[48] Although Aulus Gellius is the earliest of our three ancient sources for that relationship, it is important to note that, even for him, a far more competitive image provides the dialectically necessary background for his own account, and indeed it was this earlier competitive alternative that would later resurface in Athenaeus and Diogenes Laertius. As already mentioned, the only specific literary evidence common to all three is the Athenian Stranger's dismissive comment about the education of Cyrus in Plato's *Laws*, a connection that places Plato second but makes neither man an imitator. It is only Aulus

46 The phrase "step-by-step" in this sentence should be used to gloss "progressive" below. Cf. Lamm 2005: 105: "According to Schleiermacher's interpretation … the unity of the dialogues, therefore, is not only an organic whole or aesthetic unity, it is also a pedagogical, progressive unity."

47 But by way of illustration, consider the fact that in *Second Alcibiades* 147a5, πολυμαθία makes its entrance as one of those things that are only good in relation to the knowledge of the best that Alcibiades would need in order to pray for things that would not harm him, while *Rival Lovers* prepares the reader for Hippias, the quintessential polymath (*Hp. Mi.* 368a8–e1), by distinguishing philosophy from πολυμαθία (*Amat.* 139a4–5); indeed, this is the dialogue's principal theme, beginning with 133c9–d1. Plato also draws attention to the connection between the two dialogues in the same sentence or question (*Alc. 2* 147a5–b1) at 147a8 (cf. *Amat.* 136d6), while *Rival Lovers* 136d7 points back to *Alc. 1* 131b1.

48 Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 14.3.

Gellius, while describing the views of the partisans he rejects, who provides an example that assigns the kind of chronological priority to Plato that currently permeates the dominant conception of their relationship:

> This also they believed to be an indication of no sincere or friendly volition: that Xenophon, with almost two of its books having been read [*lectis ex eo duobus fere libris*] which first had gone forth among the public, reacted against that famous work of Plato's which he wrote about the best state of the polity and about the administration of the state, and described a different kind of royal administration, which has been entitled *Cyropaedia*.[49]

Since those who recorded this story used it to prove the opposite of what Aulus Gellius himself wants to show, it is difficult to know how much veridical value he accords it; but it does serve to introduce the following question: if Xenophon wrote the *Cyropaedia* in response to "almost [*fere*] the first two books" of our *Republic*,[50] is it not also possible that Plato then went on to write its remaining books in response to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*? There is more than enough in the first book of Plato's *Republic*—particularly in the debate with Polemarchus, who, like Xenophon, upholds the position that justice is benefiting your friends and harming your enemies—to excite Xenophon's response by undertaking a literary project that depicts with considerable originality the education of a prince who was good to his friends and terrible to his foes.[51]

More important than the fact that this passage contains the only ancient external evidence for the dependence of Xenophon on Plato, the kind of intertwined inspiration underlying the hypothesis built on it provides a specific and easily imaginable example of what I, following Aulus Gellius, take to be instead

49 Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, 14.3.

50 Following Alline 1915, who states as a certainty on 15 that "la *Cyropédie* est la contre-partie des quatres premiers livres actuel," and thus "il faut donc supposer qu' Aulu-Gelle se réfère à une autre division que celle de nos manuscrits," the theory of an earlier six-book version of *Republic* has recently been revived by Tarrant 2012 and Sedley 2013. For a response to these views, see Altman 2016b: 278 n. 240.

51 Thanks to the word *fere*, the text to which Xenophon responded may simply have reached the point in *Republic* 2 where Socrates has only just begun to describe the education of his Guardians (say through *Republic* 376d5), who, like the dogs with which Xenophon loved to hunt (cf. Xenophon *Cynegeticus* 7)—and also like Cyrus—must be considerably less formidable to their friends than to their foes (cf. *Republic* 375a2–e3). See also *Cleitophon* 410a7–b3 for an understandable confusion about Socrates' own views on this question.

a far more general and important thesis: Plato and Xenophon have been *misunderstood* as rivals. In order to explain the *appearance* of their rivalry (*species aemulationis*),[52] Aulus Gellius blames neither Xenophon nor Plato themselves, but rather their respective partisans (*fautores eorum* or *faventes*):

> For when a certain kind of great inborn ability [*ingenia*] for the study of the same thing arises in two or more famous men of either equal or nearly equal reputation [*aut pari sunt fama, aut proxima*], strife [*contentio*] likewise arises among their various devotees about the extent of their industry and fame. Afterwards, then, the contagion of competition spreads from this external competition to these men themselves, and the race of those pursuing the same finish-line of virtue [*ad eamdem virtutis calcem*], when the result is close or doubtful, descends into suspicions of rivalry not by their own, but rather by the zeal of their supporters.[53]

We would be wise to reconsider the letter and to revive the spirit of these generous remarks, paying due heed to the fact that it is not Plato who has won the day against his rival by demoting him to the rank of clumsy imitator. But the striking thing here is not simply that the two are considered "either equal in fame or nearly so," or the claim that they expended their respective talents (*ingenia*) "with eagerness for the same thing," but that Aulus Gellius has imagined them as being involved in a race (*cursus*)[54] without, however, being competitors.

The image of a *cursus* would seem to defeat its creator's purpose: how can the two be racing for the same finish line (*ad eandem calcem*)[55] without trying to defeat the other by getting there first? According to Aulus Gellius, it is only because the shared goal of both Xenophon and Plato is *virtus* that their relationship creates for others "a certain simulacrum of emulous rivalry,"[56] and

52 His words for this ζηλοτυπία are (*Attic Nights* 14.3) *obtrectio*, *invidia*, and *de gloria maiore parienda certatio*, and his comment on attributing these to Plato and Xenophon is: *haec enim procul a moribus philosophiae absunt, in quibus illi duo omnium iudicio excelluerunt.*

53 *Attic Nights* 14.3: *Nam cum ingenia quaedam magna duorum pluriumve in eiusdem rei studio illustrium, aut pari sunt fama, aut proxima, oritur apud diversos fautores eorum industriae laudisque aestimandae contentio. Tum postea ex alieno certamine ad eos quosque ipsos contagium certationis adspirat. Cursusque eorum ad eamdem virtutis calcem pergentium, quando est compar vel ambiguus, in aemulandi suspiciones non suo, sed favientium studio delabitur.*

54 OLD 2b.

55 OLD (*calx*^{2}; 3): "the finishing line in a race-course, marked with chalk."

56 *Attic Nights* 14.3: *simulacrum quoddam contentionis aemulae.*

borrowing his image, I therefore suggest that the *cursus* in question is best understood as a relay race,[57] with both Plato and Xenophon, these "two luminaries of Socratic charm," running on the same team (*simul iunctae*), both striving for the high ground (*in arduum nituntur*),[58] and, above all, both racing *ad eandem virtutis calcem*. The torch passed between them is the Socratic legacy, and their shared goal—to which each contributes, and which can only be attained if both work in tandem—is Socrates' continuing pedagogical effectiveness as the consummate teacher of virtue they both knew him to be from personal experience.

Finally, this image of a relay race is useful for illustrating the role of division and collection in the relationship between Xenophon and Plato. Specifically in contrast with Xenophon's *Apology*, but more generally in contrast to all of Xenophon's Socratic writings, Plato evidently found a way to create direct, self-standing dialogues, all of them executed without any authorial intrusion and revealing no explicit apologetic purpose. My claim, then, is that Plato's ability to employ division so skillfully may well have been spurred by Xenophon's negative example, and since it is less than likely that Xenophon wrote his *Apology* after reading Plato's *Crito* and *Phaedo*, the hypothesis of Xenophon's priority in this case serves to illustrate Plato's more considerable and indeed unique literary gifts as a dramatist. But thanks to collection, the relationship between the two Socratics is ultimately best understood as cooperative rather than antagonistic, a result that avoids the polemical prejudice that makes one of them superior in every way to the other,[59] a prejudice belied by all three ancient accounts of their rivalry, and one that is particularly well-exposed and challenged by Aulus Gellius, who found a way both to preserve and transcend the image of their rivalry.

If the notion that Plato created an interconnected series of dialogues ending with Socrates' death ever gains general acceptance, it will, therefore, be very good news for Xenophon. For where else could Plato have gotten such an idea?

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57 In accordance with Plato's immortal λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις (*Resp.* 328a3–4).

58 *Attic Nights* 14.3: *Proinde igitur et Xenophon et Plato, Socraticae amoenitatis duo lumina, certare aemularique inter sese existimati sunt; quia de iis apud alios—uter esset exsuperatior—certabatur; et quia duae eminentiae, cum simul iunctae, in arduum nituntur, simulacrum quoddam contentionis aemulae pariunt.*

59 Note that winds of change are blowing thanks in particular to Louis-André Dorion's dismantling of the interpretive dominance of the traditional "Socratic Question." In addition to his keynote essay in this collection, see also Chernyakhovskaya 2014.

It was Xenophon who had led the way in not only creating an artistic whole out of a collection of Socratic dialogues, but had also created a heroic narrative ending with a moving account of the hero's last discourse and death. Between Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and his *Memorabilia*, Plato found in his older contemporary a model ready at hand for creating an interconnected series of dialogues that collectively told a hero's story with a scarcely mistakable focus on the reader's own education, and there is, moreover, no other precedent for such a project in Greek literature. Since we know that he was still working on his dialogues at the end of his long life, and also that the elder Xenophon had predeceased him, Plato had plenty of time to cross the finish-line with the Socratic torch that the gallant son of Gryllus had passed to him not once but twice, first by showing him the need for division, and then for creative, coherent, and pedagogically effective collection.

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Xenophon and the Socratics

James M. Redfield

Plato and Xenophon, insofar as they were considered historically, were in my youth mostly treated as alternative and competing sources for the historical Socrates. (The *Clouds*, the only surviving presentation of Socrates that was composed in his lifetime, was generally neglected as obviously an utter distortion.) Some thought that since Plato was a genius he alone was capable of transmitting the reality of Socrates; a few thought that since Xenophon is dull, he could be trusted to transmit Socrates unimproved. Neither of these positions (which I have caricatured) came to terms with the specific conditions of composition of these works, nor their particular motivations—with the possibility, in Plato's case, that he wrote not to record the past but to shape the future, and therefore in the interest of this project was quite content to disregard historical truth. In Xenophon's case, I here explore the possibility that he wrote primarily not to remember Socrates (in spite of the title of his main Socratic work) but to shape the present, to establish himself among those already in his time recognized as Socratics. In this paper I propose to follow the lead of Louis-André Dorion and set aside the "Socratic problem" altogether, in favor of the problem of the historical Xenophon.[1]

I do not think Xenophon is dull. Xenophon was actually outstandingly original in respect to literary form; he alone among the classical authors wrote in a variety of modes, some of which he may have invented. He wrote treatises, also history—continuing Thucydides—also an autobiographical narrative, also a biographical sketch in the form of a eulogy of someone he knew and admired, also a fictional conversation between two famous men of a previous age, also a long fictionalized life which has been called a proto-novel. Also he wrote Socratic dialogues.

The key historical question about these is: when were they written? Higgins (1977: 131) is comfortable in asserting, "the works of Xenophon whose dates are relatively certain all were produced roughly between 368 and 354"—that is, in the last fifteen years of his life. The simplest hypothesis is that his Socratic writings also belong to this period. Higgins further suggests that no-longer-exiled Xenophon in fact returned to Athens, even if only intermittently, and that his

1 Bandini and Dorion 2000 provide a summary of the reception of Xenophon's Socrates; for Dorion's current approach, see Dorion (2013) and Dorion's keynote address in this volume 55–70.

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Socratic writings were stimulated by this renewed contact. That is plausible, but it does stack a conjecture on a conjecture. In any case, by this chronology, Xenophon was not among the inventors of the Socratic dialogue. There remains the possibility that—with characteristic originality—he remade the genre.

In my use of the terms "Socratic dialogue" and "Socratic" I follow Livio Rossetti, who over a long career and in an extensive bibliography has developed an understanding of the Socratic writings as originating in a narrow circle of men who knew and admired Socrates, whose solidarity was confirmed and perhaps created by Socrates' trial and execution, and who, furthermore, knew each other and read each other's work.[2] The genre was thus a collective product—which does not imply conformity or consensus; what we know of these men suggests that they were highly competitive. However, by this admittedly rather narrow definition, Xenophon was not a Socratic, although he wrote Socratic dialogues.

Panaitios, characteristically conservative, names six authors of Socratic dialogues: Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines, all Athenians, and, somewhat doubtfully, the non-Athenians Phaedo and Eucleides (DL 2.64). (Aristippus also wrote dialogues, but these may not have been Socratic: some of them were in Doric—he was some time at the court of the tyrant of Syracuse—and these could not have been Socratic). Rossetti places the *floruit* of the genre as one generation, roughly from 390 to 365. (Plato, who like Xenophon was one of the youngest friends of Socrates, lived a long life and developed the dialogue form in some unexpected directions.) The chronology here proposed for Xenophon's writings places his work in the next generation. It would follow that when he began to write about Socrates he had not only his own memories, but also a considerable body of other people's work, in considerable variety.

I doubt that the Socratics, either any individual among them or as a group, intended to transmit Socrates' philosophy. Socrates exemplified a manner of life called "philosophical," but I doubt that he taught a philosophy, in the sense of a body of doctrines defended by more or less plausible arguments. The chief evidence for this negation is the diversity of Socrates' followers as we meet them in the next century. They range from Aristippus, who lived large and said pleasure was the only good, to Antisthenes, precursor of the Cynics, who lived in rags. As Aristotle says (*Peri Philosophias* fr. 1.4 = SSR I H 4):

> The heirs of Socrates turned out extremely various and opposite in their views: some made a great point of self-effacement and dispassion and

2 Rosetti 2011 provides one convenient way of accessing Rosetti's work.

> self-possession, others of pleasures; some made a point of knowing everything, others of knowing simply nothing. Furthermore some in public and in view of all became celebrities, seeking the company of the many, while others passed their lives quite the other way, unapproachable and not to be spoken to.

Xenophon's dialogues take their place in this variety and are clearly different from those of Plato. This leaves the question: which are more typical of the emerging genre? Which of these two is more like the others? These others, of course, are exactly the ones we have not got.

We do, however, have a number of Socratic dialogues written neither by Plato nor by Xenophon: the seven dialogues transmitted as *nothoumenoi*, "spurious." The authors of these are unknown and their dates to the last degree uncertain; it is, however, worth noticing that they are labeled by a participle, not simply as *nothoi*, "bastards," but "delegitimated," "disowned." The participle implies an actor; the obvious candidate is Thrasyllus, who in the last years of the Roman Republic or in the first years of the Empire arranged Plato's dialogues into tetralogies; he set these seven aside either because he had evidence that they were not, or saw that they could not have been, written by Plato. They remain interesting, however; certain persons had evidently tried to produce imitation Socratic dialogues, and this may give us some idea of the genre.

These dialogues, in the first place, consist almost entirely of arguments, a rapid fire of questions and answer, generally concluding in *aporia* or paradox. The *On Justice* consists of two anonymous voices and concludes that the unjust are so only involuntarily (a familiar Socratic paradox); the *On Virtue* is between Socrates and someone identified in the title (but not in the text) as *hippotrophos*, "horse breeder"—possibly identical with the Antiphon who takes part in the transmission of the *Parmenides*. The dialogue concludes that virtue cannot be taught and is not by nature, and, therefore, must be by divine inspiration (we recognize this sequence from the *Meno*—here it is stripped down to the bare arguments). The *Demodocus* is a monologue in which the speaker (Socrates?), addressing a certain Demodocus, argues both sides of every question and then reports several other equally puzzling conversations he has heard; he concludes: "when they had said these things I was in a quandary (*ēporoun*) as to whom I should trust and whom not, whether they should be trustworthy people who know what they're talking about, or my relatives and acquaintances. So what do you think about these things?"

The *Sisyphus* is a two-hander between Socrates and Sisyphus, on some topics overlapping with the *Demodocus*. The *Eryxias* is narrated by Socrates (a device employed by both Plato and Aeschines Socraticus). It is the most com-

plex dialogue among the Spuria, and the most interesting, although to my eye it does not hold together very well. Finally comes the *Axiochos*, the farthest removed from fourth-century Greek. Uncertainly balanced between narration by Socrates and direct dramatization it consists mostly of material familiar from Roman-period consolation literature and can be neglected here.

If, then, we take the other Spuria as representing the genre of Socratic dialogue, we will see such works as overwhelmingly devoted to eristic, defined in the *Sisyphus* (388d) as "discourse (*logos*) not for the sake of any practical purpose (*pragma*) but for the sake of conversation." Plato's dialogues are, of course, well-stocked with eristic, often ending in aporia or paradox; the same cannot be said of Xenophon.

The author, whoever he was, of *Demetrius On Style* (296 = SSR IV A 148) noticed this difference in stylistic terms:

> Generally just as with the same wax one makes a dog, another an ox, another a horse, so on the same topic one makes his point as an accusation, saying: "People leave money to their children, but they do not leave with it the knowledge for using the inheritance." This kind of sentence is called "Aristippean." Another will bring forth the same point suggestively (*hupothetikos*), as Xenophon mostly does, saying, for example: "One should not only leave money to his own children, but also the knowledge for using it." Then there is the type particularly called "Socratic," which evidently Aeschines and Plato most admired; this would rearrange the previously mentioned topic into questioning, in something like the following way: "My child, how much money did your father leave you? Wasn't it a lot and more than you can count?" "It was a lot, Socrates." "So he also left you the knowledge for using it?" So at the same time he's thrown the child into a quandary (*aporia*) before he knows it, and also he's reminded him that he is not knowledgeable, and also he has turned him toward education. And he did all this naturally and delicately, with none of the so-called "Scythian manners."

Socrates does teach by questioning in Xenophon, but he characteristically uses questions to force his interlocutor to concede his main point, after which he elaborates on it in continuous, highly rhetorical, prose.

We do not know how much eristic was in the dialogues of Antisthenes, not to speak of Eucleides and Phaedo. We do know of one feature that unites Plato with the other Socratics, and divides them from Xenophon: an interest in Alcibiades. Alcibiades appears in four dialogues of Plato; dialogues entitled *Alcibiades* are attributed to Antisthenes, Eucleides, Phaedo, and Aeschines. Alcibi-

ades appears in Xenophon's Socratic works only as used by Socrates' accusers to discredit Socrates at his trial—and in a self-contained bit of eristic (*Memorabilia* 1.2.40–47) in which Alcibiades goes after Pericles; here Socrates is not mentioned.

There are other names familiar from Plato that appear as titles in the lists of various Socratics: Aspasia (twice), Menexenus, Callias, and Axiochus. Here there is some overlap with Xenophon: Callias is certainly important—Xenophon's *Symposium* is set in his house—and Aspasia is mentioned twice in passing (*Memorabilia* 2.6.36, *Oikonomikos* 3.14), but that is not much.

Plato and Xenophon also differ, obviously, in their literary technique. Plato's dialogues are either lacking narration or narrated by a definite person, Socrates or another, to an audience either unspecified (as in the *Republic*) or briefly sketched (as in the *Protagoras*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedo*). Xenophon, by contrast, is always himself the narrator, and the reader is always the audience. He either reports a conversation without a source simply factually (*pote*—"once") or claims himself to be the source (*ēkousa*—"I heard"; four times in the *Memorabilia*, plus *moi … akouonti*: 1.6.14). Xenophon claims with this word to have heard the whole of the *Oikonomikos*; he also says he was present at the *Symposium*. Xenophon even reports some conversation between Socrates and himself (*Memorabilia* 1.3.8–13)—whereas Plato leaves himself out of his dialogues. (He mentions his own presence once, as in the audience at the trial; in the *Phaedo* he even provides an excuse for his absence.)

The two-person dialogue without narration that we find in several of the Spuria and in a number of Plato's dialogues (e.g., the *Euthyphro*, the *Crito*, and the *Phaedrus*) suggests the mimes of Sophron, which evidently were usually written in this manner. A casual remark by Aristotle compares the genre of Socratic dialogue with Sophron, and this has led to the not unreasonable conjecture that Sophron was their literary source. For Xenophon we need to think of a different source, possibly the *Epidemiai* of Ion of Chios: first-person reports of overheard conversations.

The evidence of the Spuria, as far as it goes, places Plato closer to the mainstream than Xenophon. Of course, this may be because the Spuria were composed when Plato's dialogues had already achieved canonical status. However, pseudo-Demetrius attributes the generic "Socratic" manner to both Plato and Aeschines. It seems that the novelties are Xenophon's. It remains to consider what motivated his development of the form. (There is, of course, a parallel question about late Plato.)

Plato and Xenophon both knew Socrates, and both mention him in their autobiographical writings: the *Seventh Letter* and the *Anabasis*. In the *Seventh Letter*, however, Plato refers to him in general terms, as "my older friend … the

most just man of his time" (324e) and "our companion" tried on a charge "least befitting Socrates" (325b–c).[3] These references do not recall Socrates as Plato's teacher—nor do they deny that Socrates taught Plato, and the phrase "our comrade" does suggest that there was some kind of circle around Socrates in his lifetime. But the character of the relationship is unspecified.

Xenophon, by contrast, describes a personal interaction: after the battle of Cunaxa, when the Greek commanders had been treacherously slaughtered under pretense of a truce and the Greek army thus reduced to despair, Xenophon abruptly introduces himself into the narrative:

> There was in the army Xenophon the Athenian, who had joined not as a general nor a company commander nor a soldier; rather Proxenos, long his guest-friend, had sent for him to leave home. He had promised him if he came, to make him friends with Cyrus, who, he said, was more important to him than his own fatherland. When Xenophon read this letter he took council with Socrates the Athenian as to whether he should go. Socrates conjectured that friendship with Cyrus might make him subject to political attacks since Cyrus was thought to have joined with the Lacedaemonians in their war with Athens, so he counseled Xenophon to go to Delphi and get the god's advice about going. Xenophon went there and asked Apollo to which god he should sacrifice and pray in order to make the journey he had in mind in the fairest and finest way, and come out successful and safe. Apollo's response told him to which gods he should sacrifice.[4]
>
> When he came back he told Socrates of the oracle. When Socrates heard this he found fault with him that he had not first asked whether it would be better to go or to stay; rather, having himself made the decision to go, he then inquired how best he could make the journey. However, since that was the question he had asked, he should do as the god told him. So Xenophon, once he had sacrificed to the gods as the god instructed, sailed away; in Sardis he found Proxenos and Cyrus on the point of setting out on their expedition, and he was introduced to Cyrus.
>
> *Anabasis* 3.1.4–8

3 When Socrates is mentioned elsewhere in the *Letters* (314c, 363a), the reference is to the Socrates in Plato's dialogues.

4 The Dodona inquiries, preserved on lead tablets (Lhote 2006), are mostly questions that could be answered yes or no; a second group ask something like: "To what gods or heroes should I sacrifice before such a project?" Xenophon was instructed to ask a question of the first type and instead chose the second type.

I've written out this passage complete because it is a unique document: an interaction between Socrates and someone who knew him that has every indication of being an actual memory. Socrates is not represented here as a teacher or as someone particularly philosophical; he is rather the sort of older person one would consult about a critical life choice. Socrates mentions a worldly concern, and then sends Xenophon off to the oracle.

Breitenbach asks why Xenophon tells this story; if it were excised, it would leave no gap.[5] His answer is that the story absolves Socrates from any responsibility for Xenophon's choice to join Cyrus, a choice that led, directly or indirectly, to Xenophon being sentenced to exile from Athens. Socrates was accused through his association with Critias and Alcibiades; Xenophon, says Breitenbach, does not want to be the cause for Socrates being further tarred with the same brush. In other words, Xenophon's anecdote is about his disconnection from Socrates.

The anecdote, however, is also about their connection, a connection that in his Socratic writings he insists upon, even beyond the limits of plausibility. Xenophon actually tells this story against himself; he is not really asking what to do, he is looking for someone to tell him to do what he wants to do. He manages to get the oracle to play this role; this is not respectful of the oracle, or of Socrates. The disconnection, then, is from philosophy; Xenophon acknowledges Socrates' worldly wisdom, but as a vigorous young man bound for adventure, he can afford to ignore it. For Xenophon, no obvious ethical question is involved; to make friends with Cyrus may be unwise, but it is not clearly unjust. So the anecdote need not make us think the less of Socrates. Xenophon's memory of him is not inconsistent with Plato's "most just"; in his mind, it simply does not raise the issue.

Socrates' charisma—what drew to him a circle of admirers—was, I believe, not only his intellectual and verbal facility, but also his moral clarity: he was quite ready to die rather than do anything wrong, and he always seemed to know exactly where to draw the line. In Plato this quality is foregrounded, especially in the *Apology*, but also in the *Crito*, the *Meno*, the *Euthyphro*, the *Phaedo*, and elsewhere. Xenophon does not make much of it—as, indeed, his account of Socrates is not shadowed by Socrates' heroic death. (In Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates*, Socrates is convicted and executed of his own free choice.) Xenophon does, in the only other place outside the Socratic writings where he names Socrates, mention one incident of moral choice: in his account of the Argineusae trial (*Hellenica* 1.7.15), he tells us that Socrates refused to agree to

5 Breitenbach 1967, col. 1774–1775.

put the question in the assembly on the grounds that it was illegal. Plato told this story at length in his *Apology of Socrates*, but Xenophon gives us this information without comment, nor does he mention (as Plato does) that Socrates might himself have been executed for his intransigence.

The *Hellenica* does not mention the trial and execution of Socrates at all, although it occurred in the period covered by the history. Actually the *Hellenica* tells us nothing of Athens between the restoration of the democracy in 401, the same year Xenophon left for Sardis, and 395, the year Athens reentered Spartan history in connection with the Corinthian War. For Xenophon Athens in those six years apparently had no history.

Socrates' advice to Xenophon in the *Anabasis* has an implication: that by joining Cyrus Xenophon may be losing Athens. The following narrative validates Socrates. Xenophon was in Thrace, or more likely in Anatolia, when Socrates was tried; when he returned to Greece, he came not to Athens but to Sparta. At some point he was condemned in absentia to exile—a sentence that was later reversed. However, it is not certain that he ever returned to Athens. Be that as it may, he remained an Athenian, never more so than in the Socratic writings, which represent Socrates' circle as consisting mostly of Athenians.

For the years down to 362, covered by the last five books, Xenophon's *Hellenica* draws almost entirely on non-Athenian, largely Spartan sources. Xenophon shows no interest in internal Athenian politics during this period, and little interest in Athenians—apart from Iphicrates. These, however, were the years when the Socratic dialogue was being invented. It is plausible not only that Xenophon read at least some of this literature as it emerged, but that he corresponded with it authors.[6] An indication of such contact is the appearance of Xenophon—and his wife—as characters in Aechines' *Aspasia* (Cicero *de Inventione* 1.31.51–53 = SSR VI A 70).[7] Xenophon, that is, having generally sided with the losing side in the Athenian civil conflicts, described in his *Hellenica* One and Two, withdrew from Athenian politics, but it seems that he remembered more warmly the brilliant apolitical young men around Socrates. Not, however, Plato.

The anecdotal evidence, for what it is worth, is virtually unanimous: Plato was disliked by the other Socratics. No doubt Plato, like most great thinkers

6 The author of Socratic Letter no. 14 (= SSR VI A 102) provides a charming fictional version of what such letters could have looked like: Aeschines fills in Xenophon on the trial and death of Socrates.

7 Socrates' odd promise to Critobulus in *Oeconomicus* 3.14 to send him as his instructor Aspasia "who knows more than I do"—a promise which is never kept—is perhaps some kind of acknowledgment to Aeschines.

(and many who are not so great), was confident of his own greatness and let others know of it. His strand of personal religiosity, also, made him *semnos*, a pejorative term when applied to people rather than gods, something like "holier than thou." So we have anecdotes like this (DL 2.22 = SSR IV A 22):

> They say that [Aeschines] in destitution came to Sicily and was ignored by Plato, but sustained by Aristippus, who gave him some of his dialogues as a gift.
>
> Or another (DL 6.7 = SSR V A 27): [Antisthenes] mocked Plato as vain. During a parade looking at a fiery horse he said: 'You seem to me also a spectacular horse.' This was because Plato kept praising the horse. Another time he visited the sick Plato, and seeing a basin in which Plato had vomited he said: 'I see the bile but not the vanity.'

This brings us to another difference between Xenophon and Plato. Plato excludes the recognized Socratics, including himself, from his dialogues.[8] Chaerephon appears in more than one dialogue, but not as an interlocutor. Crito, of course, appears several times, but he is represented as Socrates' unphilosophical friend. (Crito appears, in both the *Crito* and the *Phaedo*, as one who has heard and retained the language of Socrates, but never really got it; in the *Euthydemus*, he is similarly uncomprehending.) Plato's major competitors, Aristippus and Antisthenes, are left out of Plato's dialogues altogether; both make significant appearances in Xenophon.[9] One theme Plato and Xenophon have in common is friendship, but Plato does not dramatize friendship among the Socratics.

An important group of Plato's dialogues represents Socrates in controversy with professional teachers, his competitors: Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias (twice) and—if their sophistry is not mere clowning—Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus. These names do not appear in the titles of other Socratic works; we can say, also, that Xenophon avoids them. Gorgias, Prodicus, and Protagoras are brushed off (Xenophon *Symposium* 1.5) as persons on whom Callias spent a lot of money before he learned better; Hippias does make an appearance

8 Except, of course, that he lists those present at the death of Socrates and makes Phaedo the narrator. The interlocutors, however, are Pythagoreans.

9 Xenophon treats Critias and Charmides as Socratics; Plato also includes them, but as I read the *Charmides* (Redfield 2011), Plato presents these two as men who tried to be Socratics, but in the wrong way, and so failed.

(*Memorabilia* 4.4) but as an ordinary interlocutor, not someone whose claims to competence must be confronted and overcome. The most sophistic interlocutor in Xenophon is Antiphon (*Memorabilia* 1.6)—mentioned briefly by Plato (*Menexenus* 236a) as an inferior teacher of rhetoric.

Plato's Socrates, in other words, is a man with an adversarial relationship to the intellectual world. For the interlocutors in the dialogues that seem to go furthest into Socrates' own thinking, Plato chose his brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, not philosophers, and two Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, representatives of a parallel, admired but different, strand of philosophy. We do not see Plato's Socrates surrounded by young creative intellectuals, disputing and competitive, each other's peers, joined by their admiration for Socrates, their superior. Plato's Socrates rather is an isolated figure, and since Plato never represents his own relationship to Socrates, we are allowed to assume that Plato, as he inherited the isolation, inherited the superiority.

Xenophon's aims are altogether more modest. He represents a world of peaceable conversation in which Socrates offers sensible advice to people more or less inclined to take it. Whereas Plato's Socrates is antisocial—he pledges allegiance to a higher order of values not ever quite actual in this world—Xenophon's Socrates is sociable, comfortably engaged in discourse that affirms the values of the *kaloi kagathoi*, the better sort of people, and is philosophical only in the sense that it achieves a higher degree of the explicit.

People who think Xenophon's Socrates dull often mean, I think, that he lacks the Platonic Socrates' irony; as Thrasymachus (someone else not mentioned in Xenophon) says of him:

> Heracles, there's Socrates' usual irony ... I predicted ... that you'd not be willing to answer; you'd ironize and do anything but answer when somebody asks you a question.
>
> *Republic* 337a

Socrates does (predictably) reply with further irony, saying he doesn't know, so Thrasymacus should say what he claims to know. The Socratic eristic seems to say: "I have no answers, so you give me an answer and I'll show you that it doesn't work." The technical name for this, of course, is *elenchos*, the reduction of opinions to nonsense and the interlocutor to confusion. Later on Thrasymachus calls Socrates a sycophant, by which he seems to mean, "You're out to make me look bad by pinning me to some minor point in my discourse." As Plato's Hippias says (*Lesser Hippias* 329b), "Socrates, you're always tangling up arguments like this, you pick out some weak spot in the argument and keep hanging on to this little point; you will not take on the topic of the argument

as a whole." Irony and logic-chopping are typical tools of eristic; neither characterizes Socrates in Xenophon.

In Xenophon's work it is precisely Hippias who says to Socrates (*Memorabilia* 4.4.9), "You're satisfied with ridiculing others, asking them questions and refuting them all, while you yourself are never willing to offer a position to anyone or expose your opinion of anything." Instead of responding with a further irony, Xenophon's Socrates proceeds to offer his answer: a definition—that justice is lawfulness. Socrates then defends this against Hippias' objections and concludes with a long rhetorical encomium of lawfulness. Thus Xenophon's Socrates produces the kind of discourse that Plato's Hippias had been asking for, as opposed to the kind of nit-picking characteristic of Plato's Socrates. Furthermore, Xenophon's Socrates defines justice as Thrasymachus does (although without the same pejorative implications): the just are those who obey the law, whatever it is.

Possibly Xenophon is here responding to Plato's text; more likely he is simply incorporating an alternate intellectual current, an alternative response to a question surely widely discussed. Xenophon may be here representing the viewpoint of one or more of Plato's competitors.

In any case, the narrative strategies of these two writers reflect their diverse understandings of Socratic discourse. Plato's ironic Socrates doesn't necessarily say what he thinks; his positions are sometimes representations of what he takes to be the position of his interlocutor (not infrequently an intentional misrepresentation); often he is trying out a position to see where it will go, and not infrequently, he proceeds to try out the opposite position. The interlocutors who are most comfortable with him, as in the *Republic* and *Phaedo*, are content to follow him as he does this, objecting only enough to keep the process going.

Furthermore, Plato's Socrates tells stories, sometimes with the solemnity of myths, sometimes as playful falsehoods, as in the account in the *Protagoras* of "Spartan philosophy." Many dialogues are narrated, which can add a layer of unreliability; Socrates himself can be ironically unreliable (we do not believe, for instance, that he is actually afraid of Thrasymachus) and at one place his unreliability is actually revealed in the text (*Euthydemus* 290e).

Plato, in other words, is ironic all the way through. He as author is of course present in his text at every point, but since the arguments are immersed in and motivated by the dramatic context in which he has placed them, there is no point at which Plato speaks directly to us on his own behalf. Paradoxically, this frees us to evaluate the arguments ourselves; if we agree with Socrates (or with someone else—more than one reader has said: "Protagoras is right!"), this says something about us; we are responsible for defending the position, however we understand it.

We do not have Plato's views but as with any writer of fiction we have his ethos; we do know what he thought interesting and important enough to write about, and since he was a genius, his writing presents to us these priorities as an imaginatively habitable intellectual world. Xenophon's Socratic writings are something quite different. His Socrates is the complete *kalos kagathos*—Lycon, his future accuser, somewhat grudgingly awards him this title at the end of his great speech on Eros (Xenophon *Symposium* 9.1)—superior to, but at home with, his interlocutors. His teachings are good sense, and as such, should command our assent as we read them. And there is no problem about sources, about the transmission of Socratic wisdom: Xenophon is himself the source. He adopts the mode of the memoir, and in a memoir, the author is always the central figure, even if his memories are of someone superior to himself. As he relates to us the other's wit and wisdom, he makes an implicit claim to be the preeminent witness. Xenophon, as it were, is Boswell, and Socrates is his Dr. Johnson—except that Boswell and Johnson were close friends for twenty years, as mature men, while Xenophon is recreating someone he knew long ago, while he was young. Thus he became a Socratic at the end of his life, going back to his youth as it was and as he wished it had been. That young Xenophon was Xenophon the Athenian. His Socratic writings—along with, I suppose, the first two books of the *Hellenica*—make his claim to be have been part of the cultural history of Athens.

A Note on Theodote

Xenophon is not often ironic but he is humorous—considerably more than Plato. Much of this humor consists of using sexual imagery to describe Socratic activity—especially in his *Symposium*. The most fully rendered instance of this tendency, however, is in the *Memorabilia* (3.11): Socrates' visit to Theodote.

Socrates goes to see this beautiful courtesan, makes a good connection with her, and shows her that he has all the skills she needs—but unfortunately he cannot help her because he is already completely occupied in exercising them.

The bond between them, as I see it, is established by her response to Socrates' first question to her. Observing that her establishment is clearly well-funded, he asks for the source of her income: does she own a farm, or rental property, or a workshop? "No," says Theodote; "if someone becomes my friend and is willing to do me good, that is my livelihood" (3.11.4). This response should take us back to Socrates' response to Agathon (1.6.13):

> Young beauty and wisdom are both fine things, and the ways of dispersing them shamefully are similar. If somebody puts up young beauty for sale to whomsoever wants it, that we call prostitution, but if someone takes as a friend someone he knows to be a *kalos kagathos* lover, that we consider chaste. Similarly those who sell wisdom for money to whomsoever wants it we call sophists, while someone who takes someone he knows to be a quality person and teaches that person whatever good thing he has, and thus makes a friend of him—to do that is fitting to a *kalos kagathos* citizen.

There is no mention here of friends "doing good" in return, but it is latent in the analogy—as the analogy is developed in the visit to Theodote. Xenophon, it seems, has asked himself a worldly question that never comes up in Plato: how did Socrates, who had no visible means of support, actually live? The answer is that his friends looked after him.

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Xenophon on "Philosophy" and Socrates*

Christopher Moore

This paper studies Xenophon's sixteen uses of the term *philosophos* and its cognates. I present the unfamiliar observation that Xenophon never in his own voice calls Socrates a philosopher, and his Socrates refers to himself as a philosopher only once (*Oec.* 16.9), in a way that seems rather more conversationally incidental than self-descriptive. My point is to explore Xenophon's diffidence about calling Socrates a philosopher. I find it related to his apologetic goals and his skepticism about certain intellectual movements. I also show, more briefly, that there are similar difficulties in understanding Plato's frequent diffidence in calling Socrates a philosopher. This similarity prompts new and useful reflections about the image of Socrates (and philosophy) in the first half of the fourth century.

Andrea Nightingale, in the most influential recent work on the birth of the discipline of philosophy, *Genres in Dialogue* (1995), also observes that Xenophon does not call Socrates a "philosopher"—indeed, she is the only other author I know who notes this. She explains her observation, however, in a way that the evidence does not sustain. She claims that "philosophy" did not refer, during Socrates' life and much of Xenophon's, to "a specific kind of pursuit practiced by a distinct kind of person," but instead simply to a general affinity to intellectual cultivation (17). Only in Plato's so-called middle dialogues did the meaning of "philosophy" develop into something like the contemplation of the eternal verities through dialectic; only then did the "philosopher" become the specific kind of person who practices the specific activity of philosophy (14; cf. Cooper 2007: 23–24 n. 4). Though Nightingale does not spell out her reasoning, the late development of "philosopher" as a term referring to a specific class of people could explain Xenophon's not calling Socrates a philosopher in only two ways. Perhaps Xenophon wanted to avoid anachronism and so refused to deploy the term "philosopher" in its novel fourth-century form to call the fifth-century Socrates a specific kind of practitioner. Or perhaps Xenophon never had access to the novel form. This would be the case if Plato's novel use never made it far enough from the Academy for Xenophon, in

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exile in Elis and Corinth (cf. Dorion 2003: xxx–xxxii), to adopt it. More importantly, Nightingale's argument assumes that Xenophon would never even have had occasion to speak of Socrates as partial to intellectual cultivation, for if he had, the earlier meaning of "philosopher" would have been available to him for this purpose.

I am not sure how plausible any of these assumptions are: that Xenophon either aimed to avoid anachronism or was ignorant of Plato's semantic innovation, and that he did not want to treat Socrates as a cultivator of intellect (see *Mem.* 4.7.1–7; *Oec.* 11.1). Fortunately, assessing their plausibility would demand supererogatory investigation. For Nightingale's argument has an overriding flaw. A closer look at Xenophon's uses of philosophy terms shows that, contrary to her claim, Xenophon does, in fact, use the term to refer to specific practices of specific practitioners. Xenophon calls certain men with distinctive ways of talking and reasoning "philosophers." He also depicts the vengeful Critias, the student-stealing Antiphon, and, indirectly, the self-aggrandizing Callias as treating Socrates as "doing philosophy," and each takes Socrates' very specific activities and character traits to justify this attribution. This means that Xenophon could have called Socrates a philosopher and meant by that a practitioner of a specific practice, had he wanted to. He could also have had his Socrates describe himself as a philosopher, had he thought it appropriate.

So we might wonder why Xenophon does not call Socrates a philosopher even though he could have, and even though he has his other characters do so. We can reject some possibilities. It must at least have occurred to Xenophon to call Socrates a philosopher, since he did think to have other people call him one. He evidently thought the term adequately familiar and informative—that is, neither esoteric nor jargon—given that he uses the term elsewhere without explanation and in contexts of colloquial conversation. It could hardly have been an accident of composition that he never got around to calling Socrates a philosopher, since he wrote many hundreds of pages about Socrates and about topics related to philosophy and was obviously a conscientious writer (Higgins 1977: 1–10). Given the political risks in being called a philosopher (*Mem.* 1.2–31; Pl. *Ap.* 23d), it might seem that Xenophon, in prosecuting his apologetic mission, would strive to eliminate all such implications that Socrates practiced philosophy. While an explanation by appeal to Xenophon's defense or praise of Socrates is surely apt, Xenophon does not defend Socrates from the imputations of "philosophy" he puts in his writings with the directness and thematic centrality with which he defends Socrates from other imputations, for example, association with Alcibiades and Critias, corrupting the young, or being useless. A final implausible view is that Xenophon was simply uninterested in, and unmoved by, the question whether Socrates was a philosopher, and if so,

in what respect. This is implausible because Xenophon shows that a Socrates partisan simply cannot be agnostic about the question.

A range of more plausible hypotheses remains. Since others called Socrates a “philosopher” (Critias, Antiphon, aggravated crowds), Xenophon may have thought it obvious that Socrates was in fact a philosopher and simply made no efforts to state the obvious. If Xenophon never called Athens “democratic,” we would do better to say that he thought the city’s being democratic went without saying than to say that he denied that it was democratic. Against this idea, it might not have been so obvious that Socrates counted as a “philosopher,” given the narrowly circumscribed way “philosopher” may have been defined; and even were it obvious, the way Socrates practiced philosophy appears, in Xenophon, to have differed from the way others practiced it. The proponent of this hypothesis might respond that Socrates’ being a philosopher, even if contentious in the years right around his execution, probably became settled later in Xenophon’s career, when Xenophon likely wrote most of his Socratic writings.

A second plausible hypothesis is that Xenophon found it either immodest or ludicrous to have Socrates call himself a philosopher. He could find it immodest only if he himself judged—or knew Socrates to judge—“philosopher” to be a great and rare status, one that could be attributed to oneself only boastingly. He could find it ludicrous, by contrast, only if he himself judged—or knew Socrates to judge—“philosopher” to be a pompous and silly name, one that could be attributed to oneself only with delusion. This hypothesis, influenced by Plato’s dialogues that vaunt philosophy and present Socrates as humble, perhaps goes too far in assuming Xenophon so admired “philosophers.”

A third plausible hypothesis is that Xenophon wanted to dissociate Socrates from phony philosophers. The thought would be that true philosophers do not call themselves “philosophers.” But in Plato’s *Apology*, Socrates, though denying the appellation “wise man,” which is falsely attributed to and taken up by conceited men, explains that the term is appropriate nevertheless—he is wise in a human way, knowing that he is ignorant (Peterson 2011: 19–36). In Xenophon, Socrates does not explain the way he is an actual, not just a pretending, philosopher. So this third hypothesis is arguing from silence and is thus unfalsifiable. We would expect instead that Xenophon would call Socrates a “true philosopher” or at least defend the appellation.

As I see it, there are two remaining possibilities. The first is that Xenophon, in neither affirming nor explicitly denying that Socrates was a philosopher, wanted to keep his attitude ambiguous or obscure. He may not have wanted to draw attention to the matter—and in this he seems to have succeeded, at least until Nightingale’s book and the present paper. He may have found either posi-

tion awkward: by denying what seemed obvious to many, he may have seemed to have protested too much, and by affirming it, he may have compromised the memory of Socrates. The plausibility of this position rests on believing that Xenophon did not have a more active reason to avoid advocating for Socrates' philosophicality or non-philosophicality.

There is a different way to explain Xenophon's neither affirming nor denying Socrates' being a philosopher. It is that Xenophon may have wanted to *distance* Socrates from the appellation. By distancing, I mean that Xenophon may not have wanted to assess the *truth* of the charges that Socrates was a philosopher at all. He may instead have wanted to show that Socrates could not be correctly understood in *terms* of being a philosopher; he did not want to pigeonhole Socrates as a philosopher. He could have had both apologetic and sincere reasons for wanting to do this.

Xenophon appears to think of Socrates as a unique moral and intellectual exemplar. Limiting ourselves to the superlatives in the summary end of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon calls Socrates "most helpful" (ὠφελιμώτατον), "best" (ἄριστος), and "most happy" (εὐδαιμονέστατος) (*Mem.* 4.8.11). Yet, as we will see, "philosophy" in Xenophon's time had already come to refer to certain stereotyped ways of acting practiced by increasingly discrete and recognizable groups of people. Socrates was prone to be assimilated to such groups, as Xenophon's writings also show. Such assimilation was not unreasonable. Xenophon presents philosophers as being concerned with dialectical clarity and rigor, especially about core value terms (*An.* 2.1.12–14; *Mem.* 1.2.19, 1.2.31; *Cyr.* 6.1.41), the uptake and teaching of practical and non-practical wisdom (*Symp.* 1.5, 4.62, 8.39; *Cyn.* 13.6–9; *Por.* 5.4), and regimens of self-improvement (*Mem.* 1.6.2, 4.2.23; *Oec.* 16.9). Xenophon attributes all these concerns to Socrates. But sharing traits with philosophers does not make it socially or rhetorically correct to call Socrates, in so many words, a "philosopher"; it might make more sense to present him as standing out from such groups. Xenophon's narratives and conversations suggest that he thought that calling Socrates a "philosopher" would obscure something special or true about him.[1]

A member of a group, whether exemplary or marginal, risks being charged with the crimes, real or imagined, committed by others in his group. His value to society is judged by the value of the practice of his group more than by the value of his own contributions. And he may be taken to understand himself as a "com-

1 Classen 1984: 164–166 leans toward arguing something similar about Xenophon's distancing of Socrates from *sophistai*, a group whose practices Xenophon finds overlap in many places with Socrates' practices.

mitted member of the group" rather than anything else. In other words, being a "philosopher," presumably by the waning decades of Socrates' life in Athens, does not just mean loving wisdom or endeavoring to recognize one's ignorance through self-examination. It means doing what other philosophers do, with approximately their level of skill and subtlety, with their self-satisfaction and confident radicalism, and with their aloofness from the non-philosophers around them. As we will see, Xenophon seems to have found philosophers as a group not altogether practical, perhaps a little silly, mannered in speech, and resistant to hard experience. Xenophon was not so cynical and biting as Callicles, who absolutely rejected the practice of philosophy by adults (*Grg.* 484c–d); but Xenophon's faith in work, striving, and not-just-theoretical care for other people may have put him at odds with the philosophers he knew or knew about. Perhaps remarkably, given his time spent with and thinking about Socrates, and his sympathy for Socrates' fastidious ways of reasoning, talking, and acting, Xenophon, like the anti-Socrates masses, may have accepted the standard stereotyped view of philosophers as big talkers, fond dreamers, charismatic teachers, and gullible students. From his perspective, Socrates may have been better than those called "philosophers," even if he fit the basic visible descriptive criteria for being called a "philosopher." Thus, despite an unarguable overlap in practical or character traits between his views of Socrates and of philosophers, Xenophon takes care to present Socrates as somebody other or more than a person recognizable by means of his membership in some group. Socrates is best described not as a philosopher—even if it cannot be denied that he is one in some respects—but as an eminently useful, virtuous, free, and happy man.

If this explanation for Xenophon's silence about Socrates' being a "philosopher" should be even partly true, it would serve to advance our understanding of Xenophon's picture of Socrates in his society—that is, our understanding of Xenophon; our understanding of Socrates as Xenophon saw him and as he saw others seeing him; and our understanding of that society. But it would also serve a more general purpose. It would advise against calling Socrates a "philosopher" without careful qualification, deliberate anachronism, or ideological supposition. As we will see at this chapter's end, Plato's Socrates also rarely said of himself that he practiced philosophy. All the same, the history of philosophy can hardly exclude Socrates. This means that the history of philosophy and the history of "philosophy"—i.e., of a discipline of practitioners so named by themselves or others—do not always coincide and should not be conflated. Not all philosophers were always called "philosophers"; and perhaps not all so-called "philosophers" are (from our or Aristotle's perspective) philosophers. Xenophon's contrast between Socrates and the "philosophers" of the late fifth

or early fourth century, the annealing decades during which both philosophy and reflections on Socrates came most dramatically together, helps us see the divergence between the history of "philosophy" and the history of philosophy.

In fact, Xenophon's treatment of philosophy and Socrates provides unique testimony to the early history of philosophy (or "philosophy"). Unlike Plato, Xenophon does not think systematically about the ways "philosophy" ultimately contributes to happiness, whether in one actual or potential form or another, whether in contrast to or in similarity to other practices. Unlike Isocrates, Xenophon does not advocate for Socrates' peculiar practice by calling it "philosophy" and treating "philosophy" as an honorific to be reclaimed from its abusers. Unlike Aristotle, Xenophon does not set Socrates squarely within a history of philosophy that includes Thales, Parmenides, Zeno, Diagoras, and others (except Anaxagoras, *Mem.* 4.7.6–7, but he does not call him *philosophos*). These differences between Xenophon's approach and his near contemporaries' suggest an impartiality of Xenophon's testimony, or at least a balancing-out bias. Xenophon looks not to have wanted to vindicate or applaud "philosophy"—even if he admired some of its characteristics—whereas Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle did; Xenophon might, therefore, give a less tendentious account of Socrates' position within the then-swirling controversies about philosophy.[2]

In assessing each of Xenophon's uses of "philosophy," I begin with the oddest, a pleonasm at *Memorabilia* 4.2, where "philosophy" means a certain course of study. I then look at the other *Memorabilia* instances, where we see how Xenophon negotiated other people's imputations to Socrates' "philosophizing." In two other Socratic works, to which I turn next, Xenophon puts Socrates in vivid comparison with so-called "philosophers." The uses of "philosophy" words in the non-Socratic writings give further evidence, in two ways, for the distinctness of a group called "philosophers" and thus support the claim that Xenophon can and does see Socrates in light of groups of people called "philosophers." At the end, as I have mentioned, I adumbrate some surprising similarities between Xenophon's and Plato's treatment of Socrates as a philosopher.

2 A difficulty with relying on Xenophon for precise information about the history of "philosophy" is that he wrote throughout a four-decade career, but we do not know the order or decade in which he wrote the individual works. We know, too, that he was absent from Athens from 401 and so would have had either to rely on his memory of the fifth-century world of Socrates or depend on books, correspondence, and visitors. See Higgins 1977: 132–133; Dorion 2003: ccxl–cclii. Similar difficulties, of course, confront the person reconstructing the early period of philosophy from our best other sources, Plato and Aristotle, though some of Isocrates' texts are dateable.

Whatever the reader thinks about Xenophon's situating of Socrates within the discipline of philosophy, I hope this chapter makes clearer some facts about the history of "philosophy." As I have mentioned already, there was a group of people called "philosophers" in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, defined as such for reasons more specific than their intellectual cultivation. This group of people had its detractors. Xenophon had some sympathy with the detractors. Xenophon also wanted to distance Socrates from the (money-seeking) sophists. But he does not see the "philosophers" as the only alternative to the "sophists" (excluding a claim in the *Cynegeticus*, in a passage which Xenophon may not have written), and since he does not seek to define, or redefine, the term "philosopher," he does not go out of his way to suggest that Socrates would be *better* understood by that term.

"Philosophizing a Philosophy"

Memorabilia 4.2 illustrates Socrates' teaching to those self-confident about their education and wisdom (4.2.1). Euthydemus has collected books from poets and wise people, and he acts as if private possession or study of them suffices for political and rhetorical expertise (11). By asking a sequence of questions, Socrates undermines Euthydemus' presumption. He reminds Euthydemus that all the wisest politicians and experts had teachers (2–6) and shows him that whatever the use to which he has put his library, he remains ignorant about statesmanship's basic knowledge, the objects of justice (12–19). By undermining Euthydemus' confidence in his political preparations and competence, Socrates brings him to a salutary self-discovery:

> But by the gods, Socrates, [Euthydemus] says, I really thought I was philosophizing a philosophy (φιλοσοφεῖν φιλοσοφίαν) through which I thought it best to be educated in the matters appropriate for a man striving to be a gentleman: but now, how do you imagine I am, spiritless, seeing myself, despite my earlier efforts, unable even to answer what I'm asked on the topics it's most necessary to know, and having no other avenue traveling along which I might become better?[3]
>
> *Mem.* 4.2.23

3 All translations are by the author.

Euthydemus understands "philosophizing a philosophy" to be an effortful and deliberately chosen intellectual route to improvement, where that improvement would allow him to become a gentleman and thus also to answer questions about the most important political topics.[4]

For Euthydemus, the route to becoming a gentleman, the route he calls "philosophizing a philosophy," has something to do with collecting books (γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον, 1; ἔτι γε συνάγω, ἕως ἂν κτήσωμαι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι πλεῖστα, 8; κεκτημένους, 9; συλλέγεις, 10). Neither Socrates nor Euthydemus states what the latter has done or means to do with those books. Consistent with Euthydemus' rejection of tutelage, he probably has not acquired them to discuss them with others (cf. 1.6.14). Rhapsodists acquire the complete verses of Homer, and doctors acquire large sets of medical texts (4.2.10); since both kinds of practitioner learn much of what they need to know orally, their acquisitions might seem useful mostly as reference. But it does not seem that Euthydemus meant to assemble a reference library. If he did, he would have told Socrates—and would have had to tell any other interrogator—that he could answer questions only after consulting his library. Nor does he ever say that something he knows comes from some authoritative book. Accordingly, Euthydemus must mean to read his books on his own, and as he acquires ideas from them to incorporate them as his own ideas. Some books that he has read must be about justice; he admits that has reflected (κατανενοήκας), a lot (μάλα), on the relationship between justice and goodness and can exposit (ἐξηγήσασθαι) what is and is not just (12). We might even guess that Socrates uses in his examination of Euthydemus' views about intentional injustice the example of deliberate versus accidental misreading (μὴ ὀρθῶς … ἀναγιγνώσκῃ, 20) to draw attention to Euthydemus' self-education through reading.

Euthydemus couches his autodidactic sentiment in a grammatically noteworthy construction. He uses a cognate accusative pleonasm "philosophizing a philosophy" to intensify and draw attention to the action; this pleonasm is recorded only twice in Greek literature before the Christian period.[5] Opening his speech with this remark reveals the terms in which he thought about his practice of collecting books; it also expresses his surprise at the practice's failure. He had conceived of his activity as "philosophizing" and "philosophy" and

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4 Smith 1903: 207 renders it "following a plan of study"; Dorion 2011: 12 has "the philosophy that I studied." I note that Xen. *Symp* 8.3 suggests that the content of gentlemanliness (καλοκἀγαθία) is not always totally clear, as does much of the *Oeconomicus*.

5 See Allen 1996: 107–111 on Plato's uses of pleonastic constructions, relevant given that Xenophon is a contemporary; see more generally Norwood 1952: 281–283 with references.

intended to reap philosophy's great benefit, the development into a gentleman, but nevertheless failed to reach his goal. We may be inclined to believe that his course of study had been justified to him as "philosophy" and promised wonderful results at its completion, and here he is finding that "philosophizing a philosophy" can fail to produce those results. That "philosophizing a philosophy" has some unity as a course of instruction and involves adopting a specific lifestyle—such as collecting and reading books about justice and politics—is suggested by a use of the same pleonasm a couple of generations later. In Philemon's play *Philosophoi* (fr. 88 *PCG* dated by Bruzzese 2011 to the start of the third century), somebody explains the odd traits of a main character: "For he philosophizes a new philosophy; he teaches hunger and takes students; he dines on a single loaf, with a fig for dessert, and water as a digestif."[6] The play appears to treat "philosophizing a philosophy" as following a coherent and planned approach to self-improvement; the subject of the joke has developed a new approach, apparently based on *autarchia* or desire-reduction. This dramatic fragment includes no reference to philosophy's expected reliance on dialectical exchange, critical defense of one's reasoning, or mentorship. It suggests instead a way of life that is unusual (teaching hunger!), seemingly indirect (one fig!), but probably reasoned-out (it's a three-course meal!). Euthydemus' procedure is similarly unusual (Alcibiades, Critias, Pericles, and the other ambitious statesmen in the *Memorabilia* are not said to have read a lot of books), indirect (management of a household, perfecting speeches, or fighting in war would seem more direct routes), and reasoned out (the books are from the authors purported to be wisest).

When Socrates replies to Euthydemus' consternation, he does not say that Euthydemus was right to philosophize a philosophy and yet should from now on philosophize a different and better philosophy. Nor does he say that Euthydemus thought he was philosophizing a philosophy but failed to, misled as he was by mistaken authors. He goes on instead to encourage knowing himself (24–30), distinguishing good from bad things (31–35), and figuring out who he means to govern once he is a statesman (36–39).[7] These are presumably the most important topics, those that a gentleman should know and about which he should be able to answer questions. None of this does Socrates call "philosophy," neither here nor anywhere else in Xenophon's Socratic works. (Euthyde-

6 Φιλοσοφίαν καινὴν γὰρ οὗτος φιλοσοφεῖ· | πεινῆν διδάσκει καὶ μαθητὰς λαμβάνει. | εἷς ἄρτος, ὄψον ἰσχάς, ἐπιπιεῖν ὕδωρ.

7 On *Mem.* 4.2, see Morrison 1994; Dorion 2003: clxxix–clxxx; 2004: 240–251; 2011: 64–115; Johnson 2005; Danzig 2010: 179–199; Rossetti 2011; Moore 2015: 216–235.

mus, by contrast, might on reflection come to think that Socratic conversation proves a better activity for someone desiring to philosophize a philosophy than the activity he settled on.)

Since Xenophon does not present Socrates as speaking of his own or recommended actions as "philosophizing a philosophy," we might wonder why Euthydemus does. Euthydemus did overhear the brief conversations Socrates used specifically to draw him in (4.2.2–8); but if Socrates had used the unusual phrase "philosophize a philosophy" there, we would expect Xenophon to have had him use it elsewhere, and more importantly, we would expect Euthydemus, in the passage quoted above at 23, to say something like, "I thought I was—*as you put it*—philosophizing a philosophy," and then to forego the gloss on that term, given that Socrates would obviously know exactly what it means. Euthydemus' motivation to collect and study books, and to call that activity "philosophizing a philosophy," must have come, therefore, from someone besides Socrates. Hippias, who becomes Socrates' interlocutor two chapters hence (4.4), advocated becoming extensively learned (πολυμαθής, 4.4.6) for the sake of one's political education (4.4.7–8) (cf. *Prt.* 318e1–319a2; *Hp. mai.* 281a1–283b4; Węcowski 2009). He or someone like him could have been one of the wise authors whose books Euthydemus collected (σοφιστῶν, 4.2.1; τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, 4.2.9). It is clear that by the late 390s, Athenians used "philosophize" or "philosophic" to refer to political preparation or thinking (Thuc. 2.40.1. Ar. *Eccl.* 571).[8] "Philosophizing (a philosophy)" thus would likely have been a name, within a social circle of intellectual-political aspirants, for the studious preparation for a political career (cf. Dorion 2011: 83). This need not have been the only available use of the term, but it does seem like a dominant one in Athens, and the one that Euthydemus uses.

Xenophon presents Socrates as helpful for people seeking a political career; indeed, the entire Book 4 of the *Memorabilia* shows a course of education apt for the political aspirant (even if it would benefit others as well). Yet *Mem.* 4.2 shows Socrates' education comprising, at least in part, tough questions and indirect answers. Certainly it shows Socrates as more or other than simply a dispenser of sage bromides, etiological myths, allegorical thought experiments, and realist analyses of public institutions. These are the elements we know to

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8 In Thucydides' funeral oration, Pericles admits that Athens "philosophizes, though without weakness," as well as "pursues beautification but with economy," and then explains that philosophizing is deliberating about civic matters in preparation for martial or other emergencies (2.40.2–3). In Aristophanes' play, the chorus urges Praxagora to think up a politically profound idea—as it turns out, communism of property and conjugal partners—by telling her to "raise a philosophical thought" (φιλόσοφον ἐγείρειν | φροντίδ').

be in the writings of the fifth-century writers called "wise men" or "sophists," including Hippias (cf. *Symp.* 1.5, 4.62), Protagoras (*Symp.* 1.5), and Prodicus (*Mem.* 2.1.21–34, where he is voiced by Socrates, and *Symp.* 4.62). Those writings addressed problems of ethics, economy, and politics and provided arguments or illustrations of views. From the uses of "philosophy" that we see in Thucydides and Aristophanes, as well as throughout Xenophon, it seems likely that imbibing this written work could be called "philosophizing."

Socrates diagnoses the failures in Euthydemus' education. Euthydemus does not know himself (4.2.24–30); he seems persuaded by theological doubts (4.3.3–17); he does not understand justice (4.2.11–19), conceivably because Hippias, who could have been a favorite author of his, also does not understand justice (4.4.5–25);[9] he does not recognize the importance of *enkrateia* ("self-control") to the acquisition of pleasure (4.5.9); and he lacks precise understanding of the moral concepts he so seeks to learn (4.6.2–12). These failures are not necessarily failures of "philosophy" itself. But they are failures consequent to not studying with other people, in particular, not studying with Socrates. "Philosophy" surely had great cultural capital with Euthydemus and those he admired. The high esteem given to "philosophy," to the extent that it was a methodical study of the matters of highest import, is reasonable. But Xenophon shows that it is Socrates, and conversation with him, that is most useful, even essential; and he leads one to doubt whether "philosophy" as Euthydemus understands it gives an essential role to Socrates.

Xenophon's desire to laud Socrates rather than to link him to a novel pedagogical trend seems to explain Xenophon's insouciance about defining Socrates vis-à-vis philosophy. This could be parsed as Xenophon's being unconcerned about "philosophy" and the jargon of the day. It could also be parsed as Socrates' concern to help Euthydemus in general rather than to correct his ideas about "philosophy." A contrary view might be that Euthydemus frames his efforts as "philosophy" exactly because he believes Socrates to be a philosopher, and that this would be the best way to appeal to Socrates' empathy, as though he were to complain, *look, I'm doing exactly what you would have wanted, with no success!* Yet Euthydemus' unwariness about Socrates' tricks of examination, and his appreciation of the *sophoi* and *sophistai* who act quite differently from Socrates, suggest that he hardly knows him. Thus Euthydemus' imputation of "philosophy" to Socrates would not prevent Xenophon from simultaneously distancing Socrates from "philosophy"; indeed, it may provide just the reason to do so.

9 I conjecture Hippias' influence on Euthydemus to explain the exchange between Socrates and Hippias set into the sequence of four conversations between Socrates and Euthydemus.

As we will soon see, the *Memorabilia* uses "philosophy" words four times before Book 4 (though we have little reason to think they came chronologically earlier). Several times the word arises in the context of charges against "philosophy" or "philosophers" or "philosophizing." The fact that "philosophy" received a bad name from some quarters suggests that Xenophon could have had a strong strategic reason for dissociating Socrates from it. He may have wanted to keep Socrates independent from a class of intellectual practitioners liable to social disapprobation. It is notable, in this respect, that Xenophon uses no "philosophy"-group words in his *Apology*. We now turn to the first book of *Memorabilia*.

Charges against "Philosophy" in the First Book of the *Memorabilia*

Self-Styled Philosophers

The first two chapters of the first book of the *Memorabilia* defend Socrates against the diverse charges historically levied against him. In chapter 2, Xenophon vindicates Socrates' association with Alcibiades and Critias. In section 19, Xenophon responds to the claim that because that pair were bad at the end of their lives, Socrates must never have made them good in the first place:

> Now perhaps many of those claiming to philosophize (πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν) might say that a just person never becomes unjust, or a disciplined person hubristic, or a person who has learned anything of which there is learning ignorant. But I do not acknowledge such things to be this way.
>
> *Mem.* 1.2.19

Xenophon epitomizes a common position among those who say of themselves that they "philosophize." Xenophon takes these claimants to philosophy to argue about justice, discipline, knowledge, and the permanence of virtue, and perhaps to form these arguments from abstract claims and deductions, for example, from the nature of opposites. Xenophon makes no charges against these topics or methods of argument. He even allows that there are claimants to philosophy who do not accept the permanence of virtue, as he does not. But Xenophon clearly distinguishes himself and Socrates from this group of "those who claim to philosophize." He does not speak of "*we* who claim to philosophize" or of "those who philosophize as opposed to those who have no grounds for their claims about virtue." He suggests that there is a distinctive group of

people who understand or present themselves as "philosophizing," and that he is addressing something distinctive about them.

It is tempting to read Xenophon as though he were saying "those claiming (i.e., falsely) to philosophize," with the implication that he or Socrates might be among a different, but related, group—those who *truly* philosophize.[10] Were he saying this, then Xenophon's ground for claiming that these self-styled philosophizers do not really philosophize would have to be that they simply have the wrong view about the permanence of justice, discipline, or knowledge, and that all who truly philosophize avoid asserting this incorrect view about it. That it is their view at issue is clear from the fact that Xenophon does not complain about their mode of argument (as being, for example, needlessly paradoxical or captious), and when he argues at length for the contrary view, the impermanence of justice (1.2.19–28), he uses a range of argumentative styles, and, indeed, enough argument to suggest that the view he opposes really does have genuine and not merely eristic adherents. But the view that Xenophon is distinguishing between "self-claimed philosophizers" and "true philosophers" has three unacceptable consequences. First, since only "many" of those claiming to philosophize hold the false view about moral permanence, and there are only two views—either a just person cannot or can become unjust—then some of those "claiming to philosophize" actually hold the view Xenophon accepts (or are agnostic), and thus they would be not merely claimants to philosophizing, but real instances. Of course, frauds are sometimes right, but it would be a harsh attitude to call them frauds at the very moment they are right. Second, if truly philosophizing depended on having the correct view, then philosophers could never disagree; one of the positions, being false, would no longer be philosophical! In theory, Xenophon could think that Socrates is the one true philosopher

10 Smith (1903: 22) asserts that Xenophon here refers to the Sophists, as does Santoni (1989: 92 n. 24), and says that φασκόντων "often suggests the idea of *alleging, pretending*" (italics in text). This is possible, but the end of *Mem.* 1.2.31 provides some evidence against this reading. There, Xenophon says that neither did he ever himself hear Socrates teach the art of words, nor did he ever hear people claim (φάσκοντες) that *they* heard Socrates do this. Xenophon surely means "claim truthfully," treating the other people as relevant and credible witnesses to Socrates' activity. It would either be inadequate or otiose to say that he never heard people "lie" (= claim falsely) that Socrates taught the art of words: inadequate because it would leave out from the record those who might have told the truth about their knowledge of Socrates, and otiose because Xenophon could know that they were lying only if he already knew about Socrates' activities independently from the (false) claims of the other people. I prefer Dorion (2003: 1.13), who translates *"se targuent," pride themselves*, where the issue is not the truthfulness of their claim but the pleasure with which they make it.

because he has the one true view, and this is why he always says the same thing; but none of Xenophon's other uses of the term "philosopher" coordinate it with having the correct view. The third unacceptable consequence of assuming that Xenophon is distinguishing between false and true claimants to philosophy is that it would make Xenophon's remark here seem nothing more than a jab at the pretentions of the self-styled philosophizers, and yet Xenophon does not seem prone anywhere to settling *that* score. He seems rather to try to keep Socrates out of the debate altogether. I might mention one other consideration connected to our use of the term "so-called." If someone tries to get us to accept his position about virtue on the grounds that he is—so he claims—a philosopher, then we might be wary of that credential; we would hope that he could appeal to better evidence for that position on virtue than a self-appointed status as expert. But if someone, who happens to call himself a philosopher, tries to get us to believe his position by giving an argument, then we can have no reason, simply because he calls himself a philosopher, to doubt that status. In this passage at 1.2.19, Xenophon is using "so-called" in this latter way.

We will make better sense of this remark if we reject the "claiming (falsely)" view and suppose instead that Xenophon means to identify a type of person who identifies himself as a "philosopher" and who (therefore) argues in a particular way—not all arguments come from philosophers, and not all arguments appeal to the same types of reasoning (cf. 1.2.17). Xenophon may have specific men in mind as these self-styled philosophers, for example Antisthenes or Plato.[11] But these arguments may be widely deployed; there must be more than a few philosophers in Athens by this time, as we will see below. In any event, though "many of those who philosophize" could be a coy reference to just one or two men, the reference works only if Xenophon could refer truly to "many … who philosophize."

If the short work called the *Dissoi Logoi* is actually from the end of the fifth century, as seems plausible, it would give us information about a group of self-styled philosophers.[12] The work begins with the statement that "contrasting arguments are said in Greece by those philosophizing about the good and the bad" (δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τᾷ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῶ ἀγαθῦ καὶ τῶ κακῶ, 1.1). These contrasting arguments are abstract, about the nature of good and bad as such; some who philosophize say that the good and bad are distinct, others that they are the same (see Gera 2000; Scholz 2003;

11 Dorion 2003: 1.90 thinks the so-called philosophers are in fact philosophers, Antisthenes perhaps among them.

12 This dating: Levi 1940, Ramage 1961, Robinson 1979; skeptical: Conley 1985, Burnyeat 1998.

Bailey 2008). The document proceeds to provide the sort of evidence for the opposing positions that their proponents might advance. It does not show any forensic purpose to which these arguments would be put. This suggests that philosophizing, for the author of the *Dissoi Logoi*, simply involves knowing and working out positions about the good and, for example, the admirable (2), the just (3), the truth (4), the teachability of virtue (6), and the relation between kinds of knowledge (8). The last but incomplete extant chapter begins by saying that memory is the greatest discovered instrument for both philosophy and for wisdom (ἐς φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ σοφίαν, 9.1). This last chapter suggests, even if it does not prove, that philosophy, which is the deployment of the kinds of arguments listed in the *Dissoi Logoi*, could be used in developing one's capacity for political or forensic debate. I say that it might not prove it because we might think of these philosophers as men with a hobby of disputation, clever but not obviously practical or insightful. In any event, the *Dissoi Logoi* defines "philosophers," as Xenophon appears to depict the self-styled philosophers, not by the quality or truth of their arguments—philosophers explicitly disagree—but as a sort of identity shared among those with a similar practice, set of questions, and preferred mode of answering those questions.

Xenophon thus acknowledges the existence of a group of people who say of themselves that they philosophize. He does not say whether he thinks that they wrongly call themselves philosophers. As a consequence, he does not say whether he thinks that there are people who are actually philosophers but do not claim, boast, or pretend to philosophize. But Xenophon seems not to think there are. He seems to think of philosophers as having an articulated, projected identity. It would probably be as hard to imagine being a philosopher without claiming to be one as being a lawyer without claiming to be one or a connoisseur of wine without claiming to be one.

A Disparagement Commonly Used against the Philosophers

Later in *Mem.* 1.2, Xenophon shows that people used "philosophy" words not only to describe themselves but also to describe others. Xenophon reports that Critias avenged an insult from Socrates—Socrates tried to discourage the Euthydemus of Book 4 from associating with Critias (1.2.29–30)—by using his legal powers as member of the Thirty against him:

> And in the laws he proscribed the teaching of the art of words (λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν), taking contumacious aim at him [Socrates] and, lacking any other way to bring him down, attacked him with this disparagement commonly (τὸ κοινῇ) used by the masses against the philosophers

> (τοῖς φιλοσόφοις) and slandering him before the masses. But for myself, neither did I myself ever hear Socrates do this, nor was I aware of another claiming to have heard him do this.
>
> *Mem.* 1.2.31

What we learn from this passage is that by 404 BC, there were philosophers. Presumably this means they were called philosophers then, too. It is unlikely that Xenophon means to identify certain people as having actually been philosophers even though nobody then used that name. Xenophon does not divulge what people thought about philosophers in general. He notes only that they were often disparaged as teachers of the art of words.[13] The idea seems to be that this teaching was taken to be bad and philosophers were often—though perhaps not always, or only—taken to be teachers of it. (In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates says that accusations about making the worse argument better were "handy against *all* those philosophizing" (*τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων* πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, 23d2–6).)

Xenophon says that he has no evidence that Socrates ever taught the art of words. Nor does he infer from the fact that the disparagement was commonly used against the philosophers that it must have been used against Socrates. What he does say is that Critias decides to use a disparagement that has already been used against the philosophers. It is not immediately clear whether Critias thought Socrates actually was a philosopher, as he understood the term. All we know is that Critias accuses Socrates of teaching the art of words because he thought the accusation might stick, and that Socrates would be vulnerable to it. Perhaps the "masses" thought, rightly or wrongly, that Socrates was a philosopher, and thus that the accusation was apt. Perhaps, though, the masses did not think about Socrates being a philosopher, and thought only that Socrates, *like* the philosophers, taught the art of words, and that they definitely disapproved.

Critias' edict proscribed teaching the art of words. It proscribed what many people thought, rightly or wrongly, was part of philosophy. Because Socrates was forbidden from teaching the art of words, he wanted to get clearer about what teaching that art amounted to. By asking these questions he would end up getting clearer about what people thought at least some part of philosophy amounted to (even if Critias or the masses did not think that Socrates was a philosopher).

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13 It is obscure what exactly "the art of words" means, per Dorion 2003: 98–100, but even Socrates recognizes the obscurity of the formulation, as we see from his asking Critias and Charicles for clarification.

Socrates asks Critias (or his associate Charicles) whether the edict prohibits correct or incorrect reasoning (1.2.34). Though Socrates may simply be trying to be provocative, he might rightly think that teachers of the art of words would teach people to use their words correctly. This is certainly what Xenophon thinks Socrates does in fact try to do (4.6). Xenophon never calls the correct use of words "philosophy"; probably he recognizes that this would be an overestimation, or underestimation, of philosophy's scope (connected largely to political training). Charicles ignores Socrates' suggestion and says that the edict only forbids Socrates from having conversations with the youth (τοῖς νέοις … μὴ διαλέγεσθαι, 1.2.35). This obviously exceeds teaching any art, since it includes talking with sellers of goods, and hardly applies only to philosophers. Nevertheless, Charicles' idea is that philosophers either actually or in the popular imagination talk to young people, those who are not yet intellectually mature (οὔπω φρονίμοις) but may be interested eventually in participating in public deliberation (35). He has in mind training the young for political engagement, as we have already seen. Charicles identifies a specifically Socratic activity, the one that perhaps bothers him so much: "asking questions to which you know the answer" (36). This still does not quite get at Socrates' activity, so Critias, taking a turn, reduces it to talking about "cobblers, builders, metal workers … cowherds" (37), Socrates' familiar examples. Socrates loses patience with Critias' circumlocutions and tells him that what Critias wants to forbid is his talking (with the young) about that for which these are examples: justice, holiness, and similar topics (1.2.37), themselves presumably perfectly respectable topics. So Critias realizes, or admits, that what he really wants to forbid is Socrates' asking of the youth leading questions about ethical, political, and theological matters, matters they would need to think about before becoming public men. Critias thinks that Socrates talks about virtues, using inferences from mundane examples, for the sake of education, and thinks also that the many connect the teaching of the art of words with "philosophy."

It is possible that the philosophers disparaged for teaching the art of words do something rather different from what Critias thinks Socrates, in fact, does. There may be only enough similarity for the disparagement, fomented elsewhere, to be made sensible to the masses when applied to Socrates. But it is also possible that Critias does think that Socrates is a philosopher as Critias understands Socrates and understands philosophers, and even as Xenophon understands them (cf. 1.2.19 and 4.2.23). After all, Socrates implicitly admits that there is a way in which he teaches the art of words and a way in which he talks to ambitious youth about moral and political questions.

Then why is Xenophon indirect in his retelling of Socrates' conversation with Critias? Why not deny, or have Socrates deny, that Socrates is a philosopher, if he

denies that Socrates teaches the art of words (as popularly understood)? Or why not admit that Socrates is a philosopher but not a nefarious or phony one like others? Or why not take on the larger case of philosophers in general and say that while they do teach the art of words, every Athenian should be glad of it? My sense is that Xenophon believes that nothing good would come from calling Socrates a philosopher, or from defending his status as philosopher, or from showing that he exemplifies or excels all other philosophers in his philosophicality. On the one hand, it would associate Socrates on Xenophon's authority with an often disreputable crowd. On the other hand, it would add an unnecessary term from which Socrates would have to be cautiously differentiated. Neither task would advance Xenophon's desire to demonstrate Socrates' exceptional life and goodness. Of course, this passage also concludes Xenophon's description of the distance that came between the once-associating Socrates and Critias (1.2.12–39). Dipping into the pool of questions that would arise were Xenophon to have called Socrates a philosopher might have in fact drowned out his point about Critias' apostasy and Socrates' unrelenting adherence to good pedagogical norms. But I take this dramatic or narratological explanation to be secondary to, or at least of less significance than, the apologetic one.

Philosophers and Happiness

Whereas Critias treated philosophers as teachers to outlaw Socrates' conversations, Antiphon in *Memorabilia* 1.6 treats philosophers as teachers to deride Socrates' failure at teaching. Xenophon presents a set-piece where Antiphon aims to poach Socrates' associates. Antiphon addresses Socrates with the intention that their conversation (διελέχθη) be overheard by those around them. His gambit opens with two references to philosophy:

> Socrates, I thought that those philosophizing would necessarily come to flourish more (τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίγνεσθαι). But you seem to me to have won the opposite from philosophy (τἀναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας). [After all, you are poor and do not charge tuition …] Now if just as the teachers of other practices show their students to be imitators of themselves, you too were to treat your associates in such a way, consider yourself to be a teacher of misery (κακοδαιμονίας).
>
> *Mem.* 1.6.2–3

Antiphon has a commercial view of philosophy; this might have been expected from Xenophon's introducing him as a sophist (τὸν σοφιστήν, 1.6.1).[14] He thinks

14 Thus Smith 1903: 61 is misleading to gloss τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας as "lovers of knowledge" and

that philosophizing amounts to teaching students and associates (cf. 1.6.12). As we will see below, others as well took philosophy to be a pedagogical profession. Antiphon also thinks that philosophizing, ideally practiced, makes one flourish. This view that philosophy leads not merely to discoveries or mental diversion, but actually to a more flourishing happy life, is familiar from Isocrates and Plato. But Antiphon links the pedagogical-professional aspect of philosophy to its flourishing-causing aspect more directly than Isocrates and Plato do. He here implies that philosophizing makes one flourish because it brings tuition payments from one's students. Antiphon takes a fee from his students; they are glad to pay him because they believe that if they imitate him, they will themselves mature into money-making and thus successful philosophers.

Because Antiphon has explained the success of philosophy by appeal to its for-profit teaching, he can ignore philosophy's specific topics. But since there are non-philosophical teachers, and because he has just claimed that Socrates teaches, but not for profit, it is unclear on what grounds he presents Socrates as philosophizing. (Socrates makes explicit his opposition to tuition; he later says that those who sell their wisdom, called "sophists," are like prostitutes, 1.6.13). He could have several types of evidence. Socrates could have said of himself, in some other conversation, that he philosophizes; at most, we have the passing remark in the private conversation of the *Oeconomicus* (16.9), discussed below. Other people could have said that Socrates philosophizes; this is likely, given that Antiphon sees Socrates as a competitor for students. Antiphon could even have a richer picture of philosophizing than he at first admits and sees Socrates' practice fitting it; a later conversation between Antiphon and Socrates might hint at Socrates' practice.

Xenophon reports a conversation where Antiphon jokes that Socrates is just but not wise: because he charges no fees from those who spend time with him, his knowledge (ἐπιστάμενος) and wisdom (σοφός) must be empty; but at least he does not greedily mislead people about its value (ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, 1.6.11–12)! The joke reveals three things about Antiphon's view of philosophy. First, philosophy involves spending time with people in knowledge-based discussion, where wisdom counts for the most. Second, since these people might be willing to pay a fee, they are probably young people looking to improve their chances in the world. Third, though here Antiphon speaks explicitly of commercial justice, his joke would be really apt only if (certain) philosophers

to derive from Pl. *Resp.* 376b that this just means φιλομαθεῖς; Antiphon addresses Socrates not because Socrates loves wisdom or learning but because while he has the trappings of a certain kind of teacher, he is not making any money from it. Santoni 1989: 321 has "engaged in a philosophy," which is better.

aimed (or pretended to aim) for justice as well as for wisdom. Plato's *Republic* Book 2 and the Platonic *Clitophon* show that understanding justice had popular appeal, political relevance, and an intellectual imprimatur, even if those two dialogues do not link "searching for justice" explicitly with philosophy (see Moore 2012: 15–17). We might guess that Socrates exemplified this commitment to conversations about justice. All the same, Antiphon acts as though he appreciates Socrates' commitment to justice only as a fiduciary responsibility to potentially naïve or enthralled associates. His act may not be dissembling or unusual. The contemporaneous discussions about justice we know about emphasized the external or instrumental benefits of being just; Antiphon perhaps thinks all philosophers, given that they are paid teachers foremost, think about justice in a way that pays for them and would pay for their students, who, after all, need to justify paying their teachers. Thus Antiphon perhaps sees philosophers as constituting a class of teachers on the basis of whose wisdom students will pay to learn about justice (among potentially other topics). Obviously this would be an unsurprising consequence, since the sophists that Euthydemus read (4.2), the familiar topics of philosophers (1.2.16), and the content of Socrates' teaching when teaching the art of words (1.2.37) all include justice as the primary matter.

As always, Xenophon does not in his own words or through Socrates explicitly deny the implication that Socrates is a philosopher. But he does not explicitly accept or modify the implication either. Instead Xenophon has Socrates explain what actually typifies him. In the midst of Socrates' discussion with Antiphon, he gives a good example. Regarding the "treasures of the wise men of old, which they left behind in the books they wrote, opening them up with my friends I [Socrates] go through them, and should we see anything good, we focus on it, and we consider it a great advantage if we become useful to one another" (1.6.14). Xenophon says that from this practice he judges Socrates to be blessed (μακάριος) and able to lead his listeners to excellence (καλοκἀγαθία). We see the contrast with Euthydemus' practice discussed in *Memorabilia* 4.2. Looking at books is valuable only when exercising judgment in conversation about their best and useful elements and applying their discoveries to oneself and others. In the previous conversation with Antiphon, Socrates says that divinity comes through minimizing one's desires, which he practices (1.6.10). So Socrates reads carefully with friends, seeks the good, minimizes desire, and thinks about becoming more divine. For Xenophon, these traits are eminently useful.

In the *Memorabilia*, then, both Critias and Antiphon see Socrates as near enough to the group called "philosophers" to charge him with the abuse thrown at philosophers or to make fun of his failure to meet philosophy's monetary ideals. In either case, the association of Socrates with this group of philoso-

phers makes sense. Socrates talks with others about the careful use of language and about justice and the other virtues. But Xenophon does not affirm the title of "philosopher" for Socrates. In the context of Socrates' encounter with Critias, Xenophon recognizes that much of the populace despises philosophers. In Socrates' encounter with Antiphon, Xenophon knows that much of the populace thinks philosophers desire profit, construing as it does happiness in material terms. Neither perception would make it advantageous to associate Socrates with philosophers.

Let us now move from the *Memorabilia* to Xenophon's other Socratic works.

Callias, the Philosophical Impresario

Xenophon's *Symposium* opens with Callias planning to host a party for his beloved, a champion fighter named Autolycus. The three uses of "philosophy" words in the dialogue are directed toward Callias. This suggests that Xenophon deploys the words only to draw a portrait of Callias' reputation as an intellectual impresario (Pl. *Ap.* 20c; *Tht.* 65a; *Alc.* 119a; Freeman 1938; Woldinga 1938: 20–23; Wolfsdorf 1998: 127–129, Bowen 1998: 13).

The dialogue's drama opens when Callias spots Socrates, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides and bids them come home with him. He exhorts them by telling Socrates that he and his friends' "purified souls" (ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὰς ψυχάς) would make his dinner brighter (λαμπροτέραν) than military and political people would (1.4). Socrates responds:

> You are always playing us for a joke and trivializing us, since you (σὺ μὲν) have given much money to Protagoras for wisdom (σοφίᾳ), and to Gorgias and Prodicus and to many others, but you regard us by contrast (ἡμᾶς δ') as being some sort of lay philosophers (αὐτουργούς τινας τῆς φιλοσοφίας).
>
> *Symp.* 1.5

Callias ignores the start and finish of Socrates' response, the twice-made claim that he insults Socrates and his friends. He agrees with the middle, that he has paid much tuition to these sellers of wisdom. He says that until now he has hidden his ability to speak fluently and wisely (πολλὰ καὶ σοφὰ λέγειν), but that this party will allow him to show its attendees that he is worthy of much serious esteem (1.6) (see Rettig 1879: 273; Woldinga 1938: 48–49; Gray 1992: 61). This self-congratulation does not itself convince Socrates to join the party. Socrates accepts only when he learns how hurt Callias is at his and his friends' hesitation (1.7).

In this passage Socrates implies that Callias has an idea about the nature of philosophy. A philosopher has a purified soul and the capacity for wise speech. This is the only time Xenophon uses the verb for "to purify thoroughly" (ἐκκαθαίρω). To understand it we have to turn to Plato, who uses it four times. In the *Euthyphro* (3a1), Socrates says that Meletus wishes to "purify thoroughly" the city of corrupting influences; this leads him to prosecute even Socrates. In *Republic* 2 (361d5), Socrates calls Glaucon's hypothetical men, the just man stripped of all appearance of justice and the unjust man stripped of all appearance of injustice, "purified thoroughly," like statues, of all irregularities and foreign matter whatsoever, even the most natural ones. In *Republic* 6 (527d8), Socrates advocates for a long education in geometry and astronomy on the grounds that it purifies thoroughly an organ in every soul, brushing off the blindness caused by everyday pursuits. Finally, in the *Second Letter* (314a7), Plato tells Dionysius that his lessons are learned only through repeated hearings, "just as gold is purified thoroughly," the ore purged a little more with each pass. So in Plato, "thorough purification" is connected three times to philosophy and once to politics and means an expunging of any foreign matter or imperfection. If Xenophon uses the word with the same range of connotations, his Callias would think, even if implicitly, that philosophers have undergone a purging, perhaps of confusion and of everyday concerns, through repeated and challenging effort (cf. Woldinga 1938: 206–208). This is not too esoteric an idea; it is what any refined practitioner does to attain his mastery. Callias' idea of the philosopher also includes oratorical excellence, an idea we have already connected to Euthydemus' and Critias' idea of the philosopher.

Socrates neither accepts nor rejects the imputation that he is a "lay" philosopher, the term "lay" usually being applied to a self-employed farmer, benefited by no assistants (*Oec.* 5.4; *Cyr.* 7.5.67).[15] Socrates simply notes that Callias' claim that he and his friends are purified of soul, and good dining companions, means that Callias takes them for incomplete (at best) or ersatz (at worst) philosophers. Neither Socrates nor Callias explicitly identify the professional philosopher against whom Socrates stands in contrast. Nightingale thinks it is Callias,

15 Winans (1881: 48) gives an overly derisive translation, "'a sort of quacks,' 'independent dabblers,' '*amateurs*.'" Bartlett (1996: 134) translates "self-taught," similarly Ollier (1961: 38) "autodidactes," but no other uses of the adjective supports this view. Bowen (1998: 27) gives "do-it-yourself," rightly emphasizing the amateur nature but implying that Callias, who does not do it himself, is the real philosopher (cf. Watson 1857: 151, "workers for ourselves in the pursuit of wisdom"). On 129, however, Bowen glosses the term "independent farmer." Bowen 89 also claims that Xenophon admires *autourgoi* for their strength and freedom (*Oec.* 5.4). See also Woldinga 1938: 213–215; Huß 1999: 86.

because he, like a professional farmer, employs others and is himself employed by nobody.[16] Socrates, too poor to contract out his philosophical labor, must do it all himself. This is a plausible view and one that may track the Greek terms of contrast (μέν … δέ …). But against Nightingale, a professional philosopher could be the one with an expansive business, who works for others and not just himself; this would mean that Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus, teachers of wisdom all, are the professional philosophers. Antiphon, after all, thought that philosophers worked for others. Others have thought that philosophers teach; and Callias seems rather to be a student.

We can leave aside the question concerning the professional philosopher, however, because the relevant point is that Socrates asserts that Callias sees him and his associates, including Critobulus, as only lay, not full-blooded, philosophers; and Callias does not disagree with this assertion. The joke is probably that Callias esteems only those whom he is willing to pay. The ensuing conversation vindicates Callias' assumption that Socrates and his friends have great facility in speaking cleverly. But Socrates remains distinct from Callias, Protagoras, and their ilk. Readers committed to Socrates' being a philosopher might say that Xenophon therefore judges Callias, Protagoras, and the rest not actually to be philosophers (whether professional or lay), and Socrates, even if he is a lay philosopher, still to be a philosopher. This might be a reasonable interpretation of the text, but I hope to have countenanced reasons for Xenophon's silence about the matter.

The word "philosophy" arises again when, in *Symposium* 4, Socrates returns to talk of Callias' studies. Explaining how Antisthenes acts as amatory intermediary, Socrates says to Antisthenes that he "intermediated with wise (σοφῷ) Prodicus, when you saw that [Callias] loved philosophy (φιλοσοφίας ἐρῶντα) and the other one needed money" (4.62). Antisthenes did the same with Hippias, from whom Callias learned mnemonic devices. We do not know whether Socrates considers Hippias a purveyor of philosophy as Callias understands it. Still, we know with certainty that Callias considers Prodicus a philosopher, that some philosophers wish to work for money, and that the love of philosophy may lead one to study with a teacher of philosophy.[17]

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16 Nightingale (1995: 16) and Bartlett (1996: 34n7) class Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus as "Sophists" or "rhetoricians"; this implies that Callias, who is not self-taught, is the "philosopher." Higgins (1977: 15) also calls those three men Sophists, but Callias a "supporter" of them, and Socrates the "philosopher." Winans (1881: 48) judges Protagoras and the rest to be the philosophers.

17 Bowen (1998: 63) obscures this in glossing Callias' love of philosophy as "passionate for learning," and in his note 113, he claims that "philosophy was a passion," where in fact the

The word "philosophy" arises for a final time in the *Symposium* in the encomium to psychic love and self-improvement that Socrates addresses to Callias. Should he, Callias, wish to be a good partner to Autolycus,

> you should look into what kind of knowledge (ἐπιστάμενος) made Themistocles sufficient to free the Greeks, you should look into what Pericles ever knew (εἰδώς) so as to be reputed the most powerful advisor among his people, you should observe how Solon, having philosophized (φιλοσοφήσας), ever established the most powerful laws in the city, and you should also seek out by what practices (ἀσκοῦντες) the Lacedaemonians are reputed to be the most powerful commanders.
>
> *Symp.* 8.39

Socrates puts four verbs in parallel: "having the knowledge to," "knowing how," "philosophizing," and "practicing."[18] The first and second mean "an ability based in thought"; the fourth probably means something like the "purifying thoroughly" from 1.4 discussed above. The parallel construction implies that "philosophizing" also refers to a source of ability based in thought and its patient development. The reference to Solon's philosophizing recalls Herodotus' story, at *Histories* 1.30, about Croesus' meeting with Solon. Solon had been traveling in voluntary exile from Athens, having just established laws there that he wanted not to be able to change (1.29). When he visits Croesus, Croesus notes that news of Solon's wisdom and wandering preceded him, in particular that he "philosophized" (φιλοσοφήσας) and traveled the world for the sake of reflective observation. Croesus may be treating Solon's philosophizing as his varied experiences and encounters. Since Solon was in fact traveling for the sake of (preserving) his laws, however, his philosophizing might have some wider compass, like engaging in sound but paradoxical leadership by absenting himself from his city. Xenophon seems to be thinking of the account on which Herodotus drew, but he has modified it, putting the philosophizing ahead of law-making. This treats philosophizing as working up the political acuity or moral insight appropriate for effective laws.[19]

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passage only treats it as an *object* of passion. Huß (1999: 312–313) takes this use of "philosophy" to have an ironic coloring.

18 Bowen (1998: 83) uses "wisdom" in place of "having philosophized"; Ollier (1961: 77) has "les profondes meditations."

19 More generally, Huß (1999: 432): "Bezeichnet hier das Bemühen um σοφία mit politischem."

Taking these three references to "philosophy" into account, we see that the *Symposium* treats "philosophy" as something Callias has a taste for and identifies some of the major intellectual players of the Socratic era as exemplars of philosophy. In Callias' view, at least as Socrates puts it, philosophy is the study of the skills highly valued in sympotic settings—public display of clever and novel speech, an ability prepared through much concerted effort. But Callias also accepts that it has its realization in legislation. Socrates supposes that Callias thinks of him, Socrates, as a sort of second-string or unaffiliated philosopher. Because we have little reason to believe that Callias has an unusual view of philosophy, we may believe that his view is Xenophon's view. In other words, Xenophon may also think that philosophy is a rhetorical skill that has its realization in political action. Socrates is a marginal case of this sort of practitioner.

A Final Socratic Reference to "Philosopher"

The word "philosopher" arises once in the *Oeconomicus*, when Ischomachus is teaching Socrates about agriculture.[20] As Ischomachus offers to tell him more, Socrates compares his desires to those that a philosophical man would have:

> —So Socrates, [Ischomachus] said, from where do you wish (βούλει) we might begin reminding you about farming? For I know that I will say quite a lot you already know about the necessities in farming.
>
> —Ischomachus, I said, it seems to me first pleasurable to learn (πρῶτον ἂν ἡδέως μανθάνειν)—for this is most of all ⟨particular to⟩ a philosophical man (φιλοσόφου γὰρ μάλιστά ἐστιν ἀνδρός)—how I might, should I wish to (βουλοίμην), get the most wheat and most barley from working the earth.
>
> *Oec.* 16.9

Socrates likens himself to a philosophical man, but obscures the precise relation. The explanatory interjection could point either backwards or forwards, focusing on, as I see it, any of five points. (i) A focus on the order of instruction (πρῶτον … μανθάνειν). A philosophical man finds it pleasurable to learn things in a *specific order*, first things first, or at least to set things out in a specific order. It would be inefficient to go willy-nilly or in the wrong order. (ii) A focus on the "first." A philosophical man likes to learn the most fundamental matters first,

20 Interestingly, Ischomachus is married to Chrysilla, who later married Callias.

in this case doing the most obvious thing farmers do, which is growing cereals. In either of these first two cases, the philosophical man would be the one who does not prefer to learn only whatever is easiest, or lies most readily at hand, or is most popular, or is most coolly sophisticated. (iii) A focus on "should I wish to." Socrates repeats Ischomachus' word "wish" (βούλομαι), now in the optative. A philosophical man gets pleasure from learning first how to do what he "might wish" to do. He learns in preparation, acquiring the knowledge on which likely future actions will have to be based (cf. Thuc. 2.40.1–2).[21] This contrasts with learning only once necessity is upon you, or bungling through something with no knowledge at all. The philosophical man recognizes that he is ignorant, but also that he may later wish to act, so he learns what does not have immediate or self-evident importance. (iv) A focus on "pleasurable to learn." The philosophical man gets pleasure from learning. (v) A focus on "learn." The philosophical man is characteristically one who learns.[22]

While none of these five possibilities seems uniquely or even characteristically "philosophical," the third is compatible with the use of "philosophy" in *Memorabilia* 4.2. Euthydemus' philosophizing amounted to studying books for the sake of becoming an effective gentleman (which is what Socrates says he wants to know about in the *Oeconomicus*, e.g., 6.13–17; 11.5–6). Euthydemus did not admit to enjoying learning *per se*, but to learning what he would have to learn in order to succeed in the speeches and actions appropriate to political life. He seems to have understood the importance of a curriculum, even if he did not understand the proper ordering of it, for example, knowing oneself

21 This is akin to what seems to be the view of Strauss (1970: 185), who gives three possible interpretations of the special characteristic of the philosopher in this passage, accepting only the third: the philosopher is the one who (i) wishes to *get* the richest harvest of crops, (ii) wishes to *know how* to get the richest harvest of crops, or (iii) wishes to know *in case he should wish* to get the richest harvest of crops. Wedderburn and Collingwood (1876: 99) translate in this way, admittedly with an odd effect: "in the first place I should be glad to hear what a philosopher more than all men ought to know, how, if I wished, I could so till the ground …"

22 Pomeroy (1994: 185) emphasizes the "desire to learn," translating, "first I think I should like to learn (for it is very characteristic of a philosopher to *want to learn*)" (my italics); see also Nightingale (1995: 16 n. 8) and Chantraine (1949: 95), who translates "cette curiosité est d' un vrai philosophe," and comments that philosophy amounts to searching for truth and calls this a Socratic notion. Audring (1992: 99), by contrast, emphasizes the learning itself, "—den das Lernen steht einem Philosophen am meiste an—." Watson (1857: 129) leaves it indeterminate. Danzig (2010) offers the idea that the philosopher is interested in making money, hence agriculture, given that Antiphon is interested in money.

first. The uses in *Memorabilia* 1, which have philosophers talking of justice and other virtue terms, might be compatible with any of the first three possibilities: learning what is fundamental, or learning what needs to be talked about first (e.g., before policy-matters), or learning about topics that might arise in exigent circumstances. In *Symposium*, Callias' love of philosophy means wanting to be able to talk cleverly and with apparent insight; and Solon's philosophizing means thinking incisively about law and public arrangements. Though neither is inconsistent with the fourth or fifth possibility, the enjoyment or characteristic practice of learning, neither is explained by it. Both are better approximated by the first three possibilities.

What it means does not, of course, explain why Socrates makes this offhanded remark. He is assuredly not just announcing, in the middle of another thought and sentence, that he is a philosopher, or excusing his asking a question. He seems to be giving a defense of a somewhat peculiar kind of question, perhaps especially peculiar for the urban talker Socrates. "Philosophical men" pursue unexpected lines of investigation, and yet if Ischomachus approves their way of life, then he will tolerate them. Socrates has been speaking in a mannered way throughout his conversation with Ischomachus, articulating with marked formality the moral precepts underlying his pupilage. A remark from the previous chapter shows this well. Socrates says to Ischomachus:

> Your opening remarks are admirable and not the sort to turn a listener away from his desire. And given that it is easy to learn—especially because of this—go through the matter for me. While it is not shameful for you to teach the easier matters, it is very shameful for me not to understand them, and especially if they happen to be useful.
>
> *Oec.* 15.13

Socrates appears to want to show that his learning is morally appropriate and, by mentioning at 16.9 those engaging in higher thought, that it has an intellectual provenance admissible to his interlocutor.

All this leaves the question whether Socrates is saying of himself that he is a philosopher, and that it is because he is a philosopher that he asks these questions, or by contrast, that he is asking a kind of question that is legitimated by philosophers' making it their habit to ask them. He makes a provocative claim relevant to this point five chapters earlier. Socrates has just asked Ischomachus to teach him about the activities of a gentleman (11.1). Ischomachus says that he will, just with the hope of getting correction (μεταρρυθμίσῃς) from Socrates where he needs it (11.2). Socrates demurs; he has gained the reputation for being a man who prattles on, beats about in airy meditation, and is called poor (ἀδο-

λεσχεῖν ... καὶ ἀερομετρεῖν ... πένης καλοῦμαι, 11.3).[23] Socrates must be referring to the claims made against him in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and Eupolis (frr. 386, 388 K.-A.), and that Plato reprises in his *Apology* (cf. Pomeroy 1994: 309). In Aristophanes' play, Socrates is not called a philosopher; we do not know about Eupolis.' In Plato's dialogue, as well as in *Memorabilia* 1.2.31, he is accused of talking and investigating the sky as people think all "philosophers" do. In the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates is admitting to having the reputation he has elsewhere, of a silly, impractical, not-very-gentlemanly person. But he says this without reference to "philosophy," and perhaps it is only to our latter-day ears that we hear him as essentially saying that he is accused of being a philosopher. But we should not hear him as saying this, because when he does mention the "philosophical man" at 16.9, we cannot understand it by appeal to what he said in 11.3. It would not even make sense to, given that none of his possible meanings of "philosophical man"—about the pleasure in learning in sequence, or in preparation, or for no reason at all—overlap with the accusations reported at 11.3 that supposedly disqualify him as a judge of Ischomachus' gentlemanliness.

In light of these considerations, I think that Socrates is saying that he is a "philosophical man" to the extent (at least) that he knows the value of pursuing certain kinds of questions (for one of the five reasons listed earlier). Whether Socrates is to be considered a "philosopher" in the more precise ways described elsewhere does not arise. What matters is that this conversation about gentlemanliness advances well when its interlocutors embrace what most characterizes a philosopher, finding out about particular issues.

Having now looked at all of Xenophon's Socratic writings, ought we to say that Xenophon's Socrates is a "philosopher" or "philosophizes a philosophy"? Doing so would be acceptable, in one respect. Socrates wants to learn about justice and the other virtues through methodical conversation; he wants to be successful on the basis of that learning, which is to be prioritized over other topics of learning (perhaps excluding in the *Oeconomicus* where he claims to want to learn about farming); he applies himself vigorously to his projects; and he does something like teaching. But the fact that we may call Socrates a "philosopher" stands in a remarkable contrast with the fact that Xenophon does not, in his own voice, call him one. As we have seen, the name has a powerful rhetorical function. The Critias and Antiphon examples show it involved in disparagement. The *Symposium* examples show it concerned with the production

23 Interestingly, ἀερομετρεῖν is found in Greek literature only here. Either Xenophon misremembered ἀεροβατεῖν (Ar. *Nub.* 225, Pl. *Ap.* 19c4) or, more probably, recalled a (lost) derivative joke made about Socrates.

of clever speeches. When Euthydemus situates himself within the intellectual life as someone "philosophizing," he reveals his self-blinding political aspirations. Xenophon never denies that Socrates is a philosopher. But whereas many others seemed quite ready to associate Socrates with "philosophy," Xenophon appears to have been diffident, even consciously diffident, about the matter.

Non-Socratic Writings

Xenophon uses "philosophy" group words on four occasions outside his Socratic writings. By studying them, we can develop some of this paper's claims only indirectly related to Socrates: that for Xenophon the term referred to a discrete group of people, a group with a characteristic manner and one that could become the source of bemusement. In three of Xenophon's uses of "philosophy" group words, they refer to abstract, deductive reasoning; in an overlapping three, they refer to a group of people contrasted with "sophists." All four appear concerned with practical rather than theoretical speculation.

Near the beginning of the second book of the *Anabasis*, an Athenian responds to Phalinus, who had encouraged the outnumbered Greeks to lay down their arms:

> —Phalinus, now, as you see, there is nothing good (ἀγαθόν) for us except our arms and our virtue (ἀρετή). Having our arms we imagine that we could also use our virtue; but surrendering them, that we would be deprived of our bodies (τῶν σωμάτων). Do not imagine, then, that we will surrender to you our only goods, but that we will fight with them even over your goods.
>
> —Hearing these things, Phalinus laughed and said, you seem a philosopher (φιλοσόφῳ ... ἔοικας), young man, and you speak not without charm (λέγεις οὐκ ἀχάριστα); know, however, that you are foolish (ἀνόητος), if you imagine that your virtue would trump the power of the king.
>
> *An.* 2.1.12–13

A "philosopher" speaks of "goods" and "virtue" and draws connections between them and the "body," that is to say, being alive. Perhaps it is an additional point contributing to Phalinus' judgment that the Athenian speaks like a "philosopher," that he "speaks with charm"—with clarity, witty concision, and deductive reasoning, here an exhaustive disjunction. Phalinus also thinks that the Athenian is foolish. This need not mean that while the Athenian "seems" (ἔοικας) a philosopher, he, in fact, is not because he is in fact foolish. The Athenian

is obviously not a (professional) philosopher, given that he is in fact a soldier. Phalinus' point is only that his speech mimics that of philosophers; and young men are prone to study with and thus mimic philosophers. Since being like a philosopher is speaking in certain argumentatively precise ways and about the topics surrounding—at least in this case—fundamental questions of life, including virtue, death, and value, this must be what philosophers do. This is more than intellectual cultivation, because it is the Athenian's specific way of talking that incites Phalinus' remark. It is not clear whether philosophers are expected to have the right answers to these questions, but it might be assumed that they are not always eminently pragmatic.

A very similar use of a "philosophy" word, as proper to deductively rigorous speech about fundamental questions of value, is found in the *Cyropaedia*. Araspas has fallen in love with Persia's most beautiful woman, Panthea, but she is married, and so he intends to leave her alone. Cyrus asks Araspas whether he will be able to do this. Araspas says he will, and explains:

> It's clear that I have two souls: this I have now philosophized (πεφιλοσόφηκα) with the unjust sophist Eros (μετὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου σοφιστοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος). For being just one ⟨soul⟩, it is not simultaneously both good and bad, nor does it simultaneously love both admirable and shameful effects, and likewise simultaneously want and not want to do them; so it's clear that there are two souls, and when the good one rules, it does admirable things, and when the base one rules, it tries to do shameful things. And now, since she [Panthea] has taken you as ally, the good one rules and quite completely.
>
> *Cyr.* 6.1.41

This passage is like the one in *Anabasis* in treating "philosophizing" as a course of distinctively abstract and compact reasoning. It is also similar in being about fundamental questions of life, in this case the soul, love, and the good (cf. Pl. *Symp.*; Alexis fr. 247 K.-A.; [Dem.] 61). The reference to philosophizing "with the unjust sophist Eros" links philosophy with sophistry, as we will see again twice below. The "with" (μετά) must mean here "in contest with." Eros must be an unjust sophist to the extent that Eros is deceptive, deviously clever, and a facile employer of deep concepts. Philosophizing with Eros presumably means arguing against Eros with as much facility and concept-employment as Eros has. Philosophizing then involves a powerful rhetorical procedure, though perhaps also with an orientation to truth rather than mere conviction.

In the *Poroi*, Xenophon lists the beneficiaries of civil peace: ship-owners and merchants; dealers in cereals, wine, oil, and livestock; entrepreneurs in judgment and money; artisans, sophists, and philosophers; and finally, poets and

the ones deploying their poetry (5.3–4). We may infer that Xenophon treats philosophers as a distinct group of people not unrelated to artisans and sophistic teachers. Xenophon does not say why they need peace to do their work. We can only speculate that it is because they travel, or because they talk to otherwise idle young men, or because their critical questions would cause discomfort during war, or because their verbal disputes require leisure.

The last pair of passages comes from chapter 13 of the *Cynegeticus*, a treatise praising hunting. This is the only place in the Xenophontic corpus that explicitly praises philosophers and rejects sophists. Indeed, it is the only place in the corpus where the author seems to include himself among the philosophers! In the work's penultimate chapter, we read the personal and civic advantages to hunting wild animals. The treatise's final section continues this encomium. Its first half discusses advice-giving in general. The author contrasts himself with so-called "sophists" (on whom see Thomas in this volume 612–639). These men profess to lead the young to virtue, but those of his generation, he says, have had no successes. They write books that please without edifying; in particular, they lack wholesome maxims conducive to learning virtue:

> Many others, too, censure the current crop of sophists, and not philosophers (τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ φιλοσόφους)[24] because they instruct in words (ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται), not in thought (νοήμασιν).
>
> *Cyn.* 13.6

> Not a single one of them [sc. sophists] is or ever was wise (σοφός), but it satisfies each to be called a sophist, which is a term of reproach at least among the thoughtful (εὖ φρονοῦσι). I recommend guarding against the teachings (παραγγέλματα) of the sophists, but not to dishonor the reasonings (ἐνθυμήματα) of the philosophers. For while the sophists hunt the young and rich, philosophers—who share their friendship with everyone—neither honor nor dishonor the fortunes of men.
>
> *Cyn.* 13.9

The author goes on to argue that politicians benefit the commonwealth much less than hunters do (Kidd 2014). We see in these passages and summary a contrast between two apparently similar groups, "sophists" and "philosophers,"

24 Phillips and Willcock (1999: 87) translate "the present-day Sophists, who are not philosophers"; this suggests that the earlier generation of sophists could, in fact, have been philosophers; the authors think he might mean those like Gorgias, and follow Isoc. *C. soph.* 19 and Pl. *Soph.* 268b. I do not think that the Greek supports this complex thought.

and an argument that, despite the apparent similarities in the current crop of both, they differ in important ways. Philosophers use reasoning and thought; sophists, by contrast, make wordy announcements. Philosophers teach without insisting on payment; sophists work only with the financially able. We see also that the names of groups may mislead, *sophistai* being close to *sophia* and to *philosophoi*.

I have referred to the author of this passage as "the author" rather than "Xenophon." This is because the *Cynegeticus*, alone of the reputed works of Xenophon, has regularly been deemed only partially or not at all by Xenophon. Many readers have found the style and syntax most unfamiliar; this is especially so for chapter 13.[25] I observe that the extent of clever antithesis seems extraordinary. Nowhere else does Xenophon throw himself so powerfully in with the philosophers. Nowhere else does Xenophon treat philosophers as identified by something other than their words; and, indeed, he always emphasizes their use of words, even if they used them rigorously or abstractly. Elsewhere, Xenophon allows us to reconstruct valuable details about philosophers; here their only trait—granted, an important one—is that they teach with reason. On one occasion, Socrates calls sophists "prostitutes" (*Mem.* 1.6.13) because they sell their goods. But Xenophon does not otherwise treat *sophistai*, for example, the authors of the books Euthydemus collected, as themselves benighted; he seems to think that Euthydemus' inadequacies were his own (cf. Classen 1984). Thus on the grounds collected by athetizers added to the peculiarity of these remarks at 13.6 and 13.9, I do not think Xenophon is the author. Even if Xenophon is the author, however, they support one claim I have been heretofore making. Xenophon sees "philosophers" as the name for a distinct group of people, dis-

25 Skepticism is found in Watson 1857: 330 (ch. 13 does not seem genuine), Seymour 1878 (ch. 13 and much else not written by Xenophon), Thomson 1969 (an early use of computer statistics), Classen 1984: 154 (Xenophon does not elsewhere excoriate sophists), Labiano 2012 (the work is unified but inauthentic), and earlier authors (e.g., Valckenaer, Radermacher, and Breitenbach). Higgins (1977: xii) treats its reputation as inauthentic as reason to ignore it from an otherwise comprehensive study of Xenophon's work. Richards 1898 allows for authenticity but thinks Ch. 13 shows Xenophon either immature or senile and says of the passage quoted above from 13.6 that "It may be right to bracket these words, but a strong enough case is hardly made out against them" 390. Sanders (1903), who reviews the scholarship of his day, cautiously accepts a young Xenophon as compiler of earlier hunting literature as its author. Gray (1985) argues for authenticity but does not address any literature cited by date in this note; she is largely followed by Doty (2003) and Thomas in this volume 612–639; an argument for cogency is added by L'Allier (2012). Phillips and Willcock (1999: 21, 25) accept authenticity with almost no discussion and follow the dating of 391 and dismissal of worries about inauthenticity of Delebecque (1970: 33–35).

tinct enough in method and in social contrast as to make these sharp claims. If Xenophon wrote *Cynegeticus* 13, we would also expect that Xenophon would be happy to include Socrates among the philosophers, even though he does not, in fact, do so. But his rhetorical goal here, which is to defend teachers of hunting against other kinds of teachers, is narrow enough that his present point should not be taken to outweigh the evidence from all his other works. And that evidence is that Xenophon writes ambiguously about Socrates' being a "philosopher." Xenophon discusses philosophers infrequently but with a sort of realism, recognizing that a self-styled or other-lambasted group of so-called "philosophers" is part of Athenian society and provides an ideal of practice or pedagogy among a subset of that society. Socrates spends time within or alongside this subset. He shares many of its habits or aspirations: accumulating knowledge, talking well, toilsome self-improvement, and confidence in the importance of discipleship. But there is something marked about membership among "philosophers," and they are subject to politically or culturally motivated criticism. Xenophon had enough work defending Socrates from criticism. It seems likely that Xenophon intends to avoid linking Socrates too expressly with that current of contemporary intellectual association.

Plato

Plato's use of "philosopher" in connection with Socrates might provide some context for Xenophon's. This paper is no place for a substantial study of Plato's use, so in this final section, I simply identify two relevant features of Plato's work. The first feature we may notice is that many of Plato's dialogues do not mention "philosophy" or "philosophers" or "philosophizing" at all. These are the *Ion*, *Meno*, *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Laches*, *Menexenus*, *Hippias Major*, *Alcibiades*, and *Clitophon*. This means that at a time when Plato could use the term "philosopher" to refer to Socrates—Plato's *Apology* shows this—he does not have the occasion or desire to. He seems uninterested in establishing a contrast or other relation between Socrates and "philosophers." The example of Socrates as a practitioner of the way of life admired or analyzed by Plato counts for more than Socrates as a model of "philosophy." It seems also clear that Plato does not aim to vindicate Socrates by transferring the positive evaluation of "philosophy" to the man.

Plato's *Apology* shares much with Xenophon's *Mem.* 1.2.31. Socrates observes that people think he is evil and corrupts the youth, but when they are asked by doing what and by teaching what, "they can say nothing, and are ignorant, but in order that they not seem at a loss, they say what's available (πρόχειρα) against

all who philosophize, namely that they study the things in the sky and the things under the earth, and do not believe in the gods, and make the worse argument the better" (23d1–7). As it was in Xenophon's remark, it is unclear whether Socrates mentions those philosophizing because this charge has its origin in disparagement of philosophers, or because those hurling these accusations at Socrates judge him to be one of the philosophers. In any event, Socrates denies this charge and reaffirms that these accusers are ignorant (23d10). He does not here say whether they are wrong to class him as a philosopher, or wrong that all philosophers do the same thing. Yet some pages later he admits to philosophizing, albeit in a different fashion. The god stationed him, as he "thinks and understands it, to live philosophizing and examining [him]self and others" (28e9–10). He obviously does not mean philosophizing in the way others mean it, as studying the things in the sky and so forth. Thus "examining himself and others" must be his gloss of "philosophizing." Socrates certainly does not seem to be boasting that he philosophizes. He must think either that "philosophizing," properly understood, does name his activity, or rather than dispute with his accusers that he philosophizes, he accepts the name with a qualification (cf. Thuc. 2.40.1). Socrates soon imagines that the jurors might wish to acquit him, as long as he stops, as he imagines their words, "spending time in this search (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν) and philosophizing" (29c9–10). He imagines them accepting, if provisionally or dubiously, his reinterpretation of "philosophizing." In his response to this imagined plea bargain, he reinforces this reinterpretation: "I shall not stop philosophizing and urging you and showing you" that his neighbors should care for virtue, etc., by means of cross-examining them (29d5–30a2). Again, Socrates ensures that "philosophizing," which apparently will be attributed to him whether he likes it or not, is rightly understood.

Were we to study Plato's other dialogues, we would see an important difference between those works and Xenophon's. Plato has an unambiguously positive view of philosophy and depicts Socrates as both engaging in it and urging others to do so. He takes on more directly people's criticisms of philosophy and Socrates' philosophizing, as much in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* as in the *Apology*. Indeed, it is against this background that Xenophon's reserve about Socrates' philosophizing is so apparent. The motivation for that reserve is hard to establish with precision. I have suggested that it might be a conscious decision to vaunt Socrates as a moral and practical exemplar, where assimilation to a contemporary group may not advance that goal. But even if it is unconscious, or this is not Xenophon's goal at all, we have learned something important about "philosophy" in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. These "philosophers" were a peculiar group, and while they certainly approved of their own ways of talking, thinking, and living, many others withheld judgment,

took some ironic distance, or positively disparaged them. Thus who counted as or counted themselves as "philosophers" would depend not only on the practices unique to "philosophy" and whether a person exercised those practices, but also on what was to be accomplished by calling, or not calling, someone by that name.

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Xenophon and the *Elenchos*: A Formal and Comparative Analysis

Geneviève Lachance

Xenophon's Socratic writings contain very few examples of refutation (*elenchos*). This feature, which contrasts with the Socratic dialogues of Plato, more precisely with the so-called "early dialogues," has been noted by many scholars. T. Gomperz, for instance, saw in this situation a hint of Xenophon's infidelity toward his master's thought (Gomperz 1905: 137). Others, such as T. Irwin, accused Xenophon of having misunderstood the nature and function of refutation (Irwin 1974: 409–413). In recent years, however, articles and comparative studies tend to invalidate these positions. According to some, the sparing use of *elenchos* by Xenophon is a conscious choice: Xenophon made little use of *elenchos* because he did not regard it as an essential tool for the acquisition of virtue. Moreover, Xenophon seemed somewhat suspicious of this method so dear to Plato's Socrates and felt that it should be used only to correct individuals who thought they knew everything.[1] Xenophon's conception of the *elenchos* thus differs from Plato's and seems original.

May the same thing be asserted about its logical structure, however? Most studies that have been conducted so far on Xenophon's conception of the *elenchos* have mainly focused on its moral aspect. Yet, *elenchos* has also a strong logical component, as can be observed in Plato (*Soph.* 230b–d) and Aristotle (*Soph. el.* 5, 167a23–27). What about Xenophon? How did he conceive the *elenchos* logically? Could a logical analysis promote a deeper understanding about Xenophon's conception of Socratic *elenchos*? How can it be compared to Plato's? The present article proposes to contribute to the research on Socratic *elenchos* as perceived by Xenophon by following a path that has rarely been taken by scholars: formal analysis. To answer the questions previously asked, a formal analysis of the only two *elenchoi* contained in the *Memorabilia* (1, 2, § 40–46 and 4, 2)[2] shall be advanced, together with a brief comparison to Plato.

1 On this question, see: Dorion 2010: CXVIII–CLXXXIII; Philips 1989; Morrison 1994; Gray 1998; Johnson 2005; Rossetti 2011.

2 We follow here L.-A. Dorion, who believes that 1, 2, § 40–46 and 4, 2 represent the only two examples of *elenchoi* in the *Memorabilia*. On this question, see: Dorion 2010: CLIX.

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Elenchos

The neutral term τὸ ἔλεγχος and the verb ἐλέγχω appeared for the first time in Homer,[3] where it had the meaning of "shame" and "to shame" or "to dishonor." From the time of Pindar, two new terms emerged: the masculine substantive ὁ ἔλεγχος, meaning "test" or "ordeal,"[4] and the verb ἐξελέγχω, signifying "to confuse in order to reveal the true nature."[5] Although one finds in Herodotus the verb ἐλέγχω, meaning "to controvert" or "to refute," it seems that Plato was the first one to use the substantive ὁ ἔλεγχος in the modern sense of "refutation," that is, "the act or process of refuting one's claim."[6] Despite this new meaning, the Platonic ἔλεγχος kept the traditional connotation of "shame" and "test": after all, when Plato's Socrates refutes his interlocutor, he does nothing more than test his beliefs and put him to shame for not living the life he ought to live.

The first logical definition of *elenchos* is to be found in Aristotle: an *elenchos* is a syllogism together with the contradictory of the conclusion (*Soph. el.* 165a2–3).[7] More precisely, an *elenchos* is the contradiction of one and the same attribute in the same respect, relation, manner, and time (*Soph. el.* 167a23–27).[8] This last definition was clearly influenced by a section of Plato's *Sophist*, in which the activity of the Noble Sophist is described in the following: to show that his interlocutor contradicts himself about the same things, at the same time, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things (230b–d).[9] From a logical point of view, *elenchos* is thus distinctly defined since the fourth century BC according to two major elements: (1) it consists of a proposition and its contradiction; (2) the two elements in contradiction are the same, and they are stated in the same respect, relation, manner, and time.

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3 *Iliad* 4, 171; 11, 313–315; 22, 100; 23, 341–343; *Odyssey* 14, 38; 21, 424–426.

4 *Olympian* 4, 18; *Nemean* 8, 21.

5 *Olympian* 11 (10), 53.

6 On the etymology of ἔλεγχος, see: Lesher 1984; Dorion 1990.

7 ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. For a similar description, see: *Soph. el.* 167a22–23, 168a37–38, 170b1–2, 171a4–7 and 175a36; *APr.* 66b11.

8 ἔλεγχος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός … κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

9 … αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας. On the resemblance between the Aristotelian definition and the Platonic one, see: Dorion 2012. It should be noted, though, that Plato used the word ἐναντία and not ἀντίφασις. On Plato's conception of "contradiction," see: Lachance 2016.

All modern scholars agree that an *elenchos* starts with the presentation of a proposition, let us call it *p*, and ends with the contradiction of that same proposition, *~p*. This is the most basic structure of the *elenchos*. What happens between *p* and *~p*, though, is still the object of considerable contention. R. Robinson proposed two distinct models of *elenchos*: in the first one (indirect *elenchos*), a thesis is rejected because it entails an absurd consequence; in the second one (direct *elenchos*), one reaches the contradictory of the initial thesis without at any time assuming this thesis (Robinson 1953: 23). Many years later, G. Vlastos proposed his own standard model of the *elenchos*: (1) Socrates' interlocutor defends a thesis (*p*) that Socrates considers false; (2) Socrates' interlocutor accepts other propositions {*q* and *r*}; (3) Socrates shows that the conjunction of *q* and *r* implies *~p*; (4) Socrates concludes that *~p* is true and *p* is false.[10] As is widely known by now within the field, Vlastos' study on the Socratic *elenchos* has given rise to numerous debates over the subsequent decades. For example, Vlastos' model supposes that Socrates uses *elenchos* in a positive fashion, meaning that he defends his own thesis with it. It also suggests that *elenchos* does not have the predominantly aporetic function we thought it had: Socrates uses it to demonstrate the truth or falsity of various theses. Last, Vlastos' model implies that Socrates is not entitled to conclude that *p* is false (*~p*), but only that it is incompatible with the proposition set he uses {*q&r*}.[11]

Vlastos' model and the different debates it provoked have all been concerned with "Socratic *elenchos*," though none of them have studied the *elenchoi* found in Xenophon's writings. In other words, the debates have been primarily "Platonic." It is now imperative to study the form of the *elenchoi* contained in Xenophon's writing if a more complete view of what is called "Socratic *elenchos*" is to be sought. Such an analysis is highly crucial for the history of logic in general and for the history of the *elenchos* in particular as it is only in Plato and Xenophon that intact and entire examples of "Socratic refutations" are found.

Forms of *elenchoi* in Xenophon

Xenophon's *Memorabilia* contains two clear examples of refutation. The first one is the refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades (1, 2, § 40–46). This refutation

10 Vlastos 1994: 11. Vlastos' article was first published in the first edition of *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (1983).

11 This is the so-called "problem of the *elenchos*." For a complete discussion on it and on Vlastos' model of the *elenchos*, see: Kraut 1983; Brickhouse, T.C. and N.D. Smith, 1984; Polansky 1985; Benson 1987; Benson 1995.

resembles a true Socratic refutation (in the Platonic sense of the word) but differs in its aim from all those found in Plato. Indeed, rather than describing a cathartic approach or a philosophical method, it seems that Xenophon intended to portray the harmful effect of refutation when it is used by an intemperate youth.[12] In that sense, the refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades does have a strong sophistic or eristic dimension. The refutation of Pericles reported by Xenophon,[13] which spreads from paragraph 40 to 46 of the first book, can be divided into three logical moments, each culminating in the unveiling of a contradiction: (1) §44, (2) first part of §45; (3) second part of §45. The second example of refutation occupies the entirety of the second chapter of book 4: the refutation of Euthydemus by Socrates. It portrays a true Socratic refutation (again in the Platonic sense of the word) as can be seen in Plato's *First Alcibiades* or *Charmides*.[14] Indeed, Socrates intends to refute Euthydemus to show him that he does not know what he thinks he knows. In that sense, the refutation of Euthydemus by Socrates does have a strong aporetic dimension. It can be divided into five logical moments, each punctuated by a contradiction: (1) §12–15; (2) §16–18; (3) §19–20; (4) §31–35; (5) §36–39.[15]

From the analysis of the different *elenchoi* contained in the *Memorabilia*, it clearly appears that they assume two different forms: (1) *reductio ad absurdum*; (2) presentation of counter-examples to invalidate the initial proposition (which could also be assimilated to an induction). The refutation of Pericles

12 See Dorion (2010: XLXI–XLXIII) for a more detailed presentation of this position. See also: Gray 1998: 50–51.

13 The refutation took place around 430 BC; hence the fact that Xenophon admits reporting the words of a third person (λέγεται γάρ). According to Gigon, it is a sign of the inauthenticity of the *Memorabilia* (Gigon 1953: 65).

14 The resemblances between Plato's (or pseudo-Plato's) *First Alcibiades* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* IV 2 have been noticed for a long time. According to H. Dittmar, Plato and Xenophon were inspired by Aeschines of Sphettus' *Alcibiades*. The question of the interrelation between Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, Plato's *First Alcibiades*, and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* IV 2 is, in my estimation, unresolvable: there remain too few fragments of Aeschines' *Alcibiades* to conduct a thorough analysis and, consequently, to draw a firm conclusion.

15 L.-A. Dorion rather divides chapter 2 in four successive refutations: (1) §11–18; (2) §19–21; (3) §31–35; (4) §36–39. I prefer to distinguish two moments in the first refutation (§12–15 and §16–18) in which Euthydemus contradicts himself a first time, recants, then contradicts himself a second time. See: Dorion 2011b: 64–65. Furthermore, to distinguish between "refutation" as an event and "refutation" as the unveiling of a contradiction, I will now use the word *elenchos* to describe these eight logical moments and the word *refutation* to talk about the event more globally. For example, the refutation of Pericles contains two *elenchoi* and the refutation of Euthydemus, five *elenchoi*.

contains three *reductiones ad absurdum*. Meanwhile, the refutation of Euthydemus contains three presentations of counter-examples and two *reductiones ad absurdum*.

Reductiones ad absurdum

The refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades is entirely conducted in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*, meaning that Alcibiades intends to invalidate Pericles' definition by showing that a false or absurd result follows from its acceptance. Alcibiades begins by asking his legal guardian if he can teach him what a law is (§ 41). Pericles replied in the affirmative: "Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done" (πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή).[16] "What ought to be done" (ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν) is quickly assimilated to what is "good" (τἀγαθὰ [§ 42]). The definition given by Pericles applies mainly to democracy: it is the people (τὸ πλῆθος) who exercise power and approve laws. Alcibiades is well aware of this feature: he will ask Pericles two more questions, but will change the identity of the person who exercises the power and, therefore, the political system. Alcibiades first uses the example of oligarchy: if some men (ὀλίγοι), as in an oligarchy (ὀλιγαρχία), gather and enact rules of conduct, is it still a "law" (§ 43)? Pericles is in no way disturbed by this substitution but will still alter his first definition by substituting the expression "sovereign power" (τὸ κρατοῦν) to the term "people" (τὸ πλῆθος): in this particular situation, a law is "whatsoever the sovereign power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and directs to be done" (πάντα, φάναι, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον, ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται [§ 43]). Then Alcibiades tackles the thorny issue of tyranny: if the person who has power is a tyrant (τύραννος), would his orders also be laws? Pericles replies in the affirmative. Finally, Alcibiades asks for some clarifications about the concept of violence (βία). He subtly equates violence to illegality (ἀνομία),[17] which is the contrary of the notion for which he's asking a definition, law (νόμος): violence—"is it not the action of the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not by persuasion, but by force" (§ 44)? Pericles agrees.

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16 [§ 42]. All references to the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon are from the Loeb Classical Library collection (trans. Marchant).

17 βία δέ, φάναι, καὶ ἀνομία τί ἐστιν, ὦ Περίκλεις; (§ 44). Alcibiades equates violence and illegality, then abandons the vocabulary of illegality in favor of terms relating to violence. According to Dorion, this maneuver is anything but innocent (Dorion 2010: 50).

Once this identity has been accepted, it will be easy for Alcibiades to refute Pericles. First of all, if things are as Pericles has said, it follows that his definition of law in a tyrannical context can also be applied to illegality. The contradiction rests upon the opposition between two contrary terms, on the one hand, law (νόμος), on the other, illegality (ἀνομία): (1) "If, then, a despot, being the sovereign power, enacts what the citizens are to do, are his orders also a law?" (Κἂν τύραννος οὖν κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως γράψῃ τοῖς πολίταις ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος ἐστί; [§ 43]); (2) "Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without persuasion, is the negation of law?" (Καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τύραννος μὴ πείσας τοὺς πολίτας ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν γράφων, ἀνομία ἐστί; [§ 44]).[18] The same can be said about Pericles' definition of law in an oligarchic context: it can be applied to violence, which has been assimilated to illegality; therefore, his definition of law can be applied to something illegal. This time, Alcibiades does not directly (and explicitly) oppose law and illegality, but rather law and violence. However, since violence has been defined earlier as illegality, it follows (implicitly) that the definition given by Pericles is contradictory because it refers to both law and its contrary: (1) "But if, as happens under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet and enact rules of conduct, what are these?" "Whatsoever the sovereign power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and directs to be done is known as a law." (ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ὅπου ὀλιγαρχία ἐστίν, ὀλίγοι συνελθόντες γράψωσιν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν, ταῦτα τί ἐστι; πάντα, φάναι, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον, ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται. [§ 43]). (2) "And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, but through using its power, are we to call that violence or not?" (ὅσα δὲ οἱ ὀλίγοι τοὺς πολλοὺς μὴ πείσαντες, ἀλλὰ κρατοῦντες γράφουσι, πότερον βίαν φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι. [§ 45]) (transl. Marchant with modifications). Lastly, the definition given by Pericles of a law in a democratic context also gives birth to the same absurd consequence: it can be applied to violence and, therefore, to illegality.[19]

18 I treat questions as propositions: in a refutative context, the assent of Socrates' interlocutor counts as an affirmation (based on the question previously asked).

19 (1) "Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done" (πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή. [§ 42]); (2) "It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, but violence?" (καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος κρατοῦν τῶν τὰ χρήματα ἐχόντων γράφει μὴ πεῖσαν, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος ἂν εἴη; [§ 45]) (trans. Marchant with modifications).

These three *reductiones ad absurdum*, which constitute the whole refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades, have a similar form and substantially follow the same pattern: (1) Pericles proposes a definition of law (§ 42–43); (2) Alcibiades assimilates "violence" to the contrary of "law," "illegality" (§ 44); (3) Alcibiades uses Pericles' definition, stated according to three cases, and shows that it is linked to violence. In the first *elenchos*, Alcibiades substitutes the verb ἀναγκάζω for κρατέω, giving that last verb a sense that it previously did not have. Indeed, even though it may have the sense of "conquer" and "impose force," Pericles uses the verb κρατέω in the sense of "governing." Alcibiades replaces the verb κρατέω with ἀναγκάζω, which does not mean "to rule," but "to force," "to constrain," and even "to torture." In the second and third *elenchoi*, Alcibiades plays on the double meaning of the verb κρατέω (κρατοῦντες, κρατοῦν); (4) It follows that the definition of law proposed by Pericles refers to something violent, thus illegal, because an identity was established between violence and illegality. To put it simply, the Periclean definition of law implies its contrary, illegality. The opposition between law and illegality is clearly stated in the first *elenchos* but is implicit in the next two. Alcibiades displays the falsity of Pericles' definition by deducting an absurd consequence from it, which is to assume the contrary.

It is quite difficult to translate these three *elenchoi* in formal language. It should always be borne in mind that the *Memorabilia*—as were Plato's works—were written at a time predating logic, Aristotelian syllogistic, and, therefore, logical formalization. Consequently, the following formalization is for guidance only. First of all, a definition of law is given by Pericles (p). Then, Alcibiades assimilates the contrary of law and its definition ($\sim p$) to violence and its definition (q). As $\sim p$ and q are equivalent, it is possible to translate that logical step as $\sim p \equiv q$. If $\sim p$ is equivalent to q, it is thus needless to say that p is equivalent to $\sim q$ $\{(\sim p \equiv q) \rightarrow (p \equiv \sim q)\}$. In other words, a law according to Pericles could not be equivalent to violence, since its contrary is equivalent to violence. We can thus deduct $p \equiv \sim q$ from $\sim p \equiv q$ and $\{(\sim p \equiv q) \rightarrow (p \equiv \sim q)\}$ by *modus ponens*. Third, Alcibiades' maneuver consists in showing that Pericles' definition of law is equivalent to violence ($p \equiv q$). Hence, from the previous $p \equiv \sim q$, we can deduct $p \rightarrow \sim q$ and $\sim q \rightarrow p$ and, by *modus ponens*, we can obtain $\sim q$ from p and $p \rightarrow \sim q$. Additionally, from $p \equiv q$, we can deduct $p \rightarrow q$ and $q \rightarrow p$ and, by *modus ponens*, obtain q from p and $p \rightarrow q$. The argument is thus contradictory ($\perp$) as it involves q and $\sim q$.

This refutation as a whole is very well-conducted.[20] However, it has a strong sophistic aspect. Indeed, it rests upon a doubtful identity between "violence"

20 On the question, see: Dorion 2010: 106–109; Gigon 1953: 68–69.

and "illegality": Alcibiades had never explicitly asked Pericles if he approved of it. Of course, Pericles never rejects it. It is thus highly possible that he approves it. However, there is no doubt that Pericles does not use the verb κρατέω in the same sense as Alcibiades does. In two cases out of three, Alcibiades gives the Periclean definition a connotation that it did not have at first, using the "strong" meaning of the verb κρατέω. In another case, he replaces the word used by Pericles with a synonym that corresponds more to the "strong" sense of κρατέω than to the "weak" sense assigned by Pericles. Pericles' reaction in paragraph 46 reveals the sophistic aspect of the refutation led by Alcibiades: he noted that the refutation to which he has been submitted rests upon subtleties of speech (ἐσοφιζόμεθα, from the verb σοφίζομαι),[21] and that it is an occupation that is particularly suited to the young age of Alcibiades.

The two following *reductiones ad absurdum* are part of Euthydemus' refutation (4, 2, 19–20 and 36–39). For the purpose of the demonstration, only the first *reductio ad absurdum* will be presented.[22] The *elenchos* in 4, 2, 19–20 focuses on the following question:[23] who is the most unjust between the one who voluntarily deceives his friends to harm them and the one who deceives them involuntarily? To recall the argument: the most unjust man is the one who commits injustice voluntarily; the one who commits injustice voluntarily knows more about the just than the one who commits injustice involuntarily; the one who knows his letters is more literate than the one who does not know them; similarly, the one who knows the just is more just than the one who does not know it (Δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου [§ 20]). As in the last two *elenchoi* of Pericles' refutation, the contradictory conclusion is not explicitly stated: the reader has to draw for herself the absurd consequences of the reasoning. It is not the case here of having two contradictory proposi-

21 The verb σοφίζομαι occurs nowhere else in Xenophon's Socratic writings. According to K.R. Sanders (2011), this use of the verb σοφίζομαι shows that Alcibiades tries to emulate the Sophists and not Socrates. For a different interpretation, see: Danzig 2014.

22 The second one (§ 36–39) will be discussed in the section "Presentation of counter-examples" as it is hybrid: it uses counter-examples and *reductio*.

23 This *elenchos* closely resembles one found in Plato's *Hippias Minor* (373c–376c). Thus, Maier (1913) and Chroust (1957) believed that Xenophon was dependent on Plato. Kahn shares the same opinion (1996: 396): "The parallels here to *Hippias Minor* 366c–367c (writing and calculating) and 375d–376b (voluntarily, involuntarily) are too close to be accidental. But nothing is made of the paradox here except to baffle poor Euthydemus." Despite some similarities, the two arguments differ on important points: (1) The question asked by Socrates is not the same in both texts; (2) Therefore, the answers—and the philosophical developments—are different. On this issue, see: Dorion 2011b: 80–81.

tions that could be extracted as such from the text:[24] Euthydemus states that the one who commits injustice voluntarily knows more about the just than the one who commits injustice involuntarily, but neither he nor Socrates asserts that the one who commits injustice voluntarily is also the most just because he knows more about the just. However, this last proposition is implicit in the text and follows from the argument that precedes it. This refutation is well done, but it rests on shaky ground. Indeed, Socrates is able to infer implicitly that "the man who commits injustice voluntarily is the most just" by assimilating justice to a *techne* like grammar. However, these two examples cannot be considered equally: with grammar, the one who knows his letters is actually the one who can better lie on the subject, but it is not the case with justice.[25] Since Euthydemus has nothing to object to, Socrates is entitled to imply the possibility of such a contradictory conclusion. The implicit contradiction is based on contrary terms, here at the comparative: ἀδικώτερον and δικαιότερον.

Reductio ad absurdum can be regarded as one of the oldest method of refutation. It is possible that Zeno of Elea was the first one to use it, although it cannot be confirmed.[26] Xenophon uses *reductio ad absurdum* in the same way that Plato does: a proposition is rejected because it entails an absurd consequence. Xenophon does not always state the contradictory of the initial thesis of his *reductiones ad absurdum* (four cases out of four) but assigns that task to his readers. We shall see that Plato does likewise. For example, in the *Charmides*

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24 This aspect has not been reported by J. Philips (1989). D.M. Johnson notes the absence of the conclusion but attributed it to the weakness of the argument (2005: 60): "The absence of the qualifying phrase is then a euphemism, albeit one which is unfortunate from a logical point of view. But perhaps there is still more to it: the omission could be a Xenophontic hint about the weakness of the argument." It is also possible that Xenophon has not presented explicitly the absurd conclusion of this reasoning because of its scandalous nature. To compare with Plato: when he presents explicitly the absurd and outrageous consequence of *Hippias Minor* 373c–376c, according to which, "the good man is he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts," Plato takes great care to add "if there be such a man" (*Hippias Minor*, 376b).

25 In Plato's *Hippias Minor*, Socrates also compares justice to a *techne* like geometry or arithmetic. Kahn (1996: 117): "Socrates is able to defend this strange conclusion only by counting justice as a capacity or a form of knowledge or both (375d5). He thus assimilates justice to the arts of section I, to arithmetic and geometry, for example, where to make a mistake on purpose is prerogative of one who has knowledge, whereas the ignorant person makes a mistake involuntarily. But this assimilation is deliberately misleading. Justice, and moral virtue generally, is not a bipolar capacity for opposites."

26 In the *Parmenides* 128d–e, Plato attributes to Parmenides an argument that has the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*.

(165c–175e), the second definition of temperance, according to which it is a science of itself and other sciences, is never refuted explicitly, in the sense that the contradictory of the initial thesis is not found. Socrates only shows that it entails absurd consequences, one of them being that it is a science that is useless. In the *Euthyphro* (14a11–15c10), the fourth definition of piety ("when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing") is rejected by Socrates because it is equivalent to a definition that was formulated and refuted earlier in the dialogue. Again, Socrates does not state the contradictory of the initial thesis (i.e., piety *is not* when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing) but only highlights the absurd consequences of this definition ("Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started?"). In terms of *reductio ad absurdum*, thus, Xenophon and Plato are very similar to one another. In order to discern a clear difference, it is thus necessary to turn now to the other form of *elenchos*: presentation of counter-examples.

Presentation of Counter-examples

Apart from *reductiones ad absurdum*, Xenophon's Socrates uses another logical strategy to refute his interlocutor. This strategy—which apparently does not have an official name—is simple and even elementary. It consists in the presentation of counter-examples in order to refute a thesis or proposition implicitly or explicitly understood in a universal sense. Three *elenchoi* in Euthydemus' refutation take this particular form: (1) §12–15; (2) §16–18; (3) §31–35. The first *elenchos* begins with Euthydemus saying that he can explain the works of justice (τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα) and, especially, of injustice (τὰ τῆς ἀδικίας). He then classifies lying (ψεύδεσθαι), deception (ἐξαπατᾶν), theft, (κακουργεῖν) and enslavement of free men (ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι) among unjust works (§14). In the next paragraph, Socrates uses three counter-examples to show that these unjust works can also be just: (1) it is just for a general to enslave an unjust and hostile city; (2) it is just for that same person to deceive the enemy when at war; (3) again, it is just for him to steal the enemy and sack its temples. It should be noted that these counter-examples only invalidate three of the four elements of Euthydemus' classification, namely deception, theft, and enslavement of free men. Nothing is said about lying. Moreover, Socrates only uses one counter-example for each of these three elements, which is not ample. Socrates does, however, highlight the contradiction in Euthydemus' discourse as follows: "Then everything that we assigned to injustice should be assigned to justice also?" (Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσα πρὸς τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐθήκαμεν, ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ θετέον ἂν εἴη [§15]). The contradiction is expressed with two contrary expres-

sions (πρὸς τῇ ἀδικίᾳ / πρὸς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ), both united with the conjunction "καὶ" and linked to the same verb (ἐθήκαμεν).

As a means of escaping contradiction, Euthydemus decides to change his previous classification (second *elenchos*: §16–18): actions classified as unjust will be considered unjust only if they are committed *against a friend* and, conversely, as just if they are committed *against an enemy* (… πρὸς μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους δίκαιον εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς φίλους ἄδικον [§16]). In other words, our conduct toward friends must be very honest (ἁπλούστατον). Euthydemus' position, although it now refers to specific individuals (friends/enemies), is still understood universally: unjust actions are such *in all cases* if they are committed *against a friend*, and conversely. What does Socrates do to refute his young interlocutor? He still uses three counter-examples to invalidate the new classification: (1) the general will not act unjustly if he lies to his troops to restore their courage during battle; (2) it is just for a father to lie to his son if he refuses to take the medicine that would save him; (3) it is just to mislead a friend in disarray and to steal his dagger to avoid his commiting suicide (§17). Of these three examples, two concern lying and deception, the other one, theft. Again, Socrates does not use an array of counter-examples to invalidate Euthydemus' classification. This sparing use of examples is not only attributable to Socrates, but also to Euthydemus: being young and inexperienced, he does not contest Socrates' words nor does he find the counter-examples insufficient. Socrates highlights Euthydemus' contradiction by the following question: "You mean, do you, that even with friends straightforward dealing is not invariably right?" (Λέγεις, ἔφη, σὺ οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἅπαντα δεῖν ἁπλοίζεσθαι; [§18]). This question, which revealed the contradiction in Euthydemus' discourse, refers to a specific action: to act simply or frankly (ἁπλοίζεσθαι) toward friends. The verb used refers directly to the initial thesis (§16), in which the adjective ἁπλούστατον was used. We have thus the following contradictory propositions: (1) δεῖν πρός γε τούτους ὡς ἁπλούστατον εἶναι (§16); (2) οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἅπαντα δεῖν ἁπλοίζεσθαι (§18).[27]

After an interval during which Socrates and Euthydemus peacefully discuss self-knowledge, the question of good and evil (τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά) is raised. Euthydemus claims to know what good and evil are: health is good, and illness is bad (§31). Socrates only presents one counter-example to invalidate

27 It should be noted that many examples used by Xenophon's Socrates as counter-examples can be found in the "relativist part" of the *Dissoi Logoi*. Compare *Memorabilia* 4, 2, §17, lines 6–9, and *Dissoi Logoi* 3, 2; *Memorabilia* 4, 2, §17, lines 10–13, and *Dissoi Logoi* 3, 4. On similarities between *Memorabilia* 4, 2 and the *Dissoi Logoi*, see: Gaiser 1957.

that answer: health can be the cause of something bad, for example when it encourages a man who is full of strength and vitality to participate in an expedition that will prove fatal; conversely, illness can be the cause of something good, for example when it encourages a weak man not to participate in the same expedition and, therefore, to avoid death. In other words, strength (health) and weakness (illness) are sometimes helpful, sometimes harmful (§ 32). Convinced by Socrates' only counter-example, Euthydemus provides a new answer: knowledge is an indisputable good (σοφία … ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀγαθόν ἐστι [§ 33]). In turn, Socrates presents many counter-examples from literature (Daedalus, Palamedes) or history (the Great King) to show him that knowledge can sometimes be the cause of the worst miseries. Breathless, Euthydemus again changes his answer: it is possible that happiness is a good thing (§ 34). Socrates tells him that happiness is a good thing only if it consists of unquestionable goods, then shows that beauty, strength, wealth, and glory, which are commonly regarded as elements that enter into the definition of happiness, are questionable goods since, in certain given situations, they are the causes of evils (§ 34–35).[28] Socrates submits one counter-example for every questionable good (beauty, strength, wealth, and glory): (1) "many are ruined by admirers whose heads are turned at the sight of a pretty face"; (2) "many are led by their strength to attempt tasks too heavy for them and meet with serious evils"; (3) "many by their wealth are corrupted and fall victims to conspiracies"; (4) "many through glory and political power have suffered great evils." Euthydemus is defeated.

The logical strategy of Xenophon's Socrates is quite simple: ask a question in order to obtain an answer (explicitly or implicitly understood in a universal way) and demonstrate that there exist one or more cases that invalidate it. Indisputably, if someone says that "swans are white," it is only required to give an example of a "black swan" to show that "swans are not white." Naturally, to refute the proposition "swans are white" in this fashion, it is imperative to understand it in a universal way. Otherwise, it is impossible to refute the proposition "swans are white" with an example of a "black swan" if "swans are white" is understood as "some swans are white." It is never made clear that Euthydemus

28 These paragraphs are often linked to Plato's *Euthydemus* 278e–281e. However, it is clear that these two passages are not alike. In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates shows that the good things that have been presented (wealth, health, honor) are nothing without wisdom (281b). For Plato, wisdom is an unconditional and unquestionable good. Without it, it is impossible to properly use the good things described above. In the *Memorabilia*, though, wisdom is a good thing among others, which can be properly used or not. For Xenophon, it is *enkrateia*—not *sophia*—that is an unquestionable good. On this issue, see: Dorion 2013: 123–146.

(or Socrates) understands propositions like "lying is an injustice," "deception is an injustice," etc. in a universal sense, but it is strongly implied. In fact, it is a typical Socratic strategy, which consists in asking a question that aims for unicity in order to obtain a proposition with an *allegedly universal value*.[29] It is also possible to see this Socratic strategy as a certain form of induction. For example, Socrates observes that lying could be just *in that situation*, with *that kind of people*, or at *that particular moment*. He thus collects numerous cases and then infers that "lying is just (absolutely speaking)," which contradicts the initial proposition. Indeed, in the first *elenchos* (§12–15), Socrates infers from numerous cases that everything (ὅσα) that was assigned to injustice can also be assigned to justice. In the second *elenchos* (§16–18), he states from multiple particular cases that it is not necessary to act frankly with friends in every situation (ἅπαντα). In these two examples, Xenophon's Socrates uses particular cases to obtain a universal conclusion. According to Aristotle, Socrates was the first one to use inductive reasoning (*Metaph.* 1078b25–30).

Xenophon's Socrates thinks that this logical tactic is sufficient to refute Euthydemus. And it is. The same can be said about Plato's Socrates. For example, in *Euthyphro* 6e–8b, Socrates refutes Euthyphro's second definition of piety ("what is dear to the gods is pious, and what is not dear to them is not pious," which is soon modified to "the thing and the person that are dear to the gods are pious, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are not pious") by presenting only one counter-example: like human beings, gods differ among themselves on the just and unjust, good and evil, or beauty and ugliness. Consequently, it follows that some gods love certain things because they think they are just, good, and beautiful, while some others hate the same things because they hold them unjust, evil, and ugly. Euthyphro's definition cannot be valid because one case has been found to contradict it. In the *Hippias Major* (287e–289d), to the question "What is the beautiful?" Hippias answers "a maiden" (287e4). Socrates rejects that definition because he is in search of the beautiful itself (αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν [286d8]), that which has the capacity to make things beautiful, that which never changes. He shows that a beautiful girl is just one of the beautiful things in the world: a mare, a lyre, or a cooking pot can also be beautiful. He also shows that a young girl is surely more beautiful than a monkey but less beautiful than a goddess. A few lines later (291d–293c), Socrates refutes Hippias' third definition ("for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and,

29 On the issue, see: Rossetti 2011: 114. See also Aristotle, *Soph. el.* 15, 174a34–35: "… universal should not be the subject of a question, but we must use it as if it had been granted."

after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents, to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring") by simply presenting counter-examples from gods and heroes.

However, Plato's Socrates rarely uses counter-examples *on their own* to refute his interlocutor. He predominantly uses counter-examples by inserting them in more extensive arguments. Unlike in Xenophon's last three *elenchoi* (§ 12–15; § 16–18; § 31–35), counter-examples in Plato represent only one moment in the argumentative sequence. For example, in *Charmides* 159a–160d, Charmides defines wisdom as a kind of quietness (159b5). He then concedes that wisdom is beautiful (159c1–2). Socrates then enumerates many counter-examples in which it is not quietness that is beautiful, but its opposite (i.e., rapidity or speed). Socrates concludes that wisdom cannot be a kind of quietness (160b7). Doubtless, counter-examples are a fundamental component of Charmides' refutation, yet they are not its only component. First, Socrates has to establish that wisdom is beautiful, then use counter-examples to show that quietness is not always beautiful, and last, infer that wisdom cannot be quietness, because quietness is not always beautiful (as wisdom is). In other words, if A is B and if A has the quality C, B will also have the quality C. Again in the *Charmides* (160e–161b), Charmides proposes a second definition of wisdom: wisdom is modesty (160e4–5). Socrates uses the same tactic as previously: he restates the proposition according to which "wisdom is beautiful" (159c1, 160e6), obtains from Charmides that "wisdom is good" (160e13), infers from the identity between wisdom and modesty that "modesty is good," then presents a counter-example from Homer (161a3) against that last proposition, and finally infers that wisdom cannot be modesty because wisdom is good, and modesty, according to Homer, can also be bad. Another example: in the *Hippias Major* (289d–291b), Hippias defines the beautiful as being "nothing else than gold" (289e3). Socrates refutes Hippias in two respects. First, based on an argument from authority, he shows that Hippias' definition implies an absurd consequence (if he accepts this definition, he will be forced to admit that Phidias is a bad sculptor; moreover, that he ignores beauty). Then, Socrates presents an example in which figwood can be more beautiful than gold because it is more suitable.[30]

30 Excluding these particular cases, it seems that Plato's Socrates uses more "examples" in his reasoning than "counter-examples." He usually does so by way of induction: examples serve as many particular instances, from which Socrates infers a general conclusion. That general conclusion is then used as a proposition in the *elenchos* or, less frequently, as the conclusion of the *elenchos*. Xenophon's Socrates, meanwhile, uses more examples as "counter-examples"; that is to say, he uses them to invalidate a general proposition and not to obtain a general proposition.

The last *elenchos* of *Memorabilia* 4, 2 (§ 36–39) represents the only case in which Xenophon's Socrates uses counter-examples in a more extensive argument. Without any surprise, this last argument has the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Euthydemus says that he knows what democracy is (§ 36). He also concedes that it is impossible to know democracy without knowing its principal object: the people (δῆμος [§ 37]). He then offers a definition of it: δῆμος refers to poor citizens, that is to say, people who have insufficient resources (§ 37–38). Socrates' strategy is to attack Euthydemus' definition of the δῆμος and thus, indirectly, show that he does not know what democracy is. How will he attack it? Simply by giving two counter-examples that invalidate Euthydemus' definition, which consists of two elements: δῆμος is poor people (A) without sufficient means (B). Socrates will show: (1) that the word δῆμος can apply to poor citizens (A), but that these poor citizens can have sufficient resources (~B); and (2) more convincingly, that rich people (~A), such as tyrants, do not always have sufficient resources (~B). Two absurd consequences follow from Euthydemus' definition and the counter-examples presented by Socrates: (1) the tyrant is part of the δῆμος; (2) those who have little means are rich, and conversely. Socrates highlights the absurdity of Euthydemus' definition by saying: "Therefore, if that is so, we will include despots in the people, and men of small means, if they are thrifty, in the rich". (Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον θήσομεν … τοὺς δὲ ὀλίγα κεκτημένους, ἐὰν οἰκονομικοὶ ὦσιν, εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους [§ 39]). The absurdity is based on the reunion of two contrary elements that are total opposites: the tyrant and the people, the poor (more precisely, those who have little means) and the rich. This last argument can be formalized in the following way (*modus tollens*):

> {p = Euthydemus knows what democracy is; q = Euthydemus knows what the δῆμος is}

$$p$$
$$p \rightarrow q$$
$$\underline{\sim q}$$
$$\sim p$$

In this particular argument, Socrates uses counter-examples to obtain $\sim q$, namely to show that Euthydemus does not know what the δῆμος is. As one is required to know the δῆμος to know democracy, it appears that Euthydemus does not know democracy. Socrates never explicitly concludes that Euthydemus does not know democracy, but prefers to highlight the absurd consequences of Euthydemus' definition.

Xenophon's Conception of the Elenchos

From the analysis conducted above, it appears that Xenophon's conception of the *elenchos* resembles closely that of his time. Indeed, *elenchos* is defined since the fourth century BC (*Soph. el.* 165a2–3 and 167a23–27, *Sophist* 230b–d) according to two principal elements: (1) it is composed of a proposition and its contradiction; and (2) the two elements in contradiction are the same, and they are stated in the same respect, relation, manner, and time. First, all the *elenchoi* studied in the *Memorabilia* consist of an initial thesis and its contradiction (implicitly or explicitly stated). In the majority of cases, Xenophon expresses contradiction with two contrary terms instead of a negation (seven cases out of eight). However, it is not possible to find a word that names "contradiction" in the vicinity of these Xenophontian *elenchoi*. Plato used the expression ἐναντία λέγειν (with or without a reflexive pronoun) to describe the act of contradicting (or contradicting oneself) in his refutative dialogues and, sometimes, the plural term ἐναντία to describe what appears to us as a "contradiction." Xenophon uses only once the expression ἐναντία λέγειν (*Hellenica* 4, 6, 13), albeit to express more an opposition than a formal contradiction. Both Xenophon and Plato ignored the word ἀντίφασις. Even though the notion of contradiction was not yet *officially* defined by the Stagirite and Xenophon did not coin a word for it, it seems that he had a good understanding of that notion when he uses it in formal argument. As for the second element of the ancient definition of *elenchos*, matters are otherwise. In Pericles' refutation, the two elements in contradiction are not the same: in the first *elenchos*, they are synonyms that do not have the same connotation; in the second and third *elenchoi*, Alcibiades employs the same term but in two different senses. This sophism, called equivocation, was well-known at the time of Plato, for he described it in the *Euthydemus* (277d–278e).[31] The fact that Xenophon only puts that sophism in the mouth of decadent Alcibiades invites us to consider that he knew about equivocation, although it cannot be proven for certain.

Xenophon's conception of the *elenchos* does not resemble the modern definition given by Vlastos as closely. Unquestionably, the *elenchoi* contained in the *Memorabilia* consist of a proposition and its contradiction. However, it is not the case in Xenophon that Socrates or Alcibiades obtain other propositions {*q* and *r*} in order to show that the conjunction of *q* and *r* implies ~*p*. In 4, 2, 12–

31 According to R.K. Sprague, Plato knew and used two main types of fallacy: (1) equivocation; (2) *secundum quid*. R. Robinson thought that Plato did not know equivocation because he had no word for it (Sprague 1962: 7).

15, 16–18 and 31–35, Socrates presents merely a few counter-examples to refute the initial thesis. These counter-examples act as particular cases that invalidate a thesis implicitly understood in a universal way. In the refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades, only two propositions are necessary, namely *p* and *q*. The same can be stated about the refutation in 4, 2 § 36–39: Socrates obtains $\sim p$ from *p*, $p \to q$ and $\sim q$. There is no "problem of the *elenchos*" here: Socrates is entitled to conclude that *p* is false ($\sim p$) and not that it is only incompatible with the proposition set he uses. Moreover, the characters depicted by Xenophon do not use *elenchos* in a positive way, in other words, to demonstrate the truth of various theses. Alcibiades predominantly uses *elenchos* in an eristic fashion: he seeks to gain the upper hand on Pericles. He defends no positive definition of law. He does not even seem to think that a stable definition of law exists. Similarly, Socrates has no definition of justice or democracy to support. It is even quite probable that he does not believe in the scandalous conclusion according to which "the one who commits injustice voluntarily is also the most just because he knows more about the just." He uses *elenchos* in a strictly negative fashion: his goal is to reveal Euthydemus' ignorance and persuade him that he needs to educate himself. The following chapters of book 4 depict Euthydemus's education, which—needless to say—does not consist of refutation.

Contrary to Plato's Socrates, more particularly the Socrates of the *Gorgias*,[32] Xenophon's Socrates does not consider the *elenchos* as a tool or method to established truth. The refutation of Euthydemus demonstrates that *elenchos* can be used in a good way to reveal the ignorance of some young man but not to educate him. Otherwise, Socrates would have used *elenchos* with Euthydemus in the succeeding chapters of book 4. *Elenchos* serves to demonstrate ignorance and nothing else. If Xenophon's Socrates had thought that *elenchos* had a positive value, he would have used it more than twice in the *Memorabilia*, in particular, in the various sections where he explains his philosophical and ethical positions. *Elenchos* can also be used in a bad way, as the refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades shows us. In 1, 2, 40–46, Alcibiades refutes his guardian for the simple joy of it. He uses tactics that are dishonest, which suggests that he is not in search of truth but victory. The refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades resembles the attempted refutation of Socrates by Aristippus in 3, 8, 1–7, in which the eventual founder of the Cyrenaic school tries to refute his master only to gain the upper hand on him and avenge himself. Consequently,

32 Vlastos 1994 on the Socratic *elenchos* mainly relies on the *Gorgias*. For examples, Vlastos cites *Gorgias* 479e to show that the *elenchos* serves to demonstrate positive theses. The positive character of the *Gorgias* was noticed by commentators since antiquity and differs from other Platonic dialogues.

Xenophon seems to have a mitigated opinion of *elenchos*: it could be used well by someone like Socrates but used less well by a perverse youngster like Alcibiades or a resentful man like Aristippus. In that sense, Xenophon's conception of the *elenchos* resembles more closely that of the late Plato, especially in the dialogues in which he condemned the use of *elenchos* in an eristic manner[33] or—like in the *Sophist*—described *elenchos* as a cathartic method used before receiving a real teaching. It should be no surprise that these late Platonic dialogues contain only scarce examples of *elenchoi*, much like in Xenophon.

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33 The use of *elenchos* in an eristic manner is one of the principal attributes of antilogic (ἀντιλογική). See, for example, *Republic* 5, 454a–b, *Republic* 7, 537e–539d, and *Sophist* 225b–233d.

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PART 2

Ethics

Laughter in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia**

Katarzyna Jazdzewska

With its relaxed atmosphere, wine, light-hearted conversations, and all sorts of entertainment, the ancient banquet was a natural place for laughter.[1] Laughter, after all, is a phenomenon that occurs predominantly in a social setting, facilitating conversations, creating social bonds, and resolving interpersonal tensions; it accompanies teasing and joking, and, as the ancients were well aware, is stimulated by alcohol consumption.[2] It is, therefore, not surprising that laughter recurs in descriptions of banquets from the beginnings of Greek literature. Book 1 of the *Iliad* ends with a burst of laughter from the banqueting gods, the feasting suitors laugh in the *Odyssey*, and Theognis repeatedly mentions laughter in a sympotic context.[3]

Yet, while carefree, bonding laughter is a recurrent feature of an ideal *symposion*,[4] Greek authors from Homer onwards are also well aware of laughter's ambiguous nature, both in a sympotic setting and elsewhere. The positive associations of laughter with mutual affinity, joyfulness, and innocent joking are counterbalanced in Greek literature by some serious concerns arising from it. In a face-to-face sympotic context, laughter can serve as a deceptive cloak for friendliness (Halliwell 2008: 120). It can also accompany derision and mockery, and this led the ancients to express concern about the thin line between innocent teasing and offensive ridicule.[5] As scholars have observed, Homer's ban-

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1 For various aspects of the ancient Greek *symposion*, see Murray 1990, Slater 1991, Wecowski 2014.

2 Hom. *Od.* 14.463–465: 'It must be the wine befuddling me, which gets even sensible men singing and laughing and up to dance' (trans. S. Lombardo); see also a comment on this Homeric passage in Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 645a: 'For song, laughter, and dancing are characteristic of men who drink wine in moderation' (trans. P.A. Clement). Plutarch 'corrects' Homer here by emphasizing that it is drinking moderately (*metriōs*) that causes these, in his view innocent, behaviours.

3 For the theme of the divine laughter, see Gilhus 1997; for a general discussion of sympotic laughter, see Halliwell 2008: 100–154 (110–125 on Theognis).

4 Halliwell (2008: 117) points out the gap between the ideal and real *symposion* and various types of laughter associated with them: 'The ideal symposium is a dream, even hallucination, of perfection. Sympotic texts recognize the risk of a gap between ideal and reality into which ambiguous manifestations of laughter can insidiously find their way'.

5 An in-depth discussion of proper, inoffensive joking (*skōmma*) appears in Plut. *Quaest. conv.*

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queting suitors are the most frequently laughing characters, but their laughter is derisive and indicative of their (false) feeling of security and superiority. Going beyond sympotic texts and settings, we observe that in Herodotos laughter typically indicates the ignorance, madness, arrogance, and misguided sense of superiority of those laughing; in the tragic poets, it is usually malevolent and derisive; in Aristophanes, the majority of laughter-references refer to laughter of derision.[6] In the major works of Greek literature—epic poems, tragedy, comedy, and historiography—laughter tends to be associated with morally problematic attitudes and is used not infrequently to negatively characterize the person who is represented as laughing.

Taking into account the association of laughter with banquets and their literary representations, on one hand, and its ambiguous character in Greek literature, on the other, this contribution discusses laughter in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia*.[7] It will examine laughter-vocabulary in both texts and draw attention to differences between the two texts in this respect; it will discuss the frequency and character of laughter-episodes, as well as the author's insight into the nature of the phenomenon of laughter, particularly in the case of Xenophon. The third part of the paper will discuss similarities and differences in the treatment of laughter by the two authors and reflect on their rapport with the above-mentioned traditions of laughter-representation in Greek literature, as well as compare the treatment of laughter in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* and their other works.

Laughter in Plato's *Symposium*

Plato's *Symposium*, as has long been acknowledged, contains a significant comic element.[8] Aristophanes' hiccups, the figure of the uninvited guest, the drunk-

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631c–640a. Though Plutarch is not exclusively concerned with humour in a sympotic setting, the setting of a drinking-party reappears in the background of his thoughts (see, e.g., 631c: ἐν οἴνῳ).

6 On laughter in Homer, see, e.g., Levine 1982; Colakis 1986; in Herodotos, Lateiner 1977; in the tragic poets, Dillon 1991; in Aristophanes, Sommerstein 2009.

7 An overview of sympotic literature and its conventions can be found in Relihan 1992 and Gera 1993: 142–148. In this paper, I refrain from the much discussed issue of the relative chronology of Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* and the possibility of one text's influence on the other. For a recent discussion of the relationship between the two dialogues, see, e.g., Danzig 2005, Hobden 2013: 195–246.

8 For a discussion of the mixed tragic and comic character of Plato's *Symposium*, see, e.g., Clay 1975.

en Alcibiades, teasing and banter among the banquet participants, and finally, Socrates' discussion of comedy at the end of the text—all these elements point to Plato's interest in the comic and humorous. There is, however, relatively little laughter-representation in the dialogue—as we will see, there is only one burst of shared laughter and two passages in which an individual character (one of whom is Diotima, and therefore not a *symposion* guest) is specified as laughing (compare this with, for instance, the *Phaedo*, in which named interlocutors laugh five times).[9] Laughter-related vocabulary, however, is quite frequent, in particular the adjective *geloios* and the adverb *geloion* (meaning 'amusing' but also 'ridiculous', nine times), the verb *katagelaō* ('to laugh at, deride', four times), and the verbal adjective *katagelastos* ('ridiculous, absurd', twice). These terms tend to appear in expressions of fear that one will appear silly or become an object of ridicule. Other laughter-words include the verb *gelaō* (three instances), the noun *gelōs* (twice), and the verb *gelōtopoieō* (once).[10]

The terms *geloios* and *geloion* are used in the *Symposium* in three main senses: 'amusing', 'ridiculous', and 'absurd'. In 174e, Aristodemos enters the house of Agathon and realizes that he is alone: Socrates, who might have provided an excuse for his showing up uninvited, has lingered behind. Consequently, τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν, 'he said that he found himself in a rather ridiculous position' (trans. after Lamb). In 199d, a question about whether Eros is the love of a mother or father is called γελοῖον ἐρώτημα, 'absurd question'. To speak ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα or τοῦ γελοίου ἕνεκα (214e–215a) means 'with a mocking intention'. Although Aristophanes in 189b makes a clear distinction between things that are *geloia* ('funny') and *katagelasta* ('ridiculous'), the distinction is not maintained throughout the *Symposium*, in which *geloios* and *katagelastos* are frequently close in meaning. The latter term and the verb from which it derives (*katagelaō*) are unambiguous and strongly associated with scorn and insult, *hybris*, rather than with the physical phenomenon of laughter. Two passages in which the verb *katagelaō* appears are revealing in this respect. When speaking of a lover remaining under the influence of the heavenly Aphrodite, Pausanias ensures that such a person will share his whole life with his beloved and will not deceive the boy and 'make a mock of him' (181d: καταγελάσαντες) by running to another one. In another passage, Alcibiades says that Socrates 'disregarded, mocked, and insulted his youthful beauty' (219c: κατεφρόνησεν καὶ κατεγέλασεν τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας καὶ ὕβρισεν).

9 See below, 201 and footnote 37.

10 A useful index of laughter- and comedy-related vocabulary in Plato's dialogues can be found in Mader 1977: 130–132.

Laughter-related vocabulary in the *Symposium* is associated predominantly with three characters: Aristophanes, who is willing to provide the company with laughter and who, therefore, parallels Philip the jester in Xenophon's *Symposium*; Alcibiades, who is drunk and nonchalantly unconcerned that he may provoke laughter from the more sober symposiasts; and Socrates, who expresses anxiety at the prospect of being laughed at, though he is also aware that he cannot escape such laughter, as this is the cost he pays for being truthful to himself.

Aristophanes, according to Alcibiades, 'is and wishes to be *geloios*' (213c), and is accused of buffoonery by Eryximachos (189a: γελωτοποιεῖς).[11] In response, Aristophanes says with laughter (*καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη γελάσαντα εἰπεῖν*) that he is afraid not so much of saying things that are *geloia*, but rather things that are *katagelasta* (189b). This passage is the only instance in which Plato represents a specific, named banquet participant as laughing, and it is undoubtedly not accidental that it is Aristophanes, who is singled out as the laugher.[12] Aristophanes' laughter accompanies the playful tenor of his words and announces the humour of his speech. Yet, his distinction between things funny and ridiculous indicates that he is not free of concern about his reputation: while he is dedicated to making people laugh, he is not indifferent to being laughed at.[13]

The second character around whom the laughter-vocabulary centres is the drunk Alcibiades, who is aware that he will be laughed at, but in his inebriation is nonchalantly unconcerned about it (212e–213a: *ἆρα καταγελάσεσθέ μου ὡς μεθύοντος; ἐγὼ δέ, κἂν ὑμεῖς γελᾶτε, ὅμως εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω*). It is after his speech that the second laughter-occurrence in the *symposion* takes place; this time it is shared laughter. Plato uses laughter here to render the reaction of the company to Alcibiades' words: they are amused at his frankness (222c: *εἰπόντος δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου γέλωτα γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ αὐτοῦ*), which, the narrator observes, showed that he was still in love with Socrates. Taken more generally, the laughter expresses the mood of amusement and indulgence with which the company reacts to Alcibiades' presence and his unusual speech.

Alcibiades' momentary lack of concern about the prospect of being laughed at is in contrast with his acute awareness of the ludicrousness of the figure

11 The verb *gelōtopoieō* creates a clear link between Plato's Aristophanes and Xenophon's *gelōtopoios* Philip. See Xen. *Symp.* 1.11, 1.13, 3.11 (Philip's pride on account of his laughter-making, ἐπὶ τῷ γελωτοποιεῖν), 4.50.

12 Xenophon's Philip makes others laugh, but is not represented by Xenophon as laughing himself.

13 Contrary to Xenophon's Philip, who does not mind being laughed at.

of Socrates and his conversational style. Socrates' *logoi*, he says, seem utterly ridiculous at first (221e: φανεῖεν ἂν πάνυ γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον). Socrates uses the ludicrous examples of asses, smiths, cobblers, and tanners; in effect, the ignorant men jeer at his words (221e–222a: ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν), yet under this absurd surface there is sense, reason (νοῦς), and images of virtue (ἀγάλματ' ἀρετῆς). Alcibiades seems to imply that this outward ludicrousness, which he calls 'a hide of a hybristic satyr' (221e), is a sort of Socratic interpersonal strategy.

Alcibiades' comments lead us to the third character around whom laughter-vocabulary centres, namely Socrates, whose complex attitude to laughter in the Platonic corpus has been discussed by scholars (Halliwell 2008: 276–302). In the *Symposium*, he expresses several times a somewhat disingenuous fear that he will become an object of mockery. In 198c, after the speech of Agathon, Socrates admits that he has realized that it was ridiculous (*katagelastos*) to agree to join the company in praising Eros, and a little later, in 199b, he says that he will not try to compete with other speakers, but rather speak in his usual way; otherwise his speech would raise laughter (ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν κατ' ἐμαυτόν, οὐ πρὸς τοὺς ὑμετέρους λόγους, ἵνα μὴ γέλωτα ὄφλω[14]). He is a misfit, and whatever he does, he will appear laughable. His fears that the speeches about Eros were to be concerned with truth make him seem ridiculous; he is also worried that if he attempts to follow the others and their manner of praising Eros, he will be laughed at, for he is unable to do it with a skill comparable to that of the others. In 214e, he suspects that Alcibiades, who is about to praise him, will make fun of him (τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις; ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερά με ἐπαινέσαι;). In response, Alcibiades ensures that he will speak 'for truth and not for laugh' (215a: οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἴσως οἰήσεται ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, ἔσται δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου).

As Halliwell (2008: 284–285) observes, here as elsewhere in Plato's dialogues Socrates oscillates between a disregard for and an anxiety about the possibility of derision. Derisive and critical laughter is famously imagined in Plato's *Republic* as the expected reaction to the truth, which defies customs and conventions: this appears in the image of the 'wave of laughter' in book 5 and in the cave metaphor, in which the man returning from the surface becomes the object of ridicule of the other prisoners.[15] In both the image of the wave of

14 The phrase γέλωτα ὄφλειν appears also in Aristophanes; see a comment by Sommerstein 2009: 110.

15 For the waves of laughter, see *Resp.* 457a–c, 473c. The actual metaphor of a 'wave of laughter' (*kuma ekgelōn*, literally 'the wave that laughs out') appears only in 473c, when Socrates talks about the third, biggest wave of objections he is expecting (in 457b–c, though laughter is mentioned as expected reaction to Socrates' propositions, the wave is not specified

laughter and in the cave metaphor there is an embedded conviction that the philosopher has to confront laughter, however violent and destructive it may be:

> Ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰμὶ ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσῃκάζομεν κύματι. εἰρήσεται δ᾽ οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ κατακλύσειν.
>
> Well, I've now come to what we likened to the greatest wave. But I shall say what I have to say, even if the wave is a wave of laughter that will simply drown me in ridicule and contempt.
>
> *Resp.* 473, trans. GRUBE, REEVE

Still, derisive laughter is not always imagined as destructive and violent; sometimes it is perceived as a relatively mild reaction of the masses when compared with the prospect of real, serious violence (which Socrates will eventually face). In *Euthyphro* 3b–e Socrates says that τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, 'to be laughed at is not a problem'; he would not be troubled if the Athenians were intending just to laugh at him in the court, but if they would be serious, this might lead to a real problem.[16] The *Symposium* depicts Socrates as being aware that he is a likely object of laughter; he exemplifies a proper response by the philosopher—endurance—in a situation in which he is threatened with ridicule.[17]

To make the discussion of laughter in the *Symposium* inclusive, let us briefly discuss Diotima's laughter. This is not an instance of 'sympotic laughter', as Diotima is not a banquet participant but appears in Socrates' account of his

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as a 'wave of laughter'). For a discussion of the phrase *kuma ekgelōn*, which has disturbed some scholars and was excised by more radical ones, see Adam 1902: 361–362. Laughter in the cave metaphor: *Resp.* 517a: ἆρ᾽ οὐ γέλωτ᾽ ἂν παράσχοι, 517d: φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος, 518b: καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ βούλοιτο, ἧττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούσῃ. For the fear of becoming the butt of jokes (*skōmmata*), which has to be overcome, cf. also *Resp.* 452c.

16 Pl. *Euthyphro*. 3d–e: εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν· εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. Notice how Socrates downplays here the hostility implied by the term *katagelaō*, 'to laugh at', as he implies it is interchangeable with *paizō* and *gelaō*.

17 Cf. with Epict. *Ench.* 22, 29.6, where the philosopher is imagined as being ridiculed and laughed at by the crowd.

encounter with her. She is represented as laughing in 202c, in one of the very few moments in Socrates' account in which narratorial interventions go beyond the occasional 'she said' and 'I said'.[18] Let us examine the passage (*Symp*. 202b–c):

> Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁμολογεῖταί γε παρὰ πάντων μέγας θεὸς εἶναι. Τῶν μὴ εἰδότων, ἔφη, πάντων λέγεις, ἢ καὶ τῶν εἰδότων; Συμπάντων μὲν οὖν. Καὶ ἣ γελάσασα, Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογοῖτο μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἵ φασιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θεὸν εἶναι; Τίνες οὗτοι; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἷς μέν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δ' ἐγώ.
>
> 'Yet everyone agrees he's a great god,' I said. 'Only those who don't know?' she said. 'Is that how you mean 'everyone'? Or do you include those who do know?' 'Oh, everyone.' And she said with a laugh, 'Socrates, how could those who say that he's not a god at all agree that he's a great god?' 'Who says that?' I asked. 'You, for one,' she said, 'and I for another.'
>
> trans. NEHAMAS AND WOODRUFF, modified

Halliwell interprets Diotima's laughter as derisive,[19] which seems to me a too strong interpretation of what goes on in the passage. We can identify at least two possible reasons for Diotima's laughter: on the one hand, it may be interpreted as her amusement at the naiveté of Socrates, who is quick to generalize and would rather do without complicating distinctions; on the other, it goes hand in hand with the playfulness with which she steers the conversation in such manner that it is about to make the surprised Socrates disagree with 'everyone'. Her laughter is the laughter of one who is in control of the conversation and who sees clearly and effortlessly the things that are hidden to her interlocutor.

Laughter in Xenophon's *Symposium*

I turn now to Xenophon's *Symposium* and laughter-representation in this dialogue. Compared with Plato's text, laughter is significantly more prominent in Xenophon, who represents the *symposion* guests as laughing more frequently

18 Another instance is in Pl. *Symp*. 207a, where Socrates moves to another conversation, and in 208b–c, in which he describes his reaction (wonder) to her words.

19 Halliwell 2008: 286: 'In Plato's dialogues Socrates is openly derided in conversation on a number of occasions (…) also (…) by a dialectically impatient Diotima at *Symp*. 202b'.

than Plato does; moreover, his characters, in particular Philip the jester, comment several times on laughter and draw attention to its curious nature.[20]

Let us begin with an examination of laughter vocabulary in the dialogue. We find the verb *gelaō* eleven times, *anagelaō* ('to laugh loud') once, and *ekkagchazō* ('burst out with laughter') also once. The adjective *geloios* and adverb *geloion* are used five times; *gelōs* four times; and there is one instance of *gelōtopoios*, *gelotopoiein*, and *gelōtopoiia*. What is remarkable in comparison with Plato's *Symposium* is the absence of the verb *katagelaō* and the verbal adjective *katagelastos*. In fact, real or feigned anxiety about being laughed at, so prominent in Plato, is almost absent from Xenophon's dialogue.[21] The terms *geloios* and *geloion*, the meaning of which in Plato oscillates between 'ridiculous' and 'amusing', in Xenophon typically mean 'amusing, funny'. They are used in the narrator's description of Philip's efforts to make the symposiasts laugh (in 1.14 (twice) and 2.22) and by Philip himself (1.13); only once, in the expression δόξα γελοία, does the meaning come close to 'ridiculous' (4.8).

The theme of laughter makes its first appearance in Xenophon's text when an uninvited guest, Philip the laughter-maker (*gelōtopoios*), appears at the banquet (1.11).[22] Kallias, the host, welcomes him gladly, for, as he observes with some disappointment, the guests are 'deficient in laughter' (1.13). The following scene, in which Philip, without much success, attempts to make the company laugh, offers some glimpses into the complex nature of laughter. Laughter is expected and welcomed at a *symposion*, but it is not always easily generated. Philip, who is a performer and resembles Aristophanic comic characters, attempts to induce the guests to laugh at him: his strategy is to offer himself as the butt of jokes.[23] Thus, he proclaims that he comes uninvited and with an empty stomach, parodying the familiar figure of the parasite (1.11–13), weeps

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20 Cf. a comment by Strauss (1972: 145) on Xenophon's *Symposium*: '"Beauty and love", "laughter", and "wisdom" are the three themes of the work'.

21 The exception is chapter 1.5, where Socrates suspects Kallias, who was trained by celebrities such as Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodikos, of making fun of him (the verb ἐπισκώπτω is used: ἀεὶ σὺ ἐπισκώπτεις ἡμᾶς καταφρονῶν).

22 On the figure of the sympotic joker, see Bremmer 1997; Halliwell 2008: 286.

23 The symposiasts laughing at Philip: ἐπ' αὐτῷ (1.14), ἐπὶ τῷ οἰκτισμῷ αὐτοῦ (1.16), ἐπὶ σοί (2.23). For characters turning laughter at themselves in Aristophanes, see Sommerstein 2009: 111–112. There is some resemblance between Philip's unsuccessful efforts to make other characters laugh and the opening of Aristophanes' *Frogs*, where Xanthias wants to tell jokes that would induce the audience to laugh; not allowed to do so by Dionysos, he expresses regret (13–15, 19–20). Cf. also Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.23: '(…) we seek to raise a laugh either at the expense of others, or at our own, or out of neutral circumstances' (trans. D.A. Russell).

exaggeratedly and wipes his nose (1.1.15–16), and mimics the dance of the entertainers (2.22–23). What is notable about the jester-figure, and what sets him apart from the other banqueters, is that he is not troubled by being laughed at: he seeks it, for his occupation relies on raising laughter at his own expense. Philip's atypical relationship with laughter locates him on the social margins. In Xenophon's portrait, Philip breathes and lives on laughter: 'I could no more turn serious than I could become immortal', he says (1.15). The prospect of a world bereft of laughter alarms him: there would be no place for him in it, he says, covering his head in a symbolic gesture (1.14–16, he uncovers his head only when he hears laughter).[24] Bearing in mind the ambivalent position of laughter in Greek literature and the thin line between innocent teasing and offensive ridicule, we can observe that the presence of the jester, who raises laughter at his own expense, ensures the presence of 'safe' laughter, one which does not entail the risk of antagonizing or offending the *symposion* participants.

There is an additional observation regarding the nature of laughter this scene allows us to make. As Philip laments that the company is not prone to laughter, they comfort him and promise that they 'will laugh the next time' (1.16: πάντες μὲν οὖν παρεμυθοῦντό τε αὐτὸν ὡς αὖθις γελασόμενοι). The absurdity of this promise draws attention to the fact that laughter is a spontaneous behaviour; premeditated laughter is not real laughter. Therefore, it is not surprising that the promise does not comfort Philip, who uncovers his head only when his exaggerated weeping extracts a real guffaw of laughter from Kritoboulos.

Another passage in which Philip comments on the nature of laughter comes in chapter 4.50, where he explains why he is proud of his profession. He remarks that people who are happy invite him to join them, while people who have experienced bad luck avoid him, for they are afraid that they will laugh against their will (φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἄκοντες γελάσωσι). This observation, again, acknowledges the curious nature of laughter: one can laugh against one's will, and even in sad circumstances; there are occasions when people may wish not to laugh, but may not be able to control themselves.[25]

From these glimpses into the nature of laughter provided by Philip, let us turn now to laughter-episodes in the *Symposium*. Kritoboulos' laughter at

24 For the gesture, its meaning, and parallels in other texts, see Huss 1999a: 113. Halliwell (2008: 144, n. 102) sees here an allusion to Hom. *Od.* 8.83–84, 92.

25 A similar thought appears in Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.8–9: 'Now, though laughter may seem to be a trivial matter, aroused often by buffoons, actors of farce, or indeed fools, it nevertheless possesses perhaps the most commanding and irresistible force of all. It often breaks out against our will, and not only forces the face and the voice to confess it, but convulses the whole body with its violence' (trans. D.A. Russell).

Philip's weeping in 1.16 is the only instance when a named character is represented as laughing. With considerable dramatic skill, Xenophon depicts Philip lamenting, together with nose-wiping and the real sound of crying (ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα ἀπεμύττετό τε καὶ τῇ φωνῇ σαφῶς κλαίειν ἐφαίνετο). The company feels sorry for him and attempts to console him; Kritoboulos, however, finds the whole situation comic and bursts out in loud laughter at Philip's weeping (Κριτόβουλος δὲ καὶ ἐξεκάγχασεν ἐπὶ τῷ οἰκτισμῷ αὐτοῦ).[26] The scene draws attention to the contrast between laughter and lament, laughing and crying, and to the emotional responses they elicit.

In all the other (four) laughter-episodes, Xenophon depicts shared laughter directed at one of the guests. Philip, as Kallias informs us, raised much laughter with his mock-dance (2.23–24: Νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Καλλίας, καὶ ἡμῖν γε, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς διψῶμεν ἐπὶ σοὶ γελῶντες).[27] Like in 1.16, where Philip's excessive weeping raised Kritoboulos' laughter, here also laughter is raised by distorting and exaggerating imitation.[28]

Socrates is another character who raises laughter in the *Symposium*: like Philip, he becomes twice the object of the company's amusement. First, in chapter 2.16, after praising the dance of an entertainer, Socrates declares that he would like to learn dance moves from the boy's trainer. When asked what use he would make of them, he announces in all seriousness: Ὀρχήσομαι νὴ Δία ('I will dance, by Zeus'). His declaration raises everyone's laughter; in response, Socrates, asks with a straight face why they are laughing and in a series of questions ('Is it because I want to exercise to better my health? Or because I want to take more pleasure in my food and my sleep?' etc.) demonstrates the senselessness of their laughter. He enumerates reasons why he might have wished to practice dancing and implies that there is nothing laughable here. Yet, despite his straight face, Socrates is clearly joking. It is evident from his questions that draw the company's attention to his physicality: he draws attention to his

26 As scholars have observed, there may be a connection between Kritoboulos' burst of laughter and a passage in Xenophon's *Oec.* 3.7., where he is portrayed by Socrates as a lover of comedy; see Strauss 1972: 145; Huss 1999a: 116. The compound verb *ekkagchazō* is rare in Greek prose; Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1150b) uses it in reference to a burst of laughter after one has tried to restrain oneself for a long time.

27 There is a nice sense of balance here between Philip, who becomes thirsty after dancing, and the symposiasts, who become thirsty after laughing at him.

28 On the type of humour generated by jesters and buffoons, cf. Cic. *De or.* 2.251; Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.29: 'exaggerated features and gestures (the sort of thing which raises a laugh in a mime) are quite unsuitable to an orator. Totally foreign to his personality also is the rough humour of the buffoon or the stage' (trans. D.A. Russell).

advanced age, claims that he wishes to have a body symmetrically developed in all parts (ἐπιθυμῶ (…) παντὶ διαπονῶν τῷ σώματι πᾶν ἰσόρροπον ποιεῖν), makes the company imagine he is searching for an exercise partner, stripping down before the crowd (με συγγυμναστὴν ζητεῖν, οὐδ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πρεσβύτην ὄντα ἀποδύεσθαι), dancing and sweating in a room similar to the one they are dining in (ἀρκέσει μοι οἶκος ἑπτάκλινος, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν τῷδε τῷ παιδὶ ἤρκεσε τόδε τὸ οἴκημα ἐνιδρῶσαι), and, finally, draws their attention to his large abdomen (μείζω τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἔχων μετριωτέραν βούλομαι ποιῆσαι αὐτήν).[29] While seemingly defending himself against this laughter, Socrates spells out the implicit reasons for it.

The second passage in which Socrates becomes an object of laughter is in chapter 3.10. It is similar to the first one: when asked what he is proud of, Socrates makes a serious face and answers that he is proud of *mastropeia*, 'pandering'. This raises a general laugh (ἐγέλασαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ); Socrates, as in 2.17, is unmoved and implies that the company's laughter is unreasonable (Ὑμεῖς μὲν γελᾶτε, ἔφη, ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ πάνυ ἂν πολλὰ χρήματα λαμβάνοιμι, εἰ βουλοίμην χρῆσθαι τῇ τέχνῃ). Again, it is the contrast between Socrates' apparent seriousness and his unexpected answer that provokes laughter.[30] The humorous character of this passage announces the jocular mood of chapters 4.56–64, in which the theme of Socrates' *mastropeia*, 'this disreputable profession' as Kallias euphemistically calls it (4.56), returns, and in which Xenophon provides his readers with an amusing parody of a Socratic dialogue.[31]

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29 For interpretation of this passage, see also Huss 1999b, with whom I fully agree about its jocular character. Huss (1999b: 388) points out other markers of Socrates' humorous intentions: 'Socrates' insistence on the topic he has brought up and the laughter of his listeners are emphasized by the repetition of γελᾶτε at the beginning of three passages (…)'. See also Huss 1999a: 153–155 on the humorous character of the passage and of some specific expressions (ἐνιδρῶσαι, μείζω τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἔχων). The word *gastēr* is not a frequent occurrence in Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues, but is at home in comedy. Remarkably, in Plato the noun appears only seven times, three of which come from Aristophanes' speech in the *Symposium* (190e–191a). Cf. also Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.112, who comments on one of Cicero's witticisms: 'stomachus enim ille habet aliquid ioco simile'.

30 The two laughter-episodes involving Socrates are examples of incongruity as a source of laughter. Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 1412a talks about surprise and frustration of expectation as the principle of certain type of jokes. For a short overview of the incongruity theory of laughter in subsequent philosophical traditions, see, e.g., Morreall 1983: 15–19.

31 See Huss 1999a: 304–308. Huss sees here a parody of a Plato-style dialectic and observes that the phrase πάνυ μὲν οὖν, which is repeated by Socrates' interlocutors, is more Platonic than Xenophontic. Yet, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, the expression appears twenty-five times, by no means infrequently! It seems quite possible to me that Xenophon's Socrates

The two scenes clearly show Socrates ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, amid joking, and we can conclude that his joking consists of resolutely raising laughter at his own expense. There is, then, some resemblance between Philip and Socrates, who both produce laughter by making themselves its objects. Some scholars have argued that, as if in some sort of a competition, Socrates here displaces Philip as the laughter-maker, and that Philip's burlesque-type of humour is inferior to Socrates'.[32] Yet I believe that the jester's role should not be marginalized: he is the one who introduces the theme of laughter into the dialogue, emphasizes its importance, and provides reflections on its complex, curious nature.

The last laughter-episode in Xenophon's *Symposium* occurs in chapter 4.45, in which Nikeratos, in response to Antisthenes' praise of poverty, admits to his fondness of money. With a remarkable sense of humour, Nikeratos visualizes himself as a never-satisfied greedy man, always counting his riches. He says that he would like to get some of Antisthenes' indifference towards material goods, but even at that very moment, reaches for a metaphor having to do with money (he wants to 'borrow' some of it, δανεισόμενος). Everyone laughs, and the narrator informs the reader about the reason for their laughter: ἔνθα δὴ ἀνεγέλασαν ἅπαντες, νομίζοντες τὰ ὄντα εἰρηκέναι αὐτόν ('A burst of laughter from the whole company greeted this admission; for they considered that he had told nothing more than the truth'). Laughter is here a response to Nikeratos' frankness and admission of weakness; therefore, it is somewhat reminiscent of the burst of laughter after Alcibiades' speech in Plato's *Symposium*. The self-deprecating humour of Nikeratos is reminiscent of Socrates: like Socrates in the passage concerning dancing, Nikeratos here presents the company with a humorous, exaggerated picture of himself.

As we consider all five laughter-episodes in Xenophon's *Symposium* together, we can see a repeated pattern. Xenophon steers clear of higher-risk jokes and

here parodies himself as well, just as he raises laughter at his own expense in 2.16 and 3.10. Cf. Pangle 2010: 140, who calls Xenophon's *Symposium* a 'gentle Socratic self-satire'.

32 For attempts to interpret Philip's kind of humour as inferior, see, e.g., discrediting comments on Philip's dancing by Strauss (1972: 149): 'He [i.e., Xenophon—KJ] did not say that they all laughed: did Socrates laugh? Philippos' performance—in contradistinction to the performances which he parodied—did not induce anyone to draw a serious-playful lesson from it'. Similarly, Halliwell (2008: 147–151) suggests that Xenophon presents some sort of competition between Philip and Socrates, in which Socrates 'discreetly displaces Philippus (…) in the role of "laughter-maker"' and by doing it, 'partly transforms the function of laughter itself, turning it from a self-sufficient goal (which the "hired" jester will do anything to achieve) into a defter, more delicate mediating factor in relations between the guests at the party' (151).

laughter raised at the expense of others, thereby avoiding the slippery ground of potentially offensive interactions. Instead, he depicts people arousing laughter at their own expense: in all five cases, the characters who are objects of laughter (Philip, Socrates, Nikeratos), make it clear by their words and behaviour that it is their purpose to elicit laughter from the company.

Laughter in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* in Context

The examination of laughter-representation in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* shows a marked difference in both the laughter-vocabulary used by the two authors and in their approach to laughter more generally. In terms of the laughter-related vocabulary, I have already pointed out that Plato uses more laughter-words carrying associations with derision: *katagelaō* and *katagelastos*, which occur altogether six times in Plato, are absent from Xenophon; also, contrary to Xenophon, Plato uses the words *geloios* and *geloion* more frequently with the meaning 'ridiculous' rather than 'amusing, funny.' Xenophon, on the other hand, uses the simple verb *gelaō* much more frequently (eleven instances, as compared with two in Plato), and, moreover, reaches for two other verbs of laughing, with slightly different meanings: *anagelaō* and *ekkagchzō*. These observations suggest that Xenophon's *Symposion* is more interested in exploring the phenomenon of playful, good-natured laughter than Plato's; this is also confirmed by the reflections on laughter Xenophon puts into Philip's mouth. Plato, on the other hand, reveals significantly more concern with the dark side of laughter and its associations with mockery: there is more anxiety expressed about the possibility of derision.

Regardless of the differences in laughter-representation in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia*, there are also some resemblances, which become apparent when we consider the dialogues in the broader context of laughter-representation in other genres. In comparison with the use of laughter in epic poetry and Herodotos, the two authors are rather reluctant to represent individual symposiasts as laughing, and neither of them uses laughter consistently to characterize the laughing interlocutors. It is certainly not accidental that Aristophanes is the one who is laughing in Plato, and Kritoboulos' burst of laughter possibly reflects his personality as well, but these are isolated occurrences. Xenophon makes use of laughter for the sake of characterization, but not the characterization of a laugher himself, but of those who willingly make themselves objects of laughter. Unlike Homer, Herodotos, and Greek dramatists, neither Plato's nor Xenophon's *Symposium* depicts malicious or derisive laughter, laughter of superiority and arrogance, or the laughter of deception.

It may now be useful to consider the use of laughter in both *Symposia* in the broader context of Plato's and Xenophon's works. Plato's restraint concerning laughter-representation in the *Symposium* is congruent with the misgivings about laughter expressed in the *Republic*, *Philebus*, and the *Laws*.[33] We can identify several objections against laughter raised or implied in these dialogues. First, Plato associates laughter with ignorance: as we have seen above, he repeatedly anticipates derisive laughter as the reaction of men without proper understanding when they hear philosophical ideas (e.g., *Resp.* 452c, 457b–c, 473c, 517a, d, 518b; *Leg.* 789e, 790a, 800b, 830b). As I pointed out above, such ignorant laughter appears in the cave metaphor and in the image of the 'wave of laughter' in the *Republic*. This derisive laughter of the ignorant is a potential stumbling block for the philosopher, who must overcome the fear of being ridiculed and not to allow it to stop him from telling the truth.

However, not only being laughed at is problematic, but also laughing. Strong laughter (ἰσχυρὸς γέλως) that overwhelms men (ἀνθρώπους κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος) creates a strong change (ἰσχυρὰν μεταβολήν) in the laugher's soul (*Resp.* 388e–389a). Laughter, then, regardless its character—whether it is derisive and malicious or playful and innocent—is problematic as a bodily reaction, a physical perturbation which disturbs the soul.[34] This is why Plato condemns the famous Homeric passage from book one of the *Iliad*, in which the banqueting gods laugh at the limping Hephaistos (*Il.* 1.599–600, cf. *Resp.* 389a).

Strong laughter is also symptomatic of strong emotions, and these emotions, as well as their expression, should be suppressed. These emotions may be of a different sort. In the *Laws*, we read that 'excessive laughter and tears must be avoided … one should try to behave decently by suppressing all extremes of joy and grief' (732c: γελώτων τε εἴργεσθαι χρὴ τῶν ἐξαισίων καὶ δακρύων … καὶ ὅλην περιχάρειαν πᾶσαν ἀποκρυπτόμενον καὶ περιωδυνίαν εὐσχημονεῖν πειρᾶσθαι). In the *Philebus*, on the other hand, when discussing comedy, Plato associates laughter with malice, *phthonos*, and with malicious pleasure at others' misfortunes (*Phlb.* 48–50).[35] In the *Laws*, he distinguishes between ridicule with and without anger (935d–e: μετὰ θυμοῦ, ἄνευ θυμοῦ), and strictly forbids the former. Laughter is problematic as an expression of one's emotions, *inter alia* emotions entailing hostility towards someone. We can suppose that it is the

33 For a general overview of laughter in Plato, see de Vries, 1985.

34 One of the most vivid ancient stories visualizing the violent, physical nature of laughter is Diogenes Laertios' account of Chrysippos' death, which was the result of a violent fit of laughter (7.185).

35 For a discussion of laughter in the *Philebus*, see, e.g., Fortenbaugh 2003, Wood 2007.

incongruity of laughter with proper control over one's emotions and with decorous behaviour (*Leg.* 732c εὐσχημονεῖν) that leads the Athenian in the *Laws* to prohibit the practice of comedy by citizens and jokes at citizens' expense (*Leg.* 816d–e, 935c–e).[36]

These objections against laughter might have influenced Plato's restraint in depicting laughter in the *Symposium*. Yet, it should be noted that such restraint is not maintained throughout the Platonic corpus. There is, in fact, a sharp contrast between Plato's *Symposium*, almost bereft of laughter, and the *Phaedo*, in which the interlocutors, in spite of gloomy circumstances, laugh surprisingly often.[37] Laughter in the *Phaedo* balances the tragic circumstances of Socrates' last conversation and emphasizes the affinity between Socrates and his companions—only his close, philosophically minded friends present—and this, as Halliwell observes, conveys 'a Socratic defiance, an emotional transcendence, of death'.[38] Paradoxically, the *Phaedo* offers conditions that neutralize the risks associated with laughter: the company present consists only of Socrates' close friends, whose keen interest in philosophy precludes the unreasonable, mocking laughter of those who have no share in real understanding. That the laughter is not violent and overwhelming, Plato reminds the reader by modifying the verb γελάω with expressions meaning 'gently, quietly' (*Phd.* 84d: ἠρέμα, 115c: ἡσυχῇ). Contrary to the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium* with its assorted company and undercurrent rivalry does not offer ideal conditions for good laughter, as is visible in the recurrent motif of the fear of appearing ridiculous. But also, from a compositional perspective, we can notice that while in the *Phaedo* Plato counterweights the gravity of the dialogue with laughter, in the *Symposium* he confronts a different challenge, namely, not let the seriousness of the dialogue become overshadowed by comic elements.

Turning now to Xenophon, the best *comparandum* for laughter-representation in the *Symposium* will be his *Cyropaedia*. Regardless of the genre-difference, there are numerous affinities between this text and Xenophon's Socratic writings; Xenophon's depictions of banquets in the *Cyropaedia* are particu-

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36 Note, however, that the Athenian in the *Laws* maintains that it is impossible to learn the serious (*ta spoudaia*) without learning the comic and laughable (*geloia*), and that one has to learn to recognize buffoonery in order to avoid it (*Leg.* 816d–e).

37 Pl. *Phd.* 62a (Kebes) 64a (Simmias), 84d (Socrates), 101b (Kebes), 115c (Socrates) (I list only the passages in which an individual is presented as laughing, not all the passages in which laughter occurs or is mentioned). For a discussion of laughter in the *Phaedo*, see de Vries 1985: 380, Halliwell 2008: 278–284.

38 Halliwell 2008: 283. See also 301–302, where Halliwell calls laughter in the *Phaedo* 'one of the supreme paradoxes of Socrates' final hours'.

larly well suited for comparison with the *Symposium*:[39] as has been observed, numerous elements of the *Symposium* are found in the banquet depictions in the *Cyropaedia*, such as the combination of serious and frivolous themes (*spoudaiogeloion*), didactic passages, competition among guests, references to matchmaking and love (both heterosexual and homosexual), and a discussion of wealth and poverty.[40]

From the perspective of our study, Xenophon's description of Cyrus' dinner with his officers in 2.2.1–2.3.1, in which laughter becomes a topic of discussion, is of particular interest. Xenophon introduces the account with a statement that Cyrus took care that dinner conversations were both entertaining (εὐχαριστότατοι) and incited to good (παρορμῶντες εἰς τἀγαθόν). He opens one conversation by asking the company whether the commoners who had joined the army were equal in social manners and military skills to the peers, *homotimoi*. Two participants relate stories that elicit laughter from the company and Cyrus himself, both at the expense of the commoners: one showing a commoner's greediness at a meal, the other one an absurd, literal exactness in following orders.[41] The laughter is indicative of the bond and understanding between Cyrus and the *homotimoi* and their distinction from the commoners. We can suspect that Cyrus asks his opening question well aware of the frictions between the peers and the commoners, and that he does so in order to provide the peers with a space for light-hearted criticism and complaint.

Yet one of the taxiarchs, Aglaïtadas, known for his sour and austere character (2.2.11: τὸν τρόπον τῶν στρυφνοτέρων ἀνθρώπων), accuses the two men who related the stories of not telling the truth and of making the stories up in order to raise a laugh (γέλωτα ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντες). The two men are, according to him, braggers, by which he seems to mean that they distort the truth for self-serving purposes—to appear better by denigrating others. Cyrus defends them:

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39 Banquets in the *Cyropaedia*: 1.3.4–12, 2.2.1–2.3.1, 5.2.5–22, 8.3.35–50, 8.4.1–27. For a detailed analysis of banquets in the *Cyropaedia* and their relation with, *inter alia*, Socratic literature and Xenophon's *Symposium*, see Gera 1993: 132–191. See also Huss 1999b: 395: '[T]he symposia of the *kalos kagathos* Cyrus are an important point of comparison in interpreting the humorous symposium at Kallias' house, at which the *kalos kagathos* Sokrates plays the leading role'. The *Symposium* and the Persian banquets of the *Cyropaedia* are also mentioned together by Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 630a.

40 Gera 1993: 135–138.

41 The stories, as has been observed, depict the stock figures of a parasite and an 'over-obedient, literal-minded man' (Gera 1993: 161–162).

> καὶ ὁ Κῦρος, Εὐφήμει, ἔφη, μηδὲ λέγε ἀλαζόνας εἶναι τούτους. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζὼν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέροις καὶ ποιήσειν ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσιν ὑπισχνουμένοις, καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ λαβεῖν τι ἕνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι ποιοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ μηχανώμενοι γέλωτα τοῖς συνοῦσι μήτε ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτῶν κέρδει μήτ' ἐπὶ ζημίᾳ τῶν ἀκουόντων μήτε ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μηδεμιᾷ, πῶς οὐχ οὗτοι ἀστεῖοι ἂν καὶ εὐχάριτες δικαιότερον ὀνομάζοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλαζόνες; ὁ μὲν δὴ Κῦρος οὕτως ἀπελογήσατο περὶ τῶν τὸν γέλωτα παρασχόντων (…)
>
> Hush, said Cyrus, don't call these men braggers. For to me, the name 'bragger' seems to apply to those who pretend that they are richer than they are or braver than they are, and to those who promise to do what they cannot do, and that, too, when it is evident that they do this only for the sake of getting something or making some gain.[42] But those who produce laughter from their companions not for their own gain nor with damage to their hearers nor with any injury whatsoever, why should these men not be called 'witty' and 'entertaining' rather than 'braggers'? Thus Cyrus defended those who had furnished laughter (…)
>
> *Cyr.* 2.2.12–13, trans. W. MILLER, adapted

Cyrus' apology for the two men who, he does not deny, might have embellished their accounts to some degree in order to raise laughter, is not concerned with the truth; rather, he offers a defence of laughter and laughter-making. He is not unaware of the ambivalent character of laughter: the tricolon μήτε ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτῶν κέρδει, μήτ' ἐπὶ ζημίᾳ τῶν ἀκουόντων, μήτε ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μηδεμιᾷ specifies three cases in which raising laughter might be problematic. These resemble the acts of a braggart: when it is produced for one's gain, when it causes harm to the hearers, or leads to some other injury (possibly an injury to an absent person who is the object of laughter). Cyrus apparently believes that neither of these took place in the situation under discussion.

The exchange between Aglaïtadas and Cyrus is next followed by an exchange between Aglaïtadas and the two officers he criticized. One of them tells Aglaïtadas that his intention was to entertain and amuse the company (εὐφραίνειν), and that Aglaïtadas should find fault with people who make others weep rather than with those make others laugh. The conversation turns towards a discussion of the value and usefulness of laughter. Aglaïtadas launches a direct attack

42 For a comparison, see the characterization of ἀλαζών in Theophrastos' *Characters*, chapter 23.

on laughter: making friends laugh is worse than making them weep. Weeping is useful in the process of education and in keeping justice in the city. By means of weeping, fathers instil in their sons moderation and self-control (*sōphrosunē*), teachers teach students good lessons, and laws induce citizens to justice (*dikaiosunē*). Laughter, on the other hand, brings nothing good either to bodies or to minds, and does not help one to become better in the management either of one's own affairs or those of the state. Aglaïtadas finds laughter not to be in harmony with moral uprightness and moral seriousness. Although he does not elaborate on what harm laughter brings, the contrast between the worthlessness of laughter and the usefulness of weeping indicates that he considers the frivolity of laughter to be, at best, a distraction from important, serious moral and political concerns.

One's interpretations of the figure of Aglaïtadas may vary depending on one's overall reading of the *Cyropaedia*.[43] Is Aglaïtadas' point of view to be dismissed altogether as indicative of his grouchiness and lack of sense of humour, or is he saying something of importance?[44] In the light of Xenophon's embracement of laughter in the *Symposium*, I find it difficult to see Xenophon as wholeheartedly siding with πολέμιος τῷ γέλωτι, 'foe to laughter' (*Cyr*. 2.2.16).[45] Xenophon's interest in mixing the serious with the amusing and laughable, both in the *Cyropaedia* (3.1: γελοῖα καὶ σπουδαῖα) and in the *Symposium* (1.1: τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα … καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς), indicates that he believed that an admixture of laughter does not impair or annihilate seriousness and decency.

On the other hand, even without wholehearted adherence to a 'dark' and subversive reading of the *Cyropaedia*, one can notice that Aglaïtadas raises important questions regarding the usefulness of laughter and playfulness in

43 For a thoughtful discussion of contemporary approaches to Xenophon, see the Introduction to Hobden and Tuplin 2012.

44 As Hobden and Tuplin (2012: 34) observe, the name 'Aglaïtadas', raising associations with a Greek noun ἀγλαΐα, 'splendor, glory', is probably not chosen arbitrarily by Xenophon; they suggest that his name can indicate that he is not 'wholly in the wrong'. Nadon (2001: 75–76) points out that Aglaïtadas questions Cyrus' reforms and defends the ancestral way of life. Gera (1993: 162–163) draws a parallel between Aglaïtadas and Hermogenes in Xenophon's *Symposium* (the unsociable symposiast). For Aglaïtadas' remarks interpreted as Xenophon's reflection on the theory of fiction, see Reichel 2010: 436–437.

45 Aglaïtadas is reminiscent of later figures, cf., e.g., Ael. *VH* 8.13 Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν Κλαζομένιόν φασι μήτε γελῶντά ποτε ὀφθῆναι μήτε μειδιῶντα τὴν ἀρχήν. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ Ἀριστόξενον τῷ γέλωτι ἀνὰ κράτος πολέμιον γενέσθαι (…). Plato, according to Diogenes Laertios 3.26 (whose source is Herakleides), was never seen laughing excessively (μηδέποτε ὀφθῆναι γελῶν ὑπεράγαν) in his youth.

education and state- and home-management—and thus supplements the reflection on the nature of laughter in the *Symposium* with a moral and political perspective (2.2.14)—and that his arguments are not countered by other interlocutors. Reichel proposed that Xenophon is responding here to Plato's *Republic*, and suggested that Aglaïtadas stands for Plato.[46] Whether we accept his proposition (which I find stimulating) or not, Aglaïtadas' insistence on the truth (2.2.11: Ἦ γὰρ οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, τούτους ἀληθῆ λέγειν ταῦτα; 2.2.14: εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ σύ, ἢν ὀρθῶς λογίζῃ, ἐμὲ ἀληθῆ λέγοντα) as well as his focus on the moral and the political (seen in his concern with σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη) brings a philosophical dimension to the discussion of laughter and marks some problematic points.

Considered together, then, the *Symposium* and *Cyropaedia* 2.2 reveal Xenophon's interest in laughter and his awareness of philosophical discussions regarding its nature and value. In the serio-comic context of a banquet, two of his characters, Philip and Aglaïtadas, raise a number of points regarding the nature and usefulness (or lack thereof) of laughter. Probably neither Philip nor Aglaïtadas—representing two extremes, as a laughter-maker and a foe of laughter—is to be identified straightforwardly with Xenophon. Yet Xenophon's view that mixing the serious with the playful can have some usefulness, as well as his willingness to represent Socrates resolutely raising laughter at his own expense—suggests a fair dose of acceptance of laughter, though he is not unaware of potential problems.

Plato's mistrust towards laughter influenced subsequent authors. The stock figure of a philosopher who never laughs recurs in ancient texts; Plato's dialogues—above all the *Republic* and the *Philebus*—must have also been influential in shaping the tradition of theoretical reflection on *to geloion*, 'the laughable', which began to flourish in the classical period.[47] But Xenophon's embracement of laughter was not lost on later writers, and some even declared Platonists tempered the Platonic sobriety with an admixture of Xenophontic approval of laughter. Such is the case of Plutarch, who in the *Quaestiones convivales* (the first *quaestio* of book 2) explicitly discusses jokes and laughter and singles out Xenophon as the author of both the *Symposium* and the *Cyropaedia* as the main reference point in his discussion.[48]

46 Reichel 1997, Reichel 2010: 436–437. For ancient authors drawing a link between *Cyropaedia* and Plato's *Republic*, see Gera 1993: 12–13.

47 For an attempt to reconstruct Aristotle's and Theophrastos' ideas on laughter, see Fortenbaugh (2003).

48 See, e.g., Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 629c, 629e–f, 630a, 632a–b, 632e.

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Socrates' Physiognomy: Plato and Xenophon in Comparison

Alessandro Stavru

Scholars dealing with Socrates' physiognomy face a number of crucial issues: Through which medium was Socrates first portrayed?[1] Were his physical traits first described through literary or visual means? Were they thematized already during his lifetime, possibly in a drama representing him, or after his death, in a prose dialogue composed by one of his disciples? Or was the first medium depicting Socrates a visual one, dating back to either his lifetime (i.e., a mask used on stage by an actor playing Socrates in a comedy), or the first quarter of the fourth century BC (i.e., a statue/bust of Socrates erected in Plato's Academy shortly after 387 BC)?[2]

Scholars have come up with a number of hypotheses to answer these questions, none of which has established itself as conclusive. This paper will deal with some of them, without trying to give a definite solution to any of them. It aims instead to shed new light on the physiognomy of Socrates by comparatively examining Plato and Xenophon's passages on the topic. A comparative analysis of these two sources is of primary importance for understanding the reception of Socrates' physiognomy in antiquity, inasmuch as subsequent literary and visual depictions of Socrates almost completely depend on them.[3]

1 On Socrates' physiognomy, see Kekulé von Stradonitz 1908; Toole 1974–1975; Scheibler 1989 and 1993; Lapatin 2006; Stavru 2011: 99–129; Sassi 2015: 15–25; Capra 2016 and 2018. I am thankful to Dave Johnson, Gabriel Danzig, Amneris Roselli, Maria Michela Sassi, and Will Altman, whose comments on previous drafts of this paper were very helpful.

2 A passage in a papyrus from Philodemus' *History of Philosophy* (*PHerc*. 1021, col. 2, 13–19. The passage is of great importance, as Philodemus quotes from an early source, i.e., Philocorus, an author who lived in the 4th–3rd centuries BC) provides important background information about the first statue (or bust) of Socrates, which was very probably erected in 387 BC: see the new texts by Dorandi 1991 and Angeli and Acosta Méndez 1992 as well as the discussions by Voutiras 1994, Speyer 2001, and Longo Auricchio 2008.

3 As pointed out by Zanker 1996: 34. Since Richter 1965, archaeologists divide the extant Roman copies into a Silenic "type A" and a more human—but still Silenic—"type B" (some scholars claim even the existence of a "type C"). Written sources mostly confirm what can be read in Plato and Xenophon, adding, however, some details (e.g., Socrates' baldness, bandy legs, and hairy shoulders): see, e.g., Luc. *Dial. mort* 20; Hieron. *Adv. Jov*. 1.48; Sid. Apoll. *Epist*. 9.9.14; schol. in Aristoph. *Nub*. 223.

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Another reason for which such a comparative analysis is crucial lies in the peculiarity of these accounts if compared to other physiognomic texts of antiquity. Plato and Xenophon's descriptions of Socrates' appearance are not physiognomic in the strict sense, as they do not attempt to draw any characterological deduction from his outward features.[4] The overarching issue of these accounts is to show that Socrates' appearance is intimately linked with his philosophical attitudes and skills. As we will see, when Plato and Xenophon describe Socrates' traits (such as his Silenic or zoomorphic aspect), or dwell on the inward qualities or abilities related to them, their aim is to highlight topics that are of philosophical importance.

The Motif of the Silenus: From Prosopon to Paradeigma

It has been suggested that the first depiction of Socrates as Silenus might date back to ancient comedy:[5] we know of at least four comedies that dramatized Socrates,[6] in which the actor who played him might have worn a Silenus-mask.[7] In the only comedy of these that survived completely, Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Socrates most likely had Silenic traits, and there might be even textual evidence for this.[8] A further allusion might be found in a comic fragment that describes

4 For an overview on ancient physiognomy, see Evans 1969 and Swain 2007.

5 The claim goes back to Dupréel 1922. More recently, see McLean 2007 and Capra 2016.

6 Namely: Telecleides (in a comedy staged between 440 and 430 BC, probably titled *Clouds*), Callias' *Prisoners* (431), Amipsias' *Connus*, Aristophanes' *Clouds I* (both 423 BC), and Aristophanes' *Clouds II* (between 419 and 417 BC). See DL 2.18 = *SSR* I A 1. Other comedies of/on which there is evidence suggesting the presence of Socrates on stage are Eupolis' *Kolakes* (421 BC) and Aristophanes' *Birds* (414 BC, esp. v. 851–894). For a reconstruction of the fragments of the comedies in which Socrates was portrayed on stage, see Patzer 1994.

7 Stone (1971); McLean (2002); Hughes (2012); Compton-Engle (2015). Aelianus *VH.* 2.13 claims that during the comedies Socrates "could be spotted among the actors, for it is clear that the costumists fashioned him [sc. Socrates], portraying him as well as they possibly could (ἔκπλασαν αὐτὸν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξεικάσαντες)." Socrates, however, "stood for the whole duration of the comedy," in order to be identified by the foreigners who were attending the rehearsal and did not know him. The latter circumstance suggests that, despite the costumists' efforts, the actors playing Socrates on stage were *not at all similar to Socrates*; they were so unlike him that Socrates, by standing all the time, could show the difference between himself and its character, thus turning the irony of his detractors back onto themselves. On this passage see Dover 1968: xxxiii and Lapatin 2006: 111.

8 See Capra 2016 and 2018. Capra notes that the invocation ὦ 'φήμερε (at v. 222) is very likely a quote from Pindar, where Silenus is uttering it at Olympus: ὦ τάλας ἐφήμερε (schol.

Socrates as *dimorphos*, "two-formed," which might hint at the fact that his character on stage was half-human and half-goat in appearance, as Pan and the Satyrs are.[9]

Given the fragmentary state of sources on Socrates other than Plato and Xenophon, it is difficult to make definite claims about Socrates' physiognomy in other authors. However, the extant evidence suggests that Plato and Xenophon were the only Socratics who drew upon the motif of the Silenus. The extant fragments of Phaedo's *Zopyrus*, a dialogue dealing with Socrates' physiognomy, do not feature this motif, and the scanty information we have of Anthistenes' *Physiognomonikos* does not allow us to surmise that he used this motif either.[10] Nor does Aristoxenus, another author who had a wide knowledge of Socratic *logoi*, mention the Silenus when dwelling on Socrates' outward aspect.[11]

It seems most likely that Plato and Xenophon had specific reasons for dramatizing a Silenic Socrates. A comparative reading of the relevant passages of Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* will allow a better understanding of these reasons, which significantly differ from one author to the other.[12] In fact, we shall see that they also use other comparisons when describing Socrates' appearance, which makes their common reliance on the Silenus motif even more meaningful.

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ad *Nub*. 223d = fr. 157 Snell). In Aristotle's *Eudemus*, it is again Silenus who pronounces this expression: ἐφήμερον σπέρμα (Plut. *Consol. ad Apoll.* 115d = fr. 44.27–29 Rose). Relying on this evidence, Capra claims that in *Clouds* Aristophanes presents Socrates as a Silenus—even if the text does not mention any Silenic trait. This is a convincing hypothesis, although it should be noted that Socrates' bare feet (v. 103–104 and 363) are at odds with a Silenic appearance (see note 29).

9 On Socrates *dimorphos* see Edmonds 1957: vol. IIIa; Bühler 1999: 110; Kock 1880: *CGF* vol. III, 754; McLean 2002: 47; Stavru 2011: 100–105.

10 Out of the Silenic traits Plato and Xenophon attribute to Socrates—namely the thick lips, the snub nose, the protruding eyes, the prominent belly, and the short stature (texts X3, P6, X4, X5, P7)—only Phaedo's ὄμματα παιδεραστοῦ might be Silenic (fr. 11 Rossetti; see note 84). The most complete collection of texts of and related to Phaedo's *Zopyrus* is Rossetti 1980, which contains fragments and testimonies not featured in *SSR*. On Antisthenes' *Physiognomonikos*, see the evidence discussed in *SSR*, vol. IV, 281–283.

11 Fr. 54a–b Wehrli, on which see Stavru 2018, 641–643.

12 For a general overview of the passages dealing with Socrates' physiognomy in Plato and Xenophon's *Symposia*, see Edelstein 1935: 7–8 and 22. On the difficult issue of the dependence of Xenophon's *Symposium* (dating to the 360s BC) on Plato's (authored between 385 and 379), see Huß 1999a: 13–15 and 449–455 as well as Danzig, Introduction to the Comparative Study of Plato and Xenophon, this volume, 1–30.

Socrates' Strangeness and Laughability

In the final section of Plato's *Symposium*, Alcibiades introduces the comparison between Socrates and the Silens, whom he equates with the Satyrs.[13] Socrates resembles on the one hand the seated statues of Silens that contain images of gods,[14] on the other, the Satyr Marsyas:

> **P1**: In fact, I say that he is most like (*homoiotaton*) the Silens that sit (*kathemenois*) in the herm-carvers' shops, the ones the craftsmen make holding pipes or flutes: when their two halves are pulled open (*dikhade dioikhthentes*), they seem to have statues (*agalmata*) of gods inside them. And I further say that he resembles (*eoikenai*) the Satyr Marsyas. Now, as to the fact that your aspect (*eidos*) is indeed like them (*homoios ... toutois*), Socrates, I am sure you would not disagree with me; as to the fact that you resemble (*eoikas*) them in every other respect, listen to what I am about to say.[15]
>
> *Symp*. 215a–b

The whole passage is about *likeness* and *resemblance*: given the impossibility of describing Socrates' strangeness (*atopia*) in conventional ways, Alcibiades provides an account of his personality "through images" (*di' eikonon*).[16]

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13 See esp. Plat. Symp. 222d, where Socrates defines Alcibiades' speech as a "Satyric and Silenic drama." Scholars in ancient iconography distinguish between Silens and Satyrs (the former being half-men, half-horses; the latter half-men, half-goats), whereas written sources mostly conflate them. According to Hartmann 1927, 36–37, neither the mythological personae nor the names of the Silens and the Satyrs can be clearly distinguished in classical age. The distinction between them happens at a later stage. See also Arias 1966, who points out that Herodotus calls Marsyas a Silenus (7.26), while Plato defines him a Satyr (*Symp*. 215b). On the iconography of Silens and Satyrs, see Durand, Frontisi-Ducroux 1984, Lissarrague 1984, Bérard and Bron 1989, Lissarrague 1990 and 1993.

14 It is important to note that these statues are *seated*. The famous fresco from Ephesus representing a seated Socrates (Selçuk, 1st century AD) might in fact rely on Plato's account. Paolo Moreno has surmised that the base of a seated statue found in the protyrus of the Athenian Pompeion might belong to the statue of Socrates, which according to Diogenes Laertius (2.43) was fashioned by Lysippus shortly after 399 BC "out of the Athenians' repentance" for the unjust conviction of Socrates (Moreno 1984, 1987, and 2002). As Dover 1980: 166 rightly observes, "no examples" of these statuettes "have survived, nor are there any references to such a type of statue except in late passages dependent on this one." For an overview of the hypotheses scholars have provided about these statuettes, see Bury 1932: 143–144.

15 All translations are my own, if not otherwise specified.

16 See also Plat. *Symp*. 215a2, where Alcibiades confesses that accounting for Socrates' *atopia*

He states twice that Socrates is like (*homoiotaton*/*homoios*) the Silens and the Satyr Marsyas and twice that he resembles (*eoikenai*/*eoikas*) them.[17] His insistence on likeness and resemblance shows that the iconic motifs employed are far from being mere analogies. As will become clear later (P3), only through them can the double nature of Socrates be understood: for the great majority of his fellow citizens, who don't see under the surface of his appearance, he is indeed the ridiculous, hybristic Silenus/Satyr lampooned by Aristophanes; for his friends and associates, who are able to access what is inside him, he reveals himself as a truly daimonic man, whose charismatic features and extraordinary ability of persuasion move Alcibiades to tears.

To highlight the double nature of the Silenic Socrates, Plato uses an allitteration (*dikhade dioikhthentes*), which reminds one of the comic Socrates *dimorphos* we have seen before. As the Satyrs, who are half-human and half-goat, Socrates is a hybrid. His true essence is the interconnectedness of his inward, philosophical seriousness and the outward, comic, and hybristic aspects of his personality.[18] At the end of the *Symposium*, the connection between these two aspects emerges as the core feature of philosophy itself: Socrates, the philosopher, forces the tragedian Agathon and the comedian Aristophanes to admit that "same man" (that is, Socrates himself) "could have the knowledge required for producing comedy and tragedy, that is, that the skilled tragedian could be as well a comedian" (223d). The serio-comic Socrates accounts for the ambiguity of the philosophy he represents, whose serious and comic aspects form an inextricable nexus. The two halves of the Silenic Socrates epitomize a new mode of the *spoudaiogeloion*, that of philosophy, whose main feature consists in its ability to merge tragedy and comedy.[19] A little further, Plato provides important details about Socrates' double nature:

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will be no easy task (οὐ γάρ τι ῥᾴδιον). On Socrates' uniqueness, see Plato, *Grg.* 494d and *Tht.* 149a as well as Aristoxenus fr. 54a–b Wehrli. According to Wehrli, "Socrates had an extraordinary power of persuasion, which reflected itself in his voice (φωνήν), his mouth (στόμα), his manifest character (ἦθος), and his unique outward appearance (τὴν τοῦ εἴδους ἰδιότητα)."

17 For similar accounts of "resemblance" (εἰκασία) in Plato, see *Menex.* 80c–d and *Resp.* 487e.

18 This point has been made by McLean 2002: 2–5, who rightly observes that "the common man saw the philosopher as an object of laughter … misunderstood, ostensibly risible, yet with a complex and hidden interior available only to those willing to do the hard work to access it."

19 On *spoudaiogeloion* in Plato, see Boyarin (2009, 319–343), who provides an original reading of the passages of the *Symposium* discussed in this paper. Boyarin draws mostly on Bakhtin (1984), but claims that the seriocomical genre begins with Plato's depiction of Socrates' double nature, and not—as Bakhtin maintains—with the Socratic *logoi*. Segoloni (2013)

> **P2:** "Look how Socrates is in love with beautiful persons, is always with them and enraptured, and ignores everything and knows nothing. Isn't his look (*skhema*) similar to that of a Silenus (*silenodes*)?" "Indeed it is." "On the outside (*exothen*) he has thrown around him this look, like the sculptured Silenus; but once you have opened his inside (*endothen*), do you know, my fellow drinkers, how full of temperance (*sophrosunes*) he is?"
>
> *Symp.* 216d

Here Socrates claims that, although exteriorly (*exothen*), he is dominated by strong passions and is radically ignorant, interiorly (*endothen*), he is indeed able to restrain himself and behave wisely. His double nature consists on the one hand of what *appears* of him, i.e., his amorous inclinations and disavowal of knowledge, on the other, what remains *concealed* within his interiority, i.e., his temperance and wisdom. It appears that the two aspects are inextricably linked, as only those who deal with the amorous and eironic Socrates can access the "statues" he has inside (i.e., Alcibiades, who manages to spot these statues, and his other friends and associates). Even more importantly, Socrates' interior qualities seem to outweigh the exterior ones: *sophrosune* and *karteria* are possibly directed at taming Socrates' strong passions, while *phronesis* and *sophia* could stand for the claims of knowledge he makes notwithstanding his profession of ignorance.[20] Plato's Socrates is a complex personality, who cannot be univocally identified with a specific character: he is both laughable and serious, passionate and temperate, ignorant and wise. Hence, his uniqueness and strangeness, and the difficulty of providing a physiognomic diagnosis of his outward appearance.[21]

purports a similar view, while Giangrande (1972) claims that the *spoudaiogeloion* owes its origin to Aristophanes, who coined this genre to depart from the *bomolochia* of other comic playwrights.

20 On Socrates' *sophrosune* and *karteria* (esp. in Plato's *Symposium*), see Stavru 2016. On Socrates' claims of knowledge and how these claims harmonize with his profession of ignorance, see the classic contribution by Vlastos 1985.

21 According to Arist. *An. pr.* 70b7–32, physiognomy is aimed at finding stable correspondences between one outward feature (*semeion*) and one inward character or affection (*pathos*)—which is obviously not possible in the case of Socrates' double nature. This might be the reason why Plato—and Xenophon, as we will see—does not draw on the physiognomic methods practiced at his time when dealing with Socrates' outward appearance (unlike, e.g., Phaedo of Elis, whose diagnosis of Socrates is physiognomical, but has a philosophical *pointe*; see note 84). This is all the more striking if one takes into account

Before ending his speech, Alcibiades concludes his praise of Socrates by making an important claim: the icon of the Silenus/Satyr is *the only possible way* of representing Socrates, as no human being—either of the present or the past—can be compared to him:

> **P3**: As to the strangeness (*atopian*) of this very man, both he himself and his speeches, one would not find anyone close to him among men of our day or among those of the past, unless perhaps one compares (*apeikazoi*) him not with other men, but with the Silens and Satyrs, both he himself and his speeches.
>
> *Symp.* 221d

Notwithstanding the difficult task of accounting for Socrates' double nature, Alcibiades attempts to provide something like a "mathematical account" of such strangeness:

> **P4**: If I will speak telling my reminiscences in a promiscuous manner don't be surprised; it is not an easy task for a man in my condition to provide a systematic enumeration (*katarithmesai*) of your strangeness (*atopian*).
>
> *Symp.* 215a

The idea outlined here, that only the comparison with the Silenus can provide a thorough and orderly account of Socrates' strangeness, seems at odds with the fact that both Plato and Xenophon do indeed represent Socrates through images which are not Silenic. We will see in the second part of this paper that they describe Socrates through zoomorphic motifs. There is, however, an important difference between the two kinds of comparisons: the Silenus highlights what Socrates *is* (i.e., his unique outward and inward personality), whereas the animals illustrate what Socrates *does* (i.e., his behaviors and skills). Socrates' strangeness, which is a trait of Socrates' *personality* (and not of his *activity*), can therefore be portrayed only through the comparison with the Silenus.

Socrates' strangeness is a distinctive sign of Plato's Socrates:[22] it does not feature in Xenophon, for whom Socrates is never *atopos*. The very adjective *atopos* appears only once within Xenophon's Socratic corpus to define Socrates' speeches, not him:

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that both Plato and Xenophon were well acquainted with physiognomy (see, e.g., Plat. *Resp.* 5.474d5–e1 and Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.7 and *Symp.* 2.20).

22 See esp. Plat. *Symp.* 221c–d; *Grg.* 494d; *Tht.* 149a; and *Alc.* I 106a; on which cf. Barabas (1986) and Eide (1996).

> **X1**: "Strange things (*atopa legeis*) you say, Socrates! It is quite unlike that you, the younger, urge me to teach you. And indeed everyone holds the contrary opinion that the elder should always lead, in both words and deeds."
>
> *Mem.* 2.3.14–15

In his *Symposium*, Xenophon gives an account of Socrates' Silenic appearance that focuses not on his strangeness, as does Plato's, but on his ugliness. According to the young and beautiful Critobulus, Socrates is not just as ugly as any Silen is, but is the ugliest of them:

> **X2**: "So what?" said Socrates: "you boast as if you were more beautiful than me." "By Zeus, of course," said Critobulus, "otherwise, I would be the ugliest (*aiskhistos*) of all the Silens rehearsing in the Satyr plays." [And Socrates indeed happened to be similar to them (*etugkhane prosempheres toutois on*)].[23]
>
> *Symp.* 4.19[24]

This passage is part of a longer speech in which Critobulus, dwelling on the beneficial effects of Eros, claims that his own beauty makes people better. Critobulus naturally assumes that his beauty is in no danger of being surpassed by the look of the elderly Socrates. He implicitly mocks Socrates for his ugliness, which reminds him of the Silens that commonly lead groups of Satyrs in Satyr plays. Socrates does not reply; and he reminds Critobulus of the pending beauty contest (to which I will revert later: see text X3).

The reference to Satyr play is of utmost importance, since it associates Socrates' Silenic traits with those of the stage Silens. This brings us back to the passage at the end of Plato's *Symposium* that we already discussed, where Socrates' philosophy conflates tragedy and comedy.[25] The evidence we have

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23 Modern editions put this sentence in brackets, thus considering it as a gloss conflated into Xenophon's text. See Huß 1999a, 239–240 for scholars holding this opinon. However, as Huß rightly points out, this opinion does not go back to the editor of the text, Stephanus. The round brackets in Steph. 2 do not denote a gloss, since Stephanus normally uses such brackets to distinguish Xenophon's own remarks from the direct speech of his interlocutors. There is, therefore, no reason to reject this portion of text as non-authentic.

24 The passage has been freely paraphrased by Ath. *Deipn.* V 188d, who draws upon Herod. *De conviv.* (Düring 1941: 122).

25 See Plat. *Symp.* 223d, discussed above.

about stage Silens suggests that they rehearsed in all theatrical genres,[26] which makes the Silenic Socrates a perfect representative for a new serio-comic genre, that of philosophy, which aims at merging and outstripping all previous theatrical genres.

Therefore, even if Xenophon's passage does not directly tell us what the Socrates of comedies looked like, it establishes a firm connection between Socrates' physiognomy and the stage Silens—not only those of Satyr plays, but also of comedy and tragedy.[27] This point has been emphasized by Nikos Charalabopoulos, who has noted the similarity between the type A Socrates and the iconography of the Papposilenus.[28] Just as in vase-painting, the stage Silens are often depicted not as human actors, but as demi-human mythological Satyrs, and so is Socrates dramatized in Plato and Xenophon.[29] In other words, it would be overly simplistic to assume that Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates is just *wearing* a mask of Silenus. The comparison between Socrates and Silenus goes far deeper than that. Socrates cannot be stripped of his Silenic features, namely his strangeness, laughability, insolence, and ugliness, since they are not just features of a mask, but constitute fundamental aspects of his personality.

Socrates' Silenic Traits

The next set of passages deals with Socrates' Silenic traits. These are the thick lips, the snub nose with wide nostrils, the protruding eyes, the prominent belly,

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26 For Silens in tragedy, see Hall 2006, 150–151; for comedy, see Dobrov 2007, 222–224.

27 As noted already by Dupréel (1922: 324).

28 Charalabopoulos 2012: 163–166. See esp. 165: "*Papposilenos' face is a mask brought to life*."

29 See Bérard and Bron (1989: 142–143) and Hedreen (1992: 105–117). There is, however, a caveat against this parallelism. Both Plato and Xenophon's Socrates also have two non-Silenic traits that are drawn from comedy, namely his bare feet and his worn out cloak. On Socrates' habit of walking barefoot, see Aristoph. *Nub.* 103–104 and 363; Plat. *Symp.* 174a and 220b; *Phdr.* 229a; Xenoph. *Mem.* 1.6.2. On Socrates' worn-out cloak, which he uses both in the summer and the winter, see DL 2.28 (Amipsias), Plat. *prt.* 335d, *Symp.* 219b and 220b, Xenoph. *Mem.* 1.6.2. These features, though not physiognomic in the strictest sense, describe Socrates' outward appearance as evidently non-Silenic. On the contrary, they seem to entail qualities that are at odds with Silenic exuberance, namely Socrates' *karteria* and *sophrosune*. It is interesting to note that the Socratics associate such qualities not with the Silens, but with demigods whose proximity with Socrates has often been pointed out: in fact, the bare feet are characteristic of Eros (Plat. *Symp.* 203d, on which see esp. Hadot 1995: 161), the worn-out cloak of Odysseus (esp. *Od.* 13.434–438; cf. Lévystone 2005 and Adams 2010). In the generation after Socrates, both features are characteristic of the "superhuman" ancestor of radical cynicism Diogenes of Sinope (the cloak becoming paradigmatic of philosophy tout court in later authors).

and the short stature. The first of these features is highlighted by Xenophon, at the end of the beauty contest between Socrates and Critobulus:[30]

> X3: Critobulus: "As for the mouth, I surrender. In fact, if it has been created in order to bite, you could bite off much more than I can. And don't you think that because of your thick lips your kiss is also more tender?"
>
> Socrates: "According to what you say, it seems (*eoika*) that I have a mouth more ugly even than those of the asses. But wouldn't you say that this a proof that I am more beautiful than you: that the very Naiades, goddesses as they are, give birth to the Silens, who resemble me more than you (*emoi homoioterous … e soi*)?"
>
> *Symp*. 5.7–8

The similarity between this passage and the diagnosis of thick lips one can read in ancient physiognomic texts is striking. In those texts, thick lips (with the upper overhanging the lower) are compared to those of asses.[31] They are a sign of stupidity, a feature that is attributed to Socrates by Phaedo of Elis (via the Syrian physiognomist Zopyrus).[32] Even more striking is that Xenophon radically departs from such reading and purports what we could call a "genealogical" explanation of Socrates' lips. The handsome Critobulus jokingly concedes that Socrates' mouth is more useful than his own for the purpose of biting and kissing, and, therefore, more beautiful. Socrates appears not to understand the joke—or he simply ignores it, for the tone of his reply is serious. He refuses to be compared to asses and lays claim to his resemblance to the Silens, stating that his outward appearance is the proof of his superior beauty because the Silens have a divine origin.[33] Interestingly enough, in this particular passage, it appears that Socrates does not follow the utilitarian argument that he had used in the previous part of his competition with Critobulus (see further, X4). Instead, he provides a mythological explanation for his superior beauty. This

30 For discussion of the beauty contest, see Huß 1999a, 319–331; Pentassuglio 2013.

31 See Ps.-Aristot. *Physiogn*. 811a24–27 and Ps.-Apul. *Physiogn*. 119.

32 Phaedo of Elis, fr. 6 Rossetti. On the probable provenance of Zopyrus from Syria, see DL 2.45.

33 Scholars (e.g., Guthrie 1971: 142 note 3) have overseen that Socrates' rebuttal of Critobulus' argument (usefulness = beauty) and his claim to a divine genealogy are at odds not only with the utilitarian argument he has purported so far, but also with the association of the beautiful (*kalon*) with the useful/beneficial (*ophelimon* viz. *chresimon*) that can be observed consistently thoughout Xenophon's Socratic works (on which see note 45).

appears awkward, since deities can indeed be ugly (as e.g., Hephaestus and the Gorgons), so that descending from them should be no guarantee for beauty.

Another peculiar feature of this passage is that this is the only instance, in both Plato and Xenophon, in which Socrates characterizes *himself* as a Silenus. In the other cases, as we have seen, the comparison is made by his competitors Alcibiades (P1–4) and Critobulus (X2).[34] Both Alcibiades and Critobulus refer to Socrates' Silenic appearance jokingly, in order to note his deviance from normality (Alcibiades focuses on Socrates' strangeness, Critobulus on his ugliness). On the contrary, Socrates is serious when he claims to be similar to a Silenus, since he wants to prove his beauty to Critobulus as if he were a lawyer on trial. The word he uses (*tekmerion*) has, in fact, a juridic background[35]—which does not come as a surprise, given the agonistic spirit of the passage. At this stage of the contest, Socrates wins over Critobulus because beauty is not what appears as such (i.e., Critobulus' young and well-formed body), nor what is immediately related to appearance (i.e., the usefulness of Socrates' ugly mouth), but what the outward appearance hints at (i.e., Socrates' divine offspring). What we have here is a redefinition of beauty, which accounts for what *cannot be seen* (Socrates' genealogy) and counterposes it to what *merely appears* (Critobulus' handsomeness versus Socrates' ugliness).

A similar redefinition of beauty occurs in Plato's *Symposium*:

> P5: If one wanted to listen to Socrates' speeches (*logon*), at first they would appear to him (*phaneien*) altogether ridiculous; such are the words and phrases they are wrapped up with outwardly, as the skin of an insolent Satyr. He speaks (*legei*) of pack-asses, smiths, cobblers, and tanners, and he appears (*phainetai*) always to be speaking (*legein*) about the same things in the same manner; so that anyone inexpert and thoughtless might find his speeches (*logon*) highly laughable. But if one looks at them once they have been opened, from the inside, first of all one will discover that they are the only speeches (*logon*) which have thought in them; and further, that they are the most divine of all things, that they bear great images of virtue within them, and that they tend (*teinontas*) to the greatest, that is, to everything that appertains to the man who strives (*to mellonti*) to become beautiful and virtuous (*kalo kagatho*).
>
> *Symp.* 221e–222a

34 As to Alcibiades, see the agonistic tone in the story of Socrates' *aristeia* (esp. at 219e7–8); as to Critobulus, see the beauty contest with Socrates at 5.1–10.

35 Whereas Alcibiades' demonstration of Socrates' strangeness in Plato's *Symposium* (215a3: καταριθμῆσαι) has a mathematical origin (see above, P4).

This passage deals also with *spoudaiogeloion*. At first glance, Socrates' speeches appear to be ridiculous, but once they are penetrated, their divine origin becomes evident, as well as their ability to make the interlocutor more virtuous. As in Xenophon, where Socrates' beauty lies not in what is evident at first sight (i.e., his ugly mouth), but in what cannot be seen (i.e., the divine origin of the Silens), so in Plato, the beauty of Socrates' speeches lies not in the way they are fashioned outwardly (i.e., in the laughable and insolent words and phrases employed), but in the divine that is concealed (i.e., the divine images of virtue).

The vision of the "inward Socrates" enhances therefore both virtue and beauty, that is, *kalokagathia*. Here, at the end of Alcibiades' speech, Plato recalls this notion, which is of key importance for Greek ethical theory, and provides it with a new meaning.[36] According to Plato, the "beautiful and virtuous" man is not the one of noble origin who owns these qualities from birth, but the philosopher who acquires them through a fruitful intercourse (*sunousia*) with Socrates. The positive outcome of this intercourse is, however, not to be taken for granted. Not all of Socrates' companions become virtuous consequent to their *sunousia* with him. The aristocratic and beautiful Alcibiades is the most representative example of this failure: he remains attached to the traditional *kalokagathia* he stands for and does, therefore, not become *kaloskagathos* in the Socratic sense.[37] Even if he manages to penetrate the Silenic appearance of Socrates until he eventually falls under the spell of the enchanting speeches located in his interior (215d–216a), he is unable to appropriate the idea of a non-physical beauty and stick to it, as becomes evident when he attempts to seduce Socrates with his handsome appearance (216d–219d).

It is noteworthy that, unlike Xenophon, Plato does not mention Socrates' ugliness. In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades never explicitly says that Socrates is ugly, which is even more striking if one considers that most of what Alcibiades

36 On the origins of *kalokagathia*, see Jüthner 1930, Donlan 1973: 369, and Dover 1974: 41–45. Classen 1959: 138–150 deals with *kalokagathia* in Plato and Xenophon; Bourriot 1995: vol. I, 253–352 and vol. II, 235–312.

37 An important parallel passage is *Mem.* 1.2.48, where Xenophon distinguishes between the "true" associates of Socrates, i.e., those who pursued *kalokagathia* (Chaerophon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others), and those who associated with him only to become good rhetoricians and lawyers. On this passage, see Fiorenza Bevilacqua, "Socrates' Attitude towards Politics in Xenophon and Plato" in this volume 461–486. On the political meaning of *kalokagathia* in Xenophon, see Bevilacqua (above) and Maria Tamiolaki, "Xenophon's Conception of Friendship in *Memorabilia* 2.6 (with Reference to Plato's *Lysis*)" 433–460 in this volume.

says assumes the opposition between his master's ugliness and his own handsomeness (esp. *Symp.* 218e–219a). Only once does Plato claim that Socrates is not beautiful, in a passage of the *Theaetetus* that provides important details about Socrates' facial features:

> **P6**: Theodorus: "Well, Socrates, it is indeed worthwhile for me to talk and for you to hear about a young boy I have met, one of your fellow-citizens. If he were beautiful I should be afraid to talk about him too much, since you could think that I am in love with him. Now however the fact is—don't get offended—that he is not beautiful (*ouk esti kalos*), but resembles (*proseoike*) you in his snub nose (*simoteta*) and protruding eyes (*to exo ton ommaton*): but these features are less [pronounced] in him than in you."
> *Tht.* 143e–144a

Theodorus, a mathematician from Cyrene, tells Socrates about Theaetetus, his promising student. Socrates is eager to get acquainted with the young man, so that he may look at him and see what his own face (*prosopon*) looks like (144d). In fact, Theaetetus looks very much like Socrates: he has a snub nose and protruding eyes, although in Socrates these features are "more marked" than in him.

This passage adds important details to the portrait we have in Plato's *Symposium*. In fact, Plato never mentions the snub nose and the bulging eyes when he compares Socrates with the Silens in the *Symposium*, and in the *Theaetetus* he does not compare Socrates to the Silens. This could mean that Plato deliberately confines the Silenus comparison to the *Symposium*, while he departs from it in the *Theaetetus* and all other dialogues in which he deals with Socrates' appearance (i.e., as we will see, *Apology*, *Meno*, and *Parmenides*).[38]

There are, however, good reasons to think that the Socrates of the *Theaetetus* has indeed a Silenic appearance. Once again, a comparison with Xenophon is most helpful. We have seen that in Xenophon's *Symposium* (X2 and X3), Socrates is twice compared to the Silens. Both passages are revealing. At X2, the comparison between Socrates and the Silens is drawn by Critobulus, while in the portion of text that precedes X3, it is again Critobulus who describes Socrates as having a snub nose (X4) and protruding eyes (X6). Then, at X3, it is Socrates

38 In fact, apart from a handful of exceptions (*prt.* 310c; *Plt.* 291b and 303c; *Leg.* 815c), Plato deals with Silens and Satyrs only in the *Symposium*, and only in connection with Socrates. The same applies to Xenophon, who apart from the comparisons discussed in this paper (*Symp.* 4.19 and 5.7) mentions Silens/Satyrs only once, in *Anabasis* 1.2.13.

who claims his resemblance to the Silens. This leaves no doubt that, for Xenophon, the snub nose and the protruding eyes are traits of the *Silenic* Socrates, and as both of these features occur also in Plato's *Theaetetus*, it is very likely that they should indeed be understood as Silenic.[39]

The next passage is also drawn from the *Theaetetus*. Here Socrates dwells on Theaetetus' similarity with Socrates. Theaetetus also has a snub nose and bulging eyes, which entails that all that Socrates says about Theaetetus' facial features should be understood as applying also to himself.

> P7: Socrates: "If I thought not only about someone who has nose and eyes, but also about someone who has a snub nose (*simon*) and protruding eyes (*exophthalmon*), shouldn't I be able to have an opinion about him better than myself or those who are like him?"
>
> Theaetetus: "Not at all."
>
> Socrates: "But I believe that there will be an opinion in me about Theaetetus only after this particular snub-nosedness (*he simotes haute*) will have imprinted (*ensemnamene*) and left in me a memorial record (*mnemeion*) that is different from all the other snubnosednesses (*simoteton*) I have previously found—and this applies also to the other traits of which you are made of—and this memorial record, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory (*anamnesei*) and make me (*poiesei*) have a right opinion about you."
>
> Theaetetus: "Absolutely true."
>
> *Tht.* 209b–c

I will now concentrate on the snubnosedness of Socrates and examine the protruding eyes later, when I deal with Socrates' animal-like gaze. Theaetetus' peculiar snubnosedness constitutes his "distinguishing mark," which allows anyone who knows him to recognize his face among other snubnosed ones.[40] But every snubnosedness is in its own way unique, including Socrates'. This

39 Another good reason to consider the *Theaetetus* passages as describing a Silenic Socrates is that in classical Greece, the snub-nosedness was intimately connected with Satyrs. According to the list of Satyr names in Kossatz-Deißmann (1991), the most common name for Satyrs was *simos*, i.e., "snub-nose." This fits with the common idea according to which snub-nosedness is a sign of lasciviousness (e.g., Ps.-Arist. *Physiogn.* 811b2; Ps.-Apul. *Physiogn.* 51), a character trait typical of Satyrs.

40 On the logical and semantic implications of this passage and their import for the problem of knowledge and belief discussed in the *Theaetetus*, see McDowell 1973: 255–256; Burnyeat 1990: 226–234; and Bostock 2005: 225–238.

means that although a feature may be the same in many individuals, the memorial record of it will be different in every single instance.[41] The uniqueness of Socrates' snubnosedness surfaces in Aristotle, who paradigmatically refers to the "snub-nosed Socrates" to indicate the coincidence between an accidental feature (the snubnosedness) and an individual substance (Socrates).[42] From Aristotle onwards, the image of the snubnosed Socrates will establish itself as a *topos* that would last throughout antiquity.[43]

Further details about Socrates' nose are provided by Xenophon:

> X4: Critobulus: "… which of the two noses is more beautiful (*kallion*), yours or mine?"
>
> Socrates: "Mine, I believe, since the gods made us noses to smell with. In fact, your nostrils look toward the ground, while mine spread out upwards, so that I can catch scents from all about."
>
> Critobulus: "But how can a snub nose (*to simon tes rhinos*) be more beautiful (*kallion*) than a straight one?"

41 The "anamnestic" function Plato attributes to the *simotes* is at odds with Luca Giuliani's reconstruction, according to which Socrates' Silenic physiognomy should be understood as an iconographical quotation with which Plato and Xenophon wanted to provide an "identikit picture" of their master many years after his death, when the memory of his actual physiognomy had faded away: see Giuliani 1997.

42 Such a coincidence does not apply to other accidental features of Socrates, e.g., his whiteness (Aristot. *Metaph.* 1032a4–10). For the logical difficulties arising from including the accident "snub-nosedness" into the form "Socrates," see Irwin 1988: 559 and Spellman 1995: 47. For the occurrences of the example "Socrates" in Aristotle, see Fazzo 2013: 331, who points out that in choosing the snub-nosed Socrates as a typical example, Aristotle might have been prompted by a painting of a seated Socrates located in the *Lycaeum* (Jackson 1920; on Socrates' seated statue, see above, P1 and note 14).

43 The *Theaetetus* passage is explicit about the fact that a facial feature, in this case the snub-nosedness, "imprints" a memorial record that has both an anamnestic and a poietic effect: it awakens the memory (ἀναμνήσει) of a particular snub nose and produces (ποιήσει) a correct opinion about the person who has a snub nose. The terms used here, *anamnesis* and *poiesis*, refer to two distinct ways of obtaining knowledge Plato deals with in his dialogues: on the one hand, through *anamnesis*, the memory of ontological entities (as in dialogues from *Meno* to *Phaedrus*); on the other, through *poiesis*, a non-mimetic creation that yields a passage from non-being to being (as in *Ion*, Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, and *Phaedrus*). It is indeed striking that a physiognomic trait, in this case the snub-nosedness of Theaetetus and Socrates, involves both of these realms of knowledge. Delving into this issue would however lead us too far; I will, therefore, leave this topic for further investigation.

> Socrates: "Because it does not obstruct the sight, but leaves it free to see whatever one wants; whereas a high nose despitefully walls off the eyes one from the other."
>
> *Symp.* 5.6

Socrates demonstrates that his nose is more beautiful than Critobulus' by playing with the notion of *kalos*: unlike Critobulus, for whom the *kalos* is simply what is beautiful, for Socrates what is *kalos* is *agathos*, that is, "good for something."[44] Consequently, Socrates' nose is "more beautiful" (*kallion*) than Critobulus' because it functions better, and is, therefore, more *useful.* This explanation squares with various passages of the *Memorabilia* in which Socrates equates the good (*agathon*) with the beneficial (*ophelimon*, *khresimon*).[45] Xenophon provides a playful redefinition of *kalokagathia* according to its root meaning: the snub nose of Socrates, with its wide nostrils turned outward, is good for the purpose it is made for, that of catching scents. The idea that undergirds this definition of "goodness" is that of "intelligent design" (*telos*), one of the most important topics Xenophon develops in the *Memorabilia*.[46]

Another Silenic feature of Socrates is his huge belly, of which Xenophon also provides a jokeful picture:

> x5: "Yes, by Zeus," said Socrates; "and I was thinking also of something else, that during the dance no part of his body was idle, but neck, legs, and hands were exercising (*egumnazonto*) all together, and this is how one must dance if he wants to have a more vigorous body. And as far as I am concerned," he said, "I would be delighted, Syracusan, to learn the figures (*skhemata*) from you."
>
> And he said: "what use will you make of them?"
>
> "I will dance, by Zeus."

44 On the "relational" meaning of *agathon*, which—unlike *kalon*—can be used to indicate what is "good *for something*," see Barney 2010: 367–371.

45 On the equivalence between *agathon* and *ophelimon/khresimon* see 1.2.51–52; 1.5.5–6; 2.1.1–3; 2.3.19; 2.3.1–3; 2.4.4; 3.7.9; 3.8.1–7; 3.9.4; 4.2.32, 4.5.9; 4.6.8–9, 4.7.2–4 (cf. also *Oec.* 1.7–14). Similar claims can be found also in Plato (*Grg.* 474d, 499d–e; *Hma.* 269d; *Prt.* 333d–334c, 353c, 356d–e, and 358b; *Meno.* 87d–e, *Resp.* 336c–d, 339b, 358a, 368d, 444e, 457b, 458e, 612b, and 608e). The correspondence between *agathon* and *ophelimon* is at the center of the Socratic studies of the German scholar W.F. Otto: see Stavru 2006, 207–221. Cf. also the overview in Guthrie 1971: 142–147.

46 See esp. *Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3. Xenophon's account of "intelligent design" (*telos*) plays a crucial role in the development of both Greek theodicy and teleology, as pointed out by Sedley (2007) and (2008).

> Thereupon, everybody laughed. But Socrates, who was absolutely serious (*mala espoudakoti*) in his face, said: "is everybody laughing at me? Is it because I want to exercise (*gumnazomenos*) to improve my health or to eat and sleep with more pleasure, or because I long for exercises (*gumnasion*) as these: not like the runners, who broaden their legs but shrink their shoulders, nor like the boxers, who broaden their shoulders but shrink their legs, but rather to make everything in the body well-balanced (*isorropon*) by training it in every part (*diaponon panti*)? Or is everybody laughing at this, that I should not stand in need of looking for a partner to exercise with (*suggumnasten*), or strip in a crowd, old as I am, but be content with a room with seven beds, just as now this room is large enough for the young people here to get up a sweat in, or because in winter I shall exercise (*gumnasomai*) under cover, and when it is very hot, in the shade? Or is everybody laughing at this, that I have a belly (*gastera*) larger than convenient (*meizo tou kairou*), and wish to make it more regular (*metrioteran poiesai*)? Doesn't everybody know that lately this Charmides here caught me dancing early in the morning?"
>
> *Symp.* 2.16–19

The description of the dancing Socrates reminds of Satyr play.[47] The general vein of the passage is in fact hilarious.[48] Socrates' pleasure in eating and sleeping described here is, however, at odds with what we know about him from ancient comedy. In Aristophanes' *Clouds* and in fragments from Eupolis and Amipsias, he and his followers are depicted as pursuing a life devoted to frugality and abstaining from both food and wine.[49] This inconsistency might entail that Socrates' habits changed over time, or that Xenophon is deliberately representing him as different from the character of comedy. If this hypothesis holds, Socrates might have progressively abandoned the "slimming diets" implied in the *Clouds* (and still alluded to ten years later, in the *Birds*),[50] until he eventually developed the belly described by Xenophon.[51]

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47 On the passage, see the discussion in Huß 1999a: 146–156, 1999b, and Brancacci 2004.

48 As Katarzyna Jazdzewska shows in her chapter on "Laughter in Plato's and Xenophon's Symposia," Socrates is in fact joking here even when he claims to be serious (in this volume 187–207).

49 See Aristoph. *Nub.* 103, 412–417, 833–837; Eupolis 386 K.-A.; Amipsias 9 K.-A., on which see Patzer 1994.

50 See Aristoph. *Av.* 1553–1564.

51 It should be kept in mind that about sixty years fall between the production of the *Clouds* (423) and the composition of Xenophon's *Symposium* (360s), whereas the dramatic setting

Socrates' *gaster* is a Silenic feature, although not all Silens were pot-bellied.[52] If the Socrates of comedy had a Silenic appearance, as I claim in the first part of this paper, it is very likely that he had no belly. His slimming diets lampooned by Aristophanes and other comic playwrights would be at odds with such a feature. It seems, therefore, that Xenophon adds this trait to the Silenic Socrates of comedy, possibly in order to show that at some point, Socrates distanced himself from the severe lifestyle ridiculed by the comics—and that in doing so, he became even more Silenic than he was in the comedies that represented him.[53] This would explain why Xenophon jokefully portrays Socrates as devoting himself to a form of *gumnasia* different from the traditional one.[54] Socrates' Satyric dance develops the whole body in a balanced way, while sport enhances specific parts of it.[55] Even more importantly, his dance aims at enjoying life (especially food and sleep),[56] while sport doesn't. Socrates dances because he wants to make his belly "more regular" (*metrioteran*).[57] Paradoxical as it seems,

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of the latter work is nearly contemporary with *Clouds*, i.e., 422 BC. This might depend on a deliberate choice by Xenophon, whose pot-bellied Socrates might be read as a polemic attempt to distance himself from Aristophanes (on the abundance of anachronisms in Xenophon's *Symposium*, however, see Huß 1999a: 18–25).

52 For iconographical evidence on pot-bellied Satyrs, see the literature listed at note 13.

53 Scholars have convincingly demonstrated that Aristophanes' comic distortions of Socratic asceticism take a critical stand toward Socrates' *epimeleia tes psuches* (e.g., *Nub.* 415, 500–502, and 1170–1171; see Moore 2013 with further references). Aristophanes was not the only playwright who lampooned Socrates's frugality. We know that in Ameipsias' *Konnos*, which came second in the Dionysia of 423, Socrates was also portrayed as a καρτερικός wearing an outworn cloak (*SSR* I A 10), and that in a comedy by Eupolis he was extremely poor and suffering from hunger (*SSR* I A 12).

54 Training of the body plays a major role in Xenophon's Socrates (see esp. *Mem.* 1.2.4 and 3.12). The aim of such training is, however, not a senseless endurance of toil, but—as in the passage of the dancing Socrates—"to perceive a pleasure worth of being remembered" (*Mem.* 4.5.9). It should be noted that traces of a "hedonistic" Socratic *gumnastike* can be found as early as in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Here Socrates' new education is presented as an alternative form of "training naked" (*gumnasia*): the Socratics train naked as all other Athenians, but they spend their days chatting in the thermal baths instead of toughening their body in the conventional palaestras (*Nub.* 1044–1054).

55 Socrates' dance reminds of Aeschylus' Satyr play *Theoroi*, where Dionysus mocks the Satyr's new kind of dance, which aims at exercising the body instead of worshiping him (see Fr. 17 Mette, 22–38 [= *Pap. Ox.* 2162], on which cf. Sommerstein 2008: 83–99).

56 Xenophon defends this idea also in the *Oeconomicus*: see 10.11.

57 It should be noted that ancient physiognomical texts do not deal at all with the *gaster*. Ps.-Aristot. *Physiogn.* 807a33 and Adamantius, *Physiogn.* B44 mention the *koilia* (= the thorax with the abdomen), which is a sign of courageousness when it is "broad and flat."

he does not want to get rid of his belly. He wants to keep it, but harmonize it with the rest of his body.[58] Albeit jokefully, Xenophon is hinting here at a core feature of his understanding of Socratic physiognomy, that of a harmony between Socrates' outward and inward traits. I will return to it later.

The next passage informs us about Socrates' stature. After Socrates has admitted that he is shorter than his associates Simmias and Phaedo (102b), he delves into a complex argument, which is aimed at distinguishing between tallness and shortness *per se* (i.e., the transcendent forms of tallness and shortness) and the tallness and shortness of specific individuals (i.e., their property-instances).[59] Then Socrates mentions his short stature:

> **P8**: "It seems to me that tallness itself not only never wants to be tall and short at the same time, but also that the tallness that is in us never admits the short, nor wants to be surpassed by it. Rather, one of the following two things must happen: either tallness flees and gets out of the way when its opposite, the short, approaches it; or else, when the short approaches tallness, the latter perishes. In fact, having accepted and abided shortness, tallness does not want to be different from what it used to be. So I, having abided and accepted shortness, am still what I am, and I am this same short man. But the tall that is in us cannot endure to be short. And similarly, the short that is in us does not want ever to come to be tall, or to be tall; nor will any other of the opposites, as long as it is still what it used to be, at the same time come to be its own opposite, and be its own opposite. If such a thing happens, *either* it goes away *or* it perishes."
>
> "It seems to me that things are absolutely this way," said Cebes.
>
> *Phd.* 102d–103a

The dramatic date of the *Phaedo* is important for the physiognomic feature that is attributed here to Socrates. The *Phaedo* stages an old Socrates who is about to be put to death. It is, therefore, more than plausible that Simmias and Phaedo,

58 O.J. Todd's translation of μετριωτέραν ποιῆσαι with "reduce it" (Marchant & Todd 1923, 551) is not fully convincing, as it does not convey the Pythagorean flavor of this passage. In fact, both the μετριώτης hinted at here and the ἰσόρροπον mentioned earlier jokingly refer to the Pythagorean concept of beauty as symmetry.

59 For discussion of the argument, see O'Brien 1967–1968; Kahn 1996: 336 n. 10 and 357; Thesleff 1999: 51 n. 93; Gallop 2002, 194–196; Casertano 2015, 211–213 and 374–375. For the physiognomic implications of the passage, see Boys-Stones 2007: 37 and Upson-Saia, Daniel Hughes, Batten 2014: 110.

who are both in the bloom of their years, are taller than him for this reason.[60] Still, if we look at the physiognomic implications of shortness, we can gather useful information about Socrates' personality. According to Pseudo-Aristotle, shortness of stature denotes a character quick to anger (*oxus*), as in short men the flow of the blood has a small area to cover.[61] This feature fits with what we learn about Socrates from Aristoxenus, who portrays him as "very irascible" whenever he was "seized by emotion."[62] Even more importantly, Socrates' shortness seems to be yet another piece of the Silenic puzzle we are trying to assemble. It is a well-known fact that in classical antiquity, short people were often associated with the world of Dionysos and, more particularly, the Satyrs, with whom they share a set of physiognomic characteristics.[63] We can, therefore, reasonably assume that the short stature of Socrates mentioned in the *Phaedo* forms an integral part of the Silenic depiction of him. And as in the *Theaetetus*, also in this case, no Satyr nor Silenus is mentioned.

It should now be clear that Plato and Xenophon employ the Silenus motif in order to redefine inward and outward beauty. The Silenus mask allows them to show how the core features of Socrates' outward appearance, namely his strangeness, laughability, insolence, and ugliness, hint at another reality that does not appear at first sight but constitutes his inward and serious being. On the one hand, the Silenus mask *conceals* Socrates' interiority, hiding it from those who are unable to spot it; on the other, it *reveals* that very interiority, displaying Socrates' hidden beauty through his ugly and ridiculous exteriority. The Silenic features of Socrates point thus beyond the surface of his outward appearance, inviting a philosophical reading of it. Thanks to Plato and Xenophon, the Silenic mask of Socrates, which had been very likely employed for at least twenty-five years in dramatic performances, acquires, therefore, a complexity that turns the dramatic *prosopon* into a philosophical *paradeigma*.[64]

60 As pointed out by Boys-Stones (2007: 37) and Upson-Saia, Daniel Hughes, Batten (2014: 110).

61 Ps.-Arist. *Physiogn.* 813b.

62 Aristox. 54a Wehrli. On Socrates' proneness to anger, see also Xenoph. *Mem.* 1.2.29–30.

63 Such as thick eyebrows, snub nose, thick lips, beard, and incipient baldness. See Dasen 1988: 272 for discussion.

64 In Plato's *Apology*, the god Apollo considers Socrates a παράδειγμα of wisdom due to his elenctic ability (23a–c). A little further, his associates imitate this ability (23c5: μιμοῦνται).

Zoomorphic Motifs

I have already mentioned that the Silenus is not the only iconographical motif that Plato and Xenophon employ to describe Socrates' physiognomy. They refer to a whole range of other motifs, which portray Socrates through analogies with terrestrial, aquatic, and aerial animals (namely: dog, bull, gadfly, pelican, crab, and torpedo ray). As we will see, five of these analogies are to be found in Plato's corpus, while only one is in Xenophon. This is not surprising, given the oddity of Plato's Socrates (see P3–4). The comparison of Socrates with the Silenus serves the purpose of accounting for such oddity, which is a major trait of his *personality*. The animal analogies, on the other hand, describe a Socrates "in action"; that is, they outline specific *abilities* he has. Plato's analogies draw on a wide repertoire of animal images, examples, and fables he propounds throughout his dialogues.[65] Jacques Derrida has pointed out that Plato's "Socratic bestiary" is crucial for understanding important features of Socrates' philosophy.[66] This is certainly true, all the more so if one considers that Plato's bestiary has little in common with the animal analogies that are employed in physiognomical texts. Here the "zoological method" consists in associating animals, and the features of their outward appearance, with specific character traits (e.g., the lion and its powerful limbs with courage).[67] This association rests on the assumption that character traits are more evident in animals than in man, and, most importantly, that in animals they are constant (i.e., a lion is *always* courageous), while in man they are not.[68] Animal analogies allow establishing univocal relationships between outward features (both of animals and humans) and specific character traits, thus paving the way for *any* physiognomical inference.[69]

It is striking that such univocal associations of outward features and character traits are absent in both Plato's and Xenophon's depictions of Socrates'

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65 For a complete overview of the animal analogies in Plato, see *Plato's Animal Index* in Bell & Naas 2015: 249–256. According to Bell and Naas, only one dialogue of Plato, the *Crito*, does not contain references to animals. All other dialogues feature various kinds of animals, some of which are employed to develop important philosophical ideas (e.g., the transmigration of souls in *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus* and the bi- and tripartite soul in *Phaedrus* and *Republic*).

66 Derrida 1981: 119 n. 52 and Frére 1998.

67 For a thoughtful discussion of the zoological method, see Sassi 2001: 34–47.

68 See Sassi 2001: 38.

69 In fact, the possibility of a physiognomical inference—and therefore of a physiognomical science altogether—is given precisely thanks to the animal analogy, which allows to univocally relate one physiognomical sign to one character trait: see Aristot. *An. pr.* 70b6–39.

outward appearance. This applies especially to their animal analogies. Plato and Xenophon do not follow the zoological method of ancient physiognomy since their comparisons of Socrates with specific animals do not tell us anything about his character.[70] Unlike the famous Zopyrus anecdote going back to Phaedo of Elis, where Socrates is described as "strange," "stupid and dull," a "fraudolent deceiver," and "libidinous" (a "womanizer" or a "pederast") who is able to eradicate (or restrain) his vices,[71] the zoomorphic analogies in Plato and Xenophon aim at illustrating Socrates' behavior (i.e., the way he stares at others) or specific abilities he has (i.e., tracking down arguments, benumbing his interlocutors, and stirring up his fellow citizens). I will analyze these analogies separately, then try to make sense of them as a whole, and finally relate them to the comparison with the Silenus.

Socrates' Animal-Like Gaze

In the first analogy under scrutiny, Socrates compares his eyes to those of a crab in order to convince his interlocutor Critobulus that they only appear to be ugly:

> **x6**: Socrates: "Do you know for which reason we need eyes?"
> Critobulus: "It is obvious: in order to see."
> Socrates: "This way my eyes would be more beautiful (*kalliones*) than yours."
> Critobulus: "How is that possible?"
> Socrates: "Because, while yours see only straight ahead, mine, being prominent (*epipolaioi*) as they are, see also to the sides."
> Critobulus: "Are you saying that a crab (*karkinon*) has the most beautiful eyes (*euophthalmotaton*) of all animals?"
> Socrates: "Absolutely: in fact, crabs' eyes have also been created in the best possible way (*arista pephukotas*) to insure strength (*pros iskhun*)."
> *Symp.* 5.5–7

The passage is part of the already discussed beauty contest between Socrates and Critobulus featured in Xenophon's *Symposium*. In a joking tone, Socrates

70 As Elizabeth Evans rightly points out (1969: 20), Plato and Xenophon's "portrait [of Socrates] is clearly suggestive of an ethical type, in which the individual features described through several dialogues do not, however, lend themselves to direct physiognomical analysis."

71 For Phaedo's diagnosis of Socrates' *ethos*, see in particular the frs. 6–12, 15–16, and 20–22 Rossetti (not in *SSR* III A). For updated discussion, see Rossetti 2015: 85–86.

argues that his eyes are more beautiful than Critobulus' because they are more useful. In fact, his eyes see also to the sides (*horosin ... ek plagiou*) since they are protruding (*epipolaioi*).[72] This means that Socrates' physiognomical features, and especially his prominent eyes, entail a specific ability that makes him better than Critobulus. We have already seen that Socrates will eventually abandon this argument and claim that his superior beauty is due to his resemblance to the Silens (x3). This could entail that Socrates' similitude with a crab is not to be taken seriously, and that the only purpose of the crab analogy is to make fun of Critobulus. This might certainly be the case. Still, as I have pointed out (at x4), there are good reasons to assume that the argument of usefulness is more than simply a joke. Socrates' teleological justification of *kalokagathia* hints at a harmony between his interiority and exteriority, that is, at his inward strength (*iskhus*), which is similar to that of a crab.[73] It seems that here Xenophon does not follow Plato's account of Socrates' double nature, which highlights the oddity of Socrates' seriocomicness. Xenophon does not counterpose Socrates' "ridiculous" outward appearance to his "serious" inward qualities, as does Plato. Nor does he establish a hierarchical relationship between them. Xenophon aims at showing not the contrast, but the homogeneity of Socrates' outward and inward features. He does so by pointing out the usefulness of Socrates' facial features (x3–4); his attempt to make all of his bodily traits look homogeneous, including his disproportionate belly (x5); and his inward strength, which is identical to that of the crab he resembles (x6).

We have seen that, in Xenophon's *Symposium*, the crab analogy is immediately followed by a comparison with the stage Satyrs (x3), and that this is a strong argument for claiming that the depiction of Socrates' protruding eyes in Plato's *Theaetetus* squares with the Silenic motif he employs in the *Symposium*. From the next set of passages, it will become clear that Plato implicitly refers to this motif also when he deals with Socrates' gaze. The following text is the only passage in the *Symposium* in which Socrates is compared with a non-

72 It is likely that this passage influenced Herodas (3rd cent. BC), who uses the expression "looking at me with eyes wider than a crab" (μ' ὀρεῦσα καρ̣κ[ί]νου μέζον): *Mim.* 4.44.

73 Another reason to take seriously this analogy is that this is the only passage in which Xenophon deals with crabs (also Plato mentions only once a crab, at *Euthyd.* 297c, recounting the myth of Heracles fighting against the hydra and the *karkinon*). Moreover, since there is no evidence of the association between the crab and the *iskhus* in antiquity (see Keller 1913: 485–499 and Gossen and Steier 1922), it seems that it is Xenophon who attributes this "philosophical" quality to the crab. This is significant, because according to Antisthenes, *iskhus* is a feature characteristic of Socrates' uniqueness: see esp. *SSR* V A 134, 2.5 (= Diog. Laert. 6.10–11).

Silenic creature.[74] Socrates' way of looking at other men resembles that of a water bird (possibly a pelican, a crane, a water fowl, or a stork):[75]

> **P9**: And then it seemed to me—to use an expression of yours, Aristophanes—that he wandered along there and here, "stalking like a pelican and casting his eyes from side to side," observing calmly both his friends and enemies, and it was clear to anyone, even from a great distance, that he would ward off with great strength whoever touched such a man.
>
> *Symp.* 221b

Plato is describing Socrates' behavior at the battle of Delium, in which he participated in 424 BC. The Athenians have been defeated by the Boeotians, and Socrates manages to keep calm during the disorderly flight of his army. He is in control of the situation thanks to his broad view that embraces the whole battlefield. As we already saw with the Silenus motif, Plato draws on a pre-existing iconographical theme, in this case, the pelican-like gesture depicted by Aristophanes in the *Clouds*,[76] to describe Socrates' vanity and turns it into a complex psychological attitude. Socrates' "gaze from side to side" is what becomes visible

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74 Scholars sometimes include in the "Socratic bestiary" two other analogies that occur in Alcibiades' speech, i.e., 216a, where Alcibiades attributes Siren-like traits to Socrates' speeches; and 217e–218a, where Alcibiades compares the effect of these speeches to the bite of a venomenous snake (for both the pain they cause and their ability to seize the victim). I will not deal with these passages as they do not focus on Socrates, but on the power of his *logoi*.

75 The common translation "pelican" is an approximation, as the verb βρενθύομαι seems to derive from the noun βρένθος, for which LSJ has "an unknown water-bird." As Keller 1913: 237 points out, before the Christian age, "pelicans" are almost non-existent in Greek literature: according to LSJ, the only occurrence for βρένθος is Aristot. *Hist. an.* 609a23–24. Krüger 1939: 307 has "stork," which seems the most unlikely of the four options. In fact, at *Alc. I* 135e, Socrates equals not himself, but his love for Alcibiades, to another bird, the πελαργός, which can be only a stork (*Ciconia alba*). The analogy aims at showing the reciprocity of philosophic *eros*: after Socrates will have hatched his love in the young Alcibiades, it will be Alcibiades who will look after the old Socrates. I am thankful to Will Altman for having pointed out this passage to me.

76 See Aristoph. *Nub.* 362: ὅτι βρενθύει τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλεις. As was noted already by Bury 1932: 163, Plato is playing here with an anachronism, since Aristophanes' *Clouds* was rehearsed one year after the battle of Delium. The verb βρενθύομαι could, however, derive also from βρένθυς, "parfume." Aristo of Chios (3rd cent. BC) draws this etymology when listing the βρενθυόμενος among the character types of his *De liberando a superbia* (col. 21.15–20; for discussion on the origin of βρενθύομαι see Ranocchia 2007: 341–342).

of his imperturbability in spite of the chaos and panic all around him. In this way, Plato shows that Socrates' *karteria* is never foolhardy, but always accompanied by reason.[77]

The next passages are drawn from the *Phaedo*. They focus on the gaze Socrates assumes when he is with his friends or his opponents. In the first passage, Socrates' gaze at his companions expresses his pleasure at the argument of his Theban associate, the Pythagorean Cebes:

> **P10a**: It seemed to me that Socrates was pleased by Cebes' argument, and gazing insistently at us, (*epiblepsas*) he said …
>
> *Phd.* 63a

Some pages later, on the contrary, Socrates' eyes express disagreement after Cebes' mate Simmias has finished his account of a mortal, "harmonic" soul:

> **P10b**: Then Socrates, gazing at us with eyes wide open (*diablepsas*), as he often did, smiled …
>
> *Phd.* 86d

The next passages occur toward the end of the *Phaedo*. Socrates is about to die and displays a magnetic gaze. First he smiles at his companions, looking at them with irony:

> **P10c**: And Socrates laughed gently, and gazing toward us (*apoblepsas*), said …
>
> *Phd.* 115c

Then he "gazes upward" to the herald the archons have sent to him to announce that he has been sentenced to death:

> **P10d**: And Socrates gazed upward (*anablepsas*) at him and said …
>
> *Phd.* 116d

Finally, Socrates speaks to the man who has just brought him the hemlock. Instead of showing fear or sadness, he displays his conventional tranquillity:

77 See esp. Plat. *Lach.* 192c (μετὰ φρονήσεως). On the interdependency of *karteria* and *phronesis* in Plato's portrayal of Socrates in the *Symposium*, see Stavru 2016: 351. For *karteria* in its relation to *enkrateia* and *autarkeia*, see Edmunds, "Xenophon's Triad of Socratic Virtues and the Poverty of Socrates" (in this volume 252–276).

> **P10e**: He did not tremble nor change color or expression, but gazed up at the man from under the brows like a bull (*tauredon hupoblepsas*), as he was used to do (*hosper eiothei*) …
>
> *Phd.* 117b

As in the Delium episode of the *Symposium* (P9), Plato is drawing here on an expression of Aristophanes.[78] And as we saw in that case, Plato adapts the original meaning to a totally different context.[79] In Aristophanes' *Frogs*, the bull-like gaze reflects the fighting attitude of Aeschylus, who is about to face a fierce contest with his rival Euripides; here, on the contrary, this very gaze shows Socrates' calmness and interior strength before drinking the hemlock. The analogy with the bull suggests a powerful way of looking that must have particularly struck Socrates' followers. Similar to that of an animal, Socrates' charismatic gaze is both startling and repugnant.

It is noteworthy that all these passages describe Socrates' feelings through his eyes. And it is striking how many nuances Socrates' gaze has: he "stares with eyes wide open" (*diablepsas*) at his companions, "looks insistently at" (*epiblepsas*) them, or "gazes toward" (*apoblepsas*) them; he "gazes upward" toward the herald sent by the archons (*anablepsas*); and he "gazes upward like a bull" (*tauredon hupoblepsas*) at his executioner. Such a concentration of *blepo*-verbs with different prefixes (*dia-*, *epi*, *apo-*, *ana-*, *hupo-*) is unique in Plato's corpus. The fact that all of these verbs occur in the aorist participle suggests that Plato is describing the gaze itself, and not just the way Socrates gazed on separate occasions, nor the different things he looked at.

Socrates' extraordinary gaze is, therefore, a distinctive feature of his outward appearance. The analogy with the bull (P10e)—an animal with protruding, lateral eyes—reminds of the passages on Socrates' crab-like eyes (X6) and pelican-like sideward gaze (P8), which also illustrate the strange way Socrates used to

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78 Namely, Aristoph. *Ran.* 804: ἔβλεψε γοῦν ταυρηδὸν ἐγκύψας κάτω. It seems likely that in *Frogs* (written in 405 BC), Aristophanes in turn draws on Euripides, who in the *Medea* (431 BC) had twice used bull analogies to describe Medea's fierce eyes (92–93: εἶδον ὄμμα νιν ταυρουμένην τοῖσδ' and 188: ἀποταυροῦται δμωσίν). On the "bullish eyes," see Cairns 2005: 123–155.

79 Bulls rarely occur in Plato's work. Only in one case, *Lach.* 196e, the bull is associated with a character trait, i.e., courage. The other occurrences are of no physiognomical import (*Resp.* 396b and *Crit.* 119d–120a). Also in Xenophon, there is only one passage dealing with the bull's character: *Cyr.* 7.5.62 (about castrated bulls, who are not deprived of their strength and capacity for work). Other occurrences are about bull sacrifices: *Cyr.* 8.3.12 and 8.3.24; *An.* 2.2.9.

look at others. Texts P10a–d contain no zoomorphic analogies, but P10e makes it likely that these texts also imply bulging and staring, lateral-looking eyes.

Plato and Xenophon repeatedly dwell on Socrates' protruding eyes, although they do not provide any clue as to which character trait they correspond to, if any. In order to understand the meaning of Socrates' *exophthalmos*, we need, therefore, to broaden the spectrum of our analysis. The fact that this term does not crop up before these two authors, and that its occurrences are very few in the classical age, could entail that it was coined by Socrates' associates to describe Socrates' physiognomy.[80] In Pseudo-Aristotle's *Physiognomonika*, the term is associated with silliness (*abelteria*: 811b25). This fits with the aforementioned physiognomical diagnosis of Phaedo's *Zopyrus*, where Socrates is considered as dumb (however, not by reason of his protruding eyes, which Zopyrus associates with Socrates' lasciviousness, but because of the missing hollows in the neck above his collarbone).[81] Medical scholars have even gone so far to diagnose that the *exophthalmos* might entail that Socrates was afflicted with temporal lobe epilepsy since childhood and was affected by Graves' disease (hyperthyroidism) later.[82] Aristoxenus' report of a choleric Socrates seems to confirm this diagnosis.[83]

These pathological explanations of Socrates' staring eyes might be the reason why neither Plato nor Xenophon provide a characterological diagnosis of them: as the feature is pathological, it can be used to draw conclusions about Socrates' illness, not his character. This explanation sounds reasonable, but things are way more complex. We have already seen that Plato and Xenophon provide a philosophical explanation of Socrates' snubnosedness: for Plato, the shape of the snub nose has an anamnestic and a poietic effect, awaking and

80 The term occurs three times in Plato (*Tht.* 143e and 209b10 and c1 = P6 and P7) and once in Xenophon (*De re eq.* 1.9). Only Plato refers it to Socrates, but we have seen that Xenophon dwells on Socrates' bulging eyes in the crab analogy (X6). All other fourth-century instances are in the corpus Aristotelicum (*Gen. cor.* 780b36, *Physiogn.* 811b23 and 25, *Pr.* 957b33). Then the term pops up only once, in the third century BC (Polybius *Hist.* 1.10.3), until it becomes common in the imperial age (in the second century AD, from Galen onward). Contrary to what Papapetreu 2015: 167 claims, the term does not occur in Aristoxenus. Nor does it occur in Phaedo of Elis, who deals, however, with Socrates' "eyes of a pederast" (fr. 11 Rossetti): see note 84.

81 Cic. *Fat.* 5.10 (= fr. 6 Rossetti).

82 Muramoto and Englert 2006; Papapetreou 2015.

83 See fr. 54a–b and 56 Wehrli (= *SSR* I B 44, 45, and 47). The most common view is that Socrates was affected by melancholy: see Heiberg 1913: 359; Döring 2007: 262–266; and Schorn 2012: 210–211.

producing knowledge about a specific person; for Xenophon, snubnosedness has a teleological justification, as it enhances both beauty and utility. The same applies to Socrates' protruding eyes and extraordinary gaze: they do not reveal what his character is like, but rather his unique awareness in topical situations.[84]

Analogies Illustrating Specific Skills of Socrates

In this section, I discuss three Platonic passages that illustrate specific skills of Socrates, namely, his ability to track down arguments (*Parmenides*), benumb his interlocutors (*Meno*), and stir up his fellow citizens (*Apology*). I will analyze these passages following the dramatic dates of the dialogues in which they occur: this might give us some clues about the skills Plato's Socrates had at the beginning of his career, i.e., when he met Parmenides and Zeno being still an ephebe, and at the end of his philosophical path, i.e., shortly before being put to death.

The first analogy I will focus on is that occurring in the *Parmenides*, a late dialogue whose dramatic date goes back to Socrates' youth.[85] In a crucial passage of the dialogue, we learn from the main character, the Eleatic Parmenides, that at that time, Socrates was not mature enough to take hold of philosophy.[86] Three Stephanus pages earlier, Parmenides' pupil Zeno reproaches Socrates for not having grasped the true meaning of his newly published book:

> **P11:** Yes Socrates, said Zeno. And even if you have not fully perceived the truth of my book, you are good at tracking down and following the traces of what has been said as the young Laconian female hounds are.
>
> *Prm.* 128c

84 Despite appearances to the contrary, Phaedo of Elis' diagnosis of Socrates is also a philosophical and not a physiognomic one. Unlike Plato and Xenophon, he provides a characterologic explanation of Socrates' "eyes of a pederast," which entails that he is a "corruptor of boys" (fr. 11 Rossetti). This diagnosis arouses the indignation of the other Socratics but is confirmed by Socrates himself, who claims to be indeed lustful, but *also* able to restrain himself (*etenim sum, sed contineo*). This means that Socrates agrees on the physiognomic diagnosis but points out that there is more to it. Physiognomy is a reliable method for diagnosing his *character*, but it cannot grasp the most essential feature of his *personality* (i.e., self-control), which is determined not by his inborn nature, but by philosophy.

85 Plat. *Prm.* 127c5. The expression *sphodra neos* ("very young"), and the fact that Socrates is mature enough to discuss with Parmenides and Zeno, implies a dramatic date at about 450 BC, when Socrates was an ephebe (17–18 years old).

86 Plat. *Prm.* 130e.

Socrates is here compared to young Laconian hounds, a race of dogs that was famous for its hunting abilities.[87] Laconian hounds were renowned, on the one hand, for their savagery, swiftness, and speed, and, on the other, for their ability to track down traces. These skills apply to the young Socrates,[88] whose instinct allows him to track down the arguments (*lekhthenta*) of Zeno's book even if his "philosophical savagery" hinders him from fully understanding its truth (*aletheia*). According to Proclus, the book mentioned by Zeno is a famous treatise containing forty paradoxes about the impossibility of ontological pluralism.[89] Young Socrates is unable to grasp the deeper meaning of these paradoxes (i.e., their *aletheia*) due to his philosophical immaturity. Some lines later, Zeno discloses the truth Socrates misses about his book: the work defends Parmenides' monism by showing that ontological pluralism, if examined thoroughly, incurs in more absurdities than monism. It seems therefore likely that the analogy with the Laconian hounds conveys both negative and positive qualities of the young Socrates: on the one hand, his philosophical rawness, but, on the other, his ability to track arguments and correct his path as he misses the truth.[90]

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87 The Laconian is the most common race of hounds in ancient literature: see Keller 1909: 188–223, for discussion of the evidence. In modern times, Laconian hounds became famous after William Shakespeare appraised them in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (1594).

88 The expression used by Plato, αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες, refers to *young* and *female* Laconian *hunting hounds*. A similar passage occurs in the *Laws* (654e), where the Athenian stranger and Clinias try to find out what the beautiful posture (*skhema*) of the body, the melody (*melos*), the singing (*ode*), and the dancing (*orkhesis*) are. The Athenian stranger compares himself and Clinias to hounds following traces. In the *Laws*, however, the noun used is *kuon* (adult dog/hound), as it is mostly in the *Republic*, where the dog is praised as a philosophic animal due to its character, which is both gentle toward his familiars and those he knows and irascible toward those he does not know (2.357e–376c). Plato uses the noun *skulax* only five times in the *Republic*, in one case intending a word play with *phulax* (i.e., the guardian of the city): 2.375a. At 5.451d, 7.537a and 7.539b the *skulakes* are "whelps." According to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (1.4.4 and 1.4.15), the *skulakes* were shameless, while the *Cynegeticus* deals mainly with their breeding (7.1–7). The specification that the hunting dogs are *young* hints at the ephebic age of Socrates. As to the fact that they are Laconian, Proclus comments that "'Laconian' gives Socrates the character of a hunter, which is a symbol of the 'hunt for being'" (Procl. *In Parm.* 1. 712.18–21). The indication that the hounds are *female* points at the learning abilities of the young Socrates: in classical age, female dogs were regarded as easier to nurture and domesticate than male ones. See esp. Arist. *Hist. An.* 608a21–28, where young Laconian female dogs are mentioned as an example for the fact that in humans, larger animals, and viviparous quadrupeds, the female sex has a softer character, is sooner tamed, and more suited to learning than the male sex.

89 See Procl. *In Parm.* 1.694.23–25.

90 The analogy occurs already in the opening speech of Sophocles' *Ajax*, where Athena likens

A similar hunting analogy occurs in the *Phaedo*, a dialogue that portrays Socrates shortly before his death. In the final part of the dialogue, the ability to "follow the traces of what has been said in the past and in the present" is mentioned together with what was arguably the most important activity practiced by Socrates throughout his life, namely the "care of the self" (*epimeleia heautou*).[91] As in the passage from the *Parmenides*, in the *Phaedo*, the "tracking metaphor" illustrates the ability to thoroughly examine all the arguments two interlocutors have come up with after they have been thoroughly discussing a given topic.[92] Such an ability should be mastered by both interlocutors, who will take care of themselves precisely by making sense of the different sides of the arguments that have surfaced during a face-to-face conversation.

It is interesting to note that at the end of his career (i.e., in the *Phaedo*), Socrates stresses the importance of an ability, that of tracking arguments, that Zeno attributes to him when he was still an ephebe (i.e., in the *Parmenides*). This suggests that Socrates stood out for this ability for his whole life. The analogy with the young Laconian hunting hounds shows how Socrates' way of dealing with arguments was perceived by well-established philosophers of the time. The fact that both Parmenides and Zeno deny that Socrates had philosophical insight makes Zeno's analogy all the more significant: it seems clear that Socrates used to have an extraordinary ability to deal with arguments *even before he became a philosopher*.

The next analogy I will discuss occurs in the *Meno*, a dialogue whose dramatic date, 401 BC, is close to that of the *Phaedo* but far away from that of the *Parmenides*. The Socrates portrayed here is close to the end of his career.[93]

> **P12**: Meno: "Socrates, I certainly have heard before meeting you that you never do anything else than be yourself perplexed and produce perplexity (*poieis aporein*) in others. And now you seem to me to be bewitching (*goeteueis*) me and drugging (*pharmatteis*) me and absolutely enchanting (*katepaideis*) me, so that I come to be full of perplexity. Indeed, if a

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her favorite Odysseus to a female Laconian dog (κύων Λάκαινα) for his tracking ability. A passage parallel to that of the *Parmenides* is Plat. *Resp.* 2.375a, on which see the lengthy discussion in Frère 1998: 54–55 and 75–77.

91 Plat. *Phd.* 115b–c (the hunting analogy occurs also at 66a and c). Socrates must have practiced and taught *epimeleia heautou* for a long period of his life: see note 53 for evidence about *epimeleia heautou* in Aristophanes' *Clouds*.

92 The two passages are similar also in the wording: for "tracking," the *Phaedo* has κατ' ἴχνη, the *Parmenides* ἰχνεύεις.

93 See Day (1994: 14).

joke is allowed (*ei dei ti kai skopsai*), it seems to me that in your aspect (*eidos*) and in every other respect you are very much like the flat sea torpedo (*tei plateiai narkei tei thalattiai*); for it produces numbing (*narkan poiei*) in anyone who approaches and touches it (*haptomenon*), and something of the sort you seem you have produced (*pepoiekenai*) in me now. For in truth I feel that my soul and my mouth are numb, and I have no answer to give you. And yet thousands of times I have made a great many speeches about virtue, and before many people, and done very well—at least in my own opinion. Yet now I am altogether unable to say what it is. And you seem to me to have done well not to sail away or emigrate from here, for, if you, a stranger in another city, were to do this sort of things, you would probably be arrested as a sorcerer (*goes*)."

Socrates: "You are cunning (*panourgos*), Meno, and you nearly deceived (*exepatesas*) me."

Meno: "Why so, Socrates?"

Socrates: "I know why you drew this image of me."

Meno: "Why do you think I did?"

Socrates: "So that I would draw an image of you in return. And I know this about all beautiful people: that they feel happy about the images which portray them. It pays for them, since I think that also the images of beautiful people are beautiful. But I will not draw an image of you in return. As for me, if the torpedo fish (*narke*) is itself numb (*narkousa*) and so produces also numbness in others (*poiei narkan*), then I am similar to it; otherwise I am not, since I myself do not produce perplexity (*poio aporein*) in others when I am not perplexed myself, but I am more perplexed than anyone when I produce perplexity (*poio aporein*) in others. And now I do not know what virtue is. Certainly you knew before you touched me (*hapsasthai*), but now you are certainly like one who does not know. Nevertheless, I want to examine and search together with you what it may be."

Men. 79e–80d

Socrates is here compared to a sea creature, the torpedo ray (*raia torpedo*).[94] As in Plato's *Parmenides* (P11), this analogy also points to an ability, that of benumbing interlocutors. Here the analogy between the animal and its ability is even stronger than in the passage of the *Parmenides*, as in this case, the animal owes its name (*narke*) precisely to its ability, that of benumbing (*narkan*)

94 On the torpedo ray, see Arist. *Hist. an.* 620b; Plut. *De soll. an.* 978b–c; Plin. *HN*. 32.2. For discussion, see Keller 1913: 377–378.

its prey or aggressor thanks to an electric discharge. Another peculiar feature of this analogy is the explicit reference to Socrates' outward appearance (*eidos*): according to Meno, Socrates resembles the sea torpedo in his "aspect" as well as "in every other respect." The details of this *eidos* are not spelled out: we may, however, guess that the analogy hints at the lateral position of the torpedo's eyes. This marks an important difference with the *Parmenides*, where we have no clue about how Socrates looked.

Socrates is explicit about the fact that the benumbing ability of the *narke* requires physical contact: to describe this proximity he uses twice the verb "touch," *haptomai* (80a7 and 80d2), which implies a physical contact. Such a contact is a core feature of Socratic *sunousia*: in Plato's *Symposium*, Alcibiades admits that he feels ashamed only when he is before Socrates, while he succumbs to the honor of the masses when he is far away from him.[95] A similar idea occurs in Antisthenes, where *paideia* and erotic *sunousia* are intertwined, as is evident in the relationships between him and Socrates and between Heracles and his preceptor Chiron.[96]

The *narke* and its benumbing *narkan* also hint at the fact that Socratic teaching cannot be conveyed from a distance. Socrates' arguments can be recounted in Socrates' absence (through mnemonic or written media), but they lose a great part of their power.[97] Socratic teaching can fully unfold itself only in a face-to-face interaction between Socrates and his associates. Proximity is a key factor for such interaction, as the analogy with the touch of the torpedo ray makes clear.[98]

Some lines later, Socrates asks Meno whether the torpedo ray benumbs only those who touch it or also itself. Meno goes for the latter option, which means that Socrates shares the perplexity he plunges his interlocutors into. Meno's argument gives voice to this perplexity: how can you search for something of

95 Plat. *Symp.* 216b. For an overview of *sunousia* in Plato, see Tarrant 2005: 133–138.

96 See *SSR* V A 14 (Antisthenes-Socrates) and 92 (Heracles-Chiron).

97 See also *SSR* IV A 2 (= Plut. *De curios.* 2.516a), a passage likely drawing on the *Miltiades* of Aeschines of Sphettus. According to Plutarchus, Aristippus meets Socrates' pupil Ischomachus in Olympia and hears from him "small seeds" of Socrates' *logoi*. From these *logoi*, Aristippus suffers such a disturbance that he immediately leaves for Athens in order to become Socrates' pupil. The fact that Aristippus feels the need to immediately meet Socrates entails that even if Socrates' *logoi* are powerful when recounted in his absence, there is something they cannot convey from the distance.

98 This interpretation of the passage rules out the idea that the *narke* operates from the distance, i.e., not touching but electrifying the surroundings of its victims, as Thorp 2015 claims.

which you know nothing at all?[99] This question turns out to be indeed benumbing for Socrates, who will be able to properly answer it only by eventually introducing the doctrine of *anamnesis* (84b–d).

But how does the numbing come about and of what does it consist? It is important to note that the torpedo analogy links numbing (*narke*) and perplexity (*aporia*).[100] Meno and Socrates are perplexed because they are paralyzed by their own arguments. These arguments are shocking as they force Meno and Socrates to overcome their fixed beliefs. But they are also highly productive since they prompt them to start anew their research: it is not by chance that we find the expression *poiein*, i.e., "producing," in connection with both the numbing and the ensuing perplexity. The whole torpedo analogy is about the *production* of torpor and perplexity thanks to an ability, that of the torpedo ray, which in ancient times was regarded as magical.[101] This explains why this passage contains several references to the magical abilities of the benumbed (and benumbing) Socrates and Meno. Meno accuses Socrates of bewitching (*goeteueis*), drugging (*pharmattei*), and enchanting (*katepadeis*) him and implicitly advises him not to emigrate from Athens, as anyone who would notice his benumbing abilities would arrest him as a sorcerer (*goes*). Socrates replies, rebuking Meno of being cunning (*panourgos*) and attempting to deceive him (*exapatesas me*). The ability to produce out of nothing numbness in interlocutors, and, thus, to arouse their perplexity, is magical—as is the nonvisible electricity of the torpedo ray.[102]

The next passage is arguably the most renowned animal analogy about Socrates. It occurs in the *Apology*, a dialogue set in 399 BC, when Socrates is facing a trial in which he is accused of impiety and corruption of the youth. In his defense speech, Plato's Socrates compares the city of Athens to a horse and himself to a gadfly:

99 Cf. Meno's perplexity at Plat. *Meno*. 80d. As Klein 1965: 91 puts it, "*this argument* must definitely produce torpor and numbness in those who accept its validity, for they would not make the vain attempt to improve their understanding, no matter what the subject might be, would not make any move in this direction and would 'stay put,' contentedly and unashamedly slothful … It will be Meno's privilege, then, if he puts this argument to use to benumb other people as well as himself." On the passage, see also Thompson 1901: 110–111; Bluck 1961: 268–269; Brague 1978: 127–129; Sharples 1985: 141; Beets 1993: 42; Weiss 2001: 21; Scott 2006: 69–74.

100 Apart from the *Meno* passage, *narkan* occurs only once in Plato, at *Resp*. 6.503d, with the negative meaning of "intellectual benumbing."

101 See the evidence in Wu 1984 and Thorp 2015.

102 Xenophon deals also with Socrates' magical abilities: see *Mem*. 3.11.17.

> P13: For if you kill me, you will not easily find another man of my kind. Even if it is quite ridiculous to say (*ei kai geloioteron eipein*), I really have been attached to the city by the god as upon a big and noble horse (*hippo megalo ... kai gennaio*), who is quite sluggish due to his size and needs to be stirred up by a sort of gadfly (*muopos tinos*). I think that the god has assigned me to this city for a reason of this kind: that I should never stop settling upon every part [of the city] the whole day long, stirring up and persuading and reproaching each one of you. Another man of this kind will not come to be among you, gentlemen, but if you will be persuaded by me, you will spare me. However, perhaps you are annoyed like those who are stirred up when half asleep, and, having been persuaded by Anytus, think that by slapping me you might easily kill me. Then you would pass the rest of your life sleeping, unless the god, being concerned for you, sent you someone else.
>
> *Ap.* 30e–31a

As in the torpedo analogy (P12), the animal reference is introduced by an if-clause that sounds as an understatement (*ei dei ti kai skopsai* in the *Meno*; *ei kai geloioteron eipein* in the *Apology*). However, a closer look at both passages suggests that these clauses should be taken seriously. Both of them introduce images of Socrates that are ridiculous at first glance but reveal a deeper meaning upon close scrutiny. As we have seen in the first part of this paper, Socrates' seriocomicness is crucial to understanding his physiognomy: his outward laughability not only hints at his inner virtue but is inextricably connected with it. This connection is particularly evident in the Silenus motif, which both Plato and Xenophon employ to point out the complexity of Socrates' personality. It is, however, patent also in the analogies of the torpedo and the gadfly, where Socrates' ridiculous appearance directly hints at his most peculiar skills, i.e., arousing his fellow citizens and benumbing them with arguments.

One could think that these activities produce opposite effects, and, therefore, cancel each other out: isn't numbing the contrary of arousal, after all? Not for Plato: if we look at the texts from *Theaetetus* and *Apology*, we note that in both cases, he describes Socrates' activity as highly disturbing. As a torpedo, Socrates paralyzes Meno and benumbs him with arguments; as a gadfly, he irritates his fellow citizens, reproaching them and challenging their complacency. The paralyzing action of the torpedo has the effect of stopping Meno from believing that inquiry is possible if one doesn't already know what he is looking for. The arousing action of the gadfly does something similar: it urges the Athenians not to stick to their age-old beliefs and prompts them to overcome their sluggishness.

The analogy with the gadfly shows that Socrates was perceived by most Athenians as an irritation. But what kind of irritation? Some translators and commentators have wrongly assumed that the gadfly Socrates *stings* the Athenian horse.[103] A number of them have even thought that the term used by Plato, *muops*, should be taken in its secondary sense of "spur."[104] As John Burnet pointed out, such a reading is wrong, since it would then not make sense that the whole analogy is introduced as "quite ridiculous" (*geloioteron*).[105] Moreover, it should be noted that Plato uses the noun *muops* only in this passage: the term he employs more often for gadfly is *oistros*, which is used more or less interchangeably with *muops* in authors before and after him.[106] In Plato, on the contrary, the two nouns indicate two different insects: the *oistros* stings while the *muops* does not.[107]

This is important for understanding the passage of the *Apology*, which does not mention the gadfly's *stinging*: the verbs used by Plato are instead "stir up" (*egeiro*), "settle down" (*proskathizo*), "persuade" (*peitho*), and "reproach" (*oneidizo*).[108] The first two verbs describe the gadfly's annoying activity and only in metaphorical sense refer to Socrates; the third and fourth only describe Socrates' activity. Another important distinction to make is that *egeiro* and *proskathizo* portray Socrates' activity from the viewpoint of the common Athenian citizens; i.e., of those who would like "to slap and kill him;" while *peitho* and *oneidizo* illustrate that very activity from the viewpoint of his associates, i.e., those who are "persuaded," accept to be "reproached," and would therefore "spare" him.

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103 See, e.g., Naas 2015: 44–47. The title of a recent book (*Stechfliege Sokrates*) is based on this wrong assumption: Martens 2015.

104 This translation owes much to the influence of Friedrich Schleiermacher, who wrongly renders "Sporn."

105 See Burnet 1977: 206.

106 See e.g. Aesch. *Suppl.* 307–308 and PV 567, and, in Classical age, Arist. *Hist. an.* 528b, 551b, 552a, and 596b.

107 Occurrences of *oistros* in Plato: *Resp.* 573b and e, 577e; *Tht.* 179e; *Phd.* 240d, 251d; *Ti.* 91b; *Leg.* 734a, 782e, and 854b. The most thorough discussion of *muops* and related terms is Moutsos 1980. On the distinction between *oistros* and *muops* in Plato, see the discussion in Frére (1998: 87) and Naas (2015: 49–54), who both claim that the *oistros* annoys without a purpose, while the *muops* does so to provoke criticism and arouse philosophical discussion. Naas goes so far as to claim that, as Plato uses *oistros* throughout his corpus, the *hapax legomenon* of the *Apology* should be taken as an indication "that the image [of the muops goading the Athenian horse] may in fact have originally come from Socrates' mouth and not Plato's imagination" (47).

108 For discussion of these four verbs, see De Strycker 1994: 337, comment at 30e6–7.

The gadfly analogy sheds light on the different viewpoints from which the Athenians look at Socrates' activity. The gadfly Socrates annoys his detractors but persuades and reproaches his followers. His activity is ambiguous since it whips up hatred among the majority of the Athenians (i.e., the *polloi*), while it inspires admiration among a minority of them (i.e., his friends and associates). This ambiguity provides a clue about why Plato's gadfly *does not sting* if compared, for example, to Phaedo of Elis, who also draws on an insect analogy to illustrate both the irritating and the powerful effects of philosophy.[109] In Phaedo, the insect of wisdom stings even though its bite can neither be perceived nor seen. Its effects become visible in the long run when the wound swells.[110] Plato's gadfly, on the contrary, goads immediately, continuously, and *without stinging*. But the most important difference is that Phaedo's insect is *both* annoying and benefiting once it stings, while Plato's does not sting but only stirs up, and is, therefore, *either* annoying *or* benefiting, depending on the audience.

In the gadfly analogy, Socrates' seriocomicness is even more patent than in other passages dealing with his physiognomy. The animals involved are two: a beautiful but sluggish horse and a gadfly, which is constantly annoying that horse. Socrates compares the horse to the city of Athens and himself to the gadfly.[111] Thus, the analogy is twofold: it illustrates not only Socrates' ability to goad Athens, but also the inability of Athens to be vigilant on its own. Socrates and Athens live in a symbiotic relationship: Socrates needs Athens to fulfill the mission Apollo has assigned to him while Athens needs Socrates to be constantly stirred up from its mindless slumber. The relationship is, however, also a conflicting one, since Socrates' constant reproaches are mostly irritating for

109 Phaedo's fragment (belonging probably to the lost dialogue *Zopyrus*) goes: "some tiny animals cannot be felt when they bite, says Phaedo, so subtle is their strength and so deceitful is their power. Their bite is marked by a swelling, and the swelling itself shows no wound. The same will happen to you when conversing with wise men: you will not find out how nor when they help you, but you will find out that they have helped" (*SSR* III A 12 = Sen. *Epist.* 94.41).

110 The metaphorical meaning of the insect's stinging should not be confused with a more violent kind of bite, that of love, which is commonplace throughout the Greek literature: in Plato, see *Symp.* 217e–218a (bite of a snake); in Xenophon, *Symp.* 4.28 (bite of a wild animal), *Mem.* 1.3.12–13 (bite of a scorpion). For references outside the Socratic literature, see Huß 1999a: 255.

111 A number of parallel passages feature the analogy of the gadfly and the horse, e.g., in Xenophon (*Cav.* 1.16, *De re eq.* 2.3, 4.5, 8.5, 10.1–2).

his fellow citizens. He will manage to persuade only a small part of them; the vast majority of the Athenians will not follow him and do everything to get rid of him.

As in the analogies of the young Laconian hounds and the torpedo ray (P11 and P12), also in this passage, the animal reference is hardly ennobling.[112] Moreover, the analogy does not provide any clue about how Socrates *is*. It describes merely what he *does*, namely shaking the Athenians out of their complacency and age-old convictions. Such an activity is essential to Socrates' protreptic strategy, which consists in questioning the established truths of his interlocutors until they recognize the necessity to abandon them and admit their ignorance.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis undertaken so far gives insight into the comparisons and analogies through which Plato and Xenophon portrayed Socrates. We have seen that some of the physiognomic accounts of these two authors square with the Silenus type even when they do not explicitly refer to it, as in the cases of the protruding eyes, the snub nose, the thick lips, the big belly, and the short stature. But Plato and Xenophon agree also when they deal with what must have been the most striking trait of the Silenic Socrates: his staring, magnetic, lateral-looking eyes.

It seems likely that the Silenus type Plato and Xenophon deal with in their respective *Symposia* was the first medium through which Socrates was represented. It was a visual as well as a literary medium: the Silenus type was a well-established character in ancient drama, and actors on stage featured the Silenus mask in a variety of occasions. There are good grounds to think that the Socrates staged in ancient comedy wore such a mask, and that Plato and Xenophon deliberately drew upon that motif. They re-created the Silenus type, transforming it into the *paradeigma* of philosophy. This new type was so influential that it affected all subsequent visual representations of Socrates of

112 Quite the contrary applies to Athens, which Plato compares to a big horse. Its physiognomy tells us indeed something about the character of the city: Athens is on the one hand noble, but on the other, sluggish due to its size. This fits with other passages of Plato's dialogues, where the character of horses is discussed mostly in connection with educational issues: see Frére 1998: 56–57 and 72–75. Horses play a major role also for Xenophon, who dedicates two of his works to the topic, *On Horsemanship* and *The Cavalry Commander*. For an overview on horses in Greek antiquity, see White 2011.

antiquity, including the statue erected in Plato's Academy shortly after 387 BC and the Lysippus statue conceived many years later.

We have seen that the Silenus motif describes what Socrates *is*, that is, his seriocomicness. But Plato and Xenophon also provide other motifs that describe what Socrates *does*, how he behaves, and which skills he is famous for. These motifs are zoomorphic: Xenophon compares Socrates with a crab; Plato compares him with a bull, a pelican, young female Laconian hounds, a torpedo ray, and a gadfly. This "Socratic bestiary" provides a wealth of information about Socrates' activity as a philosopher—and even as a young talented ephebe, still far from getting acquainted to philosophy: Socrates had a charismatic gaze, which was at times menacing, at times magnetic; he was able to track down arguments even before getting acquainted with philosophy; he would benumb his interlocutor with confusing arguments; and he would stir up his fellow citizens, reproaching and persuading them not to stick to their convictions.

What Plato and Xenophon do not provide is a physiognomic diagnosis in the strict sense. Their depictions of Socrates' outward appearance do not yield any information about his character. This is particularly evident when they deal with physiognomic features that have a long-established characterological equivalence (such as the snub nose or the bulging eyes). Plato and Xenophon deliberately depart from conventional explanations of these traits and provide a philosophical interpretation instead. Their interest in Socrates' appearance is not physiognomic, but philosophical.

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Xenophon's Triad of Socratic Virtues and the Poverty of Socrates

Lowell Edmunds

"[I]n control of his lusts and appetites he was the most self-controlled (ἐγκρατέστατος) of all men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute (καρτερικώτατος); and besides, he was so trained to need (only) the moderate (πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος) that, having very little, he was yet very content (ἀρκοῦντα)" (*Mem.* 1.2.1).[1] Louis-André Dorion says of these three attributes, *enkrateia* (self-control), *karteria* (endurance of physical pain and discomfort), and *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency), "[T]his triad forms the core of Socratic ethics in Xenophon's writings."[2] In what sense, however, are the three a triad in Xenophon? How are they related to each other? Another question concerns the parts of the triad in Plato's characterization of Socrates. Can they be found in Plato?[3] Finally, what is the relation of the triad to the famous poverty of Socrates?

The Triad

Enkrateia is primary. Socrates asks: "Should every man not hold self-control to be the foundation of all excellence, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul?"[4] What is the connection between *enkrateia* and the other two principles?

1 Trans.: Marchant 2013: 19. All translations of *Mem.* are from Marchant 2013, sometimes, as here, with slight revisions. ὃς πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις πρῶτον μὲν ἀφροδισίων καὶ γαστρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος ἦν, εἶτα πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος καὶ πάντας πόνους καρτερικώτατος, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως, ὥστε πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα.

2 Dorion 2005: 97; Bevilacqua 2010: 45, 139–161. Gabriel Danzig has called my attention to the appearance of the triad in North 1966: 125: "There are three components of sophrosyne in Xenophon's portrait of Socrates at this stage of the *Memorabilia* [1.1–2]: *enkrateia* … *karteria* … and *autarkeia*."

3 Dorion 2013 [2010] has answered in the negative for one of the parts, *autarkeia*. But, I shall ask, should one have expected *autarkeia* in Plato in the first place?

4 ἆρά γε οὐ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα, ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπῖδα, ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάσασθαι; 1.5.4; cf. 4.5.8: the best thing for a man.

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Enkrateia, Socrates says elsewhere, causes men to resist or endure (verb καρτερεῖν) desires, i.e., not to yield to desires.[5] So *karteria* over desires follows from *enkrateia*.[6] There seems to be a close connection between the two virtues. From the historical-linguistic point of view, the bases of the two words, κρατ- and καρτ-, are the same.[7] But there is a difference between them. Usually Socrates speaks of *karteria* in reference to the resistance to adverse conditions imposed by circumstances, typically heat, cold, and duress.[8] For this reason, Socrates calls for the training of the body in resistance.[9] Self-control, on the other hand, is the control of desires, typically for food, drink, sex, and sleep (Bevilacqua 2010: 143). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle makes the same distinction but draws a conclusion (that *enkrateia* is preferable to *karteria*) that Socrates would not draw.[10]

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5 "*Enkrateia* alone, causing men to endure (verb καρτερεῖν) the aforementioned (desires), also creates a pleasure worth mentioning in the aforementioned (cases)" (*Mem.* 4.5.9).

6 Dorion speaks of *karteria* as the outer extension of the inner *enkrateia*: Bandini and Dorion 2000–2011.1: 69–70; Bevilacqua 2010: 149–150; 275 n. 2 (on 1.2.1).

7 The IE vocalic **r̥* > -**ra* / **-ar*. Thus **kr̥*- > **kra*- / **kar*-. Thus Greek κράτος and κάρτος, both meaning "strength"; κρατ-ερό-ς and καρτ-ερό-ς (whence καρτερ-έω), both meaning "strong." For -ερό-: Meillet and Vendryes 1963: 381 (§ 572); Palmer 1980: 258. ἐγ-κράτ-εια is prob. "hypostatized" from ἐν κράτει "in power." Cf. Schwyzer 2.1.2: 456–457. (For the term "hypostasis": Schwyzer 2.1.1: 430.) Thus ἐγκράτης with objective gen.: ἀφροδισίων καὶ γαστρὸς ... ἐγκρατέστατος (*Mem.* 1.2.1); τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἁπάντων (*Mem.* 2.1.7); ἐγκρατεῖς τέ ... ὧν σὺ κελεύεις (*Oec.* 12.16).

8 καρτερία in this sense: in the face of heat and cold (*Hell.* 5.1.15; *Oec.* 5.4), also duress (usually called πόνος) (*Mem.* 1.2.1, *Oec.* 7.23, *Cyr.* 8.1.36, 7.5.78, *An.* 3.1.23). Bevilacqua 2010: 360 n. 13: "in effetti la *karteria* consiste proprio nel sopportare quanto colpisce il corpo dall'esterno."

9 E.g., 1.6.7 (Socrates to Antiphon): ἐμὲ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οἴει, τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα *μελετῶντα καρτερεῖν*, πάντα ῥᾷον φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος; As Bevilacqua 2010: 149 n. 634 points out, μελετάω occurs four times in this passage. Cf. *Mem.* 3.1.6: καὶ ἐπιμελῆ καὶ καρτερικὸν; 2.1.20 μελετῶντα (Socrates to Aristippus); *Cyr.* 1.5.1; *Cyr.* 7.5.80 for ἐπιμέλειαι. It is true that Socrates speaks in general of learning and μελέτη apropos of virtue (Bevilacqua 2010: 152) but μελέτη does not occur with ἐγκράτεια.

10 *EN* 1150a32–36: ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. Broadie and Rowe (2002: 199) translate: "And the opposite of being un-self-controlled is being self-controlled, that of being soft being resistant; for resisting is a matter of withstanding, whereas self-control is a matter of overcoming, and withstanding is different

The two terms ἐγκράτεια and καρτερία are, however, to some degree interchangeable. Thus, on the one hand, καρτερεῖν / καρτερία can be used for resistance to the desire for sex (*Mem.* 2.6.22) and for other desires, such as food, drink, and sleep (*Mem.* 4.5.9, cf. *Cyr.* 2.3.13 [food, drink, cold], *Cyr.* 4.2.25 [food], 6.1.36 [sex]). On the other hand, in his summary of the qualities of the future leader in his conversation with Aristippus of Cyrene in the second book of the *Memorabilia*, the main theme of which is *enkrateia* or "self-control" in Socratic protreptic, Socrates extends the use of the adjective ἐγκρατής to cover both desires and external conditions (*Mem.* 2.1.7, cf. 2.1.3 [bis]).[11]

Socrates not only exhorted others to *karteria* but also conspicuously practiced it himself, to a degree that was incomprehensible to others. Antiphon the Sophist points out to him his poor food, inadequate clothes, and his bare feet, and says that he is a teacher of unhappiness (*kakodaimonia*) (*Mem.* 1.6.2–3; cf. Apollodorus of himself at Pl. *Symp.* 173d1–3). In his reply, Socrates speaks of himself as always training his body, and he asks Antiphon: "Do you not think that I can stand (καρτερεῖν) every strain better than you can?" i.e., because you do not train your body (*Mem.* 1.6.7). Aristippus asks Socrates how the training that Socrates recommends and that he considers to be happiness (*eudaimonia*) differs from the involuntary suffering of slaves (2.1.17).

Socrates' way of life was widely known in Athens by 423 BCE, when Ameipsias' *Konnos* and Aristophanes' *Clouds* were performed (Dover 1968: l–li). In the former comedy, a character or the chorus says to Socrates:

> Σώκρατες ἀνδρῶν βέλτιστ' ὀλίγων, πολλῶν δὲ ματαιόταθ', ἥκεις
> καὶ σὺ πρὸς ἡμᾶς; καρτερικός γ' εἶ. πόθεν ἄν σοι χλαῖνα γένοιτο;
> τουτὶ τὸ κακὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων κατ' ἐπήρειαν γεγένηται.
> οὗτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὕτως οὐπώποτ' ἔτλη κολακεῦσαι.
>
> AMEIPSIAS, *Konnos* fr. 9 (9) (*PCG* 2.202) = SSR I A 10[12]

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from overcoming, as not being defeated is different from winning—which is why self-control is also a more desirable thing than resistance."

11 Cf. *Cyr.* 8.1.36: καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν δὲ καὶ πόνους καὶ ψύχη καὶ θάλπη καὶ λιμὸν καὶ δίψος δύνασθαι φέρειν ... προσείθιζε τοὺς κοινῶνας. "He tried to accustom his associates to ἐγκράτεια and to be able to bear exertions and cold and hot weather and hunger and thirst." If in this sentence we have a parallelism, not a distinction, between (A) καὶ ἐγκράτειαν and (B) καὶ ... φέρειν, then ἐγκράτεια refers to conditions to which elsewhere καρτερία applies. But Xenophon might have been distinguishing between (A) and (B).

12 Casaubon (cited in *PCG* app. crit.) discussed this frag. in relation to Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.1–10 (conversation with Antiphon the Sophist on *eudaimonia*).

> Socrates, best of a few men,[13] most foolish of many (men), you, too, have come to us? You are indeed steadfast (καρτερικός).[14] [Perhaps the speaker explains the preceding words by touching or pointing to Socrates' short cloak.[15]] Where would you be able to get a cloak? [Then the speaker, or it might be a second speaker,[16] points at his bare feet.] This affliction is an insult to the shoemakers. [Then the (first) speaker turns to someone else on stage.] This man, however, hungry as he is, never yet brought himself to flatter anyone.

As by Antiphon, here by Ameipsias, there is reference to Socrates' poor diet, his cloak, and his shoelessness.

In *Clouds*, "the shoeless ones" is a way to refer to Socrates' associates (103). Socrates' improbable student, Strepsiades, is chided by his son for going without a cloak and shoes (856–858).[17] In this comedy, we not only see again the *karteria* of Socrates, we also see that it was part of a deliberate self-presentation.[18]

> … βρενθύει τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλεις
> κἀνυπόδητος κακὰ πόλλ' ἀνέχει κἀφ' ἡμῖν σεμνοπροσωπεῖς.
> 362–363

13 Gabriel Danzig suggests to me that the phrase should be taken as comic insult, i.e., the best of only a few, while the most foolish of many. For other interpretations, see the second register of the app. crit. in PCG; Totaro 1998: 160–161.

14 The speaker ironically uses the trendy adjective formed with -ικος. Cf. Ar. *Eq.* 1375–1381 and discussion in Edmunds 2012 under "Everyday Expressions" under fr. 130b.

15 D.L. introduces his quotation of this fragment thus: Ἀμειψίας δ' ἐν τρίβωνι παράγων αὐτὸν φησὶν οὕτως. But usually the points about Socrates' cloak are that it is of poor quality; that he wears the same one summer and winter; that he does not wear the chiton underneath it. Thus Antiphon the Sophist at *Mem.* 1.6.2, on which passage see Bevilacqua 2010: 357 n. 5. For ancient references to the cloak: Döring (1998: 149), who calls it the Spartan *tribōn*, having in mind apparently *Symp.* 219b3–c1, where Alcibiades describes his approach to Socrates: καὶ ἀναστάς γε, … ἀμφιέσας τὸ ἱμάτιον τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ τοῦτον—καὶ γὰρ ἦν χειμών—ὑπὸ τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλινεὶς τὸν τουτουί, περιβαλὼν τὼ χεῖρε τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ, κατεκείμην τὴν νύκτα ὅλην. Perhaps D.L. had the same passage in mind. Cf. Prince 2015: 79 on πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα of Antisthenes in DL 6.13–15 (t. 22A).

16 Dover 1968: liv n. 2; Rusten 2011: 357; cf. Totaro 1998: 159 for a survey of opinion on the division of speakers.

17 Cf. 1103–1104 where the defeated Stronger Argument gives up his cloak and rushes into Socrates' school. Earlier jokes about garments: 179, 497.

18 But the word *karteria* does not occur in Ar. The word καρτερός occurs twice (*Ran.* 464, 1398).

> You swagger in the streets and cast your eyes sideways, and, going barefoot, endure many ills, and put on a grave face on our account.

The mannerisms (swagger, facial expressions) and the endurance (shoelessness, many ills) are all in the same category. Alcibiades quotes these lines in Plato's *Symposium* as correctly describing Socrates in Athens.[19] It can be argued that Socrates' self-presentation is intended to show his superiority (Edmunds 2005).

As for *autarkeia*, it is not clear, contrary to Dorion, that it is a higher goal to which Xenophon is subordinating *enkrateia* and *karteria* (Dorion [2010] 2013: 441). *Autarkeia* is referred to by a word formed on the base αὐταρκ- four times in *Mem.* (1.2.14, 2.6.2, 4.7.1, 4.8.11), and it is implied in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper (1.2.1).[20] Only in two of these places is it put into relation to the other two elements of the triad (1.2.1; 1.2.14). In the first of these two places, Socrates' self-control and resoluteness (masculine singular adjectives in Greek), which are active, are distinguished from his reaction to his property, which is described by a neuter plural participle (ἀρκοῦντα; cf. *Oec.* 2.4: τὰ ἐμοὶ ἀρκοῦντα). In the second of these places, the word is a superlative adjective. "They knew that Socrates was living on very little and yet was most self-sufficient (αὐταρκέστατα); that he was most self-controlled (ἐγκρατέστατον) in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with all who conversed with him (1.2.14)." In this place, in which Xenophon is defending Socrates against the accusation that he was responsible for the wrongs done to Athens by his associates Critias and Alcibiades (1.2.12–16), it might be the case that the self-sufficiency is to be understood as the result of self-control, but it is equally possible (and consider the order of the statements in this sentence) that Xenophon is referring to two separate characteristics. Certainly he cannot mean that the third characteristic, Socrates' mastery of conversation, is the result of either of the first two.[21]

Nor can it be said that there is a pervasive connection in Xenophon between self-sufficiency and *enkrateia*. In the conclusion of *Memorabilia*, Xenophon gives a list of Socrates' virtues (4.8.11):

19 *Symp.* 221b3–4. For the physiognomy of Socrates, see Stavru 2011: 99–139.

20 For Xenophon's "insistence" on the self-sufficiency of Socrates ("Xénophon, qui insiste sur l'autarcie de Socrate") Dorion (2013[2010]:429) cites *Mem.*1.2.1, 1.2.14, 1.2.60 (nothing to do with self-sufficiency so far as I can see), 1.6.10 (self-sufficiency perhaps implied), 4.7.1, 4.8.11. He does not cite 2.6.2 but he seems to be referring to this place on p. 446.

21 But as David Johnson pointed out to me, Socrates elsewhere argues that *enkrateia* is the necessary condition for good conversation (4.5.10–12).

1. εὐσεβής
2. δίκαιος[22]
3. ἐγκρατής
4. φρόνιμος[23]
5. αὐτάρκης
6. ἱκανός (twice, with two different specifications)

In this list, the first three virtues are moral, and the rest are intellectual. Further, Socrates is self-sufficient because he is sagacious (φρόνιμος δὲ ὥστε μὴ … μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι …). So the self-sufficiency of Socrates in this account has nothing to do with his *enkrateia*. With the sense of αὐταρκ- in this place can be compared 4.7.1–3, where Xenophon says that Socrates took pains to make his associates self-sufficient (αὐτάρκεις) in any work for which they were suited, and he gives the examples of land measurement and astronomy.[24] Here self-sufficiency is clearly not a moral virtue. In the remaining place in *Memorabilia* in which we find a word formed on the base αὐταρκ-, Socrates makes a link between self-sufficiency and friendship (*Mem.* 2.6.2: not to be self-sufficient is potentially to be a bad friend). There is also a link in Xenophon between self-control and friendship.[25] It does not follow that there is a link between self-sufficiency and self-control. They can be regarded as separate conditions for being a good friend. Of the four places in *Memorabilia* in which a word formed on the base αὐταρκ- occurs (1.2.14, 2.6.2, 4.7.1, 4.8.11), only one bears a clear relation to the supposed triad (1.2.14). To this place can be added the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper, in which the verb ἀρκέω occurs (*Mem.* 1.2.1).

The Triad in Plato's Characterization of Socrates

To turn to the triad in Plato, first of all, according to Dorion, Plato's Socrates "gives *enkrateia* no role," i.e., in what he says about the virtuous person, because for this Socrates *enkrateia* is a consequence of knowledge (Dorion 2006: 103). But if not in doctrine, in practice, as described in Plato, Plato's Socrates is the

22 Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 118a15–17 (final sentence): ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν **ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου**.

23 Cf. preceding note.

24 Dorion cites this place in 2013[2010]: 446 n. 55.

25 Dorion 2005: 98 surveys the relevant passages.

same person as Xenophon's Socrates. In Plato's *Symposium*, Alcibiades tells an anecdote about how, when he was young and, he thought, irresistible, Socrates resisted his offer of sex. "How do you think I felt after that?" Alcibiades asks. "Of course, I was deeply humiliated, but also I couldn't help admiring his natural character, his moderation, his fortitude—here was a man whose strength (noun καρτερία) and wisdom went beyond my wildest dreams" (219d5–7).[26] Alcibiades proceeds to describe Socrates at the siege of Potidaea, in particular his ability to withstand the hardships of hunger (verb καρτερεῖν, 220a1) and cold (noun καρτέρησις, 220a6). He tells how at Potidaea Socrates stood in the same spot from early one day until the morning of the next, introducing this anecdote with a hexameter that slightly varies the first three syllables of *Od.* 4.242 (ἀλλ' οἷον τόδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνήρ) and *Od.* 4.271 (οἷον καὶ τόδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνήρ), which are descriptions of Odysseus.[27] If, as in Xenophon, *karteria* presupposes *enkrateia*, then Alcibiades' description of Socrates presupposes *enkrateia*, even if he does not use this word.

What of self-sufficiency? There is no evidence of self-sufficiency forming a triad with *enkrateia* and *karteria* in Plato. Plato's Socrates never speaks of self-sufficiency in relation to himself and never refers to it as a human virtue except once, as an aspect of the reasonable man.[28] Again Plato is consistent with Xenophon, in whom self-sufficiency was related loosely, if at all, to *enkrateia* and *karteria*. For this reason, one would not expect to find a connection in Plato, in the passage in *Symposium* already discussed, between self-sufficiency as "une fin supérieure" and the display of *enkrateia* in the form of *karteria*, as described by Alcibiades.[29]

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26 Trans.: Nehamas and Woodruff 1997: 501. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν, ἡγούμενον μὲν ἠτιμάσθαι, ἀγάμενον δὲ τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἐντετυχηκότα ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οἵῳ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἂν ᾤμην ποτ' ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς **καρτερίαν**;

27 Plato's Socrates also explicitly counseled *karteria* (*Phaedo* 82 c4, quoted and discussed in § 3 below).

28 Words formed on the base αὐταρκ- occur in authentic works seven times (Dorion 2013 [2010]: 429–430 and notes 3–9). Thrice they refer to superhuman beings or things—the self-sufficient and most perfect god (*Timaeus* 68e1–6), the world created as self-sufficient (*Timaeus* 33d1–3), and *daimones* (*Politicus* 271d6–e2). Once such a word refers to reason and pleasure, with Socrates drawing the conclusion that neither of these is the good itself because neither is self-sufficient, etc. (*Philebus* 67a5–8). In the remaining three places, the word refers to humans. In *Theaetetus*, after an interlude, Socrates proposes to Theodorus that they recommence their discussion by considering again Protagoras' view that every man is self-sufficient with respect to understanding (φρόνησις) (169d3–8).

29 Dorion 2013[2010]: 441. Dorion says that in this passage "l' autarcie brille par son absence" (439).

Historical Questions Concerning Socrates' Self-Sufficiency[30]

To be content to live within one's means (ἀρκοῦντα, *Mem.* 1.2.1) is different from control of one's passions and the endurance of heat and cold. What was the "very little" (πάνυ μικρά) that sufficed Socrates? One's means must provide also, at a certain point in one's life, as in Socrates' life, for a family and probably slaves.[31] What Xenophon has in mind when he describes Socrates' self-sufficiency in *Memorabilia* comes out in Socrates' conversation with Critobulus in *Oeconomicus*. The latter asks for Socrates' advice on how to manage his estate even though his wealth is already a hundred times greater than Socrates'. The reason that he asks, he says, is that Socrates knows one thing about wealth: how to produce a surplus from a small income (*Oec.* ἀπ' ὀλίγων 2.10; cf. *Mem.* 1.2.14: ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων … χρημάτων). Critobulus is clearly thinking not of a hand-to-mouth existence but of Socrates as the manager of an estate of some kind.[32] So, to return to self-sufficiency in *Mem.* 1.2.1, it is the result of a certain competence, not a moral virtue like self-control or endurance.

Two further historical questions arise immediately. Exactly what were Socrates' means, and how did they produce an income (see Döring 1998: 148–149)? As for his means, he refers to his house and his possessions as worth five minae (*Oec.* 2.3).[33] As for his income, where did it come from? He says that he does not own animals or land (*Oec.* 2.11). He famously refused to accept pay for his teaching.[34] But this question is something for another research

30 For an overview of the three main directions of research on the historical Socrates: Edmunds 2015: 77–78. The approach taken there, as here, I call critical eclecticism.

31 On his family: Döring 1998: 147–148. Libanius *Apology of Socrates* 168 on Socrates' family: he taught them "to put up with their fortune."

32 As for Socrates' social standing (whatever it shows about his father's wealth), the fact that his father, Sophroniscus, is spoken of as a friend and companion by Lysimachus, son of Aristeides (Pl. *Lach.* 180e) must be relevant. To reply to a comment by David Johnson, we may not care what Critobulus thinks, but if we are interested in the historical Socrates, we care what Xenophon thinks that Critobulus thinks.

33 In Pl. *Ap.* 38b1–5 he says that he could pay a fine of one mina. On this fine see Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 225–230.

34 On his reason for not accepting pay in Xenophon: Van Berkel in this volume, 422: "we may say that to Xenophon's Socrates, the problem with demanding and accepting pay for his conversations is twofold. The formal objection is that accepting pay presupposes a wrong interpretation of the teacher-student relationship … The substantive problem is that demanding pay is in itself incompatible with the contents of Socratic moral-philosophical teaching that takes as its point of departure the principle of ἐγκράτεια." In Ar. *Nub.*, however, Socrates teaches dialectic for pay (98–99, 244–246, 467–473, 1146–1147),

project.[35] The other question concerns Socrates' hoplite status. It used to be thought that in order to be a hoplite, an Athenian citizen had to belong to one of the top three Solonian classes. Vincent Rosivach, in an article published in 2002, showed that there is no ancient evidence linking *zeugitai* (or any other Solonian class) and hoplites.[36] According to him, the link begins in nineteenth-century scholarship. If there was no link, then anyone who had hoplite armor and weapons could be expected to serve as a hoplite. Socrates had the equipment, and he served as a hoplite. How he obtained it is unclear, but one cannot infer from it anything about his wealth.

To continue with self-sufficiency, what sufficed for Socrates appeared as poverty to others. For them, his poverty was a matter for condescension or humor or outright blame. Condescension: In *Oeconomicus*, Critobulus laughs at Socrates' paradoxical comparison of his own wealth with Critobulus'. "Do *you* pity *me*?" asks Critobulus (2.3). He means that he is the one who should pity Socrates. Humor: In comedy, Socrates is someone whose poverty causes him to go hungry. In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, the ability to go without food is distorted into being without food.[37] Socrates steals a himation in order to buy food for his students.[38] Strepsiades, who is joining the school, compares the students to the Spartan prisoners from Sphacteria, presumably pale and emaciated (Dover 1968: 120 ff., line 186). In the comic poet Eupolis, someone says:

μισῶ δὲ καὶ τὸν † Σωκράτην,
τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην,
ὃς τἄλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν,
ὁπόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχοι
τούτου κατημέληκεν.

fr. 386 (352) (PCG 5.511) = SSR I A 12

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but it is also the case that the teaching of the Aristophanic Socrates is in this area explicitly Pythagorean and, more broadly, sophistic: see Imperio 1998: 111–114.

35 Gifts from friends are part of the picture: Pl. *Cri.* 45a–b. Readiness of friends to help him financially: Pl. *Ap.* 38b; *Rep.* 337d; DL 2.25, 31; esp. Xen. *Oec.* 2–8.

36 Contrast the view of Pomeroy 1994: 28, 223–224, followed by Bevilacqua 2010: 275 n. 3.

37 I have taken this formulation of the matter from Dunbar 1995: 636, commenting on *Nub.* 175 (Student: ἐχθὲς δέ γ' ἡμῖν δεῖπνον οὐκ ἦν ἑσπέρας).

38 So I think the line can be understood. See Dover 1968: 118 on line 179; Guidorizzi and Del Corno 1996: 212–214 on line 179; and especially Meynersen 1993: 25–32. Thorough discussion of the history of the interpretation of this line in Meynersen 1993: 21–24. Ebert 1994 emends θοἰμάτιον θοινάριον (understood metaphorically as "food for thought") and takes παλαίστρα as a metaphor for the table covered with fine sand on which Socrates is making a geometrical demonstration. In Eupolis fr. 395 *PCG*, Socrates is said to have stolen a serving bottle at a symposium.

> I hate [that] Socrates
> the babbling beggar,
> who'll contemplate just about anything,
> but pays no attention
> to how he can eat.[39]

Outright blame: I have already cited the passage in which Antiphon the Sophist tells Socrates that he is leading a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Plato and Xenophon apologize for the poverty of Socrates. They do it in different ways. Xenophon, for example, in two hyperbolic sentences, says:

> He schooled his body and soul by following a regimen which, barring a bolt from the blue, would afford anyone a life of confidence and security and make it easy to meet the required expenses. For he was so frugal (εὐτελής) that it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates.[40]
>
> *Mem.* 1.3.5 (cf. XEN. *Ap.* 18)

It seems odd to compare the meager income of someone who works very little with the meager income of Socrates, who did not work at all and somehow survived without working. Elsewhere, in *Memorabilia* Socrates says straightforwardly that "some who have very little not only find it enough, but even manage to save out of it, whereas others cannot manage to live within their means, however large" (4.2.38). Xenophon's roundabout manner in the two sentences just quoted is the result, I suggest, of the difficulty of distinguishing the *karteria* of Socrates from his poverty. Others, as in the examples in my preceding paragraph, saw the *karteria* as the *result* of the poverty. They saw Socrates as driven to *karteria* by his poverty. Xenophon wants to present *karteria* as the chosen *cause* of the poverty.[41] As Socrates says more than once, he deliberately trained himself to live on little and could therefore live in a condition that looked to others like poverty. To return to Aristophanes' *Clouds* for a moment, one of the requirements for students entering Socrates' school is that they go

39 Trans.: Rusten 2011: 271.

40 Xenophon continues: "He ate just enough food."

41 Danzig poses the question: "Or is the desire for leisure facilitated by *karteria*?" I think that both things can be going on at the same time: "*Karteria* makes it easier for me to lead a life of leisure. At the same time, if you want to look at my life from another point of view, this *karteria* is making me poor."

hungry (441 infinitive πεινῆν; cf. 175, 416).[42] In this respect, Aristophanes' picture of Socrates is consistent with Xenophon's. Austerity is a principle, not a practical outcome, of life in the think tank (φροντιστήριον).

Karteria, as distinguished from any requirement of poverty, is a principle in Socrates' ethical scheme also in Plato. Consistently with Xenophon's Socrates, Plato's Socrates, when he exhorts in *Phaedo* to *karteria* as part of the philosophical life, makes it a principle, and he speaks of poverty as a possible concomitant or result:

> [T]rue philosophers abstain from the desires of the body, standing firm (verb καρτερεῖν) and never surrendering to them; they are not troubled about poverty and loss of estate like the common lovers of riches; nor yet is their abstinence due to fear of the dishonor and disgrace that attach to depravity (μοχθηρία), the fear felt by the lovers of power and position.[43]
>
> 82c2–8

Socrates' reasoning in the first part of this sentence is elliptical. If one fills in the ellipses, he reasons:

a. Philosophers resist the desires of the body;
[b.] these desires would be satisfied by wealth.
[c.] But philosophers abstain from the pursuit of wealth.
[d.] They therefore risk poverty and loss of estate.
e. They are not troubled by this risk.

Here Socrates acknowledges, then, that poverty might be the *result* of *karteria*. I find it difficult to see how Socrates could here mean that poverty is the condition for practicing philosophy. In his own case, at least in Plato's *Apology*, Socrates says that the philosophic activity imposed on him by the Delphic oracle has caused him to neglect politics and his own affairs and to live in untold poverty (23b7–c1).[44] It is true that Socrates is not here referring to *karteria*, but it is clear that poverty is the *result* of the practice of philosophy.

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42 Cf. *Av*. 1282, where being like Socrates and going hungry are in effect equated.

43 … οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὔ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Trans. of Hackforth 1955: 90, with slight revision. Wagner (1882: 136) on ἔπειτα: "sums up the preceding participles."

44 καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε

In the passage in *Phaedo* quoted above, Socrates also anticipates fear of dishonor and ill repute, which are parallel to fear of poverty. It is another part of the implicit apology for Socrates' way of life. Poverty entailed loss of status, as in a fragment of a dialogue in the Hibeh papyri, from the first half of the third century BCE (Turner 1955). We do not know who the author of the dialogue was. Someone asked Socrates: "if he was able to earn enough money from this to live as a gentleman (ἐλευθέρως) and not endure an existence of hardship."[45] Unfortunately we do not know what "this" refers to, but the speaker must have in mind the limited resources about which we hear in Xenophon. Socrates replied that "wealth (πλοῦτος) and money (χρήματα) were allies against the disgraces of fortune, as against illness and also against the feebleness of old age." (These are the only two complete sentences. Trans. from Turner 1955: 37.) In other words, in the ordinary circumstances of life, before old age, one did not have to rely on wealth. Socrates' position here does not contradict the contentment of Xenophon's Socrates with his means.

So, to conclude on poverty, it makes sense to say, as has been said recently, that Socrates chose a life of poverty if you mean that in his case, poverty was the result of the practice of *enkrateia* (Xenophon) or of philosophy (Plato).[46] Someone else, like Aristippus, could have practiced *enkrateia*, if he had listened to Socrates, and poverty would not have been the result. As for Socrates' not accepting pay—Plato and Xenophon are in agreement that he did not—the reason is not in the first place that he had chosen to be poor; the reason that he gives in Xenophon is that he wished to be free to converse with whom he chose, whereas, accepting pay, he would be bound to converse with those who paid him (*Mem.* 1.2.6).[47]

τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. Hackforth 1955: 90 n. 1 (on the first half of the sentence, ending "lovers of riches") compares Socrates on his poverty at *Ap.* 23c.

45 ἐλευθέρως: Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.3 (Antiphon to Socrates): καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ἃ καὶ κτωμένους εὐφραίνει καὶ κεκτημένους ἐλευθεριώτερόν τε καὶ ἥδιον ποιεῖ ζῆν. For the sense of ἐλευθέρως "as becoming a free man," cf. Schaps 1998: 163–177. Cf. also Xen. *Ap.* 14: Χαιρεφῶντος γάρ ποτε ἐπερωτῶντος ἐν Δελφοῖς περὶ ἐμοῦ πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον. Also 16: τίνα δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐλευθεριώτερον, ὃς παρ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε δῶρα οὔτε μισθὸν δέχομαι; cf. Pericles in the Funeral Oration: οὐδ' αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων γέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, *ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ* κεκώλυται (2.37.1); especially: φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας· πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ **τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον** (2.40.1).

46 Danzig (2010: 250) asks why Socrates chose a life of poverty.

47 Cf. *Mem.*1.5.6, 1.6.5, 1.6.13. Pl. *Apol.* 31b1–c3: I neglected my own affairs but did not accept

Conclusion

The ethical triad of Socrates that scholars have found in Xenophon is a dyad consisting of self-control and endurance. The third element of the supposed triad, self-sufficiency, is related in Xenophon to Socrates' poverty, already in 1.2.1 (ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως, ὥστε πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα). Self-sufficiency is not a theme in Plato. Socrates' poverty, further, in both Plato and Xenophon is the result of, not the cause of, his conspicuous *karteria*. Even if Socrates had accepted pay for his teaching and had thus escaped poverty, he would have continued to practice *karteria*. Both Plato and Xenophon apologize for the poverty of Socrates (although Xenophon never uses the word πενία of him), explaining it as the result of his way of life. (Of course, they differ in their conception of his way of life.) These themes in Plato and Xenophon have an apologetic thrust, and this finding has the support of Gabriel Danzig's book (2010). Danzig distinguishes between the *aims* and the *teachings* of Plato's dialogues. The aims are political, in the context of Plato's Athens. One of these aims was to preserve a good reputation for Socrates. A similar distinction can be made even for the parts of Xenophon that are not ostensibly apologetic. In these parts, too, for example in *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon is indirectly defending Socrates against the kind of charges that I have described.[48]

A Question beyond This Conclusion

The austerities of Socrates to which the word *karteria* refers are sometimes summed up as his asceticism.[49] The question arises, in relation to the two-part ethical scheme that I have described, why Socrates pushed *karteria* to what appeared to others, and appears to us, to be the extreme of asceticism. This question can be posed more precisely as follows:

One can distinguish between *karteria* as an expression of *enkrateia*, exercised as the occasion demands, i.e., occasionally, in reaction to externally imposed pains ($karteria_1$) and *karteria* as a willed daily practice of austerity, as in the case of Socrates ($karteria_2$). It seems that *enkrateia*, which is primary (cf. "*The Triad*" (subhead at the top of page 2)), ought to have been enough for most purposes, and in fact, Socrates regarded it as the basis not only of one's relation to oneself, but also of a list of other relations. He says to Euthydemus:

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pay. My poverty is proof. But Plato's Socrates does not give a reason for not accepting pay. Cf. Blank 1985.

48 For the apologetic tendency in Plato: Bevilacqua 2010: 83 and notes.

49 E.g., Wilson 2007: 75 (citing Ar. *Av.* 1280–1283).

> ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν τοιούτων τινός, δι' ὧν ἄν τις καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα καλῶς διοικήσειε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ ἐχθρῶν κρατήσειεν, … οἱ μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς ἀπολαύουσι πράττοντες αὐτά, οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐδενὸς μετέχουσι.[50]
>
> *Mem.* 4.5.10
>
> What's more, the delights of learning something good and excellent, and of studying some of the means by which a person knows how to regulate his body and manage his household successfully, to be useful to his friends and city and to defeat his enemies … these are the delights of the self-controlled; but the incontinent have no part in them.

In this list, *enkrateia*, which begins as control of oneself, extends to other kinds of control or administration or leadership. The phrase "to be useful to his friends and city" recalls his earlier conversation with Euthydemus, in which he characterized the boy's political ambition in this way:

> οὐ δήπου, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσαι, δι' ἣν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίγνονται καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἄρχειν ἱκανοὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;
>
> *Mem.* 4.2.11
>
> You surely don't aim at this excellence through which men become politicians and household managers and able to rule and useful both to others and to themselves?"[51]

The overtly political sense of "useful both to others and to themselves" here explains what Socrates has in mind in the later conversation at *Mem.* 4.5.10, when he says "to be useful to his friends and city"—he has leadership in mind.[52] In this later conversation, Socrates includes generalship in the list of the kinds

50 Cf. *Mem.* 1.4.13: ποία δὲ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ἢ ψύχη ἢ θάλπη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην ἀσκῆσαι, ἢ πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, ἢ ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ ἱκανωτέρα ἐστὶ διαμεμνῆσθαι;

51 Cf. Thus. 2.40.2 (Pericles in Funeral Oration): ἀχρεῖον. For usefulness as a political principle, Edmunds 2002: 86–87.

52 Cf. the similar list at Pl. *Plt.* 259c3–5 (the unnamed philosopher from Elea): Οὐκοῦν, ὃ νυνδὴ διεσκοπούμεθα, φανερὸν ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα· ταύτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικήν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερώμεθα.

of leadership that have their foundation in self-control.[53] The more precise form of the question is, then: If the person who is self-controlled can also exercise *karteria* when the occasion demands (*karteria*$_1$), why is self-control not enough? (Agesilaus is an example of *karteria*$_1$.) What does asceticism (*karteria*$_2$) add?

The motive of display ("*The triad*" (subhead at the top of page 2)), does not seem sufficient to explain Socrates' asceticism and is presumably not the reason or not the only reason that Socrates would give for it. Does he ever give a reason? Twice in *Memorabilia* he is challenged to defend his asceticism, once by Antiphon the Sophist and once by Aristippus. To Antiphon, he uses hedonistic and utilitarian arguments (1.6.4–10). These arguments are the same ones *mutatis mutandis* that he uses in support of *enkrateia* (*Mem.* 4.5.9).[54] To Aristippus, Socrates gives examples of the benefits of voluntary suffering, using, of course, terms for suffering different from Aristippus' negative description, and these benefits include acquiring good friends, overcoming enemies (i.e., as a soldier), managing one's household well, helping friends, and benefiting one's country (2.1.19). Compare the account of *enkrateia* quoted earlier in this section (*Mem.* 4.5.10). There does not seem to be an argument for asceticism (*karteria*$_2$) that can be distinguished from the arguments for the less demanding *enkrateia*.

A reason for Socrates' asceticism appears, however, at the very end of the defense that he presents to Antiphon. He says: "my belief is that to have no wants is godlike; to have as few as possible comes next to the godlike; and as that which is godlike is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme" (*Mem.* 1.6.10). Here the goal of Socrates' asceticism (*karteria*$_2$) is clearly self-sufficiency.[55] But self-sufficiency is a goal separate from *enkrateia* and "ordinary," i.e., non-Socratic, *karteria*$_1$. As I argued earlier, there is no connection in Xenophon between self-sufficiency and *enkrateia* (end of "*The triad*" (subhead at the top of page 2)), aside from the fact that

53 The enemies referred to here are external, not internal political enemies (cf. *Mem.* 1.5.1). In Athens in the time of Socrates, ten generals were elected annually. Often these generals were also political leaders, as in the famous case of Pericles. Cf. MacDowell 2012.

54 Cf. *Mem.* 4.5.9 quoted above n. 5. Bevilacqua 2010: 648 n. 10: "valutazione della *enkrateia* in chiave squisitamente utilitaristica." Cf. Narcy 2008: 40 on Socrates' advice to Euthydemus (*Mem.* 4.5.9); 41–42 on his reply to Antiphon (*Mem.* 1.6.5); 42 "a calculation not utilitarian but hedonistic." Danzig in his chapter in this volume argues that never in Xenophon and never in Xenophon's Socrates, in particular, is *enkrateia* an end in itself; that it is always recommended for the sake of the achievements and mental satisfaction that it produces. Cf. also Dorion 2008: 97–98 on the correspondence of the position of Virtue in the "Choice of Heracles" to the position of Socrates on pleasure.

55 Dorion and Bandini 2000–2011.1: 157–159 nn. 302–304; Bevilacqua 2010: 361 nn. 19–20.

they are twice mentioned in the same context. Self-sufficiency as the goal of *karteria*$_2$ is the special Socratic case.

Then the question becomes: why self-sufficiency in this special case? An answer to this new question is suggested by comparisons with some of Socrates' contemporaries. Besides the two Athenian ascetics, Socrates and Antisthenes (to whom I will return), there were two itinerant sophists, Hippias of Elis and Aristippus of Cyrene, who set self-sufficiency as a goal.[56] Although they were not ascetics, these two give us a clue. Hippias used his encyclopedism and mnemotechnique to achieve his goal of *autarkeia* (Cambiano 1971: 134 n. 21). He once arrived in Olympia wearing only clothes that he had made himself and with a vast store of poetry and speeches in his mind (Pl. *Hipp. min.* 368b = A 12 DK). His skills gave him independence in whatever community he might find himself (Cambiano 1971: 113). We begin to see in the itinerant sophist the reason for the goal of *autarkeia*. In the case of Aristippus, Socrates characterizes his avowed desire for what Aristippus calls freedom the intention "neither to rule nor to be ruled" (*Mem.* 2.1.12), using words that recall the so-called "Constitutional Debate" in Herodotus. (At the end of this debate, when Otanes, the proponent of democracy, is defeated and a king is to be chosen, Otanes withdraws, saying, "I wish neither to rule nor to be ruled."[57]). It would be the perfect political status for the sophist. (Socrates, of course, shows that it is impossible neither to rule nor to be ruled.)

Socrates and Antisthenes are Athenians, living in their own city, but the *autarkeia* at which their asceticism aims is political or anti-political. Antisthenes held that τήν τ' ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ. καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. ("Ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; that the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established laws but by the law of virtue").[58] Antisthenes said that as with a fire so with the *politeia* one should not stand too close or too far.[59]

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56 For Hippias: A 1 DK from Suda: Ἱππίας Διοπείθους Ἠλεῖος, σοφιστὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος, μαθητὴς Ἡγησιδάμου, ὃς τέλος ὡρίζετο τὴν αὐτάρκειαν.

57 οὔτε γὰρ ἄρχειν οὔτε ἄρχεσθαι ἐθέλω, 3.83.2.

58 Again Diog. Laert. 6.11 = SSR V A 134 = t. 134 Prince. Decleva Caizzi divided this passage into fourteen (sic) fragments; for references see SSR or Prince.

59 fr. 168 Decleva Caizzi = SSR V A 70 = t. 70A Prince. Prince 2015: 252: "By contrast with Aristippus, whose personal freedom is represented by Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.11–12) as independent of a city, and by contrast with Diogenes of Sinope, who allegedly called himself "without a city, without a house, stripped of a fatherland" (ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος, DL 6.38), it seems clear that Antisthenes' conception of human life includes a city … But he also seems to have idealized independence from a city, at least in image or fiction … in an approach to individual αὐτάρκεια." Cf. discussion by Prince 2015: 257–259 of tt. 70A–C.

As for Socrates, if “a city comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient but is in need of many things,”[60] then his *autarkeia* tends to make him independent of the city.[61] In his life, he seems to have followed a precept like Antisthenes’s. He lived as a law-abiding citizen in Athens, but he did not engage in politics. When Socrates says in the *Gorgias*, “I am the only one who is engaged in politics” (521d6–8), whatever he means he does not mean the Athenian politics of his lifetime. As for the explanation that he gives to Antiphon in Xenophon, namely, that he is training others for politics, one would like to know who these others were and what he taught them about politics.[62] Discussions that begin as political seem to stay at the level of ethics or otherwise digress. For example, having introduced the “royal art” (βασιλικὴ τέχνη) in glowing terms, he never discusses it as such but only the qualifications for it.[63] If Plato’s *Republic* is held to express the thought of Socrates, i.e., not yet or not entirely Plato’s thought, one has to reflect that the first book is elenctic, and that the construction of the kallipolis begins with an ethical question: how does justice benefit the individual soul?[64]

Self-Sufficiency in a Larger Context

I have argued that self-sufficiency as the goal of *karteria*$_2$, which I called asceticism, is a special Socratic case of this virtue. I then raised the question: what is the goal of his self-sufficiency? Briefly comparing Socrates with Hippias,

60 Pl. *Rep*. 369b5–7: Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκηςἀλλὰ πολλῶν ⟨ὢν⟩ ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν’ οἴει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν.

61 Also in *Republic*, Socrates, as part of his account of the reasonable man (ἐπιεικής), states: “We also say that such a man is most self-sufficient in living well and, in distinction to others, has the least need of anyone else” (387d11–e1). In the context Socrates is referring to the deaths of friends and close relatives.

62 Explanation given to Antiphon: *Mem*. 1.6.15. As for who the others were and what he taught them, David Johnson points out to me that an answer should be sought in the series of seven conversations at *Mem*. 3.1–7. The first five concern elective military offices and the other two, more generally, the formation of the political leader. These conversations are variously interpreted, as the commentaries of Bevilacqua and Dorion make abundantly clear. In another paper, it might be possible to reconcile these conversations with the interpretation of an apolitical Socrates given here. (Note that at 3.4.1 it is implicit that Socrates does not vote in the election of generals.)

63 As I argue in Edmunds 2015.

64 Glaucon to Socrates at *Rep*. 358b4–7: ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ’ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον (justice and injustice) καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν.

Antisthenes, and Aristippus, I suggested that Socrates aimed, through his self-sufficiency, at an extra- or supra-political existence. I quoted a passage from *Mem.* 1.6.10 in which Socrates is defending his asceticism: "my belief is that to have no wants is godlike; to have as few as possible comes next to the godlike; and as that which is godlike is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme."

Socrates goes against the view that Aristotle will state: it is the city that is self-sufficient (*Pol.* 1252a27–30; cf. 1253a1 [noun αὐτάρκεια]), and the individual human is not self-sufficient (1253a25–26 [adj. αὐτάρκης]) when isolated from the city. Aristotle concludes: "The man who is isolated—who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or who has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient (δι' αὐτάρκειαν) is no part of the polis and must therefore be either a beast or a god."[65] Socrates was aiming at that divine self-sufficiency.

The terms in which Aristotle frames his discussion of the priority of the polis—namely, self-sufficiency, the individual, the polis—were already current in Socrates' lifetime, and not only in the discussions of Socrates and his interlocutors. I have referred to Hippias, Antisthenes, and Aristippus and have cited some fragments of their works. The discussion reflected in these works and in testimonials has also left its traces in Herodotus and Thucydides, authors with whom Socrates is not often brought into relation.

The latest events referred to by Herodotus are in the 420s. If Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (425 BCE) alludes to the opening of Herodotus' *Histories*, then it provides a *terminus ante quem* for the currency in Athens of at least the opening of this work.[66] The part of Herodotus of interest here lies not far beyond the opening. It is the dialogue of Solon and Croesus, which takes place during Solon's visit to Sardis (1.29–33).[67] After he has seen Croesus' treasures, Croesus asks him who is the happiest (ὀλβιώτατος) man whom he has seen, expecting that Solon will answer: "you." Instead, Solon names Tellus of Athens and assigns the second place to the Argive brothers Cleobis and Biton. Solon has chosen these persons because he knows how their lives ended, i.e., well, whereas he cannot answer Croesus' question without knowing how *his* life will end. He cannot know how Croesus' life will end because "man is wholly accident" (πᾶν

65 Trans. by Barker 1946: 6 of 1253a27–29: ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

66 Olson 2002: xxxiii, liii–liv ("almost certainly a parody of Hdt. 1.1–5.2").

67 For an introduction and bibliography: Asheri et al. 2007: 97–99.

ἐστι ἄνθρωπος συμφορή, 1.32.4).[68] Solon concludes: "It is necessary to see how the end of every affair turns out, for the god promises fortune to many people and then utterly ruins them."[69]

In this harsh theology, the chances of self-sufficiency will not be great. Here are Solon's words on the subject, which appear before the sentence just quoted:

> Τὰ πάντα μέν νυν ταῦτα συλλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐόντα ἀδύνατόν ἐστι, ὥσπερ χώρη οὐδεμία καταρκέει πάντα ἑωυτῇ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἑτέρου δὲ ἐπιδέεται· ἣ δὲ ἂν τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχῃ, αὕτη ἀρίστη. Ὣς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου **σῶμα** ἓν οὐδὲν **αὔταρκές** ἐστι· στὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλου δὲ ἐνδεές ἐστι· σὸς δ' ἂν αὐτῶν πλεῖστα ἔχων διατελέῃ καὶ ἔπειτα τελευτήσῃ *εὐχαρίστως* τὸν βίον, οὗτος παρ' ἐμοὶ τὸ οὔνομα τοῦτο, ὦ βασιλεῦ, δίκαιός ἐστι φέρεσθαι.
>
> HERODOTUS 1.32.8–9

> It is impossible for one who is only human to obtain all these things (i.e., the list of advantages of the fortunate, as distinguished from the wealthy man that Herodotus has set out) at the same time, just as no land is self-sufficient in what it produces. Each country has one thing but lacks another; whichever has the most is the best. Just so, no human being is self-sufficient; each person has one thing but lacks another. Whoever passes through life with the most and then dies agreeably is the one who, in my opinion, O King, deserves to bear this name (i.e., ὄλβιος "happy").
>
> GODLEY 1920

It is easy to say that ἀνθρώπου σῶμα (literally, "body of a human") is a periphrasis for ἄνθρωπος ("human") (LSJ s.v. σῶμα II.1–2), but, in Solon's list of the five advantages of the man who is fortunate, four have to do with physical well-being (1.32.6). One can also observe that neither the human soul nor intelligence are in evidence in the dialogue of Solon and Croesus. Man's physical well-being and, ultimately, his very existence are subject to chance, and nothing ameliorates the human condition so conceived. Furthermore, no human, on Solon's account, can have everything necessary but is always lacking in something. In short, no human is self-sufficient. The godlike self-sufficiency at which

68 I have taken this translation from the excellent discussion of the dialogue between Solon and Croesus by Immerwahr 1966: 156–158.

69 Trans. by Godley 1920 of 1.32.9: Σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται· πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεὸς προρρίζους ἀνέτρεψε.

Socrates' asceticism, i.e., the training of his body to which he refers in the conversation with Antiphon,[70] aimed would have seemed hubristic to Solon.

The passage on self-sufficiency in Herodotus has been compared with a passage in the Funeral Oration in Thucydides (Macleod 1983: 151–152):

> ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ' ἂν εἴδη καὶ **μετὰ χαρίτων** μάλιστ' ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ **σῶμα αὔταρκες** παρέχεσθαι.
>
> 2.41.1

> To sum up, I say that that the whole city is an education for Greece and it seems to me that the individual Athenian would present his person as self-sufficient for the most forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace.[71]

Thucydides has already said that Athens is the most self-sufficient (αὐταρκεστάτην 2.36.3) city in Greece. Whereas the analogy of country and individual was negative in Herodotus (neither self-sufficient), here the implicit analogy of city and individual is positive. As the city is most self-sufficient, so is the individual citizen (see Rusten 1989: 159). "Athens seems to have created a man who was more than the fragile creature, tied to his human folly and weaknesses or to folly and his mortal destiny, that Solon and archaic Greek thought took as the type of humanity" (Macleod 1983: 152). But the plague, following in Thucydides immediately upon the Funeral Oration, reduces Athenians to that archaic frailty:

> **σῶμά** τε **αὔταρκες** ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνῄρει καὶ τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ θεραπευόμενα.
>
> 2.51.3

70 *Mem.* 1.6.7: ἐμὲ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οἴει, τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶντα καρτερεῖν, πάντα ῥᾷον φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος; "Seeing that I am always training my body to answer any and every call on its powers, do you not think that I can stand every strain better than you can without training?" Bevilacqua 2010: 359 n. 11 sees Socrates here and in similar passages elsewhere as Xenophon's mouthpiece. Dorion and Bandini 2000–2011.1: 43 n. 293 compares Xenophon *Symp.* 2.18, where it is indicated that Socrates' *karteria* was sometimes relaxed.

71 The last part of this translation is from Hornblower 1991: 308. On σῶμα see the discussion of Rusten 1989: 159 ("designates individual as opposed to a larger group").

> No body (i.e., no physical type) was shown to be self-sufficient against it (the disease) as regards relative weakness or strength, but it carried off all of them, even those cared for with a complete regimen.

The same phrase (σῶμα αὔταρκες) that Pericles used of the graceful and versatile Athenian citizen now refers to the human physical constitution in its vulnerability.

The implications of this ironic repetition of "self-sufficient person" for the interpretation of Thucydides are not the present concern. My purpose is to show the relationship of the asceticism of Socrates to a contemporary discussion concerning human self-sufficiency. Even if Pericles did not really speak the words that I have quoted in the funeral oration that he delivered in the winter of 431/0 BCE at the end of the first year of the war, the fact remains that Thucydides thought it plausible to represent Pericles speaking them at this time. The relative date of the passage in Herodotus is unclear. Could Pericles (or the Pericles imagined by Thucydides in this speech) have read or heard the first book of Herodotus? Whatever the answer, assuming the *terminus ante quem* for the opening of Herodotus' *Histories* proposed earlier, one has clear indications of a discussion, in about the first half of the 420s, framed in terms of self-sufficiency and the city. (In the example of Tellus in Herodotus [30.3–5], the city is the context of his overcoming *pro virili parte* the chances of life.) The radical or atomistic self-sufficiency aimed at by Socrates (and the sophists I named) was antipolitical and implicitly challenged both the polis-based self-sufficiency of Pericles (soon contradicted by the plague) and the archaic pessimism of Herodotus.

Socrates (or Plato's Socrates) has the last word. In Book 8 of the *Republic*, in describing the inevitable decline of the ideal polis, when he comes to democracy, Socrates says, among other things:

> καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες συγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις **εὐτραπελίας** τε καὶ **χαριεντισμοῦ** ἐμπίμπλανται, μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί.
>
> 563a6–b2

> Altogether the young are thought to be the equals of the old and compete with them in word and deed, while the old accommodate themselves to the young, and are full of playfulness and pleasantries, thus aping the young for fear of appearing disagreeable and authoritarian.
>
> GRUBE 1974: 211

Socrates ironically echoes the Funeral Oration's praise of the gracefully self-sufficient citizen.[72] In Pericles' thought, the destiny of the citizen is coterminous with the polis (and even more so in the second speech of Pericles in Thucydides. It has been pointed out that the Funeral Oration nowhere mentions the possibility of an afterlife.)[73] Toward the democracy praised by Pericles, Socrates took, in his own life, a radically apolitical stance.[74] In the thought of Socrates as expressed in the *Republic*, this stance is grounded in a radical critique not only of democracy but of all existing forms of government.

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72 As pointed out by Hornblower (1991: 308) (on 2.41.1).

73 Hornblower 1991: 310 (on 2.42.4); cf. 326 (on 2.52.4).

74 Cf. Bevilacqua in this volume.

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Pity or Pardon: Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle on the Appropriate Response to Intentional Wrongdoing

Roslyn Weiss

Of those who do wrong, who merits pardon and who merits pity? In what follows, I shall argue that of the three figures to be considered here—Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates, and Aristotle—Plato's Socrates alone sharply severs pity from pardon, so that he alone can pity those who commit injustice deliberately—while nevertheless blaming them for their deed. Xenophon is not inclined to pardon or pity those who do wrong. Aristotle, if he judges an act blameworthy, finds neither pardon nor pity appropriate; for Aristotle these responses are appropriate—and always appropriate together—only when, and to the extent that, an agent is blameless.[1]

Does Plato's Socrates think there are wicked people whose choice to do wrong is deliberate?[2] I think it is clear that he does. He speaks frequently of men who are bad or wicked (*kakoi*, *mochthēroi*, *ponēroi*).[3] Wicked men, he thinks, though surely misguided about their true interests, are not *only* misguided. For there are other people, similarly misguided, who, despite thinking, as the wicked do, that injustice pays, nevertheless refrain from doing wrong. It

1 Jenny Bryan raised the question of the relationship between pity and pardon in Aristotle's analysis of tragedy. This is a fascinating question that is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper. What I hope to show is that, for Aristotle, to the extent that a deed in real life is not pardonable it is not pitiable. For Plato's Socrates, by contrast, it is precisely the unpardonable deeds that are most pitiable.

2 How one chooses to render *hekōn* or *boulomenos* when it appears in the Socratic paradox tends to reflect how one understands the paradox. Some translate "deliberately" or "intentionally." Those who use "willingly" or "voluntarily" may be suggesting that Plato's Socrates is metaphysically committed to something called a "will." My translation varies with the context; but even when I use "willingly," I do not mean to saddle it with any such metaphysical baggage. As I understand the paradox its sense is that in doing wrong intentionally one fails to achieve the truly good life that all people want or "will." Hence, one acts at the same time intentionally and "unwillingly."

3 When Socrates says at *Grg*. 521d (see also 511b, 521b) that if someone unjustly prosecutes him it will be a base man (*mochthēros*) who is his prosecutor, he obliquely characterizes Meletus as a base man, a man who intends him harm. And he regards tyrants as the quintessential base men.

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is wicked people who recklessly and ruthlessly, without any regard for others, pursue their own interests; their injustice is not limited to those occasions on which they fail to recognize that what they are doing is wrong.[4] These people, unjust precisely because their wrongdoing is intentional, are those for whom punishment is appropriate.[5] For Socrates, the one kind of ignorance that exculpates is a mistake: neither failure to recognize that unjust actions are harmful to oneself nor failure to appreciate that actions harmful to others are unjust constitutes an excuse. Socrates does not regard wicked people as innocent: in the *Apology* he censures those who wrongfully sentenced him to death (*Ap.* 41d8–e1)—"they thought they would harm me. For this they merit blame" (*axion memphesthai*). And in his cross-examination of Meletus he distinguishes between those for whom punishment is fitting because they have intentionally done wrong and those for whom instruction is appropriate because the wrong they have done was committed unintentionally (*Ap.* 25d–26a).[6] Far from showing that all wrongdoing is unintentional, this passage in the *Apology* leaves no doubt that some wrongdoing *is* intentional.[7] Socrates'

4 Segvic thinks (2000: 22) that, according to Socrates, "wrongdoers do not aim at something they recognize as wrong or bad; rather, they are misguided and ignorant about the nature of their action and its goal." On Segvic's view, it would be difficult to explain why Socrates regards wrongdoers as wicked and blameworthy.

5 Some wrongdoers could, I suppose, believe that what they are doing is not wrong—as, for example, when they harm their enemies. If people who do wrong actually believe that what they are doing is not wrong (as opposed to believing that doing wrong is itself right), perhaps they have never examined their beliefs or have never had their beliefs examined. To subject one's beliefs to critical scrutiny is a requirement of Socratic ethics; sometimes that is the only check there is on patently false belief. The more crudely self-serving a belief is, the more one ought to be suspicious of it and the more one ought to be willing to test it or to have it tested.

6 By saying that he could not be doing wrong intentionally because he is not so lacking in wisdom as to not know that corrupting his associates would result in harm to himself, Socrates implies that to do wrong intentionally is to harm others on the belief that one stands to benefit from that harm. Since Socrates knows he will not benefit from corrupting his associates, there is no chance that he intentionally corrupts the young. If the only alternative is that Socrates does wrong unintentionally, then doing wrong unintentionally cannot mean doing wrong while not knowing that one will be harmed, because Socrates has already discounted this possibility in his own case as what would have made it possible for his wrongdoing to have been intentional. The only sense that can be given, then, to doing wrong unintentionally is that one does wrong—harms another—without realizing that the sort of behavior in which one is engaged is harmful to others. Socrates' claim is that he has intended not to harm but to benefit; if the activities in which he is engaged have caused harm, he requires instruction.

7 In a very interesting article, Seel argues (2006: 38–39) that there is a contradiction between

relentless and unwavering demand of people that they always do what is right, that they refrain from committing injustice no matter what (see *Cri.* 49b; *Resp.* 1.335e), argues against his presumed belief that people cannot do other than what they regard as in their own best interest. Indeed, what Socrates says is that "we say in no way that injustice ought to be done *willingly* (*hekontas*)" (*Cri.* 49a4), suggesting that intentional injustice is precisely what most people regularly do, can certainly help doing, and ought not to do.[8] Socrates says of himself that he never committed injustice intentionally (see *Ap.* 37a5–6; *Grg.* 488a2–3);[9] his intentions were always to do right. But Socrates says this of himself as a way of signaling his superiority to most men—not as a way of finding common ground between himself and all others.[10] Never doing wrong intentionally is for Socrates a mark of distinction. It is the just man, not every man,

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the *Apology* and the *Protagoras* that requires resolution. He is not among those who see irony in the *Protagoras* argument or who regard its approach as essentially ad hominem.

8 One way to interpret "no one does wrong willingly" is as asserting that when one does wrong one is unaware that the wrongdoing is harmful to oneself. Such an interpretation, however, makes the exhortation not to do injustice willingly silly: what point is there in demanding of people that they refrain from doing injustice for as long as they think injustice harmful to themselves, if this is precisely what everyone does anyway?

9 In the *Gorgias* passage cited (though not at 509e5–6), Socrates uses the term *examartanein* for wrongdoing, a term that, along with its cognate *hamartanein*, is frequently rendered "to err," that is, to *go* wrong rather than to do wrong. Indeed, it is a common misconception that the Socratic paradox is "no one errs (*hamartanei*) willingly" (see, e.g., Penner 1997: 118; Kraut 1992: 535, where the relevant index entry reads, "involuntariness of error"; Saunders 1987: 24; Flew 1973: 24). In fact, however, the most frequent formulation of the paradox contains *adikein* rather than *hamartanein* or *examartanein*, and even when *hamartanein* or *examartanein* does appear, it is virtually always coupled with other terms (e.g., *aischron* and *adikon*) that remove all ambiguity. (In the *Gorgias* passage cited, *Grg.* 488a2–3, Socrates' *mē orthōs prattō* ["I am acting incorrectly"] executes that purpose.) Only when these terms appear alone do they mean "go wrong" or "err." In the *Protagoras*, for example, where *examartanien* appears by itself at 357d4 and d5, it refers to a going wrong in the measuring of pleasure and pain, a failure due to ignorance. At *Resp.*1.336e, where *hamartanein* appears alone, Socrates assures Thrasymachus that *errors* made previously in the discussion were unintentional. And at *Resp.* 9.589c6, where *hamartanei* appears alone, the reference is to someone who disparages justice and needs to be persuaded because he does not willingly err—that is, he does not willingly suffer a lapse in understanding. None of these is a case, however, in which wrong*doing* is reduced to mere going wrong.

10 Socrates thinks he is a good man. See *Ap.* 28a8–b1: "This has convicted many *other* good men, too"; *Ap.* 41d1: "nothing bad can happen to a good man"; *Grg.* 521b5–6: "it would be a wicked man doing this to a good man."

who scrupulously avoids injustice and wishes to harm no one (*Ap.* 28b–59; *Grg.* 460c3; *Resp.* 1.335d11; cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 4.9.1128b28–29: "but the decent man (*epieikēs*) never willingly does bad things").[11]

It would seem that the *Protagoras* is the only Platonic dialogue where Socrates argues that people always act in accordance with their judgment of what is best; those who do wrong simply miscalculate. What Socrates means outside the *Protagoras* when he says that no one does wrong willingly (as, for example, at *Grg.* 509e5–6) is that it is specifically when people do wrong quite deliberately that they are in one sense still doing what they do not wish to do; by choosing fully intentionally the thing they know to be wrong, they are making themselves wretched, something no one wants to be. To live justly, Socrates thinks, simply is to live well, and to live unjustly, to be wretched (*Cri.* 47b; *Grg.* 470e; *Meno* 73a–b; *Resp.* 1.353e1–354a4).[12] In Socrates' lexicon "happiness" is an adverb; it is the "well" in how one lives. Does Socrates think that if people *knew* they were making themselves wretched, they would then not choose the wrong they choose? Perhaps; perhaps not: Socrates does not speak hypothet-

11 A similar generalization with the same result is found in the *Republic*. In *Resp.* 1, Socrates declares, twice, that no one rules willingly, that indeed even the best men would never be foolish enough to trouble themselves on behalf of anyone else. Yet in *Resp.* 7, not-wishing to rule is a distinction that belongs to philosophers: only those who do not wish to rule are suitable rulers. These flagrantly contradictory texts cry out for interpretation. I would argue that it is when ruling means caring for others that *no one* wishes to rule. The wish not to rule is a mark of distinction, of not being like all men, in those who disdain ruling not because they find caring for others repugnant but because power, money, renown, etc., hold no appeal, or because ruling is often incompatible with justice. Socrates could not possibly think that helping someone else is a bad or foolhardy thing to do: it is, after all, helping others to which he devotes his life. Another interesting Socratic argument, found in both the *Protagoras* (359a–360e) and the *Gorgias* (497e–499b), shows that when the good is reduced to pleasure, the difference between the courageous man and the coward disappears. That is a sure sign that the good cannot be reduced to pleasure. Socrates is intent on keeping the distinction between good men and bad, and between good men and all men.

12 Socrates does say that if one wishes to be happy one must pursue and practice justice and temperance (*Grg.* 507c–d), and that those who are happy are happy through possessing justice and temperance and those who are wretched are wretched through possessing wickedness (*kakia* [*Grg.* 508b1–2]). Nevertheless, happiness need not be a state separate from the justness and temperance that guarantee it. See White 1990: 122: "virtue is not a means to the good that we are to pursue; it is that good itself"; also 126: "to possess goodness of soul is the same thing as to be happy"; and 127: Socrates does not intend "to convey that goodness is distinct from happiness and the cause of happiness." See also Allen 1984: 225.

ically. Socrates' claim is simply that *in* willingly choosing the evil they choose people are doing something they do not wish to do. It is precisely these people, these wicked people, these intentional wrongdoers, who merit punishment. They are fully to blame for their choice of the wrong and unjust over the right and just. But, insofar as their lives are wretched, they are most to be pitied. We do not pity those who unintentionally, through a simple mistake—thinking the poison in the sugar bowl is sugar—choose wrong, though we certainly pardon them. They are good people; for what reason would we pity them? We *might* pity those who do wrong unintentionally in a second sense, namely, through not appreciating that what they are doing is wrong or unjust, that is, that it is harmful to others. Until they know better, such people persist in doing wrong, and this is indeed a shame. But these are people for whom instruction, not punishment, is appropriate; if they are instructed they will presumably do right. Those for whom pity is most suitable are surely those who are wicked, those who are therefore in need of something more than instruction, those we hope to reform by punishment. Since, however, so long as they are not reformed, they are in the worst condition a human being can be in, namely, a condition of unrepentant wickedness, it is these individuals who are most pitiable (*Grg.* 469b).[13] The man who kills justly, Socrates argues in the *Gorgias*, is unenviable (*azēlōton*), but the man who kills unjustly is wretched (*athlios*) and pitiable (*eleinos*).[14]

It is, then, for Plato's Socrates, deliberate wrongdoers who are to be punished, but even they are to be punished only if and because they are blameworthy The so-called therapeutic model of punishment ascribed to Socrates and thought to confirm that Socrates thinks all wrongdoing is involuntary is in fact fully consistent with, and even arguably requires, that wrongdoing be deliberate: only those whose wrongdoing is deliberate stand to benefit from therapy because only they have damaged souls in need of repair.[15] Tyrants are the most wretched

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13 See, too, *Leg.* 5.731c7–8.

14 At *Resp.* 2.365c–d, Adeimantus remarks that because no one is willingly just, those who have adequate knowledge that justice is best undoubtedly have great sympathy for the unjust and are not angry with them. Note that, for Adeimantus, this feeling of sympathy and not of anger is called for not because no one is *un*just willingly but because no one is just willingly! When Socrates regards those who sought his death as blameworthy, he makes it clear that he believes he was intentionally harmed (*Ap.* 41d–e). Socrates explains why he is not angry (*ou chalepainō*): it is because he has not been harmed. His accusers are to blame, however, because their intent was to harm.

15 Socrates ranks the soul above the body, and so deems the welfare of the soul far more important than that of the body to a person's living well. See *Cri.* 47–48; *Grg.* 511–512; *Resp.*

of men regardless of whether they or anyone else so perceives them. Socrates regards those who commit injustice by mistake as innocent: their souls are unblemished and they need no punishment—therapeutic or otherwise. Those who live justly even for crass reasons—dread of punishment, habit, fear of the gods—are still better off (whether they know it or not and whether they think so or not) than those who are unjust, because the souls of those who are just for any reason are still in a better condition than are the souls of those who are unjust. That Socrates sees punishment as curative in no way suggests that he regards the perpetrator of the injustice whose soul requires healing as someone who could not help but do wrong.

Xenophon's Socrates blames and punishes. He does not excuse those who do wrong simply because they are foolish and vicious and fail to recognize their own advantage. It is the duty of all human beings to be virtuous, to conquer the desires that stand in the way of their virtue. Those who do wrong are vicious (*mochthēroi*); they are blameworthy; they are to be punished. Xenophon and his Socrates have no compassion for their ignorance or for their wretchedness.[16]

For Aristotle virtue and vice are distinguished and even defined in terms of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. If an act is vicious it must be blameworthy, and even though wicked acts are done in ignorance, since they are blameworthy they must be voluntary. The proper response to a vicious act is thus censure and punishment; there is no room for pity. To the extent that an act is less than fully vicious, it is less than fully blameworthy, hence less than fully voluntary and more deserving of pardon and pity. If a harmful act is committed in error it is not vicious or blameworthy, so it must be at least in some sense involuntary and, as involuntary, subject to pardon and pity. Voluntary wrongdoing merits neither pardon nor pity; involuntary wrongdoing merits both.

10.618d–619a. Interlocutors who champion injustice frequently forfeit their case as soon as they concede to Socrates that the soul has greater worth than the body.

16 Gabriel Danzig brought to my attention two relevant passages in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. In the first of these, 3.1.38–40, Cyrus advises a son to forgive his father for an act done in ignorance, hence involuntarily, and without malice. That the act was not malicious is most significant. Forgiving one's father is not, of course, the same as condoning murder. In Plato's Socrates' view, it is no kindness to a person who has committed injustice intentionally and with malice to help them avoid punishment (see *Grg*. 480a–c). Moreover, even if one forgives, blame and punishment are appropriate where there is malicious intent. In the second passage, 5.5.10, the question is whether injustice was committed or not. In the event that it was, the implication is that it merits hatred.

Plato's Socrates

Socrates in the Protagoras

Since it is the *Protagoras* that is uppermost in scholars' minds—and surely in Aristotle's—when they speak of the alleged Socratic denial of *akrasia*, let us turn first to the *Protagoras*. I offer in what follows a somewhat detailed exposition of the section of the dialogue (351b–358d) that deals with the alleged Socratic denial of *akrasia*.

In the first stage (351b–c), Socrates lays the foundation for the emergence of hedonism as the common ground that Protagoras and the many[17] share.[18] Socrates airs his suspicion that Protagoras, despite his frequent disparagement of the many,[19] subscribes to a hedonism not very different from theirs. Protagoras' agreeing that "a man who lives his life pleasantly to the end lives well" constitutes, as far as Socrates is concerned, an endorsement of hedonism. Indeed, precisely this formulation appears later (at 355a, discussed just below in connection with stage 3) as one of three that Socrates uses to express the hedonist

17 Hedonism in the exaggerated form in which Socrates limns it here is likely not an accurate representation of the view of the many.

18 Among those who regard the *Protagoras* hedonism as a nonironic expression of Socrates' point of view are Gosling and Taylor (1982: 45–68); Grote (1875: II, 87–89); Hackforth (1968: 38–42); Crombie (1962: I, 240); Irwin (1977: 103–108; 308–309, n. 13); Nussbaum (1986: 89–121). Those who doubt that the hedonism in the *Protagoras* is Socratic include A.E. Taylor (1937: 260); Vlastos (1969 and 1985); Sullivan (1961); Santas (1979: 198–199; 318–319, n. 8); Zeyl (1980); Kraut (1984: 266); Manuwald (1975); D. Frede (1986); Kahn (1996: 239). The view that pleasure is the good is surely anomalous in Plato. In the *Apology* and *Crito* pleasure does not appear among the ends worthy of human care and commitment. The *Gorgias* fiercely opposes pleasure and the life spent in its pursuit. In the *Republic* Socrates is utterly dismayed when Glaucon ventures that the good might be pleasure (6.509a). Many have tried to reconcile the *Protagoras*' hedonism with the rest of the Platonic corpus—Grote (1875: 121–122); Gosling and Taylor (1982: 45–68); Nussbaum (1986: 89–121); some even advance the view that hedonism represents the culmination of the Socratic ethical enterprise—Irwin (1997: 103–108); Nussbaum (1986: 110). Some contend that the *Protagoras* contains an enlightened hedonism (see Goodell [1921]; Gosling and Taylor [1982]; Rudebusch [1989 and 1999]). The hedonism in the *Protagoras* is, however, of the crudest sort (as it is in the *Gorgias*); see Weiss 1998; see also Vlastos 1985: 18, n. 57. Note that Socrates uses the identical expressions in the two dialogues to formulate the hedonist view. See note 21. Zeyl argues that Socrates uses hedonistic premises because he wants to show that *even* on hedonistic premises virtue is knowledge. In my view, Socrates uses hedonistic premises because he wants to show that *only* on hedonistic premises is virtue knowledge.

19 See 317a–b, 333c1–2, 352e3–4, 353a7–8, 353b1–3, 359c6–7.

view. Although Protagoras attempts to take exception to Socrates' various formulations of hedonism, his objection is the same as the many's: he recognizes some pleasures that are not good, some pains that are not bad, and neutral things that are neither bad nor good (351d4–7; cf. 351c4, where the many's would-be objection is found).[20] As Socrates will contend, however, it is not by any standard other than pleasure and pain that the many—and Protagoras—judge pleasures and pains good and bad.

In the second stage (352a–e), Socrates works to secure Protagoras' opposition to the notion endorsed by the many that knowledge can be overcome by pleasure, for unless knowledge is invulnerable to pleasure there will remain one intractable obstacle to the effectiveness of a sophistic *technē*. Does Protagoras agree with the many, Socrates asks, that knowledge is not a powerful thing, that it is no leader or ruler of people, and that people are ruled, even when knowledge is present in them, by passion, pleasure, pain, love, or fear? Does he believe, as they do, that these things often drag knowledge around as if it were a slave? Or does Protagoras perhaps disagree with the many, thinking that knowledge is a noble thing, quite able to rule a person, so that someone who recognized good and bad would not be compelled by any of these other things to act contrary to the dictates of knowledge; his intelligence (*phronēsis*) would suffice to save (*boēthein*) him?

Before addressing the many's purportedly mistaken belief that people are frequently overcome by pleasure, Socrates and Protagoras teach them that when they speak of being overcome by pleasant things like food, drink, or sex, and of indulging in these things while realizing (*gignōskontes*) all along that what they are doing is bad (*ponēra* [353c7]), they mean nothing more by something's being "bad" than that it leads to later pain in the form of disease and poverty. Similarly, when they speak of painful things (exercise, military training, medical procedures, etc.) as being good, they mean nothing more than that they lead to pleasant things, such as health, bodily fitness, preservation of cities, power over others, and wealth, as well as to relief from pain. The many, then, pursue pleasure as good and avoid pain as bad; they are unable to say that the good is anything other than pleasure or the bad anything other than pain; it suffices for them to live life pleasantly without pain; and the good and the bad are nothing but that which results in pleasure and pain, respectively.

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20 That Protagoras expresses the reservation that some pleasures are bad and some painful things good is, by his own admission, just his way of playing it safe (*asphalesteron* [351d3]). He answers, he says, taking into account how what he says will affect the rest of his life (351d3–4).

In stage 3 (352e5–357e2), Socrates seeks to redescribe what the many identify as the cause of their failing to do what is best even when they know what is best—namely, that they are "overcome by pleasure" (352e5–353a2). Socrates gives the many a final opportunity to say, if they are able, that "the good is anything other than pleasure or the bad anything other than pain" (355a1–2). Interestingly, Socrates treats the following three formulations as equivalent expressions of the hedonist thesis: (1) that the good is nothing other than pleasure and the bad nothing other than pain, (2) that "it is enough for you to live life pleasantly and without pain" (355a2–3)—which is the way Socrates first presented the hedonist platform to Protagoras at 351b6, and (3) that the good and bad are nothing but that which *results* in pleasure and pain, respectively (355a3–5).[21] The many, not being present, raise no objections to any of these formulations.

With hedonism now agreed on, Socrates can proceed to demonstrate the absurdity of the many's view that pleasure can overcome knowledge, causing a person to choose what he knows is not best, and can suggest in its place an alternative account of what the many wrongly describe as "being overcome by pleasure." Note, however, that in bringing to light the absurdity of the many's view Socrates does not do anything to establish the rightness of what is presumably his and Protagoras's view that knowledge and wisdom are powerful. On the contrary, in his refutation of the many's view Socrates saps knowledge of its power to overcome anything. His argument is as follows.

The many's view—that a person who has knowledge can nevertheless be overcome by pleasure, since at least on occasion knowledge is weaker than pleasure—turns out to be, given hedonism, an absurd way of explaining why people choose the worse of two options. For, if good = pleasure, how can we say that a person knows that *x* is bad yet still chooses *x* because overcome by pleasure, that is, by good? How can good cause someone to choose bad?[22]

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21 Cf. *Grg*. 494d: "And if a pleasant life, a happy one, too?"; see also 494e–495a: "or is it the man who claims, just like that, that those who enjoy themselves, however they may be doing so, are happy, and does not discriminate between good kinds of pleasures and bad? Tell me now too whether you say that the pleasant and the good are the same or whether there is some pleasure that is not good." See *Grg*. 492d6–7, 494d7, and 494e9–495a4 for additional parallel formulations of hedonism.

22 The absurdity arises as soon as the substitution of "good" for "pleasure" is made at premise (3) in the first argument and "painful" for "bad" at (3') in the second. What is absurd (*geloion* [355d1]) is that someone would knowingly do what is bad because overcome by good (355d1–3), or knowingly do what is painful because overcome by pleasure (355e6–356a1)—when the goods or pleasures are clearly (*dēlon* [356a1]) smaller/fewer than the

Since, given hedonism, the goods/bads or the pleasures/pains—whichever set of terms we use—that compete with one another for ascendancy in the heart of the agent who is about to act, are commensurate with one another, the only way that goods could overcome someone, causing him to choose bad, is if they were "worth" the bads, that is, they were greater or more than the bads. But, if the agent chooses an option in which the goods exceed the bads, the choice he makes is the *right* one. On the argument's assumption, however, that the choice he makes is the wrong one, the goods have to be *un*worthy to prevail over the bads, that is, they have to be less or smaller than the bads. But in that case, how can the agent be *overcome* by them? The person indeed makes the poor choice of taking (*lambanein* [355e3]) greater bad for lesser good; but he is surely not overcome.

Socrates next substitutes "pleasure" for "good" and argues substantially the same way (355e–356a). Here, too, *A* is not overcome by pleasure but nevertheless takes greater pains for lesser pleasures. He certainly errs, but how could he be overcome by the pleasures in *x* if they are smaller or fewer than its pains?

Socrates does flag a possible objection to his argument: that it might be the nearness of a pleasure that accounts for a person's choosing a smaller one when he might choose a larger (356a5–7).[23] In such a case, presumably, even with the

bads or pains. Some other views are as follows: Vlastos (1969) thinks the absurdity occurs at *Prt.* 356c3 and identifies it as that a man does what he cannot do, namely, knowingly choose the lesser pleasure; Gulley (1971) locates it in the second argument when the substitution of "painful" for "bad" is made; Gallop (1964) sees it at 357d–e, the absurdity being, he thinks, the contradiction that a man knows what he does not know, namely, that something is most pleasant/good or painful/bad. Woolf (2002: 238) argues that Socrates is not charging the many with saying something absurd but with doing something absurd, that is, with *taking* less pleasure/good for more pain/bad, and this despite their presumed commitment to hedonistic principles. Yet, what Socrates sets out to show is that it is the substitution of the terms "pleasure" for "good" and "pain" for "bad" that gives rise to the absurdity. Indeed, before proceeding, he gives the many one last chance to escape: all they need to do, if they can, is *say* (*phanai*) that the good is something other than pleasure, the bad something other than pain (355a1–2).

23 Several commentators (e.g., Penner [1997: 23–24]; Devereaux [1995: 391–392]; Brickhouse and Smith [1994: 94, and 2002: 7]) treat Socrates' response to the putative objector at 356a as if it were his general analysis of why people take lesser or smaller pleasure/good when they might take greater or larger. Because of this misstep these scholars misunderstand the analysis Socrates offers. Their interpretation of Socrates' analysis of wrong choice is as follows: At t_1 (the time prior to the decision), *A* believes that *x* is the most pleasant/best option. At t_2 (the moment of decision), *A* believes—because of the nearness of a new pleasure, *y*—that not *x* but *y* is most pleasant/best. At t_3 (the time following the choice

hedonist identification of pleasure with good, pain with bad, in place, "being overcome" might still explain why someone makes the wrong choice. (The nearness phenomenon surfaced earlier as well when, in describing how the many experience being overcome, Socrates singled out their vulnerability to near [*parachrēma*] pleasures [355b2–3].) Socrates deflects the objection, however, by contending that, so long as the difference between a present/near pleasure or pain and a future/distant pleasure or pain is a difference of pleasure and pain, nearness and remoteness should pose no problem for the expert (*agathos* [356b1]) at weighing: he will discount any illusion—produced by proximity or remoteness—of increased or diminished quantity of pleasure or pain, and will determine accurately whether the pleasures exceed the pains or vice versa. In other words, the expert chooses correctly; the nonexpert errs. Neither is "overcome."

In the exchange that follows (356c–357e), Socrates goes on to explain that when we err in choosing pleasures and pains (goods and bads), we err because we lack knowledge. Since the choice to be preferred remains the one in which the pleasures exceed the pains, and the choice to be rejected the one in which the pains outweigh the pleasures (356a3–c1),[24] our doing well (*eu prattein*) depends on our choosing greater pleasures and lesser pains—whether near or distant. And since our making the better choice depends on our mastery of the hedonic calculus, itself a kind of knowledge, it is this calculus that consti-

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of *y*) A regrets his choice of *y*. Socrates' actual analysis, however, ends before the imagined objector enters the scene. Socrates contends that, given hedonism, the only plausible explanation for A's choosing *x* is that he mistakenly thinks that *x* contains more/greater pleasures or goods than it does pains or bads. There is in Socrates' analysis no t_1 and t_2, no new pleasure *y*, and no change of heart on A's part between t_1 and t_2 because of *y*. There is, however, a t_3; there is regret (*metamelein* [356d6]). The regret comes not because the desire A had at t_1 for *x* once again asserts itself now that the distortion caused by the bigger-appearing-because-nearer pleasure *y* at t_2 has been corrected. It comes, rather, simply because A now sees that, contrary to what he had originally thought, *x* contained less/fewer pleasures or goods than pains or bads.

24 The verbals *lēptea* and *praktea* at *Prt.* 356b–c are best rendered "should be taken" and "should be done" rather than "must be taken" and "must be done." Insofar as Socrates maintains that our doing well (*eu prattein*) depends on our choosing greater pleasures and lesser pains, his point is surely not that we cannot help but make this choice but that this is the choice we ought to make. Gallop supports my reading (1964: 128). The contrary view is held by Santas (1979: 30–31) and by Gulley (1971). Since, however, as Socrates argues, given hedonism, the reason one fails to make the better choice is not that one is overcome but that one is ignorant, it follows that those who are skilled at the measuring art (= are not ignorant) will invariably choose, as they should, greater pleasures and lesser pains.

tutes our "salvation in life" (*sōtēria tou biou*). The cause of our making the wrong choice, Socrates continues, is the lack of this knowledge.[25]

Let us summarize the results of Socrates' argument in stage 3: (1) given hedonism, it is absurd to speak of one's knowing what is best yet doing otherwise because one is "overcome by pleasure"; (2) given hedonism, the correct explanation for one's choosing the less good—that is, the less pleasant—option when one is able to choose the better—that is, the more pleasant—option is that one errs; (3) the hedonic calculus prevents error; (4) one who makes mistakes in choosing lacks knowledge in the form of the hedonic calculus.

Before proceeding to stage 4, let us step back for a moment and evaluate the argument of stage 3. Is it true that if pleasure is the only good then it is absurd to say that passion, pleasure, pain, love, or fear might overcome one's knowledge of the best choice? In other words, given the hedonist assumption that there is nothing good other than pleasure and nothing bad other than pain, does it follow that it is impossible for one's knowledge that option *x* is best (most pleasant) to be overcome by passion, pleasure, pain, love, or fear?

The many, we know, understand passion, pleasure, pain, love, and fear as irrational forces that drive them to act against their determination of what is best. And Socrates knows this as well: at 355a8–b1, Socrates, in presenting the many's view, speaks of their experience of "being driven and dazed" (*agomenos kai ekplēttomenos*) by pleasures, and notes the effect on the many of the immediacy of the pleasures (*dia tas parachrēma hēdonas*), by which they are overcome (*hēttōmenos*) (355b2–3). Nevertheless, Socrates, surely quite deliberately, not only proceeds to suppress all reference to passion, love, and fear, limiting himself to just pleasure and pain, but also turns the pleasure and pain that were understood by the many to be irrational forces that *oppose* self-interested calculation into measurable components of particular options.[26] Moreover, Socrates

25 Dyson (1976) and C.C.W. Taylor (1991) note difficulties in the calculus itself. Taylor wonders how one can literally weigh "prospective or hypothetical objects, i.e. possible actions and the consequences which would ensue if these possible actions were actually performed," as well as how one can quantify pleasure or enjoyment in precise units (195–198). Dyson contends that measuring can only take place after the fact; the many unknowns and contingencies prevent accurate measuring before the fact (40). It is interesting that in the *Gorgias* (464e–465a) Socrates maintains that whereas one who possesses a genuine *technē* knows what is best, pleasure can only be guessed at. Socrates seems, then, at least in the *Gorgias*, to deny the very possibility of a *technē* of pleasure.

26 Stocks is to be credited (1913) with recognizing that the goods and bads are in the choice and not in the agent (as Adam and Adam maintain [1905: 184]). The *en humin* in the phrase *ouk axiōn ontōn nikan en humin tōn agathōn ta kaka* (355d3–4) does not signify that the

is determined not to give the attraction of immediate pleasure its due, initially just completely ignoring it, and eventually, when he finally does address it, distorting it by assimilating it to a false impression concerning the size of the pleasure. Pressing too hard the analogy between pleasure and perception, Socrates contends that just as visible things appear larger than they are the closer they are, so will pleasures appear larger than they are the nearer they are; and just as someone who wants the truly larger visible thing would do well to discount the nearness factor, so would someone who wants the truly larger pleasure do well to discount the nearness factor. The truth, however, is that the many do not find an immediate pleasure more attractive because it seems bigger to them; they find it more attractive because it is available to them *now*.[27] Yet Socrates flat-out denies that people are susceptible to the thrill of instant gratification or to the many other irrational desires and fears that might interfere with their pursuit of maximum pleasure or their overall interest in living pleasantly.

Let us turn now to stage 4. Here (357e3–358a4) Socrates begins by recapitulating the preceding three stages, reminding the sophists who are present that his and Protagoras' initial disagreement with the many concerned the many's having maintained that pleasure and other things are stronger than knowledge, while Protagoras and Socrates maintained that, on the contrary, knowledge is stronger than pleasure and everything else. What is strikingly absent from the current summary is any reaffirmation of knowledge's power to overcome pleasure and other things. Socrates claims that he and Protagoras have now shown that the experience of being overcome by pleasure is ignorance.[28] Had Protagoras and Socrates proposed that diagnosis straightaway, Socrates says, the many would have laughed, but if they laugh now they will be laughing at themselves. For they have agreed that those who make mistakes with regard to pleasure and pain, good and bad, lack knowledge in the form of measurement.[29] And an erroneous act that one performs because one lacks knowledge is done out of ignorance.

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bads are in the choice and the goods "in you," but rather that the bads and the goods belong to the choice and "you" is the seat of the rivalry. As Socrates says at 345c, a pleasure is thought (by the many) to be bad if the bads to which it leads outweighs *its* pleasures.

27 See *De Anima* 3.10.433b7–10, where Aristotle notes that whereas thought bids us hold back because of the future, "desire is influenced by what is just at hand."

28 Not "results from ignorance," as Guthrie translates (1956). There is no longer any overcoming; there is no struggle between knowledge, on the one side, and pleasure, pain, passion, love, and fear on the other. Knowledge is but the instrument of pleasure-maximization.

29 Socrates, having identified "our salvation in life" as a *technē* or *epistēmē* of measurement

According to Socrates, the many who make wrong choices lack the measuring art, which, if they but had it, would ensure that they make only right choices. Knowledge as the measuring art, however, does not *conquer* anything. Knowledge as the measuring art does not even rival pleasure and pain.[30] If anything, knowledge is the faithful servant of pleasure.[31] Ironically, it is no longer knowledge that threatens pleasure's dominance; it is ignorance that does so.

Having identified "this greatest ignorance" (357e2)—that is, the lack of the measuring art[32]—as the cause of people's failure to make the right choice, Socrates, to the utter delight of the assembled sophists, names them as the only source from which the salvific *technē* of measuring pleasure and pain can be acquired. He recommends to all who had previously thought that the skills needed for public and private success were not teachable that they seek out the sophists and happily spend all their money on sophistic instruction. For it is as a consequence of people's having withheld their money from the sophists that they do badly both in public and in private. Hippias, Prodicus, and Protagoras all vigorously applaud Socrates' "answer" to the many: they think it "marvelously true" (*huperphuōs alēthē* [358a4]).

In the fifth stage (358a5–d4), Socrates removes the final barrier to the putatively foolproof reliability of the hedonic calculus. In order for the sophistic *technē* to be able to deliver on its exaggerated promise to be "our salvation in life," it is imperative that the people who have it both use it and implement its determinations. If it were possible for people to know what is best (that is, most pleasant) but still choose otherwise, then knowing what is best would be no

(357b4), goes on to say that "what exactly this art, this knowledge is, we shall inquire into later" (357b5–6). Some scholars take this latter remark as a hint that the actual art that Socrates regards as the answer to all life's problems has not been identified and will not be identified in the *Protagoras*. There is, however, another possibility. Socrates might be suggesting that the nature of the hedonic measuring art has up to now been left rather vague—not that it has not been identified—and that to specify precisely how such an art would work might well be an impossible task. See note 20.

30 Santas shows (1971: 295) how language of value-estimate displaces that of strength.

31 Cf. *Grg*. 491e8–492a2, where Callicles says: "the man who will live rightly must let his own desires be as great as possible and not chasten them, and he must be sufficient to serve (*hupēretein*) them through courage *and intelligence*." As Ferrari astutely notes (1990: 124): "even if those people were fully adept at the art of measurement he [Socrates] describes … they would not, after all, truly be able to 'save their lives'. … For the life governed by such measurement is enslaved to the body."

32 How different "the greatest ignorance" identified in *Leg*. 3.689a1 is from this. There the greatest ignorance is to hate, not love, what one's judgment pronounces to be noble or good, and to love and enjoy what one judges to be vile and wicked.

guarantee of success. The many's resistance to instruction in *aretē* is grounded in their experience that even when they know what is best they often fail to do it. The argument of stage 3 removed a serious obstacle to people's always and necessarily choosing greater pleasure over lesser pleasure when they could and when they knew which was which: it purportedly showed that, given hedonism, no one could be "overcome" by pleasure, so that if people do nevertheless sometimes take greater bad for lesser good it is because they do not compute correctly the size or amount of the goods and bads or pleasures and pains in the options before them.[33] In stage 5, the argument is taken a step further. Here it is insisted that human nature itself prevents people from choosing less pleasure when they might choose more. If pleasure and good are the same, Socrates maintains, then it is simply, "so it seems" (*hōs eoiken* [358d1]), "not in human nature" for a man to choose what he believes to be worse (less pleasant) when he might choose what he believes to be better (more pleasant). Having discounted in stage 3 the possibility that a person might be "overcome" by pleasure, Socrates is able to state categorically in stage 5 that no one who is able to choose more pleasure (or good) chooses less.

In both stages 3 and 5 Socrates ties his conclusion to hedonism.[34] Indeed, he had said when he first established the hedonist leanings of the many that "on this [namely, that a thing cannot be good for any reason other than pleasure or bad for any reason other than pain] all the arguments depend" (354e7–8). In stage 3, it is on the premise that pleasure and good are the same that the conclusion that it is impossible to be overcome by pleasure is founded. And in stage 5, it is only after Socrates secures the assent of the sophists to the proposition that

33 As Wolz reasonably asks (1967: 213): "why should young men pay a high fee for the acquisition of a kind of knowledge which cannot withstand the onrush of a blind impulse?"

34 Socrates frequently blames the conclusions he reaches on the interlocutor's premises. It is therefore counterproductive to try to read the account of *akrasia* in the *Protagoras* apart from hedonism. The denial of *akrasia* turns on the acceptance of hedonistic premises, so that it is bound to be misinterpreted when presented "in a way that should be of interest to hedonists and non-hedonists alike" (Segvic 2000: 39). See Santas 197: 273–274: "The complete dependence on hedonism in which Socrates places his argument against the explanation 'overcome (or driven or dazed by) pleasure' indicates clearly not only that this explanation is to be reconstituted along hedonistic lines but also that the alleged absurdity is to be found in a conjunction of the explanation and hedonism, not simply in the explanation." See also Kahn 1996: 239. For classic discussions of the alleged Socratic denial of *akrasia*, see Davidson 1980; Watson 1977. Devereux (1995: 392) argues, like Penner, that desire can cause a standing true belief to be momentarily "clouded," so that one ends up acting on a temporary false one.

"the pleasant is good, the painful bad" (358a5–6), it is only after he assimilates *noble* (*to kalon*) to good and beneficial—and thus to pleasant (358b3–5)—that he ventures to deny *akrasia*.

The denial of *akrasia* is unique to the *Protagoras*, tied as it is to the dialogue's hedonistic premises.[35] Nowhere else in Plato do we find a declaration of the psychological impossibility of a person's making choices that contradict his better judgment. Whereas other dialogues, as we shall see, consider what people want and why they choose what they choose, none asserts that it is not in human nature to act against what one *knows or believes* to be the better option.[36]

Note that Socrates advances no argument in stage 5 for the impossibility of *akrasia*. He alludes briefly to the earlier discrediting of "being overcome" as an explanation for one's making the wrong choice—"To give into oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and to control oneself is nothing other than wisdom" (358c13)—thereby discounting what he assumes is the only objection that might be raised against his new assertion.[37] So long as the possibility of being overcome is not a viable one, Socrates can simply proclaim the impossibility of what might be called "irrational conduct." He says, and all those present agree, that if the pleasant is the good, then no one who knows or believes that there is something better he might do that he is able to do[38] will continue to do

35 That is why Aristotle is obliged to quote the *Protagoras* when criticizing Socrates' denial of *akrasia* (*Eth. Nic.* 7.2.1145b24–25).

36 The expression "knows or believes" (*oute eidōs oute oiomenos* [358b7]) is no accident. Knowledge is no longer a powerful force within a person, a force capable of overcoming competing forces. Once everyone wants pleasure, and once pleasure is not a force competing with one's judgment, one will act in accordance with knowledge if one has it; if not, one will do what one *thinks* best.

37 A second such allusion is found at 359d6.

38 Santas takes the notion of something's being "possible to do" (*dunata*; *exon* [358e1]) (1971: 295–298) to signify that the agent is psychologically able to do it. Since, he argues, a person who is "overcome" is not psychologically able to do other than what he does, if a person does choose the worse of two options, he might do so for one of only two reasons: either because he thought it the better option or, if not, then because he was overcome and so was unable to do otherwise. What cannot happen, according to Santas' reading, is that a person who is psychologically able to do otherwise will knowingly choose the worse of the available options. It is clear, however, that Socrates does not think that being overcome renders a person psychologically unable to do otherwise. At 355a–b Socrates describes the many's position, which he shows to be absurd, as follows: "you say that frequently a man, knowing the bad to be bad, nevertheless does that very thing, when it is possible for him not to do it (*exon mē prattein*), having been driven and overwhelmed by pleasure." Here

what is worse. “No one goes willingly toward the bad or toward what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good. And when one is forced to choose one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser” (358c6–d4). Whatever chance there might have been for someone to choose pleasure over good, or, for that matter, good over pleasure, is absolutely precluded when good and pleasant are the same. At 358b4–5, the noble, too, like the good, derives its character from its role in the advancement of pleasure.

Taken in its hedonistic context, then, the implication of the denial of *akrasia*, of the view that no one ever chooses what he regards as the worse of two choices, is that people are all the same. It is not that there are some who succumb to temptation and others who overcome it, some who rule themselves and others who are out of control, some who choose the just and right even when it strikes them as painful and others who avoid pain at all costs. No; nature herself has made everyone the same. All pursue what they believe to be most pleasant. No one has or can have any other standard. People differ only in their level of computational skill.

In the *Protagoras* Socrates deliberately contorts and impoverishes the human personality, turning people into purely rational pursuers of pleasure. His denial of *akrasia* produces a version of the Socratic paradox that is anomalous and “un-Socratic”: when Socrates says in the *Protagoras* that “no one does bad things willingly,” he means that no one who is able to choose what is in his judgment a better alternative will ever choose a worse one. The paradox in this perverse form plays a critical part in Socrates’ project to discredit in Protagoras’ own eyes his claim to teach *aretē*. By setting forth the improbable conditions for successful sophistic education, Socrates exposes the uselessness of such education for real people who are to be genuinely made virtuous. Real people are not pleasure-calculating automatons; real people are vulnerable to the

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a person, though “driven and overwhelmed by pleasure,” is still said to be *able* not to do what he is driven to do. See also 352d–e: “most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they know what it is and it is possible for them to do it (*exon autois* [352d7]). And when I have asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are overcome by pleasure or pain.” (Similarly at 355d2, where the expression used is *ou deon auton* [its not being necessary to do it].) In the *Hippias Minor* at 366c, Socrates explains that by “if he is able” he means if he “is not prevented by disease or other such things.” See, too, Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 7.3.9: “if able and not prevented.” As Austin says (1961: 146) (quoted by Santas): “We often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse.”

tug of passion, pleasure, pain, love, and fear—that is, they are subject to *akrasia*. And some real people care about things other than maximizing pleasure: brave people, for example, really do "go toward" things different from those toward which cowards go. Moreover, even those real people who do care exclusively about maximizing pleasure are able to recognize, if not always to pursue, other goods besides pleasure. So long as people are real people, sophists cannot teach *aretē*. A hedonic calculus will not help real people acquire *aretē*. What real people need in order to be truly good is nurture of the soul and critical reflection. Of course, if doing well (*eu prattein*) depended on getting the biggest pleasures and smallest pains (356d), and if getting the biggest pleasures and smallest pains required nothing but mastering the hedonic calculus, then it would make good sense for sophists to be sought after and handsomely paid. But if, as Socrates suggests to Hippocrates, what doing well (*eu prattein*) depends on is whether the soul becomes good or bad, then not only should sophists not be sought after and paid well, but they should be avoided at all costs (313a).

It is, then, in souls that are properly nurtured that knowledge of good and bad rules the soul and is not dragged around like a slave by passion, pleasure, pain, fear, and love. Such knowledge, however, is not the hedonic calculus. For the hedonic calculus, as an instrument for pleasure maximization, is the servant of desires and appetites and not their master. The hedonic calculus thus does nothing to improve people; it fails to "take the desires in a different direction" (*Grg*. 517b5–6).

Plato's Socrates outside the Protagoras

Let me review very briefly what I take to be the message of "No one does wrong willingly" in other Platonic dialogues in which it appears in one form or another. It is my view that Socrates denies *akrasia* only once—in the *Protagoras*. Nowhere else—not in the *Gorgias*, not in the *Meno*, not in the *Hippias Minor*—does he contend that it is impossible for a person to act against his or her better judgment; nowhere else, in other words, does he pretend that people are perfectly rational agents or even that they invariably choose what at the moment of decision seems best. Moreover, the denial of *akrasia* in the *Protagoras* relies, as we have seen, on the hedonist identification of goodness and even of nobility with pleasure, a context that surely renders suspect Socrates' putative allegiance to it.[39] Socrates' assertion in the *Meno* that no one wants to be

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39 It seems beyond doubt that Aristotle derives his belief that Socrates denies *akrasia* directly from the *Protagoras*, since he quotes Socrates' remark there that it would be strange if

wretched, and his pronouncement in the *Gorgias* that people do bad and intermediate things for the sake of good ones, do not constitute denials of *akrasia*.

In addressing Polus in the *Gorgias* Socrates promotes the idea that all bad and intermediate activities must aim at some benefit. His arguments are tailored to Polus who is hopelessly enamored of tyrants and who relishes the sheer power of being able to do as one pleases—even, or especially, to kill, confiscate, and banish. Two distinct ideas are presented in Socrates' first argument against Polus, two lessons for Polus to ponder: first, that bad things—killing, confiscating, and banishing among them—are not wanted "just like that" and, second, that when someone wants *to do* bad things for the sake of benefit, he fails to "do what he wants" if the things he thought good are not really good. When someone wants good things and not bad, does he not want the things that are *truly* good? The tyrant fails to do what he wants and fails to have great power because, though he does bad things for the sake of true benefit, he lacks the intelligence to discern which things are truly good (466e10), and thus fails to attain his true benefit. Socrates' point is not that no one can do other than what he thinks best; his point is rather that those who do what they think best are often mistaken; those who are mistaken and who harm themselves when they mean to advance their interests are hardly enviable; surely such people do not do "what they want."

Socrates goes to great lengths in the *Gorgias* to persuade Callicles that pleasure and the good are not the same. Once he succeeds, he is then able to argue that committing injustice is both more shameful and worse than suffering it—though suffering it is still bad. It is in seeking to bolster his contention that the man who wants to avoid committing injustice should cultivate a certain power and art (509e1) that Socrates has recourse to his paradox. If, as Socrates and Polus have already agreed, "no one does wrong willingly, but it is unwillingly that all who do wrong do wrong" (509e5–7), then guarding against doing wrong will require all the power and intelligence one can muster; wishing alone will not suffice. Here, too, the sense of "no one does wrong willingly" is that since doing wrong is not something desirable, since it is not something beneficial, and since it causes one to live badly, all wrongdoing is unwilling—that is, unwanted—insofar as no one wants to live badly. There is no implication at the

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when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and "drag it about like a slave" (*Eth. Nic.* 7.2.1145b24–25; *Prt.* 352c1–2). See Grote 1875: II, 62n.: "We see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon *the doctrine of Sokrates*, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the *Protagoras*" (emphasis in original). Grote points out that Aristotle similarly relies on the *Protagoras* for his report (at *Eth. Nic.* 9.1.1164a25) that Protagoras allowed students to assess their own fee.

end of the *Gorgias* that no one can do anything to oppose the desires or beliefs he has or that one who knows what is right must do it. On the contrary, every effort must be exerted to avoid wrongdoing lest one suffer the greatest misery, the deformity of the soul that only wrongdoing can cause.

In the *Meno* Meno maintains that *aretē* is a matter of having refined tastes and the power to satisfy them. According to Meno's definition, there are then two marks that distinguish the man of virtue, two criteria by which one man may be judged superior to his fellow: (1) a penchant for the fine, and (2) power. It is in connection with the first of these that Socrates introduces his paradoxical notion of "no one does wrong willingly."

Socrates is occupied with the first part of Meno's new definition from 77b6 to 78b2. It is his aim in this stretch of text to level all people with respect to what they want—note his concluding words: "and in this respect [in respect of what people want], no one is better than another" (78b5–6)—thereby discrediting the foolish and groundless elitism manifest in the first component of Meno's latest definition. Socrates considers two sets of people identified by Meno as desiring bad things. The first are those who believe that the bad things they desire are beneficial. What Socrates shows with respect to this set of people is that they do not desire bad things after all: although the things they desire may be in fact bad, they desire (to possess) good things. The second set of people who desire bad things consists, according to Meno, of those who desire bad things recognizing them as harmful. Socrates contends—and Meno agrees—that there is no one who wants (*bouletai*) to be harmed because there is no one who wants (*bouletai*) to be wretched and unfortunate. Since bad things harm their possessor, there can be no one who wants (*bouletai*) bad things. Socrates concludes, therefore, that those who desire bad things thinking them harmful actually do not want (since no one wants) bad things. In this argument, although Socrates denies that anyone can *want* (*boulesthai*) bad things, he does not deny that someone can desire (*epithumein*) them. One *can*, then, as far as Socrates is concerned, desire bad things, even recognizing them as bad; what one cannot do is *want* them. Desire, brute appetitive craving (*epithumein*) for bad things is able to persist even in the face of one's recognition that the objects of one's desire can cause one harm; desire can remain unaffected by judgment. It is only wanting, *boulesthai*, whose objects are restricted to things one judges to be good or beneficial.[40] Since Socrates allows in the *Meno* that an

40 We note that *epithumein* as used in our passage is broad enough to take as its objects both things judged beneficial and things judged harmful. In the first part of the argument, the part that concerns those who desire bad things thinking them good, its objects are things

agent might *desire* (and pursue) bad things even while judging them harmful, he ought not be charged, as he so often is, with overintellectualizing human choice, of making it always a function of one's rational determination of one's own good.[41] Although it may seem paradoxical to say that one may desire but cannot want what one judges to be bad in the sense of harmful, it is actually a point well taken: despite one's recognition that certain things are harmful, one may still be drawn to those things; yet, insofar as no one wants to suffer and be wretched, there is also a sense in which no one really "wants" the bad things that one finds oneself powerfully attracted to or craving. To be wretched, then, Socrates concludes,[42] is to desire, *epithumein*, bad things (which, as has been argued, remains possible), and to get them. The desire is itself an important source of wretchedness because it is desire that impels one to pursue even things that one recognizes as being bad for oneself.

In effect, what Socrates shows in the *Meno* is only that because everyone wants good things—(a) those who desire bad things thinking them beneficial desire good things, for they do not know that bad things are bad if they think them beneficial, and (b) those who *desire* bad things thinking them harmful nevertheless do not *want* them, since no one wishes to be harmed, wretched, and unfortunate—it follows that no person can be said to be superior to others with respect to his wants. Yet, since Socrates does not make the claim that all men *desire* good things, things they judge to be good or beneficial, the possibility remains open that men might be distinguished from one another in terms of their respective desires, that is, in terms of the kinds of things that attract them and in terms of how able they are to resist the harmful things that attract them. The *Meno*, then, strongly suggests that a man's desires can mark him as more wretched than his fellow; for the wretched are identified as being not only those who get (things they regard as) bad things but also as those who desire

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judged beneficial. In the second part, the part that concerns those who desire bad things thinking them bad, its objects are things judged harmful. *Boulesthai*'s objects in this argument, however, are exclusively things judged beneficial.

41 Devereux recognizes (1995: 398–403) that Socrates not only intends to distinguish in this passage between what people want and what they desire, but holds, too, that people can desire things they believe are bad and harmful to them. Devereux is not, however, prepared to say that Socrates acknowledges in the *Meno* the possibility of *akrasia*. He attributes to Socrates the view that strong desires cloud people's judgment temporarily, so that when they choose things they themselves think are bad, they still believe them at the moment of decision to be good. The *Meno* text, however, does not support this reading.

42 See Sharples in Plato 1985: 139. Cf. Nakhnikian, who argues (1973: 5), that there is a logical flaw here.

them. Thus, even if with respect to their wants all men are equal, it need not be so with respect to their desires.

Although the *Hippias Minor* is thought to be Plato's way of driving home the point that no one does wrong intentionally—since, per impossibile, "if there were such a man" he would be the good man—this is not, I would argue, what the argument shows. What the argument shows is that if justice is a skill, then, as in the case of any skill, the more skilled practitioner (in the case of justice, the good man) is the one who does poorly (in the case of the skill justice, this would be the one who does injustice) intentionally. Far from arguing that no one does wrong intentionally, Socrates notes that doing badly on purpose rather than not on purpose is a sign of greater competence. The conclusion that the good man is he who does wrong intentionally cannot possibly be, however, one that Socrates embraces. For him, the good man always wishes to do right, so that the only way a good man would do wrong is *un*intentionally. As we have seen, this is precisely what Socrates says of himself: if he does wrong, it can only be unintentionally (*Ap*. 37a5–6; *Grg*. 488a2). The *Hippias Minor*, then, like the *Protagoras*, reduces to absurdity the notion of justice as a skill, especially one purportedly taught and teachable by sophists.[43]

There is no suggestion in any of these dialogues that all men of necessity pursue their advantage as they see it, so that those who do injustice in order to advance their interest could not have done otherwise.

43 A similar argument appears in Xenophon at *Mem*. 4.2.19. Note that in the *Hippias Minor*, doing injustice intentionally is doing *bad*: Socrates never says that intentional injustice is better than unintentional, but only that the *person* who does injustice intentionally is more skilled, hence "better," in this limited sense. The "good man" is understood to be good as good carpenters, smiths, etc., in the sense of being more skilled—in his case, more skilled at justice. The *typical* good man is—in all things—the one who does well; it is only when the odd case of the man who does poorly is considered that the person who does poorly intentionally is preferred—because he is more skilled. Note, too, the word-play (or equivocation) on "intentionally" in the argument's conclusion. The man who intentionally does injustice can be either the man who does injustice when he wants to and not, because of his incompetence, when he does not want to, or the man who *wants* to harm others—in other words, either the man who does injustice *only* when he wants to because of his competence, or the man who does injustice *because* he wants to. Cf. Cephalus in *Resp*. 1 who sees as one of the great advantages of being wealthy "not having to cheat or lie to any man unwillingly (*akonta*)" (331a–b).

Xenophon

Xenophon deals with the question of *akrasia* in two passages of the *Memorabilia*: 3.9.4, and 4.6.6. Scholars debate whether and in what sense Xenophon's Socrates' view of *akrasia* coheres with that of Plato's Socrates. Unfortunately, scholars tend to look to the *Protagoras* for Plato's Socrates' view on this matter. As we have seen, however, the *Protagoras* is the last place to look: by tracing the absurd consequences of the idea that there is no such thing as *akrasia*, what the *Protagoras* shows is that only if virtue is to be taught—that is, taught by sophists—must it be a matter of knowledge; and it can only be completely a matter of knowledge if knowledge not only has no competition from pleasure but if the desire for immediate pleasure can be reduced to the wish to get more and bigger pleasure. Indeed, knowledge in the *Protagoras* is not, in the final analysis, revealed to be stronger than pleasure but rather revealed to be an instrument for pleasure-maximization—a hedonic calculus.

In the second of the two *Memorabilia* passages in which there appears to be a denial of *akrasia*, *Mem.* 4.6.6, Socrates' responses to Euthydemus on piety and justice rely on a foolish intellectualism—knowledge of rules—worthy not of Socrates but of Euthydemus. This argument is preceded by one at 4.4.13, where Socrates offers Hippias a worthless pseudo-argument to show that the just and the lawful are the same. The game is essentially over as soon as Hippias agrees that one is just if one obeys the laws, and unjust if one disobeys them. Note, first, that this argument is intended to illustrate how Socrates sought to exhort his associates to self-control. Second, Socrates, having asserted his view that deeds are better witnesses than words, offers a definition of justice only under duress. Although Hippias agrees that many say what is just but do not do it and that if one acts justly one is not unjust, nevertheless, since, as he insists, acting a certain way is not the same as offering an account, and since, moreover, Hippias charges, Socrates ridicules (*katagelas*) others, questioning and refuting them, but never offering his own account, and since, moreover, deeds are not an account, Socrates is obliged to offer an "account." Socrates' account of justice is not, then, one of those moral lessons he purportedly offers freely and generously to all comers.

Section 4.6.6 is a clear instance of Socrates' tailoring an argument to suit the interlocutor, the sort of tactic Socrates regularly deploys in Plato's dialogues. Xenophon, no less than Plato, recognizes that Socrates tailors his educational approach to suit the student: "he did not employ the same manner for all" (4.1.3). Xenophon depicts Euthydemus as someone who prides himself on his education and his wisdom (4.2.1) but pretends never to have learned anything from anyone (4.2.3–4). In 4.6.1, Xenophon makes clear that in what follows he

will be showing how Socrates made his associates more skilled at discussion (*dialektikōterous*). It is only after defeating Euthydemus repeatedly and humbling him that Socrates presumably proceeds to teach him "simply and clearly" (*haploustata de kai saphestata*) in order that he be most excellent (*kratista*) (4.2.40).[44] The "reasoning" here is as follows: unless one knows the rules one cannot be pious or just; but if one *knows* the rules (what ought to be done) one will also *think* they are what ought to be done; and, since people do what they think ought to be done, those who know what ought to be done do it and hence are pious and just. There is in this argument the bizarre implication that everyone who simply knows the rules will obey them and will, as a result, be pious and just. Let us note that on this definition of piety and justice, almost everyone would be pious and just; the pious and just would hardly be exceptionally admirable. Moreover, there is equivocation on "ought": is the "ought" in knowing what ought to be done the same as the "ought" in people's doing what they think ought to be done? In the first case it is what is prescribed by the laws; in the second, it is one's own estimation of the best way to proceed, by whatever measure of best one might apply.[45]

The first passage, 3.9.4, is perhaps of greater philosophical interest. There are in this passage two distinct, though connected, matters being dealt with, matters that scholars tend to run together. The first matter is whether Socrates separated *sophia* (wisdom) from *sōphrosunē* (prudence).[46] Xenophon says that

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44 See, too, 4.7.1: "I think I have said enough to show that Socrates stated his own opinion plainly to those who consorted with him."

45 In discussion with Euthydemus, the same ridiculous conclusion is reached: "And is he who knows *ta dikaia* more just than he who does not?" Euthydemus is rightly unsure. He is less unsure with respect to the conclusion at 4.2.22, that those who are slavish (*andrapōpodesi*) are ignorant of the noble, the good, and the just. Xenophon's Socrates blurs the distinction between the question of *which* is more unjust—intentional or unintentional deception—and the question, which is Plato's Socrates' question: *who* is the more just man (4.2.19–20).

46 As Seel correctly notes (2006: 37), *sōphrosunē* is not for Xenophon the same as *enkrateia*. He suggests that *sōphrōn* be translated "of sound mind," "discreet," "prudent," or "moderate." Keeping the terms distinct allows the possibility that someone might be *enkratēs* and *asophos*—that is, that someone might have the precondition for virtue, namely, *enkrateia*—yet, because he has not as yet acquired wisdom, fail to be virtuous. Although Dorion acknowledges (2003: 653) that Xenophon, in his discussion of *enkrateia* at 1.5, 2.1, and 4.5, never explicitly calls it a virtue, and that he does not include it in the list of virtues Socrates defines in 3.9 and 4.6, he mistakenly supposes that it is synonymous with *sōphrosunē* at 3.9.4 (2003, 652–653), and hence that it counts as a virtue. (See, too, Dorion 2006: 101, where Dorion says that for Xenophon *sōphrosunē* is "almost always synonymous with *enkrateia*.") Seel, however, also calls our attention (2006: 37) to 4.5.7, where Socrates asks

he did not: for Socrates, a man who knows the noble and the good things (*ta men kala tagatha*) uses them, and one who knows the shameful things avoids them; such a man is both *sophos* and *sōphrōn*. The implication is that knowing the noble and the good things causes one also to use—or do—them; *sophia* concerns the knowing; *sōphrosunē* concerns the doing. But the second matter is a *different* one: "when he was *asked further* …" (*proserōtōmenos*). Here the question is about one who knows what is to be done but does otherwise. This is *not* someone who uses—or does—the noble and the good; it is someone who *does* wrong. Moreover, it is clearly also not someone who knows the noble and the good, because one who knows these does right.

Far from denying *akrasia*, Xenophon's Socrates states rather bluntly that the man who knows what he ought to do but does the opposite is unwise and *akratēs*. It appears, however, that the phenomenon under consideration—of knowing what ought to be done but doing otherwise—is not what Xenophon's Socrates calls *akrasia*. If it were, the question that immediately follows would be rather peculiar: whereas one can see why someone might think such a person wise, how might anyone think such a person anything other than akratic?[47] What Xenophon's inquirer in fact seems to be wondering about is if one who knows what is right but acts otherwise would be wise—after all, he knows what ought to be done—even though he is also akratic insofar as he fails to do it. In other words, the question is: can a person be wise even though he has failed to master his desires, passions, and appetites? Socrates' answer is that he cannot: there is no wisdom here—only *akrasia*, only lack of mastery of appetites and desires. The sheer knowing of what ought to be done does not constitute wisdom. For knowing what ought to be done can be overridden; yet knowing the noble and good—wisdom—cannot.[48] Moreover, says Socrates, the person who knows what is right but does wrong mistakes his true advantage.

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to which person *sōphrosunē* belongs less than to the *akratēs*. If *sōphrosunē* were the same as *enkrateia*, that would be, as Seel points out, a foolish question.

47 An alternate reading has *enkrateis* rather than *akrateis*. If that is the correct reading, the inquirer would be wondering if a person who does what is wrong while knowing what is right is showing some sort of wisdom in knowing what is right and some sort of strength in overcoming what he knows. This is a rather odd construal of *enkrateia*, but perhaps not an impossible one. (Perhaps someone like Callicles or Thrasymachus might think that it is a sign of strength or mastery to be able to overcome what one knows to be right.) For a full discussion of these variant readings, see Seel 2006: 37.

48 A similar, though not identical, distinction is drawn by Jan Szeif in his review of Dorion's *Socrate* (*Que sais-je?*) (2006). Szaif distinguishes between the "quite extreme position" that "actions and inclinations are always fully determined by one's beliefs about what is good and what is bad such that there is no room for acting against these beliefs" and the "more

Note that Socrates does not ridicule the question he is asked, namely, whether those who know what they ought to do but do the opposite are at once both wise and *akrateis*,[49] but responds to it quite civilly—which suggests that he does not at all regard the phenomenon that *we* (and Plato's Socrates) call *akrasia* as absurd or impossible.[50] To be clear: the phenomenon of knowing what is right and doing otherwise is *not* what Xenophon calls *akrasia*; for Xenophon *akrasia* is the opposite of *enkrateia*,[51] which is the precondition for the acqui-

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moderate" view that "genuine *knowledge* or *understanding* regarding what is good and what is bad cannot be defeated by irrational desires" (2006: 344; emphasis in original). In my view, the passage under discussion suggests that the "more extreme" position that Xenophon rejects is that those who know (*epistamenous*) *ha dei prattein* must act accordingly. Cf. 4.2.22: Those who are slavish (*andrapōpodesi*) are ignorant of the noble, the good, and the just—note, however, that they are not said to be ignorant of *ha dei prattein*.

49 I follow those who read *akrateis* rather than *enkrateis*—however, see n. 47.

50 For the contrary view see Waterfield, who contends that Xenophon's Socrates in 3.9.4 "outlines with perfect clarity the theory of voluntary action which leads to the paradoxical denial of *akrasia*. … This is a clearer expression of Socratic intellectualism than we find even in Plato" (2004: 99). (Morrison 2008, too, finds in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* the clearest statement of Socratic psychological egoism.) Waterfield goes on to cite 4.6.6 as further confirmation that Xenophon both preserves and fully understands the Socratic denial of *akrasia*. But see Terence Irwin, in his review of Strauss's *Xenophon's Socrates*, where he says (1974: 412) that Xenophon's remarks on the evils of *akrasia* (1.5; 4.5) show that his Socrates does not doubt the existence of *akrasia*. For Waterfield, Socrates' disparagement of *akrasia* in Xenophon (such as that found at 4.5) are actually denigrations of *akolasia*. I find *this* point by Waterfield persuasive so long as (1) *akrasia* is understood as the general failure to master pleasure, which is the counterpart of *enkrateia* and *not* the phenomenon of knowing *ha dei prattein* but doing otherwise, and (2) the *akolastos* is taken to be someone who has failed to master pleasure rather than, as Aristotle understands him, someone who believes pleasure is to be pursued. Seel perhaps confuses this sort of *akrasia* with what he calls pre-deliberation *akrasia*, and which he likens to Aristotle's notion of the *akrasia* that is a matter of *propeteia* (impetuosity)—as contrasted with post-deliberation *akrasia* that is a matter of *astheneia* (weakness). I think that for Aristotle these two types of *akrasia* are both ways in which someone knowingly makes the wrong choice *now*. Since, however, the *akrasia* that is associated with *propeteia* is not the general failure to master one's appetites, this is arguably not the sense in which Xenophon uses the term *akrasia*. It is true that, as Seel maintains (2006: 34), Xenophon does not recognize the phenomenon of post-deliberation *akrasia*; Xenophon's Socrates seems to think that *akrasia* precludes deliberation. But that is because, for Xenophon's Socrates, *akrasia* is not the phenomenon of acting against one's knowledge of *ha dei prattein* but rather the failure to have mastered one's desires and to understand one's true advantage, the latter probably being a result of one's not knowing the noble and the good.

51 Dorion recognizes (2003: 656) this use of *akrasia* in 1.5 and 4.5; this *akrasia* prevents a

sition of the virtues, including the virtue of *sōphrosunē*.[52] In the absence of *enkrateia*—that is, in the presence of *akrasia*—it is possible to know what is to be done yet do otherwise. But in the absence of *enkrateia*—that is, in the presence of *akrasia*—it is impossible for one to acquire the *sophia* and *sōphrosunē* that guarantee acting rightly. Xenophon's Socrates finds nothing impossible or absurd in the phenomenon that *we* call *akrasia*, so long as *akrasia* in *his* sense is present. So, we cannot say that Xenophon's Socrates denies *akrasia*—whether in his sense or in ours.

I find puzzling the widespread interpretation[53] that sees in this passage a denial of the phenomenon of knowing what ought to be done but doing otherwise. Socrates does not say in this passage that it is not possible for there to be someone who knows what ought to be done and yet to do otherwise; what he says is that such a person is not wise and not a master of his or her pleasures and passions. To be sure, this is a person who fails to appreciate his or her true advantage; but why should this make him or her a person who fails to know what ought to be done?[54]

This passage concludes with the proposition that those who do not act correctly (*mē orthōs prattontas*) are neither wise nor prudent. How does Socrates reach this conclusion? His reasoning appears to be as follows (I supply the missing premises): People choose what they believe is to their advantage. (This proposition is in the text.) The person who knows what ought to be done yet does not do it does not see that what ought to be done is to his advantage. Such a person does not know the noble and the good (*ta men kala te kagatha*)—though he knows what ought to be done—because a person who knows the noble and good knows that what ought to be done is to his advantage. Therefore, any person who acts incorrectly fails to be wise and prudent, since these entail knowing the noble and the good—that is, they require the deep understanding and appreciation of the noble and good that lead always to right action.

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person from being virtuous from the outset. In my view it is in this sense of *akrasia* that Xenophon speaks of the *akratēs* in 3.9.4 as well.

52 *Enkrateia* is not, strictly speaking a virtue. It is distinct from *sōphrosunē*. See n. 46.

53 This interpretation is found, for example, in Dorion 2003: 651: "… *le cas de figure envisagé par son interlocuteur anonyme est tout simplement impossible*."

54 Similarly, 2.1.5. Here Socrates mocks the person who, despite knowing the likely ramifications of committing adultery, commits it anyway, but does not imply that the agent fails to know that adultery is not to be done, or even that it is likely to have unwelcome consequences. What he fails to know, because he is an *akratēs*, is his true advantage. And he clearly lacks *sophia* of the noble and good and so also the virtue of *sōphrosunē*.

Xenophon confirms this interpretation by arguing in what follows (3.9.5) that those who know the noble and the good will never choose otherwise; those who do not know them will choose badly even if they try to choose well. (See, too 4.1.5.) Furthermore, in 4.5.3–11, Socrates elicits Euthydemus' agreement that it is the *akrateis*, those who are ruled by bodily pleasure, who are least free and least able to do what is best. They are held back by "hinderers" (*kōlusontas*)—the pleasures that prevent their pursuit of the best. Not only are they kept from doing what is most noble, but they are compelled to do what is most shameful. They thus suffer the worst kind of slavery. *Akrasia* precludes, too, the greatest good, which is wisdom. It holds men back from what is useful by drawing them away from the useful to the pleasant. It disturbs people's perception of good things and bad so that they choose the worse rather than the better. The *akrateis* cannot be prudent; they cannot care for what is appropriate or what is beneficial; *enkrateia* has the opposite effect and so is best for man. In the end, *akrasia* does not even bring enjoyment, because the hunger, thirst, and lack of sleep that only the *enkrateis* can endure makes food, drink, and sleep great pleasures when they are at last experienced. Moreover, the *akrateis* are deprived of the pleasures of learning things that are noble and good—indeed of the joys of knowledge itself. The *akrateis* value pleasures that are near over pleasures that are better. Euthydemus draws the conclusion that those who are at the mercy of bodily pleasures have no connection whatsoever with virtue. Socrates concurs: those who cannot control their desires may not be able to begin to consider the most excellent things (*ta kratista*) and so are precluded, like beasts, from classifying things as good and bad and preferring the bad. Thus, as Dorion has persuasively argued,[55] *enkrateia* is for Xenophon's Socrates a precondition for the acquisition of wisdom and of virtue (see *Mem*. 1.5.4); *akrasia*, then, is an obstacle to these. A person who is at the mercy of his or her desires can be neither wise nor virtuous. At 1.5.4–5, Socrates affirms that *enkrateia* is the foundation (*krēpis*) for virtue, without which no one can learn or care worthily for any good; the man who is enslaved to his pleasures, Socrates declares, is shamefully disposed in body and soul. At 1.5.6 Xenophon lauds Socrates for manifesting in his own deeds the *enkrateia* he preaches in words.

There is nothing in this passage to suggest that the person who acts incorrectly is excusable. Although the person who knows what is right but does otherwise fails to see the coincidence of what is right with what is to one's

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55 Dorion 2003; also, Seel 2006. Dorion's argument is tainted by his view that Xenophon's Socrates denies *akrasia* in 3.9.4 (see n. 53), and by his assimilation of *enkrateia* to *sōphrosunē* (see n. 46).

advantage, Xenophon's Socrates does not appear to regard this sort of ignorance as exculpatory. Here is a person who knows what is right. Here is a person who might have mastered his appetites and desires, those drives that are responsible for his failing to appreciate the coincidence of advantage with what is right. Such a person is indeed bound to go wrong. He is unable to deliberate properly and, even when he aims at his advantage, is likely to miss. Yet his failure is his own. Like Plato's Socrates, so, too, Xenophon's Socrates blames those who killed him unjustly: it is they, rather than Socrates who is unjustly killed, who will bear the shame of it (*Mem.* 4.8.9; cf. Xenophon, *Ap.* 26).

How does Xenophon's Socrates' view compare with Plato's Socrates' view in the *Protagoras*? In the *Protagoras*, that people choose wrongly is actually the fault of the sophists. The sophists are, after all, withholding the hedonic calculus, "our salvation in life" (356d, 357a), which they might share! People need only the hedonic calculus to do right without fail; if they have it, they do right; without it, they stumble. The *Protagoras* countenances no wicked people, no morally flawed people, no blameworthy people.[56] If people fail it is because the sophists have failed them. There is no reason to hold the people responsible for their moral errors.[57] To be sure, they should be pitied because the sophists have not come to their rescue and they are therefore not getting as much and as big pleasures as they otherwise might. And they are to be excused because all people want the same thing and all people go toward the same thing. For Xenophon's Socrates, by contrast, unmastered desire for pleasure is an obstacle to understanding that the right and the personally advantageous coincide. The desire for pleasure rivals one's ability to choose what one ought, what is truly advantageous. But it is incumbent upon each of us to master our desires and our appetites. The ignorance that results from our failure to do so is our own. We are to be neither pitied nor pardoned.

For Plato's Socrates everywhere but in the *Protagoras* (or, including the *Protagoras* when read ironically), however, not to see what is right as advantageous to oneself is no excuse at all. People are expected to do what is just regardless of whether or not they believe it benefits them. The only fully excusable harm is

56 Dorion represents Plato's Socrates' position as well as Xenophon's as the view that the "*virtuous* person who knows what is good will never act, under the influence of pleasure or of some other passion, contrary to his virtue" (2006: 103; my emphasis), when, in fact, Socrates' point in the *Protagoras* (when taken at face value) is that *no one* will do so: no one who knows what is best (= most pleasant) will fail to do it, since what is right is most pleasant.

57 The people themselves are to blame, too—but only to the extent that they have withheld their money from sophists.

harm that is wholly innocent—that is, harm that results from sheer error, errors of the kind Aristotle describes in *Eth. Nic.* 3.1.16–17 (see the following section, below). Why would one who mistakenly causes harm be pitied?: his soul has not been damaged in any way. It is inexcusable harm—the harm that ruins the soul—that is pitiable.

Xenophon's Socrates is not a moral intellectualist any more than Plato's Socrates is. He does not think that if one knows what is right one will do it: does he really believe that everyone who knows the rules follows them? Of course, generally speaking, people will do what they believe is to their advantage. But is it permissible to do wrong because one believes it is to one's advantage? For both Plato and Xenophon, the person who knows the noble and the good will do right. But knowing what ought to be done—*ha dei prattein*—does not entail knowing the noble and the good. Many more people know *ha dei prattein* than know the noble and the good.

Aristotle

One of the more awkward features of Aristotle's treatment of wrongful acts is that he is obliged to violate the connection he himself establishes between blameworthiness, voluntariness, and knowledge. One would think—and so Aristotle would normally think—that for an act to be voluntary it must be done knowingly,[58] yet Aristotle acknowledges the ignorance of the wicked who do wrong deliberately. They are ignorant, Aristotle says, of the universal, but since their ignorance does not exculpate, their ignorant acts must be voluntary.

From Aristotle's perspective (*Eth. Nic.* 3.1.14–15), all wicked men (*mochthēroi*) are ignorant of what ought to be done, *ha dei prattein*, and of what ought to be refrained from, *hōn aphekteon*. They become unjust and bad because of (*dia*) this error. Yet, Aristotle contends, the term "involuntary" cannot apply in their case, because any ignorance that constitutes vice (*mochthēria*) is something we blame (*psegontai*), and anything blameworthy is automatically precluded from being involuntary. (In all the cases that are blends of the voluntary and the involuntary, the determination of which of these they are and to what extent turns on their blameworthiness or praiseworthiness. Similarly, voluntariness seems to depend on how easy or hard it is to avoid the wrongful act: if it is easy

58 See *Eth. Nic.* 3.5.4: wickedness (*mochthēria*) is voluntary (*hekousion*) because a man begets his actions as he does his children, and so their origins (*archai*) are in us and they are up to us (*eph' hēmin*). In 3.5.7, those who are excused have been constrained (*biāi*) or act from ignorance (*agnoian*).

to avoid the bad act and most people can do so, the bad act is deemed more voluntary in the case of one's failure to avoid it [7.7.6]. An act's greater voluntariness qualifies it for greater blameworthiness.) These wicked agents are ignorant of their interests (*ta sumphertonta*); for that they are culpable. They are ignorant in moral choice (*prohairesis*); they are ignorant of the universal (*katholos*). Acts done out of this sort of ignorance are inexcusable, and, since they are inexcusable, they are not involuntary. Were they not blameworthy they would merit, as they surely do not, pity and pardon (*eleos kai sungnōmē*). Legislators need to know if an act is voluntary or involuntary in order to know if punishments and rewards apply (3.1.1).

Why does Aristotle think the wicked are ignorant of the universal? Is it not more reasonable to say—with Xenophon—that the wicked know the universal and know the particulars of their current situation, yet act in defiance of both? Is the *akolastos*, the licentious man who pursues pleasure, ignorant of what ought to be done, or is he well aware of *ha dei prattein*—that one ought to live moderately—and that the excessive pleasures he is about to indulge in are an instance of *hōn aphekteon*? The wicked may well not appreciate that the right things are to their advantage—as Xenophon's and Plato's Socrates would surely concede—but do they not know what ought to be done, which things belong (at least generally) in the category of virtue and which of vice?[59] If Aristotle wants to (1) blame the wicked, (2) assign voluntariness to base acts and involuntariness to innocent ones, and (3) associate voluntariness with knowing, why does he insist that (4) the wicked are ignorant, that it is through their ignorance, because of their ignorance, due to their error, that they become unjust and bad? Why does he feel he must carve out a space for ignorance that is not involuntary?

There can be, I think, only one explanation for Aristotle's insistence that the wicked are ignorant of the universal, of *ha dei prattein*, when it is not so for Xenophon or for Plato, for whom the wicked are ignorant only of their advantage. Aristotle's reason must be his belief that knowledge cannot be dragged around like a slave. If the wicked were not ignorant they would not be wicked; if one knows what is right one does it. And so, for Aristotle, it must be the case

59 Callicles in the *Gorgias* reveals that he does indeed know the difference between virtue and vice when he finds infuriating (*aganaktēton*) the prospect that Socrates, a noble and good man, would be at the mercy of a base (*ponēros*) one (*Grg.* 511b). And Socrates professes not to know what to do about a Thrasymachus who would place injustice in the category of virtue, and justice in that of vice (*Resp.* 1.348e); he is used to dealing with those who place injustice in the category of the vicious and shameful though they insist it is profitable.

that the wicked are in the dark. But if the wicked are ignorant, it follows for Aristotle that not all ignorance is exempt from blame, and so, that not all ignorance is involuntary. He does not distinguish, as Xenophon does and as Plato no doubt does as well, between knowing *ha dei prattein*, on the one hand, and having the kind of wisdom that is knowledge of the noble and good, on the other.

The kind of ignorance that is exempt from blame, Aristotle says (*Nic. Eth.* 3.1.16–17), the kind that is pitied and forgiven, is ignorance of the particulars concerning the act: not knowing (1) doer; (2) deed; (3) "object or person affected by it"; (4) "wherewith (e.g. instrument with which) it is done"; (5) "that for the sake of which it is done (e.g. protection)"; or (6) "way in which it is done (e.g. gently or violently)." If I, for example, take something that belongs to another person not knowing it is not mine—that is pardoned (and, Aristotle adds, pitied). But if I take something belonging to another person while knowing full well that it is not mine, that is not excusable, because ignorance of the universal that one ought not to take what is not one's own, unawareness that it is to one's detriment to steal, and ignorance in the *prohairesis* are all culpable.

Let us turn now to Aristotle's *akratēs*, contrasting him first in broadest outline with Plato's and Xenophon's *akrateis*. Plato's *akratēs*, as described in the *Protagoras*, is someone who knows (or believes) something is right, is able to do it, but does not wish to do it (*Prt.* 352d). As we noted, Xenophon does not call the person who knows what ought to be done yet does not do it an *akratēs*. For him, an *akratēs* is someone who has failed to master his appetites and who therefore fails to know his true interests, fails to know the noble and good, and fails to be wise about what to do and *sōphrōn* about doing it. One consequence for Xenophon's *akratēs* of his failure to know the noble and good is that he can know *ha dei prattein* yet not do it—although, as we have seen, it is not this failure that is *akrasia*. What is distinctive about *Aristotle's akratēs* is not that he knows what is right but fails to do it; what is special about him is that he really *wants* to do it. Moreover, he presumably regrets not having done right after he has failed to do it. His doing wrong is something he himself regards with disappointment. He is basically a good person.[60] One does not get the impression

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60 It is perhaps this "good person" aspect of the *akratēs* that prevents Aristotle from simply condemning him for his ignorance as he does a drunk. Aristotle advocates doubling the penalty for a drunk because he did not have to be drunk; the drunk is the cause of his own ignorance (3.5.8). Whereas the drunk got drunk quite deliberately, the *akratēs* wishes he could withstand temptation and is dismayed when he cannot. If a man knowingly (*mē agnoōn*) acts in a way that will result in his becoming unjust (*adikos*), he is voluntarily

that Plato's or Xenophon's *akrateis* are good people. Outside the *Protagoras*, Plato's *akrateis* are not good people; in the *Protagoras*, there simply are none.

Because Aristotle's *akratēs* means well he is not wicked or vicious and cannot be completely blameworthy. Yet, since he does do wrong, and does so deliberately, then, although there has to be some sense in which he knows that what he is doing is wrong—otherwise there would be no *akrasia*—there has to be another sense in which he is ignorant, lest his act become fully blameworthy. (Let us not lose sight here of Aristotle's wicked man who is, quite anomalously, fully blameworthy regardless of his ignorance.) Since the *akratēs* is not wicked, his ignorance cannot be the same ignorance as that which plagues the wicked man: ignorance of the universal. Yet, his ignorance also cannot be the same as that to which the fully innocent succumb (see the list above, from *Nic. Eth.* 3.1.16–17). In Aristotle's example, the *akratēs* must know that no sweets are to be tasted and that this is so for *all* people—the universal is universal in both these ways; and he must presumably know that the universal is advantageous. (It is the *akolastos* whose sense of the advantageous is so distorted that he believes eating sweets is good for him.) But the *akratēs* must know and not-know the particular, the premise on which he acts. He must know and not know that *this* is a sweet to be avoided.

The Socratic view, from which Aristotle is at pains to distance himself yet with which he is clearly sympathetic—witness his insistence that the wicked are ignorant of the universal—contains, according to Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 7.2), two elements: the less extreme (1) that knowledge cannot be "dragged around like a slave," and so cannot be "overcome" by pleasures, pains, and passions; and the more radical (2) that no one acts contrary to the best while supposing it so. There are some people, Aristotle reports, who are sympathetic to (1) but not to (2).

Let us look more closely at *Nic. Eth.* 7.2. According to Aristotle, the second element in the Socratic view, namely, that no one acts contrary to the best while supposing it so, but only in ignorance, is the one that is "plainly at odds with how things seem to be" (*tois phainomenois*), for it implies that the agent who is in a state of *akrasia* did *not* believe, (even) before the onset of this condition, that the thing that is best is best.[61] Since some who accept (1) nevertheless find

unjust (*hekōn adikos an eiē*) (3.5.12). Perhaps the *akratēs*, in Aristotle's view, merely fails to work hard enough in molding his character but he still wants to be just.

61 Aristotle says only: *ouk oietai*—"he does not think"—but does not supply what it is that the *akratēs* does not think. Commentators have filled in the blank with such expressions as "he should do what he actually does" (Pickavé and Whiting 2008: 327) or "the action right" (Rackham in the Loeb 1934: 379) or "he ought to act so" (Barnes 1984: 1810). But Aristotle

it implausible that the one who acts contrary to the best necessarily did not believe prior to acting that this best thing was best, they propose that the agent *believed*, though he did not know—he had *doxa* but not *epistēmē*—before the onset of his akratic condition, that the thing that is best was best.

Aristotle rejects this solution out of hand. Why would he do so if not because he wants to be sure that the *akratēs* is not forgiven? If all the agent has is opinion—and a weak one at that—and if in addition his desire is strong, he is someone we forgive (*sungnumē*). Yet we do not forgive the *akratēs*—for even though his *akrasia* does not amount to vice (*mochthēria*), it is not only vice that is not forgiven but "other blameworthy things" (*allōn tōn psektōn*) as well (7.2.4).

Aristotle rejects as well the suggestion that what the *akratēs* has is *phronēsis*, a solution proposed presumably on the assumption that *phronēsis* is not as strong as *epistēmē* but is stronger than *doxa*. In Aristotle's view not only is *phronēsis* very strong, but it is not theoretical the way *epistēmē* is and so is actually less vulnerable than *epistēmē* is to being overcome in action. Moreover, a person cannot be at the same time *phronimos* and *akratēs*, because it cannot be said that the *phronimos* willingly performs the basest actions (*phaulotata*). If it is not *doxa* (which is pardonable), nor *phronēsis*, nor *epistēmē* that is overcome by the pleasures or passions of the *akratēs*, how, Aristotle wonders, can Socrates be wrong?

In 7.3, Aristotle begins to present his own view. If Socrates is not right, or at least not completely right, then the *akratēs* must be knowing (*eidotes*) in some way. It will not do to say that he has mere opinion; opinions, too, can be strong and one can be most confident in them. And, for that matter, one can lack confidence in knowledge. The question then remains: how can one who has great confidence in his belief fail to execute it?

This Aristotelian difficulty calls for an Aristotelian solution: a distinction between having knowledge and exercising it, on the one hand, and having knowledge and not exercising it, on the other, a distinction between first actual-

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is explaining the ignorance that is assumed by Socrates, according to the more extreme interpretation of his view, to be involved in the allegedly, though impossibly, akratic act. According to the more extreme interpretation of Socrates' view on *akrasia*, Aristotle tells us, what the agent is ignorant of, what "he does not think," is that the action that is in fact best is best. For, if the akratic thought it best, he would not—could not—choose otherwise. Aristotle can leave the object of "does not think" blank because it is the same as the object earlier of *hupolambanonta*. Socrates denies that one can act contrary to what is best, supposing (*hupolambanonta*) that it is best. Here, too, the *akrateuomenos* before he is in his condition does not think (*ouk oietai*) that it [what is best] is best.

ity (which is the equivalent of second potentiality) and second actuality—that is, between having mastered something and so being able on any occasion to put it to use, and having mastered something and actually be using it now. This distinction aligns nicely with the distinction between acting "through (*dia*) ignorance" and "while ignorant" (*agnoounta*) developed in 3.1.14—though transposed to the case of knowing. The *akratēs* acts not *through* knowing because his knowledge is there but dormant; he acts instead *while* knowing, because the knowledge is there at his disposal even when not in use.

The way I understand Aristotle's view of *akrasia* is, then, as follows. There is a morally correct universal of which the *akratēs* is aware throughout the akratic event. It is this universal to which the *akratēs* is devoted; he wants always to act in accordance with it. This universal forms the major premise of the relevant syllogism: "All sweet things are to be avoided by all." Prior to the akratic event and afterwards, the *akratēs* also knows the particular, which forms the minor premise: "This candy bar is a sweet thing to be avoided."[62] Prior to and following the event he can successfully draw the syllogism's conclusion: "Avoid this candy bar." What happens, however, to an akratic when a passion (*pathos*) or a desire (*epithumia*) is present is *either* that he ceases to know the final premise (*teleutata protasis*),[63] that is, the minor premise that leads to action—he does not have it—*or* he "knows" it the way a drunk knows something:[64] he both

62 What I have done here is apply the universal to the particular to form the minor premise, the one to be acted on. "This candy bar is sweet" is not enough to spur action without a further association of sweetness with something to be either avoided or pursued. The akratic both knows and does not know that this candy bar is a sweet to be avoided, and this drunken knowledge is easily displaced—in someone who is akratic—by "this candy bar is a sweet that is desirable and pleasant." The sense-perception knowledge that *this* candy bar is a sweet to be avoided is insufficient to prevent eating it; the *doxa* that this candy bar is desirable and pleasant is, in the *akratēs*, sufficient to spur its consumption.

63 There is a raging controversy over what this phrase refers to. Yet it surely refers to the last or the minor premiss and not to the conclusion, at least as I have set these out. For a survey of this controversy, see Pickavé and Whiting 2008: 360–361; also Destrée 2007: 156–157.

64 The trio of drunk, madman, and sleeper are not perfectly analogous to the *akratēs*, nor are the three in all ways like one another. One critically important feature of the *akratēs* is his wish to do good; there is no counterpart to that aspect of the *akratēs* in this group. Other issues are the voluntariness or involuntariness of what they do. The reason these three types are cited is in order to illuminate the way something may be known yet not really known. Another—though even weaker—analogue that is also used is the person who has just learned something for the first time: he can say what he has learned but has not assimilated it yet and so does not really know (7.3.8).

has the knowledge in the sense that he can recite it now and can exercise it at other times, *and* does not have it in the sense that it is not active for him right now (7.3.13).[65] Since the kind of knowledge that is displaced during an akratic episode is knowledge derived from sense-perception, to be akratic does not entail the impossibility affirmed by Socrates in which knowledge in the most robust sense is dragged around like a slave. His *epithumia* causes the akratic to form a rival opinion about the candy bar:[66] displacing the formerly known premiss that the candy bar is sweet and therefore to be avoided, there is now the opinion that it is sweet and therefore a source of pleasure and desirable. In the absence of active exercise of the knowledge of the last premiss of the syllogism, this substitute *doxa* effects the act of eating.

In 7.7.8, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of *akrasia*, one of which involves impetuousness (*propeteia*), the other, weakness (*astheneia*). The weak *akratēs* deliberates but his passion (*pathos*) prevents him from sticking to his resolution; the impetuous *akratēs* does not deliberate but follows his imagination. The impetuous or impulsive (*ekstatikos*) *akratēs* is the better of the two and the easier to reform. So, too, is the one who is akratic by habit rather than by nature. It would seem that those who can be trained or educated are better than those whose character is more entrenched. The *akratēs* who deliberates but nevertheless does wrong has already learned to slow down and deliberate but nevertheless fails to act on his conclusion; the impetuous *akratēs* might still learn to slow down. The proverb Aristotle quoted earlier (7.2.10) applies here as well: "When you are choking on water, what can you drink to wash it down?"[67]

In 7.10.3, Aristotle makes clear that the *akratēs* acts voluntarily—he knows what he is doing and for the sake of what—but he is not wicked because his choice is to do the good thing. He is "half-wicked (*hēmiponēros*)." It is true, of course, that the errors the *akratēs* makes are not any of the ones enumerated

65 For Pickavé and Whiting (2008: 353), it is the universal (or the first or major premiss) that is not activated. But universal premises, since they are not the ones that spur action, do not need to be active. They need only to be available to the agent for his formulation of the minor premiss.

66 The *epithumia* does its work, however, probably without the agent's forming a syllogism or spelling out for itself a major premiss or universal. As Aristotle says at 7.6.1, *epithumia* rushes off to enjoy what is pleasant. One imagines, however, that in deliberative *akrasia*, the sort involving weakness rather than impetuousness, the *akratēs* at least formulates a *doxa*, a proposition concerning the desirability of the particular.

67 Ironically, Aristotle had used this proverb earlier to support the idea that an agent who pursues pleasure by conviction and choice may be thought to be better than one who is akratic, since the former is easier to cure.

in 3.1.16–17, and so he cannot be completely blameless. But since he is at least half-wicked, his act must be at least somewhat voluntary.

There is in Aristotle's analysis of *akrasia* a strong emphasis on cognitive failure. That is why he must concede in the end that his own view is not far from that of Socrates (7.3.13–14)—that is, from the view that Socrates espouses in the *Protagoras* and which Aristotle takes to be the one he sincerely holds. The only difference between them, it would seem, is that the knowledge displaced by *epithumia* is not full-blown knowledge but the knowledge (of the minor premiss) known by sense-perception (7.3.14). *Epithumia* is certainly the cause of *akrasia*, but it can have its effect only in the presence of inactive (or deactivated) knowledge. Aristotle might have—and perhaps should have—said that the blameworthiness of the *akratēs* resides in his not having become even as admirable as an *enkratēs*, in his not having properly formed his character so that his *epithumiai* are not able to jettison his reason. As things stand, Aristotle must be willing to intellectualize the *enkratēs* as well, to say that the *enkratēs* differs from the *akratēs* in having his knowledge of the particular in actu, in having a relationship to the minor premiss that is not like that of a drunk. But is it not on account of his fortitude that the *enkratēs* is praiseworthy? After all, although the *enkratēs* lacks virtue inasmuch as his appetites are not moderate, he nevertheless merits praise for being able to put reason first when desire threatens to weaken its force. It would appear, perhaps surprisingly, that for Aristotle, in the final analysis, it is a kind of ignorance that is responsible for the akratic act, just as it is a kind of ignorance that is responsible for wickedness.

We have seen that Aristotle regards all wickedness as voluntary, although he acknowledges—even proclaims—that all wickedness involves ignorance in one's choice, ignorance of the universal, and ignorance of the advantageous. We have noted as well that the *akratēs*, insofar as he is blameworthy even if not wicked, similarly acts voluntarily. Fully involuntary actions are actions involving mistakes; they are therefore deserving of pardon and pity. To the extent that an act is voluntary, Aristotle must hold the agent culpable, and to the extent that the agent's act is culpable, he is not entitled either to pity or to pardon. It is because Aristotle cannot divorce pity from pardon that he has no pity to spare for the ignorant wicked. It is because he cannot divorce pity from pardon that he pities those whose wrongdoing was by sheer accident. And it is because he cannot divorce pity from pardon that he has to determine just how blameworthy and therefore just how voluntary all sorts of acts and people—including akratic acts and people—are. Had he separated pity from pardon, he could have blamed the wicked and yet have had compassion for them—indeed, he could have recommended that they be punished and yet have had compas-

sion for them; he could have pardoned the entirely blameless without pitying them; and he could have been a bit harder on the well-intentioned *akrateis* who, though they deserve our pity for meaning well but being unable to do what they would like to, and for having done something they regret afterwards, nevertheless merit punishment for their deliberate wrongdoing and for their failure to master their appetites.

Conclusion

In the view of Xenophon's Socrates, as we have seen, those who are wicked are neither wise nor virtuous: they neither know the noble and good nor practice it. It is because they fail to master their desires that they are not wise; indeed, they are rendered incapable of careful deliberation. And they are not prudent: they are unable to do what is right. To know what is right is not the same as being wise, though if one is wise, one is also virtuous. Those who know what is right but fail to do it have no excuse. That they are unable to appreciate their true advantage is their own fault. They should have acquired the *enkrateia* which would have enabled them to conform what they do to what they know they ought to do. Aristotle's view might have benefited from a dose of Xenophon's Socrates' common sense. What helps Xenophon but trips Aristotle up is the distinction between knowing *ha dei prattein*, on the one hand, and knowing the good, noble, and just—and one's advantage—on the other.

Plato's Socrates has, in my opinion, the most subtle of the three views. In the *Protagoras*, I believe, Socrates shares the view of the many, that one's knowledge of what ought to be done can indeed be dragged around like a slave by pleasure, fear, etc. That is not to say that for him one who knows the noble and good will ever stray from virtue. We see in Socrates himself someone in whom even just the strength of reasoned conviction regarding the noble and good can suffice to keep a person from misconduct. Yet Socrates is well aware that most people succumb to pleasure—to pleasure as a rival force, not to pleasure as a commodity. The *Protagoras* levels people: none are worse than others—except, perhaps, the sophists who jealously keep their salvific calculus to themselves. Socrates surely does not, however, think that all men are the same.

Outside the *Protagoras* Socrates employs various versions of "No one does wrong willingly." But, as I have argued, the view that all wrongdoing is involuntary, when espoused by Plato's Socrates outside the *Protagoras*, means that there is a sense in which the more deliberately people choose evil over good, the more fully they sabotage their interests by damaging their souls and the more egregiously they forfeit the genuinely good life they truly want. For Socrates, it is

in this sense that wrongdoing—deliberate wrongdoing—is involuntary. Such wrongdoing merits censure and punishment at the same time that it evokes compassion. The many wretched people who with every additional injustice wreak greater havoc on their souls are not pardonable but are certainly to be pitied. By the same token, there is no reason to pity—though there is every reason to pardon—those who do wrong by mistake. For Socrates, then, intentional wrongdoers are to be pitied but not pardoned, innocent wrongdoers pardoned but not pitied.

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Mechanisms of Pleasure according to Xenophon's Socrates*

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Happiness and Material Wealth

Xenophon mentions happiness almost exclusively in a political context, in the wider sense of that word, i.e., when speculating on a good ruler or military commander or householder. From this it may seem that happiness for Xenophon and his Socrates is merely material and is generated simply via the acquisition of material wealth. This may be true, I believe, in the case of collective happiness, i.e., the happiness of a state or an army or a household (see, e.g., Dorion 2013: 147–169), but it would be wrong to automatically attribute that same kind of happiness to an individual belonging to any of these social groups. To cast doubt on the established opinion that happiness and the mechanisms generating it are, in Xenophon, of a purely material kind, it will suffice to recall the story of Pheraulas, whose riches not only failed to make him happy but, on the contrary, kept him from happiness, so that he was able to feel happy only after he had given away his fortune.[1] This example alone must persuade us that in at

* I am greatly indebted to Gabriel Danzig and David M. Johnson for their critical comments on the original draft of my paper, which I tried to meet the best I was able (not to mention how much I owe to the latter for greatly improving my diction). Though I feel there still remains much uncertainty as far as the proof for some of my arguments is concerned, rethinking them along the lines suggested by the criticism from these two scholars proved extremely stimulating and helpful.

1 *Cyr.* 8.3.48: '[…] while the other [Pheraulas] considered himself most blessed (μακαριώτατος) because he was to have a steward who would give him leisure to do only whatever was pleasant (ἡδύ) to him' (trans. Miller). Though the story of Pheraulas must not, of course, necessarily reflect the views attributed by Xenophon to Socrates, it has been noticed that there is generally a clear similarity between the teachings of Xenophon's Socrates and the wisdom of the "wise" personages in the *Cyropaedia*. In this particular case, two details will suffice to illustrate the point. The plot of the story of Pheraulas, who entrusts the management of his household to the Sacian, inevitably brings to mind the opening lines of the conversation in which Socrates and Critobulus discuss the question whether someone who is an expert in the art of management would be capable, despite not being himself wealthy, of managing another's estate well (*Oec.* 1.3–4). Another important parallel is found in the following phrase put into Pheraulas' mouth: "it gives me not one whit more pleasure (οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν ἥδιον) to eat

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least some cases material wealth is not sufficient for happiness, which means that individual happiness cannot be reduced to materiality. And if one considers Xenophon's Socrates from this point of view, one will be tempted to go to the extreme, for his happiness seems to be almost completely nonmaterial:

> Don't you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I (οὔτε βέλτιον οὔθ' ἥδιον ἐμαυτοῦ βεβιωκέναι)? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life (ἥδιστα [ζῆν]) is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness. And to this day that has been my experience.[2]
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> *Mem.* 4.8.6, trans. MARCHANT

The Nature of Pleasure

In Xenophon, Socrates distinguishes between three kinds of human pleasure: bodily pleasures (the pleasures arising from eating, drinking, sleep, and sex); the "common" pleasures (arising from doing one's job well); and the "Socratic" pleasure (arising from acquiring knowledge and from self-perfecting; see Chernyakhovskaya 2013: 292 f.). The mechanism of generating the state of pleasure/satisfaction is the same for all three kinds of pleasure. I conceive the nature of happiness in Xenophon to be similar to the nature of bodily pleasures; it is noteworthy that in both passages on happiness quoted above, one speaks about τὸ ἡδύ, "the pleasurable."[3] The pleasure from food (one of the four kinds

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and drink and sleep now than it did when I was poor" (*Cyr.* 8.3.40, trans. Miller). It is hard to fail to see behind these words one of the most characteristic theses of Xenophon's Socrates, i.e., that the pleasure gained from eating does not depend on whether the meals consumed are fancy or plain (*Mem.* 1.6.5; see Chernyakhovskaya 2014: 27). Apart from that, if the happiness even of such a figure as Pheraulas is not entirely material, still more one will expect that the happiness of Socrates, who is a far more "intellectual" protagonist in Xenophon's writings, cannot be based on material wealth. The text of the *Memorabilia* gives a good support to this assumption (see below).

2 See also *Mem.* 1.6.8–9 and *Ap.* 5–6.

3 Cf. *Cyr.* 8.3.48 and *Mem.* 4.8.6 quoted above; see also *Mem.* 1.6.8–9 quoted below and then note 30. It is only fair to note that Xenophon's Socrates never says himself that he is happy; it is Xenophon who does this for him (*Mem.* 4.8.11: ἄριστός τε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος; see also *Mem.* 1.6.14: ἐδόκει αὐτός τε μακάριος εἶναι; cf. Pl. *Phd.* 58e3–4: εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο), while in the *Cyropaedia* passage, the connection between the two concepts is quite explicit: cf. 8.3.48 in note 1 with 8.3.46: "In the name of the gods, then, said Pheraulas, please make yourself happy (εὐδαίμων) at once and make me happy (εὐδαίμονα), too!" (trans. Miller).

of bodily pleasures listed above) depends not on the gustatory qualities of the meal, but on how strong the preceding sense of hunger has been (*Mem.* 4.5.9): the pleasure comes from satisfying the hunger, and the stronger hunger gets, the more agreeable becomes its satisfaction. It is satisfaction as such that is the cause of pleasure, not the way it occurs. Pleasure derives from the *process* of satisfying a desire/unpleasant sensation/suffering. So there are two necessary conditions for pleasure to be generated. First, one needs to endure a certain deprivation, but then, second, one needs to soothe that deprivation. To illustrate this mechanism, consider the following example: when someone has an itch, it makes the person suffer. But once the affected part gets scratched, he or she immediately feels pleasure. Should the scratching be stopped, the suffering returns. But as soon as the itching ceases, not only does the suffering stop, but the pleasure stops as well, for its source is no longer there.[4]

And though the mechanism of generating pleasure is the same in all humans, it is obvious that such a sensation is by its nature individual and variable, i.e., experienced differently at different times even by the same person. The pleasure from food is generated when hunger is satisfied, and the stronger the latter is, the greater is the pleasure obtained (*Mem.* 4.5.9; see Chernyakhovskaya 2014: 26). This means that when feeling less hungry, a man will gain less pleasure than eating with the greatest possible hunger, but even so, it still will be pleasure: in one and the same human being, the intensity of pleasure may vary since it is dependent on the intensity of hunger, which is also variable.

4 Though Xenophon never actually quotes this example, it is, in fact, Plato's Socrates who dwells upon the subject of pleasure deriving from scratching oneself in his conversation with Callicles (Pl. *Grg.* 494c–e): it gives a perfect model of the general mechanism of generating pleasure which, in my opinion, completely conforms to the views of Socrates in Xenophon's version, despite the undeniable fact that the character of the pleasure arising from scratching certainly differs from that deriving from the bodily pleasures of eating, drinking, etc. There is a single cardinal difference between the two, and it is of little relevance when considering the mechanism of generating pleasure: bodily pleasures can happen with unavoidable regularity, since a human being inevitably has a regular desire to eat, drink, etc., whereas itching occurs spontaneously, does not follow any regular pattern, and may even remain totally unknown to a given person. One may observe, with David Johnson (in a private communication), that in some cases itching (and scratching) can be self-reinforcing (the more one scratches, the more one itches), but it does not make this kind of pleasure radically different from other bodily kinds, seeing as the same pattern can be observed, for instance, in the case of pleasure gained from consuming alcohol: the more one drinks, the greater becomes the desire to have more of it. (Again, it is of no importance here that this dependence has a different explanation than in the case of itching, all the more so because one can develop an addiction even to some ordinary foods.)

Moreover, even a strong hunger can be satisfied in different ways: one can eat very plain meals instead of delicacies, or food one is less fond of instead of what one really likes. Xenophon's Socrates, however, does not enter into such details and does not give any special consideration to how the intensity of pleasure can be affected by different foods when the intensity of hunger remains the same.[5] But though Xenophon's account of Socrates leaves one with the impression that he really was totally indifferent as to the quality of food with which he satisfied his hunger, nonetheless, in the *Oeconomicus* he says that the dinner he had with Kallias was δεῖπνον ἄμεμπτον, "perfect in its kind" (*Oec.* 2.2), thus letting us understand that even if he has no interest in fine dining himself, he still is well aware that others may find the taste of a meal more or less agreeable. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that Socrates would agree with the idea that generally humans prefer to satisfy their hunger with tasty rather than tasteless meals. But this is a situation where individual predilections start to matter, and what is delicious for one person can be perceived as flavorless by another; what under certain circumstances appears unpalatable to someone may, at a different time, seem exceptionally good even to the same person. In addition, Socrates not only prescribes waiting till hunger is at its peak, but also insists on eating only as much as is enough to provide pleasure (*Mem.* 1.2.4: ὅσα ἡδέως ἡ ψυχὴ δέχεται), i.e., only as long as the hunger has not been satisfied. The measure of all pleasures is the individual's sense of what is agreeable,[6] and since this feeling is different in every individual, as also is the speed at which one achieves satiety, the duration of pleasure may differ from person to person as well. The intensity of pleasure from eating will thus depend, even if to varying degrees, on at least four factors: on the strength of hunger (which is, of course, the most important condition); on the quality of the food; on individual tastes; and on the individual's feeling of what is agreeable. This means that it is hardly possible to conceive a uniform scale for objectively measuring the intensity of pleasure in different individuals and for comparing who has experienced greater and lesser pleasure.

Everything said above will also be true for happiness, as will be shown below.

5 Xenophon's Socrates only takes the extremes into consideration, so he contends that someone who eats plain bread while feeling hungry experiences a greater pleasure than the one who eats a fine meal with no hunger. It is Cyrus who says that satisfying one's hunger with tasty dishes is more pleasurable than quenching the same hunger with plain food: *Cyr.* 7.5.81. See also below.

6 Cf. Gigon 1953: 101: "das rechte Maß der Nahrung ist das ἡδύ, das subjektive Verlangen" ("the right measure of food intake is τὸ ἡδύ, the subjective desire").

Happiness and Labor

In his attempt to expose Socrates in front of his followers, Antiphon declares that while he thought philosophizing made whoever practices it happier, the example of Socrates attests to the contrary (*Mem.* 1.6.2). In response, Socrates says that he is no less happy (and indeed much more so) than anyone who succeeds in practical affairs:

> And again, you surely know that while he who supposes that nothing goes well with him is unhappy (οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι μηδὲν εὖ πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται), he who believes that he is successful in farming or a shipping concern or any other business he is engaged in (οἱ δὲ ἡγούμενοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ γεωργίαν ἢ …) is happy in the thought of his prosperity (ὡς εὖ πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται). Do you think then that out of all this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as the thought: "I am growing in goodness"? (οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι;)
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> *Mem.* 1.6.8–9, trans. MARCHANT

To feel happy, one needs, first, to have a task, then to be successful in carrying it out, and finally to be conscious of one's success and be content with it.[7] The mechanism that generates happiness, therefore, is the same as has been described for bodily pleasures: it is deprivation soothed. Without suffering, which, in this case, is represented by πόνοι (*ponoi*, toil and effort), it is impossible to achieve happiness. Though the quality of food can to some extent affect the intensity of pleasure, no food whatsoever can cause pleasure when there is no hunger. The same goes for the so-called good things: though they can enhance happiness, no good things, according to Cyrus, will ever bring happiness if they are obtained without *ponoi*. *Ponoi*, just like hunger in the case of food, are the main necessary condition:

> One must take this lesson to heart: that good things bring the greater pleasure (τοσούτῳ τἀγαθὰ μᾶλλον εὐφραίνει), in proportion to the toil one

7 It is obvious that both the (objective) fact of being successful and the (subjective) recognition of one's own success are equally necessary. On the one hand, one can be successful but, for some reason, fail to recognize it or to be discontent with it and, therefore, remain unhappy. On the other hand, one can be lacking in success but still *consider* oneself successful and so even experience happiness of a certain kind. That sort of "happiness," however, belongs only to the insane, those who are unable to perceive reality adequately (cf. *Mem.* 3.9.7).

> undergoes beforehand to attain them (ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον προπονήσας τις ἐπ' αὐτὰ ἴῃ); for toil gives a relish to good things (οἱ γὰρ πόνοι ὄψον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς); and nothing, however sumptuously prepared, could give pleasure (ἡδὺ εἶναι) unless a man get it when he needs it.[8]
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> *Cyr.* 7.5.80, trans. MILLER

The same point is stressed by Socrates in his conversation with Aristarchus,[9] and Virtue in Prodicus' parable also argues that no pleasures can be known to Vice because she is unable to toil for their sake.[10] *Eupraxia*, according to Xenophon's Socrates, is not just prosperity or well-being, but it is a particular kind of well-being resulting from successfully carrying out a certain task, the success being dependent on knowledge and achievable only through skills based on experience (*Mem.* 3.9.14).[11] Here the rather gloomy view of the world in which nothing is given to man without toil, otherwise typical of Xenophon,[12] gets a vindication: it is in suffering that the origin of happiness lies; toil is indeed the guide to a happy life (*Cyr.* 1.5.12: πόνους δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἡδέως ἡγεμόνας). But just as hunger may differ in intensity, so too the *ponoi* may vary in difficulty; happiness, therefore, is a scalar notion. Thus Cyrus, leaving the throne to his elder son, consoles his younger sibling by pointing out that this means that he is receiving happiness of an easier and less "painful" kind (*Cyr.* 8.7.11: εὐδαιμονίαν ἀλυποτέραν), the one that derives from surmounting less difficult tasks. One may assume that just as in the case of eating, where for the most part the

8 Cf. *Mem.* 1.3.5: [Socrates approached eating in such a way that] "hunger would give the relish to his bread" (τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου ὄψον αὐτῷ εἶναι). On this passage, see Chernyakhovskaya 2014: 25, note 40.

9 *Mem.* 2.7.7. The main idea of this chapter is not that someone who is doing a certain job is wealthier and, therefore, happier than an idle beggar, but rather that a man engaged in an activity is better in all respects (see *Mem.* 2.7.8–9 and *Mem.* 3.9.15) and thus happier.

10 *Mem.* 2.1.30: "What do you know of pleasure if you won't care to do anything to attain it?" (τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα μηδὲν τούτων ἕνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα;). See also *Mem.* 2.1.31. In his oration, Cyrus asserts the same idea that only the wicked consider leisure as happiness and labor as unhappiness (*Cyr.* 7.5.74; cf. *Mem.* 2.1.26, where Kakia is answering Heracles' question about her name: "My friends call me Happiness and those who hate me nickname me Vice.") When there is such a close similarity between passages expressing a similar complex of ideas, I believe it is fully legitimate to quote the *Cyropaedia* in order to enhance our understanding of some contexts in Xenophon's Socratic writings, particularly when the former work gives a clearer expression to the same thought as one encounters in less articulate terms in the Socratica.

11 Cf. *Mem.* 2.7.7 and note 9.

12 *Mem.* 2.1.20; 2.1.28; cf. *Mem.* 2.7.7–8.

stronger the hunger one feels, the greater is the pleasure of satisfying it, so too is happiness more complete the greater are the hardships one has to overcome on the way toward it. On the other hand, just as in the case of hunger and the pleasure of eating, one's having to overcome a *ponos* is here a necessary, but by no means the only, condition of happiness. Nor is the difficulty of the task one has to surmount any more so than the strength of hunger one feels the only parameter determining the intensity of happiness. There are tasks that are objectively more or less difficult, but what is more difficult for one person may prove easier for someone else. The individual tastes and predilections play their role as well, just as with food: performing a given task may bring one person more pleasure than surmounting some other task irrespective of their objective difficulty (in those cases where one can readily measure difficulty); and the reverse may prove true for another person. Some tasks, as was also the case with delicious meals, may seem more attractive to all or, at least, to most people, and there is no reason why this common tendency should not somehow be reflected in Socrates' personal hierarchy of tasks; but Socrates' priorities cannot be applied universally because he puts self-perfection at the top of the pyramid, immediately followed by βασιλικὴ τέχνη, "the royal art" (see Dorion 2004a). Happiness is individual: while for some people certain *ponoi* and their resulting form of happiness will suffice, there are others who will never be satisfied with "small" and "insignificant" progress and will aspire to more ambitious tasks in order to attain "greater" happiness. But it may happen that it will prove to be "greater" only for them because there is no objective scale for measuring the intensity of happiness as perceived by different persons. When Xenophon's Socrates contends that the pleasure he is gaining from self-perfection is greater than, e.g., the pleasure of a successful farmer, it can be greater only on his individual scale and not objectively.

As has already been pointed out, pleasure derives from *soothing* the suffering: if "suffering" is equivalent to *ponoi*, then "soothing" these latter is carrying them out successfully. A hunter finds pleasure in hunting because this is the way his *ponoi* meet their satisfaction (*Mem.* 2.1.18: ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι): imagine a hunter who fails to catch a prey for years—this activity will cease giving him pleasure, and he will lose whatever interest he used to have in it. Happiness needs not only *ponoi*, but also success, when the necessary combination of suffering and pleasure becomes possible: πονεῖν ἡδέως, "to toil with pleasure" (*Mem.* 2.1.19). From this it follows that, for an individual, it is essential to choose the right kind of task. On the one hand, one should only undertake tasks that are not above one's ability,[13] so that success is achievable; hence, the necessity

13 *Mem.* 1.7.2–4; 2.8.6; 4.2.26.

of knowing oneself by knowing one's δύναμις, one's abilities and aptitude for a given task.[14] On the other hand, for the sake of carrying out the chosen *ponoi* successfully one ought to work to improve one's abilities; hence, the necessity of experience and competence in a given field.[15]

A state of happy citizens, therefore, will be such a society where everyone has a particular task and succeeds in carrying it out, the task being within the grasp of that individual. The principle defining Plato's just state inevitably comes to mind: it is a state where every citizen has the task "of one's own" to do: τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττειν (see, e.g., Pl. *Resp.* 453b5). Both in Plato and in Xenophon, one's task is the task for which each person possesses the necessary competence and skill, the task which he or she carries out very well. Both in Plato and in Xenophon, a well-ordered state is a state where everyone has a particular task most suitable for that individual's skills and capacities.[16] There is, however, a difference between the two approaches. For Plato, every individual has a proper task by nature: the innate abilities, while no doubt requiring further training and instruction, determine once and for all whether this or that individual is suitable or unsuitable for a given task.[17] Hence, the Principle of Specialization (Annas 1981: 73) or the "one person, one job" principle (Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 166) advanced to become the foundation of justice in a state (Pl. *Resp.* 433c4–434d1), as well as the ban both on simultaneously pursuing several tasks and on arbitrarily changing the task that has been allotted to this particular individual.[18] Xenophon's Socrates, on the contrary, though he recognizes that

14 *Mem.* 4.2.25. See Dorion 2004b: 242 ff. and Bevilacqua 2010: 97 f. According to V. Gray, to operate within the limits of one's capacities is "an important part of the definition of *eudaimonia*" (Gray 2013: 61). In my opinion, this is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for happiness, but not a part of its definition.

15 *Mem.* 2.6.39; 3.1.4; 3.6.18; 3.9.11; 4.2.4–5; 4.2.6–7.

16 This is the reason why Xenophon's Socrates criticizes the practice of selecting the rulers by lot: *Mem.* 1.2.9; 3.9.10. Cf. *Mem.* 3.14.6: here Socrates is blaming someone who, while not possessing the knowledge required for the métier of a cook, tries to do over a meal prepared by a skilled master; he thus commits the misdeed of transcending his competence.

17 Pl. *Resp.* 370b1–2: "One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another" (ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πράξει, trans. Shorey). See also the myth of the metals in *Resp.* 415a1–c7.

18 Pl. *Resp.* 374a6–c2: "It is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well. [...] while we were at pains to prevent (διεκωλύομεν) the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted (ἓν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστος)" (trans. Shorey). See Annas 1981: 79: "This is the first mention of compulsion

people from birth can have different gifts and different innate dispositions, still believes that acquired competence and skills are the determining factor of success in a given activity.[19] Since both *enkrateia*, the necessary basis of all human knowledge (*Mem.* 1.5.4: τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπῖδα),[20] and knowledge itself are in theory accessible to anyone, and since no one possesses knowledge naturally, there is no reason to distinguish between persons suitable and unsuitable for this or that profession on account of their innate capacities. No one has been allotted his or her "own" task from birth.[21] A valid criterion for such a distinction can only be knowledge and experience acquired in the course of life. As I see it, Xenophon's Socrates does not rule out practicing two tasks at the same time or changing between the tasks (it is noteworthy that he does not even say a word about it). Every person has the full right to perform different jobs (either simultaneously or in succession) provided that he or she proves to be capable of acquiring, as far as these different professions are concerned, theoretical knowledge through learning and then practical skills through experience.

In Xenophon, one does encounter a formulation of the principle "one person, one task," but it is in the *Cyropaedia*, not in his Socratic writings.[22] This I

in the state, and Plato offers *no defence of it whatever*. He simply takes it for granted that the fact that the common good would be furthered if people did something legitimizes forcing them to do it. […] there is unmistakably a reference to compulsion."

19 *Mem.* 3.9.1–3; 4.1.2–3.

20 See, e.g., Dorion 2003 and Chernyakhovskaya 2014: 51 ff. My interpretation differs from L.-A. Dorion's in that I do not hold *enkrateia* to be a virtue.

21 In *Oec.* 4.2, Socrates does say that the so-called βαναυσικαὶ τέχναι, "lowly trades,", make an individual unsuitable for any other business, but even here he refrains from dividing people into classes *by nature*. He neither says nor means that artisans by their nature are incapable of handling political matters. Xenophon's Socrates indeed employs the adjective *banausos*, which, as G. Vlastos notes, is "a highly emotive term which no one would apply to them [who work at βαναυσικαὶ τέχναι] to their face, unless one wanted to insult them" (Vlastos 1994: 99 = "The historical Socrates and Athenian democracy" in *Political Theory* 1983 (11–14): 495–516). Vlastos is not, however, quite right in saying that Xenophon's Socrates calls "that largest single segment of the working population *banausoi*": he speaks, in fact, only of αἱ βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι, i.e. τέχναι, and he does not say οἱ βαναυσικοί, i.e. ἄνδρες. See also Chernyakhovskaya 2008: 39 f.

22 *Cyr.* 8.2.5: "For just as all other arts are developed to superior excellence in large cities, in that same way the food at the king's palace is also elaborately prepared with superior excellence. For in small towns the same workman makes chairs and doors and plows and tables, and often this same artisan builds houses, and even so he is thankful if he can only find employment enough to support him. And it is, of course, impossible for a man of many trades to be proficient in all of them. In large cities, on the other hand, inasmuch as

believe is not by chance, but is indicative of Xenophon's approach to the problem of happiness. The *Cyropaedia* operates within a perspective that is different from the *Memorabilia* and similar to the one adapted by Plato's *Republic*: the benefits of narrow specialization are considered here in the light of the theoretical reflection on economic efficiency of a given constitution and the common good in it.[23] The object pursued in building up Plato's ideal state is not the happiness of the people inhabiting it,[24] but rather the happiness, or justice, of the entire state, and if individual citizens also happen to be happy, it is a mere by-product of the main aim.[25] The perspective used by Xenophon's Socrates is quite different: he insists that the chief task of a ruler or a military commander

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many people have demands to make upon each branch of industry, one trade alone, and very often even less than a whole trade, is enough to support a man: one man, for instance, makes shoes for men, and another for women; and there are places even where one man earns a living by only stitching shoes, another by cutting them out, another by sewing the uppers together, while there is another who performs none of these operations but only assembles the parts. It follows, therefore, as a matter of course, that he who devotes himself to a very highly specialized line of work is bound to do it in the best possible manner" (trans. Miller). See also further at *Cyr*. 8.2.6.

23 Annas 1981: 75: "[…] differences of talent are seen solely as means toward the greater good of the whole. That is why Plato does not bother to ask whether the farmer, although he is good at farming, would not prefer to do something else occasionally. […] For him to neglect the task that he can best do, just because he yearns to do a bit of shoemaking occasionally, would for Plato be self-indulgence at the cost of the common good." Consider also the rule followed by Cyrus in training his army, when the primary goal is the desirable outcome of a battle: "he thought he had observed that those became best in any given thing who gave up paying attention to many things and devoted themselves to that alone" (*Cyr*. 2.1.21, trans. Miller). Cf. Pl. *Resp*. 370c3–5: "The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature (εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν), at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations" (trans. Shorey). But even here the *Cyropaedia* does not say that the division and the specialization of labor is natural!

24 See, e.g., Keyt 2006: 345: "The one need that is not addressed directly is the need for happiness."

25 Pl. *Resp*. 420c1–4: "Our first task then, we take it, is to mold the model of a happy state—we are not isolating a small class in it and postulating their happiness, but that of the city as a whole"; 421b3–c3: "Consider, then, whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness among them or whether that is something we must look to see develop in the city as a whole, but these helpers and guardians are to be constrained and persuaded to do what will make them the best craftsmen in their own work, and similarly all the rest" (trans. Shorey); 421c3–6: "In this way, as our whole *polis* grows and is well governed, one must let nature (ἡ φύσις) allot each group its share of happiness" (trans. Keyt 2006: 345).

is to ensure that *people* are happy,[26] hence, the freedom of choosing and changing their "proper" tasks is granted to them.

Happiness and External Circumstances

Now the mechanism of generating pleasure is exactly the same, be it bodily pleasures that stay at the bottom of hedonistic hierarchy, or happiness, at the very top of the pyramid. There are, however, two very important distinctions. First, in many respects, bodily pleasures are subject to the laws of physiology and are, therefore, much more under the control of the possessor of the body than happiness is: in order to gain pleasure from food, one only has to refrain from eating until hunger reaches its maximum. Whether an individual has enough patience to arrive at this point depends on him or her alone, there are no other necessary conditions for generating this kind of pleasure. (I do not consider, as apparently neither does Xenophon's Socrates, the extreme situation where someone is forced to eat, so that no feeling of hunger can possibly arise, nor do I take into account the opposite case, when someone is entirely deprived of any food with which he or she could satiate the hunger). A human being is capable of experiencing bodily pleasures at any time and under any circumstances, even if there is no access to delicate and tasty meals. (Xenophon's Socrates again does not take into consideration an extreme case, hence the theoretical possibility that someone may be physiologically incapable of perceiving pleasure of this kind.) Happiness, on the contrary, is not entirely within the reach of mortals: in contrast to bodily pleasures, certain favorable conditions, which are neither dependent on human will nor influenced by it, are necessary for happiness. One may possess the necessary competence well-suited to *ponoi*, which are correctly chosen not to exceed the limits of one's capacities, and still be deprived of any possibility to implement the chosen activity and to achieve success in it. Even a piece of bread and a glass of water one has to consume in order to survive may suffice to generate the pleasure of eating and drinking, but it is not so with the pleasure deriving from successfully performing one's task. One cannot substitute just any task for the one a man himself would choose and expect him to find pleasure that way: Socrates would never exchange his task of self-perfection for any other activity.

26 See *Mem.* 3.2.2–4: "By these reflections on what constitutes a good leader he stripped away all other virtues, and left just the power to make his followers happy" (here 3.2.4: τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἡγῆται, trans. Marchant). And, since the people are happy, so is happy the state: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν (*Mem.* 4.1.2).

The deprivation Socrates experiences consists in realizing his imperfection, while the *ponoi* he has chosen for himself are the efforts directed toward overcoming this imperfection and pursuing perfection.[27] This task remained within his grasp throughout his life; he endured his *ponoi* not in vain (*Ap.* 17: οὐ μάτην ἐπόνουν)—that is to say, he was successful in his endurance and, because he succeeded in "soothing" his *ponoi*, he managed to lead a pleasurable life.[28] But impending old age with its miseries threatened to make his task insurmountable: he would be less proficient in mastering new knowledge and more prone to forgetting the old; his mind would lose some of its quickness, so, as a result, he would cease to improve and start to degrade, becoming less good than he used to be.[29] This means he would no longer be able to carry out his task to success: the "deprivation" would not be given due "soothing," and, as a result, pleasure would not be generated. To be successful in carrying out his task, Socrates needs good health; its unavoidable deterioration, which he cannot resist, makes a hitherto happy life impossible from now on. Socrates' happiness is not entirely in his own hands: it depends also on some circumstances that are beyond his reach. Death for Xenophon's Socrates is a desirable thing because he has no wish to live without pleasure:[30] when the mechanisms of pleasure cannot operate, suffering alone is what remains, and this is something to be avoided whenever possible. But Xenophon's Socrates, as distinct from the Platonic Socrates of the *Apology* and the *Phaedo*, prefers not to look ahead: he does not meditate on the prospects of acquiring pleasure or happiness after death. He considers what would await him in life should he live longer, and his desire is to *avoid* what is *bad* for him, whereas Plato's Socrates is concerned above all with what is to come after death and *strives* for what is *good* for him: in this respect the two *Socrateses* stand in direct opposition to one another.

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27 These are not exactly the words put by Xenophon in Socrates' mouth, but this is the line of thought that is implied in what Xenophon does make his Socrates say.

28 *Mem.* 1.6.9: ἡδονήν; 4.8.6: ἥδιον and ἥδιστα; *Ap.* 5: ἥδιστον. For a different view on this point, see Gabriel Danzig's paper in this volume, in particular 352, note 25.

29 *Mem.* 4.8.8; see also *Ap.* 6.

30 *Ap.* 6: πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ ἔτι ἂν ἡδέως βιοτεύοιμι; *Mem.* 4.8.8: πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη χεῖρόν τε καὶ ἀηδέστερον ζῆν; according to Socrates, even if he was not aware of his degradation, his life would no longer be worth living (*Mem.* 4.8.8: ἀβίωτος ἂν εἴη ὁ βίος) because it would be a life lived under delusion, in which he would keep getting worse, whereas his task and the meaning of life for him is to be getting better. Should he continue to believe that he keeps improving and for this reason feel pleasure, this pleasure would be unwarranted, and Socrates does not desire such a lot. See also note 7.

Apart from the internal (i.e., somatic) favorable conditions,[31] to attain happiness one also needs propitious external circumstances, the "grace of the gods" (or should we say "luck"). Ischomachus observes that not everyone succeeds in achieving well-being, even if that person is competent for the task and carries it out with greatest diligence.[32] Socrates himself pronounces words that are permeated with an even more bitter pessimism: it may well happen that one is bound not to succeed at all with the task one has chosen, and it is, therefore, by no means clear which task is best to undertake (viz., to choose for oneself as the necessary *ponoi*) or to avoid if one is to attain happiness.[33] To shed

31 It is worth noting two things here. First, the fact that good health seems to be a prerequisite not only for the task performed by Socrates, but also for success in many other activities does not at all mean that aged or unhealthy people cannot be happy. To attain happiness, they simply ought, exactly like anyone else, to make the correct choice of their *ponoi*, which means to undertake only what is within their grasp. In theory, therefore, anyone can be happy. But when a healthy, happy young man is growing old and sick, he can very well become wretched once his previous activity becomes too hard for his powers, unless he finds a new task that would give him pleasure and in which he could again be successful. Second, when speaking of unfavorable somatic circumstances that cannot be influenced by an individual, Socrates names only old age and does not mention ill health. And whenever he discusses the evil effects of poor physical condition, he invariably intends only that kind of feebleness that comes from the incontinent way of life (*Mem.* 1.3.6; 1.5.3; 1.5.5; 2.1.20; 2.1.31) or from neglecting care of one's body, i.e., from a lack of proper training (*Mem.* 3.12). But both these things are within everyone's grasp: there is no one who is not capable of developing due *enkrateia* and *karteria* and who is not obliged to do so.

32 *Oec.* 11.8: "I seem to realise that, while the gods have made it impossible for men to prosper (εὖ πράττειν) without knowing and attending to the things they ought to do, to some of the wise and careful they grant prosperity, and to some deny it (τοῖς μὲν διδόασιν εὐδαιμονεῖν, τοῖς δ' οὔ)" (trans. Marchant). The fact that it is Ischomachus who is saying this here is of no real importance, since the same thought is expressed elsewhere by Socrates himself: see *Mem.* 1.1.8 quoted in the note below. It follows from these quotations that virtue is insufficient for happiness: a virtuous individual can still be unhappy. This notwithstanding, virtue does remain a necessary condition of happiness, so a non-virtuous person can never be happy, according to Xenophon's Socrates. This, however, has no direct impact on the argument of the present paper and is not discussed here in detail.

33 *Mem.* 1.1.8: "You may plant a field well, but you know not who shall gather the fruits; you may build a house well, but you know not who shall dwell in it; able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command; versed in statecraft, you know not whether it is profitable to guide the state" (trans. Marchant). One may chose a task on the ground of the interest it seems to represent, but fail to achieve any success in it (which, of course, means no happiness as well), then drop it in favor of another activity, not nearly as interesting as the previous one, and achieve success, but still attain no happiness because of the lack of satisfaction. In this paper I am not going to expand on the idea that every-

some light on the gloomy picture, Socrates proposes a universal method to prevent circumstances that are beyond human control from interfering with our attempts to achieve success: one has to win the favor of gods and ask them for help. The confidence with which Socrates speaks and the example of the happy Ischomachus leave the impression that this method is quite solid.[34] Next, when Critobulus complains about the external circumstances that might prevent the farmer from performing his task successfully, he has in mind things that depend solely on the will of the gods, such as hail, drought, and the like (*Oec.* 5.18), but when Socrates utters his words about the crops that may be harvested not by those who have sown them,[35] he is speaking of external circumstances that while beyond individual grasp, still depend on the state, whose mission is to make its citizens happy. Thus, the state ought to create the favorable external conditions under which any individual has the chance to bring an undertaking to a successful conclusion; in this particular case, the state ought to protect the crops against rapacious invaders. This is yet another reason why collective happiness is of a material nature: if every farmer in the state is happy, this indicates that the farmers' task is being carried out successfully, the sum of individual successes determining the flourishing condition of the state as a whole.

The Socratic definition of *eupraxia*, which is based on the assumption that individual happiness is not dependent on external circumstances (though it still depends on good health), seems to be inconsistent with the reconstruction just proposed. I contend that what accounts for this is not any internal contradiction in the text or incongruence of argument (see Bandini and Dorion 2011a: 362 f.), but rather one characteristic trait of Xenophon's Socratic writings: in general they offer a fairly pessimistic (or should it be called realistic?) picture of the world that serves as background for highlighting the optimistic features in the figure of Socrates, who is presented as an example for imitation and emulation. As an example from a different context: though Socrates believes that all people are egoists (*Mem.* 3.9.4), he nonetheless insists that virtuous people, even if their interests conflict, can always come to a compromise that will not only be fair but also advantageous for both sides (hence the necessity of virtue for friendship: *Mem.* 2.6.23). The same is the case with happiness: from the fact that it depends on external circumstances, it does not follow that an individual is left only with good luck to rely upon, and that it makes no sense to undertake

one is striving for happiness, which forms the background of all similar deliberations in Xenophon.

34 Cf. the words of Ischomachus in *Oec.* 11.8 and of Socrates in *Mem.* 1.1.7–9. See also *Oec.* 5.19–20; *Mem.* 4.3.17; 4.7.10.

35 See *Mem.* 1.1.8 quoted in note 33; 2.1.13; *Oec.* 5.13.

anything on one's own account. Those who have acquired the necessary competence and who are endeavoring to surmount the *ponoi* they have chosen for themselves, are on the right way to happiness;[36] to show this, Socrates contrasts the familiar terms *eutuchia* and *eupraxia*, synonymous in common usage (*Mem.* 3.9.14). To make the contrast more conspicuous and more telling, he even avoids here what has been labeled his restrictive "apotropaic formula," the sort of reservation he likes to use in other instances.[37]

The Subjective Nature of Pleasure

Though the mechanism of generating pleasure is the same for all people, the pleasurable sensation, as I have already pointed it out, is of an individual and largely subjective nature. This is proven by the simple fact that hunger can be satisfied in many different ways. Though on the whole, fine dishes can perhaps give a more intense pleasure in the process of satisfying hunger than simple meals,[38] there is no general rule, and what increases pleasure for one individual can as easily decrease it for another. In a dialogue with Antiphon, Socrates says that the simple food he is taking gives him no less pleasure than Antiphon gets from his lavish meals (*Mem.* 1.6.5); this is so because Socrates embarks on a repast only when he feels hunger and thirst. He does not say, however, whether his pleasure will be changed if he is given the possibility to satisfy his hunger not with the simple food he is used to, but with Antiphon's delicacies. Even if we suppose that Socrates' pleasure in this case will not increase (he can maintain that this is true since he knows from experience that the meals taken at feasts give him no more pleasure than his usual diet), he cannot guarantee that the same will be true for Antiphon: it may happen that in his case,

36 The same idea is expressed in the parable of Heracles at the crossroads. Cf. also *Oec.* 2.17–18. It is not by chance, of course, that the way toward virtue, happiness, fame, and favor with the gods is one and the same, through acquiring knowledge and performing one's task: see e.g. *Mem.* 1.7.1; 3.6.17–18; 3.9.15; 4.1.2.

37 "Unless some god stand against it": see *Oec.* 2.18: εἴ σοι ὁ θεὸς μὴ ἐναντιοῖτο; *Oec.* 5.13: ἂν μὴ θεὸς ἀποκωλύῃ; *Symp.* 8.43: ἂν μὴ θεὸς βλάπτῃ; *Cyr.* 1.6.18: ἢν μή τις θεὸς βλάπτῃ; *Cyr.* 5.2.12: εἰ μή τις θεὸς βλάπτοι. The context *Mem.* 3.9.14, which comes into question here, in this respect does not differ from those indicated above: it too reports Socrates' direct words, so such conversational formula would not be out of place should the speaker decide to use it. Cf. also Huß 1999: 437: "einschränkend-apotropäische Formulierung." It is worth noting, however, that in the *Memorabilia* one finds such a formula only once, when Xenophon speaks on his own behalf and not *ex parte Socratis*: *Mem.* 1.3.5.

38 *Cyr.* 8.2.4; see also *Cyr.* 7.5.8.

meals with delicacies consumed during hunger of equal intensity can really give more pleasure than the simple ones. Socrates' argument is asymmetrical in that he compares the pleasure he receives from simple food while feeling hungry with the pleasure Antiphon experiences from delicacies while feeling replete.[39] In this particular instance, Socrates' pleasure may, in fact, be superior to what Antiphon feels (if he feels any pleasure at all) because pleasure is, first of all, the soothing of a deprivation. But for a correct comparison, both sides must be in the same condition, i.e., equally hungry.

In the same manner, happiness as a kind of pleasure derived from surmounting the *ponoi* is also subjective; moreover, in happiness, the degree of subjectivity is even higher than in bodily pleasures because the nature of these latter is physiological, whereas that of happiness is psychological or, if one is to avoid this term, mental. This is the second fundamental distinction between happiness and bodily pleasures and the reason why bodily pleasures require only deprivation and its soothing, while for happiness, the combination of *ponoi* with success is not yet sufficient. To generate happiness, it is no less necessary that the individual should be conscious of his success and be content with it. In the dialogue with Antiphon quoted earlier, Socrates maintains that what distinguishes happy people from unhappy is not that the former are successful and the latter are unsuccessful in carrying out their respective tasks, but that the former *think* their task is progressing well (οἱ δὲ ἡγούμενοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς) while the latter *think* otherwise (οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι μηδὲν εὖ πράττειν). And then, when he describes his own pleasure, he says that it derives not from self-improvement as such but from his *awareness* of it (ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι).[40] The awareness of success in the chosen task provokes in Socrates as in everyone else the feeling of gratification;[41] the awareness of his failure and dissatisfaction with himself, on the contrary, would make Socrates' life lacking in pleasure and, therefore, undesirable.[42]

The subjective perception of a personal situation, therefore, plays the key role in the mechanism of generating happiness. An individual can be very successful in implementing one task or another but be unaware of success (for instance, because of feeling despondent); or someone can be both successful and aware of success, but still dissatisfied (e.g., if he or she considers the task to be less hard than desired):[43] in both cases, there will be no happiness. Socrates

39 See note 5. A similar asymmetric comparison is to be found in *Symp*. 4.41.

40 See also *Mem*. 4.8.6: αἰσθανομένους; 4.8.7: ᾐσθανόμην; 4.8.8: αἰσθανόμενον; *Ap*. 6: αἰσθάνωμαι.

41 *Ap*. 5; *Mem*. 2.1.19.

42 *Ap*. 6. See also *Mem*. 4.8.8.

43 One sees here another manifestation of Socrates' optimism as portrayed by Xenophon:

believes old age is making his task insurmountable for him, which threatens to deprive his life of pleasure, but he is not prepared to start looking for another task that would be within his grasp because no other activity would give him satisfaction. Someone else in a similar situation, however, would very likely be able to find a new task and to live on with pleasure: generally speaking, anyone capable of getting satisfaction from whatever activity is within his or her grasp, provided this activity is carried out to success, will always feel happy. Happiness is subjective above all because it depends on the subjective perception of reality by a given person: in exactly the same situation, one individual will be happy and another unhappy, and if one task is substituted with another, one person will become more and another less happy. In both cases, happiness experienced by either individual will increase or decrease with respect to how that person experienced happiness earlier, but it is as impossible to make a direct comparison between the happiness of one and that of another as it is to determine whose pleasure from eating is greater. But to think that one is not happy is, for Xenophon's Socrates, enough to be unhappy. This is another distinction of happiness as understood by the Socrates of Xenophon from that of Plato's Socrates. Naomi Reshotko observes that, for the Platonic Socrates, *being* happy is not the same thing as *thinking* that one is happy (Reshotko 2013: 165 ff.). For any person, it is possible to be mistaken about what his or her own *eudaimonia* consists of. For the Platonic Socrates, *eudaimonia* is, therefore, objective, and it takes an expert to evaluate a given person's happiness (see *Ap.* 36e and *Grg.* 470e). For Xenophon's Socrates, I believe, there can be no such expert.

Xenophon's Socrates, however, contends not only that his life was pleasant, but that it was more pleasurable than anyone else's life (*Mem.* 4.8.6). His "Socratic" pleasure, as I call it (Chernyakhovskaya 2013: 293), derives from the awareness of self-perfection and is superior to bodily pleasures deriving from satisfying the desires of the body (*Mem.* 1.6.8); it also surpasses what I have called the "common" pleasures, those which originate from successfully carrying out some trade or task.[44] The placement of bodily pleasures at the bottom of the pyramid can be explained not only by their inferior physiological nature, but also by the fact that they, unlike the other two kinds, are of no benefit to

despite many times stressing the importance of self-awareness, Socrates prefers not to deliberate on people who are successful but unhappy. But even if he does not address this question directly, Xenophon's works provide us with sufficient ground to put it here. When there are no passages to provide a definitive answer, one is bound to look for the consistency of argument.

44 See *Mem.* 1.6.9 quoted earlier. Among the "common" pleasures of his hierarchy, Socrates accords the first place to the one deriving from husbandry: see, e.g., *Oec.* 5.11.

anyone at all.[45] But the very position of the "Socratic" pleasure at the top level of his hierarchy rests on the authority of Socrates' individual predilections alone: it is his hierarchy, and others can have different hierarchies. Socrates' claim that even those who can experience "Socratic" pleasure similar to his own will still fall short of his pleasure is also unsubstantiated. Given that there exists no instrument to measure the intensity of pleasure experienced by different persons, why does he believe that he perceives his self-perfection and enjoys it more intensely than, for instance, his pupils who are learning that art from him (*Mem.* 4.8.6–7)?

It will not be inappropriate to recall that Plato's Socrates in the *Republic* seeks to determine the objective value of the various kinds of pleasure; for these he, too, suggests a tripartite hierarchy that conforms with the tripartite structure of human soul (see, e.g., *Resp.* 580d7 and 581c6); moreover, he proceeds to compare different pleasures by way of calculation and arrives at the conclusion that the king lives 729 times as happily as the tyrant (*Resp.* 587d12–e4). Unlike Socrates of the *Memorabilia*, whose claim to have a more agreeable life than the lives of those who enjoy "common" pleasures is unsubstantiated, Plato's Socrates argues that while all those who are content with their lives consider their existence to be the pleasantest (*Resp.* 581c8–e5), only he who prefers the pleasures of intellect, i.e., the philosopher, is guided in his choice by reason, intelligence, and, most importantly, experience (*Resp.* 582a5: ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ), for he has tested all the pleasures, whereas those who are adept at lower pleasures have no acquaintance with the pleasures of intellect (*Resp.* 582a8–d2; see, e.g., Taylor 2003: 40 f.). Even more remarkable in this context is that Plato's Socrates believes that the soothing of deprivation or suffering, which Xenophon's Socrates takes to be the essential form of all pleasure, is no genuine pleasure at all (*Resp.* 584a7–10). For Xenophon's Socrates, bodily pleasures, though he considers them to be pernicious (*Mem.* 1.3.11), are still pleasures among the others, which he does not divide, with Plato's Socrates, into genuine and spurious categories.

Socratic Happiness and *autarkeia*

In chapter six of the first book of the *Memorabilia*, Antiphon reproaches Socrates for leading an ignoble and mendicant way of life. In his reply, Socrates, among other things, says the following:

45 *Mem.* 1.6.8; 4.5.10.

> You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) consists in luxury and extravagance (τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι). But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme.
>
> *Mem.* 1.6.10, trans. MARCHANT

According to the interpretation proposed by Louis-André Dorion, Socrates is implying here that what happiness amounts to is autarky.[46] I disagree with this and would like to argue that what Socrates asserts here is not that happiness consists in autarky, but rather that it resides in perfection, of which autarky is a manifestation. Socrates makes no effort to refute Antiphon's thesis (as related by Socrates) that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance, which is the starting point for discussion; he only confronts with it his own point of view. Socrates' argument evolves as follows: to have need of nothing is a divine condition, and a divine condition is perfect; the man who is content with what he has and who needs nothing more than that is, therefore, close to the divine condition and, hence, to perfection. Looking back to the original thesis and formulating for Socrates what he does not explicitly say, one can say that the man who is constantly in need of something and desires more than he has (this is what follows from the words τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι) is, on the contrary, quite remote from any divine condition and so from any kind of perfection. Thus, the path taken by Antiphon leads away from perfection, while that taken by Socrates leads toward perfection. If Socrates is to attain the "Socratic" happiness, he must follow his own way, which leads him through *ponoi* that are overcome to allow him to approach perfection. Antiphon's way is meaningless for Socrates because the one who adopts it will face *ponoi* of a different nature, which cannot generate happiness for Socrates but can very well, once overcome, generate it for the likes of Antiphon and the Sacian from the story of Pheraulas recounted in the *Cyropaedia*. Their task consists in acquiring material wealth, and to achieve it they need to make profit and to get more and more good things and possessions. Their failing to accumulate these will mean that they are not successful in implementing their task, which will lead

46 Bandini and Dorion 2000: 157: "Même si le texte ne l'affirme pas expressément, il faut sans doute comprendre que Socrate considère que le bonheur véritable consiste en l'autosuffisance." Cf. Bevilacqua 2010: 361 f.: "… [l'autosufficienza] costituisce per l'uomo la condizione più vicina possibile al divino e, anche se Senofonte non lo afferma esplicitamente, finisce per coincidere con la felicità." See also Chernyakhovskaya 2014: 39–50 and Lowell Edmunds' contribution to this volume: 252–273.

to their being discontent with themselves and, therefore, feeling unhappy. In every trade, the sign of success is some kind of profit, and Socrates alone is indifferent to profit because it is irrelevant to the success of his task, inasmuch as it cannot be the sign of success in his process of self-perfection; on the other hand, it is precisely owing to the high degree of perfection attained by him (as compared to Antiphon and others) that Socrates has become autarkic and has no need for anything. In addition, the success of Socrates' task is less dependent on the external circumstances, luck, or chance than the success in any other human activity, but it still depends on the grace of the gods, who could deliver him from ailments of old age, which, according to Socrates himself, may eventually prevent him from continuing to do what he has successfully been doing for his whole life. It is noteworthy, however, that Socrates never hints that, should he be given a chance to live longer, he would consider praying to the gods for a life free from the infirmities of age.

Conclusion

It would hardly be a novelty to say that most Greek theories of pleasure rest on the assumption that pleasure is inseparable from pain.[47] In Xenophon, the mechanism for generating any pleasure requires deprivation/suffering. In other words, pleasure cannot succeed without hunger and thirst or *ponoi*, toil and effort; pleasure is thus a form of gratification that, in its turn, is impossible without eating and drinking or in the absence of activity. Pleasures of every kind derive from the process of satisfying desires or *ponoi*, which is the reason why I believe that, for Xenophon's Socrates, the mechanism for generating happiness is not a static but a dynamic one. Thus, the mere possession of material wealth, which is so often taken to be Xenophon's idea of happiness, will not result in happiness for Xenophon's Socrates: happiness requires activity in response to need. That activity can come in different forms for different people. Some of these activities may be facilitated by material wealth, but the same basic dynamic of need, effort, and gratification applies to them all.

47 See, e.g., Pl. *Phd.* 60b–c., *Phlb.* 47a ff.; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 2.5.1105b22 ff.; Epicurus *Ep. Men.* 132; etc. For a pertinent account of the controversial points in Aristotle's highly sophisticated version of this doctrine, see Biondi 2004: 153 ff.

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Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon on the Ends of Virtue*

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> One should pursue the pleasures which follow exertions (*ponoi*), not those which precede them.
>
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The Greeks always viewed the *aretai* as qualities worth cultivating. This was traditionally connected with their usefulness to society.[1] The Greeks also thought that virtue was worthwhile for the agent himself, but they recognized that the virtuous did not always receive the rewards they deserved.[2] The idea that *arete* has some intrinsic value to its possessor, regardless of any external rewards, is first addressed in a theoretical fashion in Plato's *Republic*. Like many other Athenians, Glaucon and Adeimantus worry that justice (*dikaiosune*) brings more loss to its practitioners than benefit. They set a challenge to Socrates: can he show that justice, by which they mean just behavior, is so valuable in itself that it is worth choosing even at the expense of all the other goods, and with the harshest evils thrown in to boot? Justice must be shown to have an inherent value that exceeds the negative value of all possible evils, including death. Whether or not Plato's Socrates succeeds in this formidable task, the very terms of the challenge suggest that justice might be and ought to be something that is valuable for its own sake and not merely for the sake of the things that it brings.

Since everything, including virtue, is valued for its contribution to happiness (Plato is no Kant),[3] the more precise question is whether or not justice, in and of itself, contributes to happiness. Plato's argument that justice is sufficient for happiness is founded on the idea that justice is a healthy state of the soul rather

* I thank Dave Johnson, Don Morrison, Louis-André Dorion, Olga Chernyakhovskaya, and David Thomas for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

1 See A.W.H. Adkins 1960 esp. 34–36, 195–210.

2 See J. Redfield 1994 chapter 1, 3–29.

3 But see D.T. Devereux 1995 and D. Morrison 2003 for Kantian interpretations of Plato.

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than a manner of behaving (*Resp.* 441d–e, 442b). While justice in the soul does prove valuable for external success (*Resp.* 351a–352d) and does insure general conformity in practice with ordinary standards of justice (*Resp.* 442d–443b), its primary role is to insure the proper function and balance of each of the parts of the soul: the intellectual, thumotic, and desirous powers (*Resp.* 443c–444a). This is what makes it valuable even if external benefits are not forthcoming (*Resp.* 445a–b). Not only justice, but all the virtues that Plato treats in *Republic* are primarily not powers of action but qualities of the soul essential for its good state or health (see *andreia*, *sophia*, and *sophrosune*: *Resp.* 442c–d). Apparently, Plato would not be able to argue that just action alone, in the absense of any external benefits, is sufficient for happiness; it is only as a quality of the soul that justice is sufficient for happiness.

Xenophon cannot make such an argument. Since he does not make the perfection of the soul an end in itself or a sufficient condition for happiness, he does not have the resources necessary for defending the virtues in the way that Plato defends justice. In fact, the position Plato attributes to his brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, that virtue is worth pursuing mainly for the results it obtains, has much in common with Xenophon's position, although the brothers miss Xenophon's main point—the psychological benefits of succeeding justly.[4] Plato himself does not do a very good job of showing that justice in the soul is sufficient for happiness. Even after arguing that justice is the healthy state of the soul, his interlocutors conclude merely that without justice in the soul, life would be miserable: in other words, that justice is necessary for happiness, not that it is sufficient (*Resp.* 445a–b).

Aristotle does not make this mistake because he does not argue that the possession of virtue is sufficient for happiness. He compares happiness to an athletic prize, something to be won by the person who makes use of his or her virtuous abilities (*Eth. Nic.* 1099a1–6). Justice in the soul is not a final end for man, and it is not sufficient for happiness, since for Aristotle happiness is an activity (*Eth. Nic.* 1.5.6 = 1095b30–1096a4, 1.7.10–16 = 1097b21–1098a20, 1.8.8–9 = 1098b30–1099a10). As with Xenophon, a virtue in the soul is a means to an end. But for Aristotle, the end is not some material benefit, or even the emotional rewards of accomplishing great things, but merely the virtuous activity itself, which functions as an element of a happy life (*Eth. Nic.* 10.8, 1178a9–1179a33).[5]

4 As I hope to show in a future publication, Xenophon holds positions close to those of Socrates' sophistic interlocutors in Plato's dialogues, but he differs in ways that make his positions less vulnerable to the attacks offered by Plato's Socrates.

5 When contrasting it with contemplative activity, Aristotle denies that "practical" activity, which includes political and military activity, is choiceworthy for its own sake (*Nic. Eth.* 10.7,

Although he claims to have shown that justice in the soul is sufficient for happiness, Plato may well have been aware that a virtue of the soul cannot be a final end and that it gains much of its value from the fact that it serves as a means to some activity. But even if Plato shares Aristotle's opinion about the finality of action, he does not view justice as a means to the same kind of activity that Aristotle does. In general, Plato places less emphasis on virtuous ethical activity as an end in itself than Aristotle. In *Republic*, for example, Plato's Socrates defines a just action as one that *leads to* justice in the soul (*Resp.* 443e), not one that flows from justice in the soul. Just action seems to be a means to an end. Although he argues that the just person will tend to conform to the standards of vulgar justice, he does not claim that doing so is what makes his actions just. But even if justice in the soul is the end of just action, and not a means to it, it still might be a means to some other form of activity. For Plato, intellectual contemplation is the supreme felicity and man's highest aim (*Resp.* 505d–e, 508d–509a, 517c–518b), and justice, which ensures the proper functioning of the parts of the soul, and especially the subordination of the *thumos* and the desires to the intellect, is essential for enabling that activity. If so, justice in the soul is not simply an end in itself but (also) a means to a further end. Indeed, Plato argues that the best kind of good thing is good both in itself and for its results (*Resp.* 358a). Whether or not that dictum deserves to be applied to justice in the soul, it reflects a pre-Aristotelian assumption.[6] Unlike Plato, Aristotle famously argues that if something serves a further end, it loses in value because it loses in finality. Xenophon seems to share Plato's view. For him, a virtue is good both because of the results it achieves and for its own sake, but, as I will argue, it gains its true value only when it is used in practice to achieve worthy accomplishments.

As I have argued, not only Aristotle, but even Plato can be read as valuing the virtues of the soul for the ends they serve. So formally, they are not far from the position I attribute to Xenophon. But here is where the difference arises. While Plato and Aristotle credit virtue for enabling us to perform activities that are ends in themselves, Xenophon endorses virtue on the grounds

1177b1–25). But later, in considering the "other" form of virtuous activity (activity in conformity with virtue of character), Aristotle acknowledges that it is also a constituent element of happiness, although an inferior one (*Nic. Eth.* 10.8, 1178a–1179a). Aristotle does not explain how these statements can be reconciled. I thank Roslyn Weiss for drawing my attention to this problem.

6 This dictum may also apply to contemplation itself, since, for Plato, contemplation is not completely useless but enables the philosopher to serve as a just ruler.

that it contributes to activities that have further ends, which are chiefly economic, military, and political in nature. If these are indeed the ends of virtue in Xenophon's view, then he disagrees with Plato and Aristotle not on the status of virtue as a means, but on its distance from the end. For Plato and Aristotle virtue is penultimate, while for Xenophon it is antepenultimate: virtue enables action, which in turn aims at practical gain. If so, he also disagrees about the nature of the ends that virtue serves.

The nature of the end determines the nature of the virtue. For Plato and Aristotle, although virtue can contribute to economic, military, or political accomplishments, it is more valuable for its contribution to the virtuous activities that constitute happiness. For these thinkers, the virtues are natural human perfections and are defined by a theory of human nature and psychology, or by conceptual analysis, not by their contribution to practical or political success. There is no guarantee that these virtues will produce this kind of success at all. Both Plato and Aristotle are deeply aware that there is, in theory, a gap between those qualities that lead to external success and those that are truly virtuous, and they both emphasize that virtue is of much greater value than material success. In *Gorgias*, for example, the art of rhetoric is rejected as a pseudo-science even though it may produce victory in the assembly (see, e.g., 456a–457c). The fact that it is possible for a few worthless individuals to out-argue a virtuous man is enlisted as an explanation of Socrates' demise (*Gorgias* 486a–c), and Socrates can be represented as a hero and martyr precisely because of the gap between *arete* and the qualities that lead to success (*Ap.* 28b–d). The true pilot is unable to take control of the ship, and the philosopher in a cave is confused by the darkness. Plato's virtuous man or woman is naturally ill-equipped to succeed in the rat race of the *polis* precisely because virtue aims at other things. Aristotle, too, while less given to expressions of dramatic power (at least not in his lectures—we do not know how he expressed himself in his dialogues), recognizes that the better soldier is not necessarily the man of greater courage (*Eth. Nic.* 3.9.6 = 1117b17–21; contrast *Hell.* 2.4.40–41) and that experience can be more useful than wisdom (*Met.* 1.1.7–12 = 981a12–981b7). This is not the basis for a tragic vision for either of them because virtue or virtuous activity is its own best reward.

For Xenophon, on the other hand, there is no such gap between the virtues and the qualities that lead to practical success. Xenophon's heroes are successful in political, military, and economic terms precisely because the virtues they possess help them succeed. This implies that the virtues are conceived and defined by their contribution to this kind of success, and not by any conceptual analysis or analysis of human nature or by any other analysis that might set them in another direction. It implies that for Xenophon, virtue can be dis-

covered only by an empirical investigation of those qualities that promote this kind of success, the kind of investigation he may fancy himself to have conducted in his long and varied military career. Because virtue is identical to those traits that lead to practical success, Xenophon, unlike Plato (see *Laws* 742e–743a), denies that vicious behavior can lead to long-term material success (see e.g. *Mem.* 1.7, 2.1, *Cyr.* 1.6.22). Unlike Plato, Xenophon does not boast that the virtue of any of his heroes is proved by their indifference to success or inability to achieve it. This is most notable in his portrait of Socrates' performance in court, which he portrays as an unmitigated success for Socrates. While good men can fail, the cause of such failure is malignant chance or unpropitious circumstance,[7] not the lack of the qualities that lead to success.[8] Clearly, Xenophon is valorizing the virtues of practical activity in stark opposition to both Plato and Aristotle. But he does not make the mistake of thinking that the results of practical activity are themselves of greater value than the virtuous effort that produces them.

For Xenophon and Xenophon's Socrates, virtue and virtuous activity[9] are not ends in themselves but should always be pursued for the sake of an external reward, some other end, separate from the activity itself (for this formulation see Ar. *Eth. Nic.* 1094a4–6). If virtuous activity is not an end in itself, but only a means to an end, it is easy to imagine that it is not chosen for its own sake. Aristotle seems to be stating the obvious when he says that an activity that aims at a separate end is not chosen for its own sake (*Eth. Nic.* 1176b5–9). Such an activity is not as valuable as the end it serves, since a means is always worth less than the end it serves (*Eth. Nic.* 1094a4–6). Because these principles seem almost self-evident, it is easy to assume that they apply to Xenophon's virtues as well. Since Xenophon understands virtues and virtuous activities as means to an end, one might assume that they are in his mind of less value than the ends they serve. One could support such a position on the basis of a speech by Xenophon's Cyrus, who argues that the Persian forefathers gained nothing from their practice of virtue, since they never used their virtues for gainful purposes

7 This also explains why piety in an almost traditional sense is such an important quality for Xenophon as opposed to Plato: the assistance of the gods is necessary precisely because virtue aims at political success but cannot guarantee it in a world of contingent events.

8 Melina Tamiolaki (2012) has argued that Xenophon's virtuous leaders are not always successful. But this does not imply, and she does not argue, that *arete* itself aims at anything other than political success.

9 When I use the term virtue or virtuous in this paper, it reflects the Greek term *arete*. I refer to the nonintellectual virtues, such as courage, justice, and moderation, as virtues of character, even when discussing Plato.

in war (*Cyr*. 1.5.8–10). Cyrus' argument suggests that virtuous activities, which typically produce valuable results, are not valuable in themselves but have only instrumental value.

On the other hand, there are many indications that for Xenophon virtue and virtuous activity, when they are used for pursuing a worthy end, have a value that is not reducible to the value of the material ends they achieve. First, Xenophon's constant praise of virtue, sometimes bordering on the lyrical, does not sit well with a purely instrumental view. Second, Xenophon sometimes acknowledges that the gains achieved by virtuous effort may be minimal, but he finds them worth pursuing nevertheless (e.g., *Mem*. 2.1.18–19). Third, Xenophon's Cyrus says clearly that the possession of wealth, one of the chief ends of virtuous practical activity, does not bring happiness. He says instead that happiness is produced by the activity of acquiring wealth by honorable means (*Cyr*. 8.2.23). Finally Xenophon places special importance on the emotional rewards of successful accomplishment, and, as I shall argue below, this implies that virtuous activity is inherently valuable.

Here is my explanation of this seemingly contradictory message: for Xenophon, virtuous activity is valuable in itself, but only insofar as it serves a practical end. Neither virtuous activity alone, nor the products of virtuous activity alone, are sufficient for happiness. To achieve happiness, one must combine them by making active use of one's virtue in pursuit of a worthy end, and one must succeed in winning it. When this happens, the virtuous activity itself, of relatively little value in other cases, gains in inherent worth. It is transformed from a valuable activity in potential into a valuable activity in actuality.

Why is it important to use virtue for practical accomplishments? Accomplishments function in two ways: (1) as a goal that arouses desire, hope, or good expectation (*elpis*) and thereby both stimulates a person to hard effort (*ponos*) and makes it easier to bear; and (2) as a concrete symbol of personal excellence that stirs pleasant memories, a kind of trophy. Aristotle argued that honor is not an end in itself, but a kind of assurance of the possession of virtue (*Eth. Nic*. 1.5.5). Similarly, for Xenophon, accomplishing something that provides practical gain for oneself or others, as opposed to the mere practice of virtue, serves as a hallmark of one's virtuosity and as a reminder of its successful application. It offers both a reward and a proof of the successful actualization of virtue.

Understood in this way, Xenophon provides a philosophically coherent portrait of the life of practical achievement, explaining why it is worthwhile to win a war, make money, or even, in today's world, win a prestigious award, quite apart from the value of those objects themselves.

Intellectual Virtue

Perhaps the most striking divergence between Plato and Aristotle on the one hand and Xenophon on the other is found in Xenophon's attitude toward theoretical contemplation. Although this is the highest form of human activity in the minds of both Plato and Aristotle, for Aristotle exemplifying an activity that is an end in itself, Xenophon does not view it either as an end in itself or even as a worthwhile activity at all. Instead, he devotes a disproportionate amount of his time to describing political and military activity in books that we refer to as historical writings. These include major compositions such as *Anabasis*, *Hellenica*, and *Cyropaedia*. He also devotes an unusual amount of time to describing economic activity, including farming and hunting. These interests are not limited to his historical writings and essays, but also inform the bulk of Socrates' conversations in books two and three of *Memorabilia* and in *Oeconomicus*. Neither Plato nor Aristotle wrote anything remotely approaching Xenophon's historical-political and economic writings (excluding the pseudepigraphal *Oeconomica* attributed to Aristotle). While Plato and Aristotle place theoretical activity in the highest rank, and demote political and economic activity, which they treat—when they treat it—almost exclusively from a theoretical point of view, Xenophon focuses on politics and economics and does so mainly from a practical point of view, while rejecting theory.[10] The reason he rejects theory is that it can achieve no practical accomplishment.

There is no hero in Xenophon's writings to whom one might more plausibly attribute an interest in theoretical contemplation than Socrates, and no hero who can more plausibly be viewed as engaged in activities that are nonpolitical or non-economical in character.[11] If Socrates sees intellectual virtue as essentially practical in character, there will be no one left on whom to rest the opposite case. In fact, Xenophon's Socrates limits the areas of intellectual pursuits to the purely practical ones. He opens *Memorabilia* by describing how Socrates used to heap scorn and ridicule on those who investigated cosmolog-

10 As Louis L'Allier has emphasized (2012: 492), *Cynegetikos* includes an attack on sophistic intellectuals and may serve as an implicit defense of Xenophon himself from membership in such company. In this volume, David Thomas argues that the critique is directed against Plato, 612–639.

11 Aristippus would be a better candidate for the latter honor, but, of course, he is not a Xenophontic hero but a dissolute errant. Socrates takes great joy in learning lessons, but these are useful lessons (*Mem.* 4.5.10). Even dancing, one of the most seemingly nonproductive activities imaginable, is justified by Socrates for its practical benefits (*Symp.* 2. 17–19).

ical questions (*Mem.* 1.1.11–15) and he ends it on a similar note (*Mem.* 4.7.2–8). He says that Socrates wondered about those who study celestial phenomena, whether they think they can change the courses of the stars, or whether they are satisfied merely with knowing the causes (*Mem.* 1.1.15). Such studies are pointless because they are useless. Similarly, Socrates said that "one should study geometry up to the point that one is able to acquire, transfer or divide land by a right measurement, in case one ever needs to do so, or to calculate the produce" (*Mem.* 4.7.2). He "told others to study math, but in this as in other other areas he told them to avoid futile matters. He himself would investigate and discuss with his companions all things so far as they are useful" (*Mem.* 4.7.8). If cosmological and geometrical studies were worthwhile for their own sakes, it is hard to see why Socrates would reject their study on the grounds that they are useless.[12] Only that which is useful can be worthwhile.

Another sign that the intellectual virtues are purely practical in nature may be found in Xenophon's description of the intellectual curiosity of those whom Socrates loved: he loved those who possess "desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and estate, and tactful dealing with men and the affairs of men. For education would make such beings not only happy in themselves, and successful in the management of their households, but capable of conferring happiness on their fellow-men and on states alike" (*Mem.* 4.1.2). Clearly the knowledge that Socrates admired is practical knowledge.

The practical, nontheoretical character of wisdom can be seen in the discussion of *sophia* as an ambivalent good (*Mem.* 4.2.33; see also *Symp.* 3.4).[13] What makes *sophia* ambivalent? Neither here nor elsewhere does Xenophon argue that *sophia* can be used for a bad purpose. *Sophia* is always a positive quality; its ambivalence derives solely from the fact that it makes one useful to others, and hence liable to kidnapping, or that it arouses envy.[14] Socrates cites the story of Daedalus, who was captured and enslaved by Minos for his technical ability, and the story of Palamades, who earned the envy of Odysseus, as well as other unnamed persons captured for their wisdom by the king of Persia. Only

12 Theoretically, Xenophon may denigrate theoretical study on the grounds that it is preferable to engage in activities that are both useful and inherently worthwhile rather than those that possess only the latter trait. This would allow some value to purely theoretical studies. But such an opinion is never mentioned, and the tone in which Socrates ridicules theoretical study suggests otherwise.

13 Although Xenophon calls wisdom the greatest good (*Mem.* 4.5.6), this does not imply that it is never bad, only that it is better than the other goods, all of which are ambivalent.

14 See Donald Morrison 2010 and contrast L.-A. Dorion 2012.

because wisdom has a practical value does possessing wisdom make one liable to kidnapping: no one would want to capture an absent-minded philosopher who has no practical value.[15] Wisdom is dangerous to possess precisely because it is always useful.

David Johnson (2005: 68) has argued that while in this context Socrates is obviously speaking of practical wisdom, there is another kind of wisdom, not theoretical but moral, also referred to as *sophia*. This kind of wisdom is not ambivalent and not prone to attracting kidnappers. Since it does not produce anything of value, this form of wisdom would, presumably, be valuable only for its own sake. In *Memorabilia* 3.9.4–5, Xenophon says that Socrates identified *sophia* with *sophrosune*, a moral virtue, thereby acknowledging the existence of moral wisdom.

I do not think that this discussion implies the existence of a distinct form of wisdom, moral wisdom, or that if it did, such wisdom would have no practical benefit. Although Xenophon recognizes many kinds of wisdom,[16] none of them is called moral wisdom. The identification of *sophia* and *sophrosune* does not imply that there is a separate form of wisdom, identical to *sophrosune* but also called moral wisdom, but rather that wisdom in all its forms has some bearing on character and behavior. For example, forms of wisdom such as mastery of the practical arts imply the possession of self-control by the artist.[17] Even if there were a distinct moral wisdom, why would it not make one useful to others? Assuming that this hypothetical moral wisdom would fulfil some of the functions of moral virtue (*enkrateia*), it would enable people to perform useful tasks. Socrates suggests that Aristippus may be relying on his lack of *enkrateia* as a guarantee against enslavement (*Mem.* 2.1.15), a view that shows how valuable the *enkrateia* of a slave is to a master. So even if there is a moral

15 In principle, envy could be aroused by the possession of theoretical wisdom as well, but there is no indication anywhere that this is what Palamedes possessed.

16 See L.-A. Dorion 2012.

17 Johnson argues that the fact that Xenophon chose as examples of this ambivalent wisdom Palamades and Daedalus, both of whom are connected to Socrates (Palamedes by comparison and Daedalus by ancestry), shows that he is aware of this distinction between two kinds of wisdom, and, hence, of the fallacy of his argument. However, it may better show that he conflated the two kinds of wisdom. In the Hebrew tradition too, the term *chochmah*, wisdom, is used for both moral and practical wisdom, and its application to King Solomon is not unrelated to his role as the builder of the First Temple. L.-A. Dorion (2012) takes a more extreme position, arguing that wisdom for Xenophon has no moral component, but his attempt to reconcile this with texts such as *Mem.* 3.9.5, 4.2.22–23 and 4.5.6 is not persuasive. For a critique of an early version of his paper, see D. Morrison 2010.

form of wisdom, as long as it performs some of the functions of moral virtue, it would not be any less exposed to the arguments Socrates uses in conversation with Euthydemos. *Sophia* would still create a temptation to kidnapping since it would still make one useful to others. While this hypothetical moral wisdom might indeed possess some inherent value, it would not provide an example of something that is valued despite offering no benefits. And whatever inherent value it may have would not be disproportional to other goods: when it becomes a burden, by inciting kidnapping, one would be better off without it. The only kind of wisdom whose value would be purely inherent and hence completely useless to others would be theoretical wisdom, and this Xenophon completely rejects.[18]

In short, Xenophon's rejection of theoretical contemplation on the grounds that it is useless reinforces the impression that all worthwhile activities must aim at a practical end of some kind, and that no virtuous activity can be an end in itself. That does not necessarily imply, however, that virtuous activities are to be valued only for the sake of the material benefits they provide. Practical usefulness may be merely a necessary or defining characteristic of activities that have some inherent value, at least when directed toward useful ends.

Moral Virtue: Socrates

Let us turn to the moral virtues. The reasons for practicing these virtues, especially *enkrateia* but also the other virtues, are regularly said to be practical in nature. Even seemingly impractical virtues fit this pattern. In the anecdote of the big and little boys in *Cyropaedia* (1.3.17) and in the discussion of justice in *Memorabilia* (4.2), justice is described as something that promotes the well-being and success of the community. Similarly, pious behavior is regularly described as a useful means of arousing divine assistance for individuals and communities (see above note 8, and *Mem.* 1.1.4–9, 1.4.11–19, 4.3.12–18; *Cyr.* 1.6.1–6).

In some cases, Xenophon transforms a problematic virtue in order to insure that it fits this pattern. Xenophon is surprisingly uninterested in courage. His lengthiest discussion occurs in *Agesilaos*, where he has an interest in multiplying the *aretai* of his subject. At first he praises the king for a display of courage,

18 Theoretical wisdom might also expose one to damage by arousing envy, as Donald Morrison has argued (2010: 231); but there is no indication that Xenophon admires theoretical wisdom, and there are many signs that he despises it.

but notes that it was not a very safe display (2.12; see also *Anabasis* 4.4.34). Later, offering a fuller treatment of courage, Xenophon praises Agesilaos for confronting the strongest enemies, for placing himself at the forefront of the battle, and for winning hard-fought battles in which he received bodily wounds (6.1–2). But he also goes on to praise him for knowing how to gain a victory without entering battle at all, a tactic that was both safer and more beneficial to the city and its allies (6.3). Xenophon regularly says that it is preferable to avoid battles if possible (see *Cyr.* 1.6.26; *Mem.* 3.4.1, 3.6.8, *An.* 4.6.10–13), but this is not a practice that would ordinarily be associated with courage. Here Xenophon's concern with benefit leads him to descibe a potentially harmful *arete* in an unusual manner.[19]

As L.-A. Dorion has shown, the single major *arete* that Socrates stresses is *enkrateia*[20] or *karteria*.[21] He discusses it in *Mem.* 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, 2.1, 2.6, 4.5, 4.8, and it is centrally present in most of his other Socratic and non-Socratic works. The fullest explanation of the reasons for practicing *enkrateia* is found in the discussion with Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1).[22] In this conversation, Socrates attempts to

19 Similarly, at *Hellenica* 4.2.40–41, he implicitly identifies courage with skill in battle. Aristotle alludes to this theory at *Nic. Eth.* 3.8.6–9 = 1116b, attributing it to Socrates.

20 There is some controversy over whether *enkrateia* is a virtue itself or merely the foundation of the virtues (See L.-A. Dorion 2003). In my opinion, this is a false dichotomy. Xenophon's claim that *enkrateia* is the foundation of virtue (*Mem.* 1.5.4–5) does not imply that *enkrateia* is not itself one of the virtues. Xenophon emphasizes the importance of this quality throughout his writings, and not always or even usually for its foundational role in the cultivation or preservation of other virtues. Sometimes *enkrateia* is all you need, as when you are facing a temptation of one kind or another. Socrates is frequently praised as *enkrates*, which seems to imply that it is good in itself, and not merely useful for acquiring other qualities.

21 Although there are good grounds to treat *enkrateia* and *karteria* as distinct but related *aretai*, Xenophon himself does not distinguish them rigorously. This is clear, for example, in the manuscript reading of *Mem.* 2.1.1, in which qualities of both appear in a single list as elements of *enkrateia*. Editors sometimes emend this passage to eliminate the qualities normally associated with *karteria* in order to maintain the distinction (see Dorion 2000–2011: 113–115, note 1, vol. 2 Part 1, and see Edmunds, this volume 252–276). But the simple solution is that the two virtues overlap.

22 Later portraits of Aristippus as a corporal hedonist have some basis in Xenophon. When Socrates proposes that they begin by considering food, Aristippus agrees and points how how important food is (*Mem.* 2.1.1). Socrates has introduced the subject of food for a very different reason, not to point out how important food is but how important it is to be able to resist eating it. Socrates also puts a special emphasis on the folly of adultery (*Mem.* 2.1.4–5), which suggests that this was one of Aristippus' weaknesses.

persuade Aristippus to practice *enkrateia* on the grounds that it is necessary for successful political leadership, and that it is impossible to be happy without being a leader. Socrates begins and ends his discussion of the benefits of *enkrateia* with this point (*Mem.* 2.1.1; 2.1.7).[23] He argues that a lack of *enkrateia* can lead to adulterous relations that may result in personal damage and shame (*Mem.* 2.1.5). He points out that many occupations are practiced in the open air, which demands the ability to withstand varying temperatures (*Mem.* 2.1.6). Elsewhere, Socrates shows that *enkrateia* is necessary for leaders, citizens, and even slaves (*Mem.* 1.5). He recommends *enkrateia* as providing freedom from the contraints of desire and for enabling the acquisition of wisdom and *sophrosune* (*Mem.* 4.5). He also argues that *enkrateia* is useful for augmenting pleasure (*Mem.* 1.6.5, 4.5). *Arete* argues that self-restraint is the best source of corporal pleasures: one enjoys food, drink, sleep, and sexual relations much better after abstention, restraint, and hard work (*Mem.* 2.1.30, 33). *Arete*, who here seems to represent *enkrateia*, is useful for craftsmen, masters, and servants; she provides good allies in peace and war and is the best partner for friends (*Mem.* 2.1.32). Consistently, *enkrateia* is presented not an end in itself, but as a means to other things.

Since *enkrateia* is valued mainly for its products, would it not be preferable to acquire the good things without the pain, in which case *enkrateia* would have no inherent value at all, but only instrumental value? Xenophon is aware of this possible argument and, in at least one place, he suggests that *enkrateia* is purely instrumental. Rather than claiming that virtuous effort is valuable for its own sake, Xenophon's *Arete* argues that it is simply impossible to gain the good things without it. Inferior, short-term pleasures may be available without *enkrateia*, and at great cost, but, "None of the good and beautiful things do the gods give to men without toil and effort" (*ponou kai epimeleias*: 2.1.28).[24] In this

23 It is useful to anyone not being trained for disability in the political realm. The boy who is not trained in *enkrateia* is to be raised in such a way that he will never seek political rule: (ὅπως μηδ' ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς). This is the way one trains potentially dangerous slaves or subject peoples. Presumably, *enkrateia* would still be of value for everyone else, including most slaves. Socrates' argument depends on the claim that a lack of *enkrateia* will make rulership impossible, not on the claim, which he never makes, that *enkrateia* is useful only for rulers. Socrates emphasizes the value of *enkrateia* for political rulers because this fits his rhetorical strategy with Aristippus: he wants to convince him to practice *enkrateia*, and he thinks that the prospect of leadership is the best inducement for this. He does not argue that even a slave needs *enkrateia* in this context, since Aristippus would not wish to be a slave, and, hence, this would not serve as a good inducement.

24 See also the quotation from Hesiod (*Mem.* 2.1.20).

statement *Arete* makes no effort to justify the efforts as worthwhile in themselves, but rather justifies them solely on the grounds that they are necessary for achieving the good things. This suggests that *enkrateia* too is purely instrumental in value, and that one would be better off getting the good things without resorting to it. But that would be an argument from silence. The statement is also consistent with the opinion that it is good that we cannot obtain the good things without effort, because this is what forces us to cultivate virtues.

Moral Virtue: Cyrus

Xenophon explores this question further in *Cyropaedia*. His Cyrus appears to have found a way to evade the divine decree and provide others with the fruits of virtuous effort while exempting them from the moil and toil these normally demand. Croesus, for example, claims to be happy under Cyrus' dominion, since it provides him with a life that everyone thinks blessed, a life like that which his wife has led, and this means no need to engage in the strenuous acts of *ponos* that Cyrus has engaged in all his life.[25] If Croesus be judged a happy man, this would show clearly that virtuous activity is not worthwhile in itself but only for its results. However, the point is doubtful. If we look closer at the story of Croesus, we may conclude that he does not evade the divine decree. Cyrus finds Croesus' words difficult to believe (*ethaumase*: 7.2.29). He makes Croesus his constant companion, and Xenophon comments that he may have done this because he thought it safer to do so (7.2.29), a sign that Cyrus at least does not believe Croesus is as happy as he claims to be. He has good reasons not to be happy. As we will see, while it may be possible to obtain some of the good things by the gift of others, the most important benefits of virtuous activity remain unambiguously beyond the reach of those like Croesus who do not earn them by their own efforts.

Xenophon's Cyrus always emphasizes the rewards of virtuous effort. But in his first speech to the troops, he seems to go further and to deny any inherent value in practicing virtue if those rewards are not in view:[26]

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25 *Cyr.* 7.2.25–29. Croesus does not live the impossible life of freedom advocated by Aristippus, but the third way of life indicated by Socrates: that of serving the rulers (*Mem.* 2.1.12). Socrates himself seems to be a case of someone who does not require a life of toil as a prerequisite to happiness, despite a single reference to his toil in *Apology* 17 (See Chernyakhovskaya in this volume 329).

26 There is much controversy over whether or not Cyrus is an ideal leader or even a good man.

I have noticed[27] that our forefathers were not inferior to us. They also spent their time practicing (*askountes*) what are considered to be acts of *arete*.[28] But so far I have been unable to discover what good (*agathon*) they gained by being as they were, either for the state (*koinonia*) of Persia or for themselves. But I think that no virtue (*arete*) is exercised by men in order that those who have become good will have no advantage over the bad. Rather, those who abstain from immediate (*parautika*) pleasures do this not so that they will never have enjoyment (*euphranthōsi*), but they prepare themselves thus, by means of this self-restraint (*enkrateian*), so they may have many times more enjoyment (*euphrainoumenoi*) in the future. Those who are eager to become good speakers (*deinoi legein*) spend time on it not so that they will never stop speaking well but in hopes that by speaking well they will persuade men to perform many great good deeds (*polla kai megala agatha*). And those who practice military arts (*ta polemika*) undertake hard toil (*ekponousin*) not so that they will never stop fighting, but thinking that those who become good at the military arts will obtain much wealth (*olbon*), much happiness (*eudaimonian*) and great honors both for themselves and for the city. But if people undertake such toil and then knowingly allow (*perieidon*) themselves to become weak before they gain any fruit (*karpon*) from it,[29] it seems to me that they undergo what someone undergoes who, eager to be a good farmer, sows well and plants well and then when it is necessary to reap the fruits permits them to fall to the earth uncollected. If an athlete who has worked hard and become capable of victory should spend his

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My response to the literature on this question and argument for the exemplary character of Cyrus can be found in G. Danzig 2012. Similar conclusions are reached independently by V. Gray 2011, esp. 246–290.

27 Xenophon sometimes opens his own compositions with similar comments in the first person (*Cyr.* 1.1, *Mem.* 1.1; see *Poroi* 1.1, *Ap.* 1.1).

28 Here signifying *enkrateia* or *karteria*.

29 I thank Olga Chernyakhovskaya for comments on my translation of this clause. Although *periorāō* can often be translated merely as "to allow," it is likely that by choosing this term rather than the colorless *eaō* that he uses in the farmer analogy Xenophon wishes to suggest some form of awareness. Reflection on accomplishments is a central element in Xenophon's account of happiness and unhappiness (see below). So the farmers in question are not merely losing their crops, they are aware of the loss, and this causes psychological stress. This interpretation is supported by a similar passage in *Memorabilia* where the word *idein* is used (*Mem.* 3.12.8). Xenophon uses *eaō* when there is no issue of perception involved (see also *Cyr.* 1.6.11).

> time without competing, such a person would seem to me blameworthy for stupidity (*aphrosunes*).[30]

This is probably Xenophon's strongest statement in favor of what looks like a purely instrumental view of *arete*. Virtue is a means to an end, and it is foolish not to use it to pursue that end. By practicing virtue without seeking further rewards, the Persian forefathers behaved like foolish Platonists and Aristotelians. This attitude was so well-rooted in the fictional Persians that Cyrus must spend time persuading his troops of the importance of gaining the rewards.

To a certain extent we might be able to dismiss this speech as serving a rhetorical purpose. Cyrus is clearly trying to encourage his men to engage in warfare, so he may be exaggerating the folly of the Persian fathers. Both Cyrus' father (*Cyr.* 1.6.27–33) and Socrates (*Mem.* 4.2.13–19) permit deception in circumstances not very different from those that Cyrus faces in this scene. Although Xenophon thought deception to be a serious mistake when used as a military or political tactic,[31] it is not clear that he would object to its use in this case where there is little chance that the deception would be discovered, or, if it was, that its discovery would alienate Cyrus' soldiers.

But despite this, it is not at all clear that Cyrus is speaking falsely. Cyrus certainly denies that virtue has great value when pursued as the forefathers pursued it for no good purpose. But this does not necessarily mean that their practice had no value at all. It might be stupid to work at a job without collecting one's pay, and yet one might be somewhat better off working at a job without pay rather than doing nothing at all. Not only does practice make one competent for doing useful things when the time comes, it also offers important side benefits. One of Cyrus' strongest examples is the farmer. Although farming may seem pointless if one does not reap the harvest, Xenophon is famous for pointing out the many benefits that farming offers for both the body and the soul regardless of whether or not the fruits are harvested (*Oec.* 4.4–6.11). So while it may be foolish not to reap the external rewards of one's efforts, we cannot draw the conclusion that in the absence of such rewards, virtuous activity has no value at all. Cyrus may ignore these side benefits because his aim is to stir his men up for war, but he does not necessarily deny them.

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30 *Cyr.* 1.5.8–10. Although the reference to competing might suggest that competing is an end in itself, Xenophon probably means that competing is a means of gaining a deserved victory.

31 For Cyrus' care in avoiding the deception of friends, see G. Danzig 2012, esp. 517–522. For the importance of honesty even toward enemies, see G. Danzig 2007.

One hint in this direction may be found in the incongruity between most of the examples Cyrus offers and the situation in which Cyrus' soldiers find themselves. Cyrus blames the farmer for doing all the work but failing to reap the fruits. But neither the Persian forefathers nor Cyrus' troops have done all the work. The Persian forefathers are not nearly as foolish as the farmer, for in declining to engage in war they not only sacrifice the fruits of victory, they also avoid the painful and dangerous efforts necessary to bring it about. The abstention example has a similar problem: according to this analogy the Persian forefathers should be blameworthy for practicing abstention (*enkrateia*) while conducting and winning the war and then failing to enjoy the pleasures. But they never conducted or won any wars. These analogies seem designed to stir up the soldier's appetite for material rewards by ignoring the difficulties they still face. But if we apply these analogies strictly to the soldiers' situation, they would imply that the military campaign is one of the fruits of their efforts that they should harvest immediately, and hence that the activity of conquest is valuable in itself.[32]

This may be an overly subtle interpretation. But there is much stronger evidence of Xenophon's devaluation of the material rewards of success. Even in this speech we find an analogy that makes the point a bit more clearly. Cyrus says that it is foolish for an athlete to undergo training but never to enter the competition. Like an athlete, both the Persian fathers and Cyrus' troops underwent extensive training, and Cyrus is now encouraging his troops to enter the competition. According to this analogy, the thing that the soldiers would be foolish to refrain from is not the external reward of war, the booty which is not now available anyway, but participation in the military struggle itself.[33] An athlete in ancient Greece took pride in his or her personal excellence and in a victory that was pursued not primarily for the sake of financial enrichment.[34]

32 The oratory analogy is implicitly self-referential, referring to Cyrus' own speech and speeches like it that aim to inspire groups of men to take worthy action. Like military practice, persuasion is prior not only to the reaping of the fruits of victory but also to the use of one's skills in a practical activity like war.

33 It is superfluous to mention that I do not personally believe that war is a good thing. Although Xenophon does not seem to view war as tragic, as it was viewed by Homer and others, I do not believe he would have found much merit in warfare as it is practiced today.

34 The Greeks did not generally see athletic competition as a means of earning a living. The prize for Olympic victory was always a wreath rather than gold (Ar. *Plutus*: 585; see Herod. 8.26). Although the city of Athens offered meals to Olympic victors (Pl. *Ap*. 36d–e), this seems to have been more a mark of honor than a salary. In a passage that recalls Cyrus' speech, Aristotle compares virtuous activity to participation in an athletic contest (*Nic. Eth.* 1099a3–7).

Being in good shape may be a great thing; working out in practice sessions may be worth something too; but both of them are worth little if one does not enter the contest itself, and win it, not because of the monetary value of a prize one may win, but because of the exhilaration of striving for victory and the pride that victory engenders. So too, the soldiers may be better off pursuing the rewards of military conquest not merely for the sake of the rewards, but also for the sake of the psychological rewards that accompany the successful pursuit.

Xenophon's devaluation of the material rewards of conquest is reflected in the peculiar phrasing of Cyrus' most direct invocation of such rewards:

> But I think that no virtue (*arete*) is exercised by men in order that those who have become good will have no advantage over the bad.[35]

This statement is designed to encourage the men to perform well, on the grounds that they are better than their enemies and hence deserve a greater reward. But even here, Cyrus avoids saying that virtue is practiced for the sake of material rewards, limiting himself to denying the absurd notion that men would practice virtue in order to preclude the good from gaining any advantage over the bad. In addition to this, his words are formulated in an abstract manner so that they can be interpreted as referring not to material rewards but to any good thing at all. The fact that Cyrus refrains from claiming more than this in a speech dedicated to encouraging his soldiers to seek the rewards of military conquest shows his hesitance to claim that material rewards are the best reason for engaging in virtuous activity.

The fact that the prize-money is not the chief reward becomes even clearer in a passage in book eight of *Cyropaedia* where Xenophon's Cyrus offers some comments on happiness:

> I do not judge them happiest who possess the most and guard the most. For those who guard the walls (of the city) are not thereby happiest, although they guard everything in the city. But he who is capable of *acquiring* the most with justice and of *making use* of the most in the right way, this one I consider most happy, even with respect to wealth. And it was clear that he acted in accordance with that.
>
> 8.2.23

35 *Cyr.* 1.5.8; contrast the more definite formulation in *Anabasis* (1.9.29).

This is a striking and deliberate statement that openly contradicts the idea that financial rewards are the end of virtue. Nor does it suggest that honor, pleasure, or even friends are the end of virtue. Rather, it makes the activities of acquisition and use the best activities and the ones that make men happiest. Although the end of acquisitive effort is material gain, the wealth one obtains is not the chief reward. It functions more as a lure to the accomplishment of difficult deeds and as a sign of success in accomplishing them. Pheralaus says the same thing, and he acts on it (8.3.42–44).[36]

The idea that activity rather than possession is the end of virtuous activity is a familiar theme in Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1.8.9 = 1099a). Aristotle dismissed the life of money-making on the grounds that money is not an end but a means (*Eth. Nic.* 1.5.8 = 1096a6–10), but he did not consider the possibility that a life devoted to material enrichment by just and virtuous means might have merits that are irreducible to the value of the material benefits obtained.[37] Not only does the desire for gain provide a spur to the acquisition of virtues such as *enkrateia*, the actual experience of successfully winning a reward by means of honest effort and ability (virtue) provides its own psychological benefits. This emphasis on the value of acquisitive activity, together with the relentlessly practical character of the virtues he recognizes, makes Xenophon unique in the pantheon of extant ancient philosophical writers.

All of these passages concern the inherent value of virtuous exertion *when it is used for a good purpose*. Xenophon never speaks about the marginal value of practicing virtue without a clear material goal. This suggests that, paradoxically enough, virtuous activity gains its inherent value only when it is used in practice to make an excellent accomplishment. In the remainder of this paper, I will explore the reasons for this conclusion, discovering them in Xenophon's account of the psychology of the life of practical accomplishment.

Pride and Joy

For Xenophon all virtuous activities, and not merely obviously acquisitive activities such as farming, hunting, and war-making, pursue practical benefits such as wealth, honor, and friends (see *Mem.* 2.1.28). These possessions, the immediate rewards of practical virtuous activity, are essential components of happi-

36 It is true that Pheralaus, like Cyrus, takes special pleasure in doing good for others, but in the passage I have cited he expresses his agreement with Cyrus that acquisition creates more joy than possession.

37 On this theme in *Memorabilia*, see G. Danzig 2018.

ness (*Mem.* 4.2.34–35).[38] But there are other less obvious benefits that come to those who pursue and obtain these things by means of virtuous effort or activity. In *Mem.* 2.1, Socrates attempts to persuade Aristippus to practice virtue by offering him a whole range of inducements. Not only will he avoid slavery and gain mastery, he will also gain valuable emotional rewards. Of course, the acts of hard toil and endurance accomplished by means of *enkrateia* and *karteria* are inherently unpleasant. But hard work is unavoidable; and when one undertakes hard tasks in the right way there are ways to sweeten the suffering and even gain psychological or emotional benefits that are available in no other way:[39]

> "What? Aristippus," said Socrates, "don't you see that willing acts differ from unwilling in these ways: he who starves willingly can eat when he wishes, and he who thirsts willingly can drink when he wishes, and so too the others, while he who suffers these things by necessity cannot cease when he wishes? Furthermore, he who suffers willingly endures hardship (*ponōn*) with good hope and is happy (*euphrainōn*), *like hunters who suffer pleasantly* (*hedeōs mochthousi*)[40] *in the hope of catching something*. Such rewards for toil are of some small value. But those who make hard effort to acquire good friends,[41] to defeat enemies, or *to become capable in body and soul* to manage their households well, to benefit their friends and perform services for their homeland, how can one avoid concluding that these toil pleasantly (*ponein hedeos*) for such things and live happily (*euphrainomenous*), admiring themselves, praised and envied by others?"
>
> *Mem.* 2.1.18–19 italics added; see 2.1.33

38 See V. Gray, commenting on a passage in *Mem.* 4.2:

These goods suggest a purely external definition of *eudaimonia*, and that impression is strengthened by the external qualities of the horse in the analogy, but Socrates is arguing to destroy arrogance, not to produce a final view of the goods of *eudaimonia*, so he chooses his targets. He does after all go on to teach Euthydemos that he must develop piety (4.3) as well as self-control (4.5), which are the obvious moral constituents of *eudaimonia* (2013, 58).

As I argue here, neither material goods nor virtuous states of soul constitute the primary elements of happiness for Xenophon.

39 This whole discussion can be fruitfully compared to Aristotle's discussion of the natural slave (*Politics* 1.4–6, 1253b23–1255b15): the natural slave is the one who is in need of compulsion because he lacks foresight and is unwilling to engage in toil without compulsion.

40 Note the striking oxymoron. Compare *Anabasis* (1.9.19).

41 Or to render their friends good. For this use of *ktasthai*, see Sophocles *Philoctetes* 1281, and Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.5.17. See also van Berkel 398, n. 30.

The person who toils willingly has the option to stop. Although this may not be a realistic option in the competitive world Socrates has described, the use of optatives suggests that the mere awareness that one has a choice is all that matters. Psychologically, knowing that one is free to choose lightens the burden, just as does the honor of being recognized as a leader (*Cyr.* 1.6.25). Choosing to toil transforms imposed *ponos* to optional *ponos*, which is far less onerous.

In addition to the effects of choice, the fact that one is pursuing a tangible reward helps lighten the burden. It is much more enjoyable to run after a hare than to run after nothing. The image of a hunter chasing a hare or other beast over rough terrain and in inclement weather (if I may embroider on it a bit), fired up by hope of catching the quarry, provides, I think, an excellent image of Xenophon's vision of virtuous behavior in general. The activity is not inherently pleasant, but it is made pleasant by the hope of gaining the quarry. The hunter's goal is not to hunt forever without catching anything, but to catch a hare. What the hare provides is not merely the financial value of its flesh and skin, but also a motive for running that sweetens the pain. So while there is and must be a separate reward, the financial value of the reward is not what makes the activity worthwhile. One would not trade an exhilarating hunt for a hare bought at the marketplace. It is the experience of pursuing gain by means of virtuous effort that is the valuable thing, but this is impossible without a target in sight. This helps explain why Cyrus spoke out against the virtuous practice of the Persian fathers: not only did they miss the material rewards of military activity, they also missed the joy of acquisitive pursuit.[42]

There is a third benefit as well. Not only is it pleasant and exciting to chase "hares," the activity is made worthy by the fact that it is accomplished by the exercise of virtue. This leads to another form of pleasure, the pleasure of recalling the proud achievement and hearing the praise and perceiving the envy of others. *Arete* expands on this idea in her address to *kakia*:

42 This helps answer a question raised by Louis-André Dorion in his commentary on this chapter. According to Dorion, Socrates' argument with Aristippus fails because Socrates does not argue that the best reason for practicing virtue is that virtue is worth practicing for its own sake: "si vraiment Socrate voulait convaincre Aristippe qu'il est dans son intérêt de reconcer à son *akolasia* il devrait lui demontrer que l'*enkrateia* est profitable en elle-même, en ce qu'elle rend plus hereux celui qui s'y exerce," (Louis-André Dorion 2000–2011, vol. 2, part 1, 119–120, n. 4). In my opinion, Socrates does not use this argument because he does not believe that virtue is worth practicing for its own sake. But I do not think that his argument against Aristippus fails.

> You have never heard the most pleasant sound of all, praise of yourself, and you have never seen the most pleasant sight, for never have you seen any great accomplishment (*ergon kalon*) of your own.
>
> *Mem.* 2.1.31

When those who follow the path of laziness and vice grow old, they are ashamed of what they have accomplished and pained by what they have done (2.1.31), while those who follow the path of virtue and effort rejoice in hearing praise when they are young, receive honor when old, recall their past deeds with joy, and are pleased by their present deeds as well (2.1.33). The hare functions here not just as an incentive, but as a focal point for action and memory. This is why today we offer a "trophy" as a reward for an excellent accomplishment.[43] Insofar as one may look forward to future pride and praise, this expectation may also add to the enjoyment of exerting effort. Although Socrates does not explicitly say this, the fact that he mentions potential praise as an incentive to Aristippus shows that it can function in this way.

This passage helps reconcile Xenophon's valorization of practical activities with his claim that possession is not the highest end of virtuous activity. Although practical activities must aim at a tangible goal, that goal is important mainly for its psychological effects both prospective and retrospective. Even a raw financial reward may play this role, insofar as it takes on a symbolic value as a worthy accomplishment (*ergon kalon*). Farming too can be reconceived as a kind of virtuous accomplishment and its fruits as a kind of trophy. Even education can be conceived in this way. As I hope to show in another paper, Xenophon assimilates Socrates to his phenomenology of the practical life by conceiving of teaching as a practical accomplishment. This is already implied here in *Arete*'s words about those who make hard effort "*to become capable in body and soul* to manage their households well." Socrates' efforts can be assimilated to the model of achievement that Xenophon uses for his more military-oriented heroes because he trained his students exclusively in useful skills. The expectation of gain brought joy not only to their later activities but to the activity of learning itself.[44] It is, therefore, not only the activity of pursuing gain that is valuable in itself, but also the preparatory activity of becoming capable of doing so. This helps explain Xenophon's denigration of the Persian

43 Greeks including Xenophon regularly referred to great accomplishments as focal points for pride and incentives to accomplishment. See *Anabasis* 3.2.13 for an example.

44 One may compare the feeling one has on receiving an advanced degree in the humanities from a prestigious university with the feeling one has on receiving an advanced degree in law or business, knowing the opportunities for financial gain this entails.

forefathers. While their practice of virtue may perhaps have had some value in itself, it would have provided much more enjoyment if they had undertaken it as a preparation for winning an empire. And actually winning an empire by means of their virtues, as do Cyrus' troops, would have added incomparably more to their happiness.

While the prospective expectation brings joy, the retrospective memory brings pride. This pride in having accomplished something worthy implies that there is merit in one's efforts: one would not be proud of obtaining money by fraud, for example—unless one thought that fraud was an admirable practice. While not transforming practical activities into ends in themselves, since they always have a separate end, this does show that practical activities have an inherent value, a value that is actualized when they are used in pursuit of a worthy end. To put it another way, material success only provides emotional rewards insofar as it provides a demonstration of personal superiority, and it can provide such a demonstration only if it is achieved by means of virtuous activity. You cannot get a satisfying feeling of pride by stealing a Nobel Prize—unless you consider theft a virtuous activity. Since one is proud of the fact that one's success is a result of one's virtue, it follows that virtuous activity is inherently valuable, as long as it is not wasted in foolish ways.

By highlighting the praise and honor that will accrue to Aristippus if he adopts the path of virtue, Socrates is essentially recommending a life guided by *philotimia*. As Xenophon says, those who are motivated by *philotimia* are willing to forego immediate pleasures and undergo all kinds of *ponos* for the sake of the sweet praise that will greet them at the end (*Cyr.* 1.5.12; see also 1.2.1, Due 182–183, and Sanders 60–63). Honor is obtained by providing benefits for others, usually by means of hard work. In Plato's timocratic regime, those who pursue honor behave virtuously not because virtue is an end in itself, but because it is a path to honor (*Resp.* 547d; 549a–b, 549e–550b). It should not be a great surprise that Xenophon's Socrates, who rejects Plato's best life of theoretical contemplation, should promote the pursuit of honor, Plato's second-best life.

If honor or pride is the real end, why does Xenophon need to emphasize the material rewards of practical activity in the first place? One reason is that honor cannot function as the immediate end of any activity. There is no activity that can be described as "seeking honor." Honor can only be sought by engaging in an activity that has its own immediate and honorable end. Similarly, there is no activity that can be described as "the pursuit of hopes." One is only fired up by hope when one is pursuing a particular end. The tangible goal of a practical activity provides a clear object of pursuit, a focus for memory, and a mark of achievement for comparison with others. Since the meta-goals are depen-

dent on the existence of a tangible goal, the tangible goal plays a crucial role in enabling us to obtain the meta-goals. This is a reversal of Aristotle's theory whereby practical activities have less value to the extent that they aim at any reward apart from the activity itself. Here the existence of a practical goal transforms a potentially valuable activity into one that is valuable in actuality. On this count, Xenophon's view is closer to Plato's view that an activity is better if it is both valuable in itself and produces some benefit (*Resp.* 358a).

Conclusion

In sum, virtuous activities are directed to ends that are financially rewarding or politically enriching, or both, as in the case of military conquests, rather than the mere practice of virtue, because those ends are valuable and worth having, because their pursuit makes effort joyful, and because their achievement creates an abundance of pride and praise. This is why Xenophon does not recommend useless activities, not even virtuous ones: not only do they bring no gain, which is a serious demerit in itself, they do not provide the all-important psychological or emotional benefits either.

It seems clear from this account that Xenophon does not hold that happiness is an activity. The importance of pride and joy suggests that happiness is conceived by Xenophon, in accordance with common-sense views, as a pleasant psychological state.

While he places a great emphasis on self-reflective pleasure in the passages we have considered, in other places Xenophon justifies self-restraint by reference to the enhanced corporeal pleasure produced by delayed gratification (*Mem.* 1.6.3). This is not the place for a full investigation of the role of pleasure in Xenophon's thinking.[45] Such an investigation would have to ask whether or not Xenophon privileges the pleasures that come through the exercise of virtue, and if he does, whether he does this because of their superior pleasantness, which would make him a hedonist, or because they are the products of virtue. Does he emphasize these pleasures because they are the products of virtue, or does he value virtuous accomplishment because it leads to the pleasures he sees as intrinsically superior to other forms of pleasure? In either case, he clearly places greater emphasis on the pleasures of accomplishment, and it is this which makes accomplishment worthwhile.

45 See the paper by Olga Chernyakhovskaya in this volume 318–339.

Given the disdain Xenophon expresses for theoretical contemplation, he clearly views it as occupying a level lower than that of useless virtuous activity, as practiced by the Persian forefathers. Xenophon does not seem to recognize that a philosopher might find joy in the hunt for truth in metaphysics (see *Euthydemos* 291b–c for this metaphor), and be proud of his or her accomplishments. Although one could provide a Xenophontic defense of philosophy along such lines, anathama though that would be to Plato and Aristotle for whom philosophy is an end in itself, Xenophon sees theoretical contemplation as more like the kind of frivolous activity whose claims to finality and happiness Aristotle discusses and rejects at the end of the *Ethics* (10.6 = 1176b9–1177a11).

At a slightly higher level is the virtuous activity of the Persian forefathers who foolishly spent their time in continual practice of *arete* without gaining anything from it, thereby losing not only the material rewards, but also the psychological ones. Even their virtuous activity itself seems to lose most of its value by being wasted frivolously. A more difficult question is what to say about those who make use of their virtues in competition for worthy prizes, but fail to obtain them. Such people would experience the joy of pursuit, but this might be overbalanced by the agony of defeat. Xenophon does not explore this question, possibly because it would harm his educational effort to promote virtuous effort.[46] The highest level of happiness is attained by those who succeed by their exertions in accomplishing worthy things. They experience the joy of pursuit, the pleasure of gain, and the reflective pride and praise for having accomplished something worthy.

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46 Xenophon does have Cyrus' father warn him against deploying his army in any unnecessary encounters, so as not to put his army at risk (*Cyr.* 1.6.26). This shows a concern about the effects of failed effort, but as the failure here also includes personal destruction, it does not tell us much about the state of a person who survives after losing a contest.

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Socrates *Erotikos*: Mutuality, Role Reversal, and Erotic *Paideia* in Xenophon's and Plato's *Symposia**

Francesca Pentassuglio

This paper aims to investigate the role of mutuality and role reversal in the erotic theory and practice that Plato and Xenophon ascribe to Socrates in their *Symposia*. The starting point of the analysis is the fact that in both accounts of Socrates' erotics the rules set by the traditional *ethos* of fourth-century Athens—namely, hierarchy, asymmetry and one-way desire in pederastic relationships—are waived. Indeed, in the praise of ἔρως Socrates delivers in chapter eight of Xenophon's *Symposium*, he establishes mutuality as one of the chief elements of his erotic theory and, moreover, as a distinguishing trait of ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς (cf. 8.16 ff.). Similarly, according to the praise of Socrates pronounced by Alcibiades in Plato's *Symposium* (215a–222b), Socrates breaks down the hierarchical relation: as Alcibiades complains, even though he presents himself as an ἐραστής, he ultimately proves to be the ἐρώμενος (222a–b). This role reversal—as we will see—turns out to be a defining feature of Socrates' erotic behaviour and paves the way for erotic mutuality. I will explore the two accounts, attempting to provide a portrait of two different interpretations of this perplexing aspect of Socrates' erotic doctrine.

Some terminological clarifications are required with regard to the words *reciprocity*, *mutuality*, and *role reversal*.

i. The term *reciprocity* can have a broad range of meanings. In some sense, for instance, even the kind of exchange outlined by Pausanias in Plato's *Symposium* (184c) can be seen as a form of reciprocity (see *infra*, 379). This is why I will rather speak about erotic *mutuality*, by which I mean here—depending on the context and the source—both mutual affection (ἀντιφιλεῖν) and mutual desire in love (ἀντέρως), with special regard to homoerotic relationships.

ii. *Erotic mutuality* does not necessarily entail perfect symmetry or equality. In Plato's case, the introduction of mutuality in homoerotic relationships involves an ἐπιθυμία on the part of the beloved (and so an active role both

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in the homoerotic relationship and in the philosophical enquiry), but it does not imply that the roles of ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος are therefore symmetrical. Similarly, in Xenophon's *Symposium* the mutual affection between Callias and Autolycus does not rule out asymmetry in terms of political *status*. This emerges, in particular, from the protreptic section of the speech addressed to Callias (8.39–40), in which Socrates lists the qualities which would make Callias suitable for political office. Even though both Callias and Autolycus are from leading families and enjoy a high social *status*—as Socrates states (8.7)—Autolycus is still too young to undertake a political career; he needs Callias' support in order to 'exalt his country by setting up trophies of victory over its enemies, and for these reasons draw the admiring glances of all and be famous among both Greeks and barbarians' (8.38).[1] On the other hand, Socrates explicitly refers to Callias' political role: 'you are their *proxenus* and their foremost citizens are always being entertained at your house' (8.39). Furthermore, this implies an educational asymmetry between the two: as Socrates' claims clearly show (8.25, 8.27; cf. 8.38), Callias is responsible for Autolycus' moral development.

iii. The expression *role reversal*—to which I will often refer with regard to the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades—must be distinguished from mutuality. Role reversal is the 'first step' in Socratic παιδεία, which reshapes the traditional hierarchy by arousing in the beloved the erotic desire that belong to lovers. Nonetheless, as we will see, this is not the completion of the process Socrates inspires, which goes beyond reversed hierarchy. Both Plato and Xenophon emphasize the importance of erotic mutuality in their portraits of Socrates. Moreover, this was a subject discussed also by other Socratic authors whose works were lost, and especially in Aeschines' dialogues. Current scholarship tends to reconstruct Socrates' doctrine on the basis of a single testimony. We have therefore a considerable number of studies on Plato (among others: Robin 1908, Feier 1990, Ferrari 1992, Montoneri 1994, Casertano 1997, Cappelletti 2000, Geier 2002, Rhoades 2003, Schindler 2007, Iordanoglu & Persson 2009), a smaller number of studies on Xenophon (Flacelière 1961, Rubin 1989, O'Connor 1994, Hindley 1994, 1999, 2004, and Thomsen 2001) and only few works on Aeschines of Sphettus (Ehlers 1966, Kahn 1994, and Giannantoni 1997) and Antisthenes (Roy 1985 and Brancacci 1993). But there seem to be no studies that address the issue of Socratic ἔρως—and particularly of erotic mutuality—by taking into account the different *logoi Sokratikoi*. This is the reason why the

1 All the English translations of Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus* are from Marchant and Todd (1979).

analysis of the main sources will be carried out from a comparative angle, so as to clarify each of the accounts through a parallel reading of common issues.

In the first two sections of the paper I will focus on Xenophon's and Plato's *Symposia*. I will argue that, despite a surface agreement, the function of erotic mutuality and its implications are very different in the two accounts, and that this reflects the different portraits of Socratic philosophy they provide. First, the treatment of erotic mutuality is much more explicit and extensive in Xenophon's *Symposium* than in Plato's. Second, Xenophon interprets mutuality in a 'spiritual' sense: unlike Plato's account, there is no mutuality of desire in homoerotic relations, but rather a non-physical friendship. In short, while Xenophon deals with mutuality in terms of spiritual φιλία, Plato's starting point is mutual ἐπιθυμία and hence physical desire is not excluded. Third, the issue of erotic mutuality has in Xenophon a moral and political outcome; in contrast, Plato's Socrates ends with Forms and the implications of his erotic doctrine are rather metaphysical and gnoseological. My aim is to examine these differences in depth and to investigate the reasons why a single theme spawned such different interpretations by Xenophon and Plato.[2] Finally, in the last section, some parallels are drawn with Aeschines' dialogues, which bear some striking resemblances to the other two accounts, and particularly Plato's.

Xenophon

As I briefly noted before, if we look at the respective presentations of Socrates' erotics, we find much more mutuality in Xenophon than in Plato. Before going into Socrates' speech in the *Symposium*, some preliminary observations can be made regarding the notion of mutuality in this work.

Xenophon usually refers to mutuality with the verb ἀντιφιλεῖν. As stated before, this mutual φιλία is to be understood as 'spiritual', and such a mutual affection must therefore be distinguished from mutuality of pleasure. On a second level, it is possible to point out some connections between the notion of mutuality and others issues that Xenophon deals with both in the *Symposium* and in other works, such as: a) long-lastingness, b) willingness in homoerotic relations, and c) καλοκἀγαθία. Each of these points represents a separate issue in Xenophon but, as I will try to show, they can be (differently) related to the problem of erotic mutuality so as to enrich its understanding.

2 See in this volume L.-A. Dorion, "Comparative Exegesis and the Socratic Problem, esp. 57–60.

Within the *Symposium* the theme of erotic mutuality is dealt with especially in the central paragraphs of the Socratic speech on ἔρως, where a series of arguments in favour of the love of the soul is expounded by Socrates in order to persuade Callias (8.12 ff.). The theory of male love expounded by Socrates in chapter eight is based on the dichotomy between love of the body and love of the soul, which evolves in the course of the speech as a long praise of ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς and a corresponding condemnation of any physical expression of pederastic love. In this section, mutuality represents a defining feature of ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς and is introduced with special regard to homoerotic relationships. The general premise of Socrates' reasoning is the claim that 'there is no converse worth the mention that does not include affection (ἄνευ φιλίας)': indeed, while affection (φιλεῖν) is 'a pleasant and willing constraint' for those who admire their lover's character, many of those who only experience physical concupiscence (ἐπιθυμούντων) go as far as to detest the nature of their ἐρώμενος (8.13). After briefly discussing, in 8.14–15, the issue of the long-lasting nature of those relationships inspired by ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς, in 8.16 Socrates introduces the theme of mutuality. After having shown to Callias the most prominent traits of the '*Ouranos* lover', Socrates says that he now wants to prove the reasonableness of the position that such a lover will have his affection returned (ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι). First of all, as a reason for this mutual affection he puts forward the beloved's awareness of being admired by the lover for his virtuous character—that is, for something that, unlike physical beauty, will not vanish:[3]

> First, who could feel dislike for one by whom he knew himself to be regarded as the pattern of nobleness, and, in the next place, saw that he made his favourite's honour of more account than his own pleasure, and beside this felt assured that this affection would not be lessened under any circumstances, no matter whether he suffered some reverse or lost his comeliness through the ravages of illness?
>
> *Symp.* 8.17

We find here a further allusion to the factor of permanence in homoerotic relationships, which is mentioned again later in the speech.

Socrates then goes on: 'Moreover, must not those who enjoy a mutual affection unavoidably take pleasure in looking into each other's faces, converse in amity, and trust and be trusted, and not only take thought each for the other but

3 For the evaluation of physical beauty in the *Symposium* and its connection to καλοκἀγαθία, see Alessando Stavru's contribution 208–251 in this volume ("Socrates' Physiognomy: Plato and Xenophon in Comparison").

also take a common joy in prosperity and feel a common distress if some ill fortune befall [...]?' (8.18). In the final section of the paragraph, Socrates stresses the persistence over time of those relationships characterized by mutual affection, which can last—he claims—until old age.

Long-lastingness is repeatedly presented as another defining characteristic of the love of the soul and represents a parallel issue in Socrates's theory of ἔρως. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the factor of permanence confirms the 'spiritual' nature of the kind of relations here praised by Socrates, the same ones he characterizes as mutual. It is precisely because they are not based on bodily (temporary) beauty or on physical pleasure,[4] that they can last more than traditional homosexual relations. This leads to a second point: just as mutuality distinguishes Socrates' theory from the traditional view on pederasty, so too, as we will see, does long-lastingness. Indeed, given the pedagogical function of homoerotic relationships, continuity over the years was generally excluded (see Brisson 2006: 235 and Thomsen 2001: 150–151).

Socrates goes on to show the reasons why a *Pandemos* lover cannot share a mutual affection with his παῖς: 'But what is there to induce a favourite to make a return of affection (ἀντιφιλήσειεν) to a lover who bases his feeling solely on the flesh?' (8.19). The lover who makes use of persuasion in order to obtain the beloved's favours is even more reproachful than one who resorts to violence; indeed, whereas the latter plainly reveals himself as a wicked lover, the former corrupts the soul of the one upon whom he prevails (8.20). This passage raises the issue of the beloved's willingness in the pederastic relationship and allows us to investigate more in depth the connection between mutuality and the problem of coercion. Socrates makes it clear that lack of coercion is not sufficient to show mutuality: as Socrates' reference to a 'subtle persuasion' reveals, even when there is no coercion on the part of the ἐραστής, mutual desire can be absent from the relationship. Despite this, in other works the theme of mutuality recurs in association with that of the voluntary nature of a relationship and—even though they remain two different issues—in some passages from the *Hiero* mutual affection seems to be bound up with the fundamental requisite of the lack of coercion. That the parameter of coercion represents the basic criterion for the classification of the different kinds of relationships clearly emerges from a passage of the first chapter of *Hiero*, which provides a description of the possible and admissible types of relationship.[5]

4 For an in-depth exam of bodily pleasures and the 'Socratic' pleasure in Xenophon see in this volume 318–339 O. Chernyakhovskaya, 'Mechanisms of Pleasure According to Xenophon's Socrates'.

5 For a wider analysis of this chapter see Degradi 2000, 97–100.

The general rule presiding over this 'taxonomy' is the following: one should prefer those relationships that entail a spontaneous concession of favours on the part of the partner, regardless of his/her being the wife or the παῖς. As far as male love is concerned, Xenophon stresses the need for the ἐρώμενος to offer his favours with 'affection' and 'spontaneity' (1.29–38).[6] After having said to Simonides that τὰ μετ' ἔρωτος ἀφροδίσια are more satisfying (1.29) and that 'favours from a loved one are very pleasant (ἥδισται) only when he consents (παρὰ δὲ παιδικῶν βουλομένων; 1.34)', Hiero clarifies his assertion by introducing the notion of mutuality, which is understood, as in the *Symposium*, as mutuality of affection rather than mutuality of pleasure: 'For instance, if he is in sympathy with you (παρὰ τοῦ ἀντιφιλοῦντος), how pleasant are his looks, how pleasant his questions and his answers; how very pleasant and ravishing are the struggles and bickerings' (1.35).[7] What emerges from the whole chapter of the *Hiero* is that partner's affection reflects the non-coercive nature of a relationship; willingness can therefore come along with mutual affection in a relationship, even though—as Socrates' statement in the *Symposium* clearly shows—lack of coercion alone is not a sufficient condition for mutuality.

In the next section of the *Symposium*, Socrates completes with increasing emphasis the portrait of the *Pandemos* ἐραστής by comparing him to a buyer at the market who, as such, will not be loved by the ἐρώμενος more than a seller loves his customer. Socrates argues against a purely physical relationship, and it is particularly telling that, in order to do so, he gets to the core of the problem of the lack of mutual pleasure in homoerotic relationships. There are no reasons, he observes, why a boy should love a *Pandemos* lover in return: he will not love (φιλήσει) him because, as a young man, he is associating with one who is not youthful; because he is the handsome companion of a lover who is no longer handsome himself; and finally, because he is untouched by desire while the other longs for him. Socrates then frames the issue of mutuality of pleasure in explicit terms: 'a youth does not share in the pleasure of the intercourse as a woman does, but looks on, sober, at another in love's intoxication' (8.21). No wonder, therefore, that this engenders a sense of disdain and disgust towards the ἐραστής in the beloved, who is subjected to a pleasure that he does not share and remains indifferent to the lover's desire (8.22). The last observations are in

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6 On this issue see also Aeschines' *Against Timarchus* (especially 15, 55, 116, 137) and Dover 1978, 34–39.

7 English translation by E.C. Marchant (Marchant and Bowersock 1925). Mutual affection comes together with favours freely offered, and consensual relationships turn out to be also the most satisfying ones: 'But what I long to get, I very strongly desire to obtain by his goodwill (μετὰ μὲν φιλίας), and with his consent (παρὰ βουλομένου)', says Hiero in 1.33; see also 1.29.

line with the particular conception of mutuality outlined by Xenophon in the *Symposium* and can be connected to the thesis I advanced before: given the lack of mutual pleasure, according to Xenophon's perspective the only way to achieve mutuality in pederastic relations is by transforming them into spiritual friendships.

We can examine in greater depth this specific declination of mutuality by considering a recurring theme within Socrates' speech on ἔρως, that of καλοκἀγαθία.[8] Not only can a close connection be observed between the love of the soul and the notion of καλοκἀγαθία, but by exploring this connection a peculiar aspect of mutuality emerges: the interaction between the lover's and the beloved's καλοκἀγαθία produces, as I will try to show, a mutual stimulus to virtue, which can be interpreted as a special kind of mutuality.

First of all, Socrates himself accords the status of ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς to Callias' affection for Autolycus: 'That is the sort of love [*scil. love of the soul*], Callias, that seems to have you in its grip' (8.10). In the following section, he clarifies the reason for his assertion: 'I infer this from the noble nature of the one you love (τῇ τοῦ ἐρωμένου καλοκἀγαθίᾳ) and because I see that you include his father in your meetings with him. For the virtuous lover (τῷ καλῷ τε κἀγαθῷ ἐραστῇ) does not make any of these matters a secret from the father of his beloved' (8.11). What Socrates' observation seems to suggest is that the tendency of the lover who is inspired by *Ouranos* ἔρως is to turn his attention not to the beloved's body, but to his noble nature—in other words, to his καλοκἀγαθία.

This is a recurring idea in the speech: Socrates draws a contrast between those who only lust for the body of the ἐρώμενος and those who love his nature (τὸ ἦθος; 8.13) or the qualities of his character (τοὺς τρόπους; 8.22). Moreover, he states that the good lover is the one who teaches the beloved 'right speech and conduct' (8.23) and 'by whom he [*scil. the beloved*] knew himself to be regarded as the pattern of nobleness (καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός; 8.17)'. As far as an

8 A study by Bourriot (1995) on the use of the terms καλοκἀγαθία and καλὸς κἀγαθός in Xenophon has revealed that the *Symposium* is the work in which Xenophon makes the most frequent use of the noun καλοκἀγαθία and of the corresponding adjective, with six occurrences each. In four of these six cases the καλοκἀγαθία is mentioned by Socrates, who is therefore the character who uses the term most, in particular with reference to Hermogenes, who is said to be in love with καλοκἀγαθία (8.3), and to the noble nature of Autolycus and Callias (8.11). As far as the other characters are concerned, Critobulus address the guests as καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας (4.10), while, speaking to Callias, opposes the teaching of manual crafts to that of καλοκἀγαθία (3.4). The great relevance of the term is finally shown, in the closing section of the work, by Lycon's remark: 'Socrates, you seem to me to have a truly noble character (καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος; 9.1)'; see Bourriot 1995: 295–313.

Ouranos lover is concerned, the beloved 'feels that he cannot keep his lover faithful without nobility of character (καλὸς κἀγαθός; 8.26)' and this is exemplified by the behaviour of the Lacedaemonians, 'who hold that if a person so much as feels a carnal concupiscence he will never come to any good (μηδενὸς καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ; 8.35)'. On a textual level, there is a remarkable insistence on the concept of καλοκἀγαθία when dealing with ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς, not only with regard to the ἐρώμενος—as the heavy stress laid on Autolycus' virtues shows[9]—but also with regard to the ἐραστής, whose καλοκἀγαθία is a direct cause of choosing a παῖς *because of his noble character* (see 8.8 and 8.27). This close association that emerges from the passage cited above (8.11)—where Callias is defined as a καλός κἀγαθὸς ἐραστής just after mention is made of the 'noble nature' of his beloved—is further confirmed by a consideration raised by Socrates. For after praising Autolycus' strength, stamina, courage, and sobriety, he adds: 'Setting one's heart on such traits gives an insight into the lover's character' (8.8).[10] Socrates deals again with the beloved's καλοκἀγαθία in 8.26: 'the favourite who realises that he who lavishes physical charms will be the lover's sovereign will in all likelihood be loose in his general conduct; but the one who feels that he cannot keep his lover faithful (οὐ καθέξει τὴν φιλίαν) without nobility of character (ἂν μὴ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ᾖ) will more probably give heed to virtue'.

Socrates next considers the lover's καλοκἀγαθία, which is at the same time the effect of that of the beloved—as the defining feature of a lover inspired by *Ouranos* ἔρως is the fact that his attention is turned to the beloved's καλοκἀγαθία, not to his body (8.11)—and the precondition for it, because 'the greatest blessing that befalls the man who yearns to render his favourite a good friend is the necessity of himself making virtue his habitual practice. For one cannot produce goodness in his companion while his own conduct is evil, nor can he himself exhibit shamelessness and incontinence and at the same time render his beloved self-controlled and reverent' (8.27). From these passages we can infer that in a pederastic relationship inspired by ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς a sort of 'virtuous circle' is produced, as the lover's καλοκἀγαθία inspires that of the beloved

9 In addition to the passage cited above (8.11), consider what Socrates says in 8.8 ('Now, I have always felt an admiration for your character, but at the present time I feel a much keener one, for I see that you are in love with a person who is not marked by dainty elegance nor wanton effeminacy, but shows to the world physical strength and stamina, virile courage and sobriety') and in 8.37 ('In your case, Callias, I deem it meet that you should thank Heaven for inspiring you with love for Autolycus. For his ardor for glory is manifest, inasmuch as he undergoes many toils and many bodily discomforts to ensure his being proclaimed victor in the pancratium').

10 See also Socrates' claim in 8.27.

and vice versa. Indeed, on the one hand, the virtue of the ἐρώμενος is nourished by his awareness of the fact that the love of the ἐραστής towards him is due to his καλοκἀγαθία and not to his body, so that he will lose his affection if he does not increase his being καλὸς κἀγαθός. On the other hand, the lover has to make virtue 'his habitual practice' if he intends to make his favourite a φίλον ἀγαθόν; as a consequence, he has to keep himself self-controlled and modest; that is to say: he has to be καλὸς κἀγαθός in turn.

According to the theory of ἔρως expounded here by Socrates, then, a mutual stimulus to virtue can occur in a relationship between ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος—as this clearly emerged in 8.26–27—but only if this relationship is characterized as a τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία, as an 'affection' for the soul that excludes any physical gratification, which in Socrates' opinion necessarily entails an ἀναιδής ὁμιλία producing 'many shocking results' (ἀνόσια πεπραγμένα; 8.22) and, for the beloved, 'the deepest contempt' (τὰ ἐπονειδιστότατα; 8.19).

It is now possible to investigate the connection between this specific aspect of Socrates' theory and the use of a peculiar language—in particular, the choice of terms and expressions that fall outside the semantic field of ἔρως. As we will see in the following section of this paper, linguistic usage in this sphere generally abides by well-defined and stringent criteria, which entail—on the one hand—that mutuality is reserved for φιλία relationships and that asymmetry pertains to the specific homosexual ἔρως experience and—on the other hand—that in the case of these one-way relationships one generally speaks of ἔρως for the lover and φιλία for the beloved. Therefore, it is particularly telling that, especially in the paragraphs dealing with the issue of spiritual erotic mutuality, Xenophon uses almost exclusively terms belonging to the semantic field of φιλία and φιλεῖν (ἄνευ φιλίας and φιλεῖν in 8.13; τὴν φιλίαν συναπομαραίνεσθαι in 8.14; τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία in 8.15; φιλεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον and ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι in 8.16; μειωθῆναι ἂν τὴν φιλίαν in 8.17; τὸ φιλεῖσθαι and ἐρῶντες τῆς φιλίας in 8.18; ἀντιφιλήσειεν in 8.19; φιλήσει in 8.21).

In the light of these considerations, it is interesting to note that, outside of Socrates' treatment of the ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς, we don't find the same linguistic consistency. At the very beginning of Socrates' speech, there are hints of the theme of mutuality: while showing the guests' devotion to the god Eros, Socrates states that 'Charmides here has gained many lovers and has in some instances felt the passion himself (Χαρμίδην δὲ τόνδε οἶδα πολλοὺς μὲν ἐραστὰς κτησάμενον, ἔστι δὲ ὧν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμήσαντα; 8.2)'. Unlike the central paragraphs of the speech, the verb here employed by Xenophon is ἐπιθυμέω; similarly, he does not use φιλεῖν to describe the relationship between Critobulus and Cleinias in chapter four. Now, it is clear both from Critobulus' speech (4.12 ff.) and from the following exchange between Critobulus and Socrates (4.19–26), that the man's attraction

towards Cleinias is far from being inspired by ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς, as Hermogenes' intervention seems to confirm: 'For my part, Socrates,' said Hermogenes, 'I do not regard it as at all like you to countenance such a mad passion of love in Critobulus' (4.23). It is therefore relevant that Socrates refers to Critobulus' feeling with the verb προσκαίω (4.23), while Critobulus himself describes his desire with a term so explicit as πόθος (4.22).

A similar remark can be made with regard to Socrates' reference in 8.3 to the mutual affection between Niceratus and his wife, which is presented as an ἀντέρως: 'Niceratus too, so I am told, is in love with his wife and finds his love reciprocated (ἐρῶν τῆς γυναικὸς ἀντερᾶται)'. I will leave aside the wide issue of the ἀντέρως in heterosexual relationships, as it would also require an in-depth analysis of Xenophon's conception of marriage, as expounded for instance in chapter seven of the *Oeconomicus*. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Socrates mentions again mutuality between men and women later in the speech (8.21), as we have seen before (*supra*, 370). We can infer from the passage that mutuality of pleasure is a common feature of heterosexual relations for Xenophon's Socrates and that, at the same time, it doesn't seem to pose any moral problem within Socrates' erotic doctrine. On the other hand, precisely because there is no mutuality of pleasure (as is to be expected) between an older and younger man a mutual relation between them must be spiritual, while this is superfluous for men and women.

Furthermore, it is only when Xenophon's Socrates deals with this special kind of homosexual spiritual love that he resorts exclusively to terms related to φιλία, so defining a kind of relationship to which he ascribes—as we have seen—three special features: long-lastingness, willingness on the part of young man (who is not to be object of violence or persuasion) and, finally, mutual affection, which also implies a mutual stimulus to virtue.

Now, before drawing further conclusions about Xenophon's views, I will move on to Plato's *Symposium* in order to explore a different interpretation of the same aspect of Socrates' doctrine.

Plato

A careful examination of the issue of erotic mutuality can be carried out by considering, first of all, the meaning of the role reversal between ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος within Plato's *Symposium*.[11] As a starting point for our analysis we can

11 It is worth noting that—unlike Xenophon, who never portrays Socrates and Alcibiades (or

take a remark that Alcibiades addresses to Agathon, when warning him about Socrates' behaviour towards young men: Socrates always presents himself as an ἐραστής, but in the end proves to be the ἐρώμενος rather than the lover (222a–b). This confusion of erotic roles Alcibiades complains about effectively finds confirmation in the image of Socrates as he is depicted in the *Symposium*. Indeed, Socrates here takes on both the role of the ἐραστής and that of ἐρώμενος according to Diotima's theory of ἔρως. On the one hand, he seems to be identified with the ἐραστής within the description of *Eros* provided by the priestess, in which scholars have often recognised a portrait of Socrates;[12] like the son of Penia, Socrates is 'ever poor,' 'far from tender or beautiful,' shabby and barefoot (203c–d); like the son of Poros, he is 'desirous and competent of wisdom, throughout life ensuing the truth', halfway between wisdom and ignorance, and therefore a philosopher (203d–204b). Moreover, as Diotima points out in stark contrast to Agathon's speech, *Eros* is the lover (τὸ ἐρῶν) and not the beloved (τὸ ἐρώμενον), as someone had supposed, wrongly inferring from this that *Eros* is 'all-beautiful' (204c). In Socrates, then, Alcibiades primarily sees the ἐραστής, he who—according to Diotima's speech—is attracted to handsome young men and is able to make them better (210c). This is why Alcibiades has chosen Socrates—who in turn declares to have long fallen in love with him (τούτου ἠράσθην; 213c–d)[13]—as his ἐραστής (218c–d). Nonetheless, even though Alcibiades describes himself as the perfect ἐρώμενος, 'beautiful and submissive' in Edmonds' words (2000: 273), when he realizes that Socrates is not impressed by his renowned beauty,[14] a role reversal occurs and Alcibiades changes, with respect to Socrates,

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anyone else) as lovers—Plato expressly refers to the relationship between the two not only in the *Symposium*, but also in the opening scene of the *Protagoras* (309a) and in the *Gorgias* (481d), where Socrates presents himself as an ἐραστής of Alcibiades and philosophy. See also *Alc.* I 103a–b.

12 See, among others, Edmonds 2000: 273–274 and Cappelletti 2000: 255–256. For a detailed reconstruction of all parallels between the description of *Eros* in Diotima's speech and Socrates' portrait in Alcibiades' praise, see Sheffield 2001: 196–197.

13 Also in *First Alcibiades* Socrates declares to be in love with Alcibiades (103a–104c). For an analysis of the portrait of Alcibiades in *First Alcibiades* see Duràn López 1991: 114–122; on the presence in the dialogue of a role reversal comparable to that of the *Symposium* see Mazzara 2007: 133–134. Finally, on the issue of erotic mutuality, which marks the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades in this dialogue as well, see Howland 1989–1990: 65.

14 This is what Alcibiades complains of before telling about his attempt to seduce Socrates: the latter shows himself to be interested in handsome young men, with whom 'he is always busy and enraptured', but actually 'all the beauty a man may have is nothing to him' (216d). Even more so after failing in this attempt, Alcibiades comments: 'he showed such superiority and contempt, laughing my youthful charms to scorn' (219c).

from ἐρώμενος into ἐραστής (217d).[15] What is particularly telling, in this regard, is the comparison between Socrates and the Silenus-figures that sit in statuary shops:[16] like the latter, Socrates is grotesque on the outside and—leaving the simile aside—feigns to be 'amorously inclined' towards handsome young men, like a typical ἐραστής (216d). Furthermore, in the same way as these Silenus-figures, once opened, are found to contain images of gods (215a–b), Socrates has images within him which are so 'divine and golden, so perfectly fair and wondrous' (216e–217a), that—once discovered—they become an object of ἔρως, thereby reversing his appearance as a lover.

Before going on with the analysis of Alcibiades' speech, a deeper insight into the Athenian traditional view on pederasty is required, especially with a view to the comparison of Plato's and Xenophon's accounts. By taking on both the role of the lover and that of the beloved in his relationship with Alcibiades, Socrates breaks with that one-sided conception of pederastic relationships that ruled the traditional *ethos*.[17] According to it, the lack of symmetry

15 On the issue of the role reversal between Socrates and Alcibiades see, among others, Steier 1996: 90; Scott 1996–1997: 74–76; Edmonds 2000: 261–264, 270, 272–277; Sheffield 2001: 200–201. Sheffield, in particular, interprets this exchange of roles as a *topos* of satyric drama—a genre which, in his view, influences aspects of Alcibiades' speech. The presence, in this speech, of some features that belong to the genre of satyric drama has been highlighted also by Micalella (2000) and Segoloni (1994). In Segoloni's opinion (1994: 212–213), this can be interpreted as evidence of the 'tragic' character of Plato's *Symposium*, given the close connection between satyric drama and tragedy.

16 For an in-depth examination of the two comparisons drawn by Alcibiades—between Socrates and Silenus-figures, and between Socrates and the satyr Marsyas—see Steiner 1996. For an analysis of Alcibiades' speech from a rhetorical point of view, with special regard to the norms of the epideictic genre and the use of comparisons, see North 1994: 93–96, who particularly focuses on the depiction of Socrates as αὐλητής and ὑβριστής.

17 An in-depth analysis of the traditional *ethos* falls beyond the scope of this paper; a detailed investigation of the earlier sources would certainly show a more complicate situation. Nonetheless, several scholars agree about this particular trait of homoerotic relationships. Calame (1992: 72–73), for instance, highlights the asymmetric nature of homoerotic relationships with regard to the erotic practices in the *gymnasia* in the VI century. Dover (1978: 16 and 84) generalises this thesis by pointing out that 'the reciprocal desire of partners belonging to the same age-category is virtually unknown in Greek homosexuality' and that 'homosexual relationships in Greek society are regarded as the product not of the reciprocated sentiment of equals but of the pursuit of those of lower status by those of higher status'. Halperin (1990: 267) provides a similar interpretation: 'the ethos governing the proper sexual enjoyment of citizen youths denied the latter a significant share in the experience of eros: it was clearly unacceptable, after all, for the future rulers of Athens to exhibit any eagerness or desire to play a subordinate role in their relationships

was the distinctive feature of the ἔρως experience and at the same time what distinguished it from φιλία relationships. While φιλία is effectively mutual, as the active-passive ambiguity of the term itself reveals—φίλος, as Kahn[18] noted (1996: 257), means both 'fond (of)' and 'dear (to)'—homosexual ἔρως generally was not. The Greeks stress this by speaking of ἔρως with regard to the lover and of φιλία with regard to the beloved, the latter corresponding to a feeling that includes affection, gratitude, and admiration. Now, such a distinction is well attested in a famous passage from the *Phaedrus* where Plato, dealing with the difference between lover and beloved, defines the ἔρως of the beloved as a reflection or an image of that of the lover: referring to the beloved he states that 'love's image, requited love, dwells within him; but he calls it, and believes it to be, not love (οὐκ ἔρωτα), but friendship (ἀλλὰ φιλίαν)'.[19] It is in the *Lysis*, however, that the connection between φιλία and mutuality is explicitly established and discussed at length (see 212b–213d).[20]

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with other man'. Even though such assumptions about a 'traditional *ethos*' could be oversimplifying, it must be noted that a considerable number of ancient souces confirms the one-way nature of pederastic relationships. As far as the comedy is concerned, see Ar. *Nub.* 979–980, 1071–1074; *Ach.* 263–279; *Av.* 128–134, 137–142; *Vesp.* 578; *Eq.* 877–880, 1384–1391, where we find a positive judgement on the active partner and the derision of the passive one (on the mockery of erotic passivity see also *Thesm.* 35, 50, 198 ff., 200 ff., 206). Other sources display that the virtues admired in an ἐρώμενος are the virtues which the ruling element in a society (in the case of Greek society, adult male citizens) approves in the ruled (women and children): see Anac. fr. 360; Pl. *Chrm.* 158c and *Lys.* 222b. Aristotle, who considers mutuality as a necessary element of friendship (*Eth. Nic.* 8.1155b27–1156a5) refuses to consider the male homerotic relationships as a kind of friendship on precisely this ground: see *Eth. Nic.* 8.1157a3–1159b19, in particular 1159b17–18: 'hence an erotic lover also sometimes appears ridiculous, when he expects to be loved in the same way as he loves (φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν)'; see also Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 4.26. This become even more explicit after the classical period: see Mel. fr. 9 Gow-Page; Ov. *Ars am.* 682–684; Plut. *Mor.* 769e–f, 140e–f, 142e–143a.

18 This distinction is also highlighted by Thomsen (2001: 118): '*philia* is a mutual feeling, even when it is translated "love"'.

19 Pl. *Phdr.* 255e (transl. by H.N. Fowler).

20 See in particular 212b: φίλος γίγνεται, ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος; 212c: ὁ μὲν φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλεῖται; 213a: οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φιλῶν φίλος ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὁ φιλούμενος; 213b: τὸ φιλούμενον φίλον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ φιλοῦν; for the use of the verb ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι cf. 212b: οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου ὃν ἂν φιλῇ; 212c: ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα οἱ μὲν οἴονται οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι; 212d: οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν; see also 215a: τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη, μηδεμίαν ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα.

The traditional lack of mutuality in pederastic relations can also be illustrated by some passages from Plato's *Symposium*. When Phaedrus, in his speech, states that the gods are more 'admiring and beneficent' when the beloved is fond of his lover, he defines the feeling of the beloved by using the verb ἀγαπάω and not ἐράω (180b); similarly Aristophanes, when referring to those παῖδες who have originated from a primeval male being, does not speak of ἔρως but says that they φιλοῦσιν men (191e). Even more explicitly, Aristophanes juxtaposes ἔρως and φιλία in a sentence that shows the distinction between the two terms and the specific meaning of each: 'A man of this sort is at any rate born to be a lover of boys (παιδεραστής) or the willing mate of a man (φιλεραστής; 192b)'.[21] This formulation—in which the first term refers to the disposition of the adult lover and the second term to that of the young beloved—confirms that there is no ἔρως on the part of the young favourites, because this only comes into play when they grow up and became lovers in turn (ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀνδρωθῶσι παιδεραστοῦσι; 192a–b). Finally, also Pausanias in his speech speaks about 'Aristogeiton's love (ἔρως)' and 'Harmodius' friendship (φιλία)', without any further explication of this distinction, which was evidently taken for granted.

The asymmetry in homoerotic relationships reflects, first of all, a difference of social *status*: according to the traditional *ethos*, these relationships were strictly polarized and characterized by the same disparity that regulated the social interaction between the two members. The latter were divided, so to say, into two categories that corresponded to a well-defined hierarchy: the distinction between activity and passivity was isomorphic to that between a dominant and a subordinate *status* (see Foucault 1984: 217). By limiting erotic mutuality to the love of women—thus to 'heterosexuality'—the ruling *ethos* opposed male and female ἔρως in terms, respectively, of hierarchy and mutuality.[22]

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21 All the English translations of Plato's *Symposium* are by H.N. Fowler (1925).

22 Mutuality is here to be understood as *mutual pleasure* as, of course, heterosexual love might be considered as hierarchical from other points of view; namely, from a social or a political one. On this topic see Ludwig 1996: 540. In this context, it is interesting to read Socrates' statement in 8.21: 'a youth does not share in the pleasure of the intercourse *as a woman does*'. Similarly, Halperin (1990: 270–271) stresses the fact that erotic mutuality was a prerogative of women, the only ones who—according to the traditional *ethos*—could experience ἀντέρως. A similar remark is made by Thomsen (2001: 146), who considers mutuality to be the distinctive feature of marital relationships and what distinguishes them from homoerotic ones; he mentions in particular Socrates' allusion to Niceratus and his wife in 8.3. Taking the same passage into account, Flacelière (1961: 108) defends a fun-

What lies at the bottom of this conception is, then, the pedagogical function of homoerotic relationships: the older lover was supposed to be in possession of specific virtues, including civic ones, in order to be able to educate the young beloved (see Ludwig 1996: 538–539, Brisson 2006: 231, and Ferrari 1992: 251). We may argue that these qualities on the part of the ἐραστής, and particularly his educational value, pushed young people to get involved in relationships with older (and possibly unattractive) men. What emerges is, then, a kind of reciprocity, which however turns out to be a form of exchange and not of mutuality, as neither mutual affection nor mutual desire is given. To give a further example from Plato's *Symposium*, the ideal beloved depicted by Pausanias does not share his lover's desire. He expects to get something else in return from the ἐραστής: the development of virtue (185a–b). Indeed, it is the lack of desire on the part of the young lover that engenders the need for another, higher 'motive' for him to engage in a homoerotic relationship.

What clearly emerges here is the distance between Pausanias's view on pederasty and that put forward by Socrates in Xenophon's *Symposium*: while in Pausanias's speech the lack of mutual pleasure can be compensated by educational benefits; according to Xenophon's Socrates it is necessarily accompanied by the beloved's disgust for the ἐραστής (8.21–22). Thus, it was precisely this one-way nature of pederastic relationships that marked the Athenian institution of pederasty as depicted by Pausanias. It is, moreover, the same 'contractual' model that lies at the bottom of Alcibiades' behaviour towards Socrates. Going back to Alcibiades' speech, we can note that what he offers to Socrates is exactly the kind of exchange outlined by Pausanias. The latter states that according one's favours to a lover is not shameful if the ἐρώμενος acts for the sake of wisdom and virtue; that is: 'in the belief that his friend will make him better' (184c; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9.116b29–1164b21). So, adopting this model for pederastic relationships, Alcibiades believes it 'sheer folly not to gratify' Socrates, because—as he declares—'to me nothing is more important than the attainment of the highest possible excellence, and in this aim I believe I can find no abler ally than you' (218c–d). The fact that Alcibiades insists on conceiving homoerotic relationships in the traditional terms of mixed favours causes his failure both as ἐρώμενος and as ἐραστής; above all, it reveals his misunderstanding of the real nature of Socratic ἔρως.

Alcibiades fails to understand the role played by the breaking of the paradigm of roles and by the redefinition of the hierarchical distinction between

damentally different position: in his opinion, the depiction of a marital relationship in terms of mutual love represents an anomaly for Classical ethics.

ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος on the basis of the opposition between activity and passivity. Now, this issue has been especially dealt with by Edmonds (2000: 264–272), who directly connects this aspect of Socrates' erotics with the maieutic activity depicted by Plato in the *Theaetetus* and the *Symposium*. As far as the *Symposium* is concerned, he highlights the error of those commentators who ascribe to Socrates only the role of the lover—of the ἐραστής who, pregnant in his soul, seeks 'the beautiful object whereon he may do his begetting' (209b; cf. 206d)—and who therefore confine the ἐρώμενος to a purely passive role. On the contrary, when the lover finds 'a soul that is fair and noble and well-endowed' (209b6), the beloved acts in this συνουσία[23] as a midwife, allowing the lover to beget what he was pregnant with 'from his youth' (209b).

In the theory of ἔρως expounded by Diotima, the role of the beloved is not described in detail and no direct reference is made to any positive action on the part of the ἐρώμενος. Nonetheless—as Edmonds observes (2000: 269)—in one passage Diotima states that the lover shares with the beloved 'the nurturing of what is begotten' (209c). This seems to refer to a common and shared activity of the two, which can be understood to imply some active role for the beloved. The role reversal in the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, then, entails that Socrates is not only the lover—poor, 'far from tender or beautiful', always needy and deficient—but also the ἐρώμενος: the beautiful soul with which young men like Alcibiades fall in love once they discover its inner beauty. By taking this role, Socrates, as a midwife, attends to his interlocutors, so that they can give birth to their ideas. Making the beloved an active part in this process, Socrates reshapes the traditional hierarchy of roles between ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος by introducing mutuality in the erotic relationship. According to this view, therefore, when correctly interpreted, ἔρως is not hierarchical but reciprocal (see Halperin 1990: 265).[24] The resulting ἀντέρως does not merely produce

23 The συνουσία is here described as a philosophical activity: in 209b–c we read that the lover 'in addressing such a person is resourceful in discoursing of virtue and of what should be the good man's character and what his pursuits; and so he takes in hand the other's education'.

24 According to Halperin (1990: 266–271, 275–298) Plato chose a woman, Diotima, to instruct Socrates on the subject of love precisely because he intended to remodel the homoerotic *ethos* of Classical Athens. Indeed, he adopted in this way a model of erotic mutuality which traditionally belonged to women, by replacing (male) acquisitive desire with a theory of erotic 'procreation' that his contemporaries would have perceived as a typical female experience. Therefore, through the figure of Diotima, Plato outlines reciprocal and (pro)creative erotics and applies it to male philosophical exchange. Also in Reeve's opinion (1992: 96–97), the protocols of pederastic ἔρως were not accepted by Plato's Socrates, as it emerges also from the *Lysis* (222a).

a reversed hierarchy, which would entail transferring the passivity to the lover. Plato, instead, completely removes the passive role: in Socratic erotics, both members of the relationship become active and neither of them remains a pure object of desire. The beloved too actively takes part in this mutual relationship, which represents a model for philosophical conversation—indeed, for the very practice of philosophy.

Ultimately, what Alcibiades does not understand is that the role reversal is a necessary step for the ascent towards beauty itself: as Nucci noted (2009: 197, n. 322) only when the beloved discovers himself as a lover can he seek beauty, tend to it, and set out for the 'pedagogical path' of ἔρως. The same point is also stressed by Reale (1997: 235–236)—who states that only the 'beloved as lover' ('l'amato come amante') can be driven by the 'bipolar' impulse of ἔρως and ascend the *scala amoris*—and by Ioppolo (1999: 70–71), in whose opinion the function of Socratic love is to engender in the beloved the desire that belongs to lovers. According to Ioppolo's interpretation, Socrates succeeded in arousing this ἐπιθυμία in Alcibiades; so from this perspective, the fact that Socrates is depicted in the *Symposium* both as an ἐραστής and as an ἐρώμενος perfectly fulfils the principle of mutuality, on which the erotic relationship is based.

We can also read Socrates' statement in 177d–e in the light of this interpretation of Socratic ἔρως: 'I do not see how I could myself decline, when I set up to understand nothing but love-matters (τὰ ἐρωτικά)'. What is at issue here is not the knowledge of a *doctrine* of ἔρως, which Socrates would impart or teach. The understanding of τὰ ἐρωτικά refers, instead, to the sphere of *erotic behaviour*; to a conduct in love matters that Socrates exhibits in his relationship with Alcibiades. By presenting himself as an ἐραστής, and then by taking on the role of the ἐρώμενος, Socrates aims to activate a process that starts with ἐπιθυμία and ends with βελτίον γίγνεσθαι, the moral improvement that represents the core of Socratic παιδεία. This is probably why he can declare he has a competence in τὰ ἐρωτικά without contradicting his repeated professions of ignorance.[25] In this sense, we might argue that Socrates' behaviour towards Alcibiades is an attempt, on his part, to implement what he has learnt from Diotima.

The misunderstanding of the real nature of Socratic erotics leads Alcibiades to accuse Socrates of being ὑβριστής (215b, 217e, 219c) since he has refused a 'contractual' exchange, and, finally, causes his failure in erotic παιδεία.[26]

25 See Pl. *Ap.* 20c, 20e, 21b, 21d, 23a–b, 29b; *Euthphr.* 5a–c, 15c–16a; *Chrm.* 165b–c; 166c–d; *Lach.* 186b–e; 200e; *Hp. mi.* 372b, 372e; *Hp. mai.* 286c–e, 304d–e; *Lys.* 212a; 223b; *Grg.* 509a; *Men.* 71a–b, 80d, 98b; *Symp.* 175e, 177d, 216d; *Resp.* 1.337d–e, 354c; *Phdr.* 235c; *Tht.* 150c, 210c.

26 Also Antisthenes, who deals with Alcibiades in two dialogues (*Cyrus minor* and *Alcibi-*

Cleary[27] points out that Alcibiades reaches the point of assuming the role of the lover, but fails to further advance in the ascent to the Beautiful because he is unable to transcend the love for a single particular object, in this case Socrates. This is why, according to Scott (2000: 26–34), he stops at the third rung of the *scala amoris*, in which the ἐραστής loves and takes care of an individual soul (210b6–c3). However, it is worth noting that even the second rung is not fully attained, as Alcibiades considers physical beauty to be fundamental and—as the words he addresses to Socrates in 218c–d—suggest—exchangeable with moral beauty.

Scholars have provided different explanations of Socrates' failure to educate Alcibiades,[28] but this issue falls beyond the scope of the present paper. What is particularly relevant for the purpose of a comparison with Xenophon's *Symposium* is the introduction of mutuality within the pederastic relationship. Indeed, this turns out to be, *prima facie*, a point of agreement between the theory of ἔρως expounded in Plato's *Symposium* and that put forward by Xenophon's Socrates in his λόγος. Nonetheless, it is evident how the same theme is dealt with from completely different perspectives and carries different implications in the two cases of Xenophon and Plato.

Before focusing on these differences and drawing some final conclusions, a parallel can be made with Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Aspasia*, which provide a third perspective on the issue of erotic mutuality. Actually, this is a case in which the comparative approach proves particularly fruitful.[29] The evident mutuality in Xenophon's (and Aeschines') view on relationships can help us to

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ades) and generally praises this figure, highlights his lack of παιδεία (cf. V A 134 SSR); see Giannantoni 1997: 371.

27 See Cleary 2007: 45 and Ferrari 1992: 262, who notes: 'Instead of loving wisdom, he falls in love with the wisdom lover, exactly the danger that Diotima attempts to exclude from her ladder of love by banishing individuals from the center of attention when the rung of philosophy has been reached'.

28 For some scholars the reason why Socrates fails is that he is not really an ἐραστής. That is, for instance, Reeve's interpretation (1992: 112–114): in his opinion, Alcibiades' speech at the end of the *Symposium* aims to show that Socrates is a bad lover, so that 'he cannot teach anyone the truth about love because in real life he had no Diotima—no Plato—to tell him the truth about it'. On the other hand, Anna Maria Ioppolo (1999: 72) believes that Socrates' failure depends on the limits of the doctrine of the attractiveness of the good; in other words, on the possibility that values other than the good—such as the ambition for public honors, in the case of Alcibiades (216b)—may prove most attractive. Thus the failure to educate Alcibiades only demonstrates that the good is not the ultimate object of desire for everybody.

29 On the interpretative possibilities offered by comparative exegesis see in this volume 55–

explore this issue in Plato, where it is less explicit, and the agreement of the three sources on this doctrine suggests that it presumably belonged to the genuine Socratic teaching.

Parallels

Generally, it can be noted that Aeschines' dialogues show many more similarities to Plato's account than to Xenophon's. One parallel in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* concerns the paideutic relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades and the *modes of transmission* of virtue and knowledge within Socratic teaching. As some passages from Aelius Aristides' *De rhetorica* show,[30] in this dialogue Socrates distinguishes between two ways by which one can make other people better: through μαθήματα and by awakening, through ἔρως, the desire (ἐπιθυμία) to pursue virtue. He then denies that he possesses any art (τέχνη) or science (μάθημα) that may be of benefit to other people: if Socrates can help others, it is only by divine dispensation (θείᾳ μοίρᾳ) and by his love for Alcibiades, so that he believes he can improve the young man διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν, 'through love'. Unfortunately, the ambiguous syntax of the expression διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν—noted by Kahn (1994: 94 and 1996: 22–23)—makes it difficult to draw conclusions: it seems to mean 'because of my love for Alcibiades', but might also mean the converse.

Further elements are provided by Plutarch's testimony on the *Alcibiades* (*Vit. Alc.* 4.193c–e): 'Thus, by despising himself, admiring his friend, loving that friend's kindly solicitude and revering his excellence (αἰσχυνόμενος δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν), he acquired an "image of love" (εἴδωλον ἔρωτος), as Plato says, "to return love" (ἀντέρωτα) [...]'.[31] We find in this passage the idea that Alcibiades' moral improvement is due to a sort of 'response' to Socratic virtue, which is at the same time a paradigm for the young man and the source of his feeling of inadequacy. Alcibiades feels ashamed when confronted with Socrates' ἀρετή, and this acts as a stimulus for virtue. Moreover, in Plutarch's account also, this 'exchange' within the paideutic relationship is framed according to the dynamics of ἔρως: thanks to his συνουσία with Socrates, Alcibiades has an εἴδωλον ἔρωτος, an 'image

70 L.-A. Dorion, "Comparative Exegesis and the Socratic Problem." For the relevance of the "other Socratics" see James Redfield's contribution, 115–127, "Xenophon and the Socratics."

30 Aristid. *Rhet.* 1.61–62, 1.74 (fr. 11 Dittmar = VI A 53 SSR). See Giannantoni 1997: 362–363 and Döring 1984: 17–18.

31 VI A 54 SSR; transl. by B. Perrin (1916). Interestingly, the verb ἀντεράω is found in Xenophon's *Symposium* (8.3), as well as the idea of admiration (ἄγαμαι occurs six times in chapter eight). Also the εἴδωλον is mentioned in Critobulus' speech (4.22).

of love' that must be understood—according to the doctrine expounded in the *Phaedrus* (255d), and which Plutarch refers to—as the kind of love that reciprocates (ἀντέρως) the ἔρως of the lover towards the beloved.

It is worth mentioning another reference to the doctrine of mutual ἔρως in Aeschines' *Aspasia*, even though it pertains to marital relationship (not to homosexual ones) and it is much more implicit and indirect. Hints of the theme of erotic mutuality can be found in Cicero's account in *De inventione* 1.31.51–53,[32] where a conversation between Aspasia, Xenophon, and his wife is reported.[33] The discussion focuses on the theme of marital ἀριστεία and on the idea that the search for a better husband or wife is vain unless both partners aim to be ἄριστοι. Now, the theme of *optimum esse* may be regarded as correlated to that of βελτίον γίγνεσθαι: as in the *Alcibiades*, the goal of the pedagogical activity is to engender—starting from an initial sense of loss provoked by the ἔλεγχος[34]—a desire which leads to self-improvement (see Natorp 1892: 499). As Kahn noted (1996: 27), 'Aspasia is appealing to the love that Xenophon and his wife have for one another in order to urge them on to a mutual effort of self-improvement' (see also Kahn 1994: 101–102). In this respect, Aspasia's teaching can be seen as a generalization of the principle that Socrates expounds at the end of the *Alcibiades*: to make others better διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν. The difference between the two is that Aspasia—unlike Plato's and Aeschines' Socrates, but like Xenophon's Socrates in the *Symposium*—stimulates a desire for self-improvement in others without being personally involved. At any rate, the crucial factor is the mutual nature of this process: as Natorp has pointed out (1892: 499), love is to be understood here as an impulse to knowledge and to moral improvement, but especially as the sharing of this impluse and its 'propagation' to others. This is why ἔρως—again, when correctly interpreted—leads to an erotic ἀριστεία that is based on mutual marital virtue. These brief remarks suggest that Aeschines' account confirms a trait of Σωκρατικὸς ἔρως which also emerges from Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia*: the centrality of mutual desire in love and the impulse that love can provide for the pursuit of virtue.

32 Fr. 31 Dittmar = VI A 70 SSR.

33 For a reference to this passage see, in this volume D.M. Johnson, "Xenophon's Intertextual Socrates" 81–82.

34 On the analogies between the ἔλεγχος of Alcibiades in the *First Alcibiades* and that of Xenophon and his wife in the *Aspasia*, see Döring 1984: 25.

Conclusions

Xenophon's and Plato's accounts seemingly have in common a break with the one-sided conception of homoerotic relationships: in both accounts, Socrates disrupts this paradigm in favour of erotic mutuality. Nonetheless, this break is not as radical in Xenophon as in Plato, and it depends largely on their different conception of mutuality. Xenophon's Socrates conceives erotic mutuality as a spiritual mutual affection within a non-physical friendship; it is presented, indeed, as a distinctive feature of the ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς and can take the form of a mutual stimulus for virtue.[35] Moreover, this issue is closely bound up with two other features of those relationships inspired by love of the soul: their endurance and the willingness on the part of the beloved. The insistence on ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι with regard to the love of soul is connected to the achievement of καλοκἀγαθία, which has a direct political relevance, as emerges in the last section of Socrates' speech (8.39–40). After saying to Callias that he should thank the gods for inspiring him with love for Autolycus (8.37), Socrates states that through his ἀνδραγαθία Autolycus could acquire the ability to benefit his friends and to exalt his country (φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὴν πατρίδα αὔξειν), in which case, he would esteem the one 'whom he looked upon as the best partner in furthering these designs' (8.38). In the following section, Socrates lists all the political skills that Callias should develop in order to 'be in his [*scil.* Autolycus'] good graces'. He concludes: 'our city would be quick to entrust itself to your hands, if you so desire'. Socrates then goes on to mention a series of qualities that would make Callias suitable for political office.

Finally, unlike Plato, who still speaks of ἔρως—albeit an ἔρως that is completely reshaped by Diotima's doctrine—Xenophon leaves aside the specific terminology of ἔρως. Xenophon's Socrates argues exclusively in favour of φιλία: while bound up with a specific kind of ἔρως, the ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς, this term is rarely used to define the object of Socrates' praise and is replaced, from 8.15 onwards, with the expression ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία. Therefore, the long praise of ἔρως in chapter eight ultimately takes the form of a praise of φιλία[36] or rather—as Socrates speaks of ἔρως at least in the opening section of his speech—of ἔρως φιλίας. This concept, which Cicero criticizes in book four of his *Tusculanae Disputationes* (4.70), dealing with *amor amicitiae*, a Stoic concept opposed to that

35 See also Socrates' claim in *Mem.* 2.6.28; cf. 2.6.14.

36 Carrière outlines (1998: 258–259), in particular, the social goals behind the kind of φιλία relationships depicted in Xenophon's *Symposium*. See also T.A. van Berkel, 391–430, "Socratic Economics and the Psychology of Money" and M. Tamiolaki, 433–460, "Xenophon's Conception of Friendship in *Memorabilia* 2.6" in this volume.

of *amor stupri*, is put forward by Thomsen (2001: 121–122) in order to explain the peculiar love doctrine expounded by Socrates in Xenophon's *Symposium*. According to Thomsen, this is not only a Stoic notion but also a Socratic one, which stands at the core of the theory of ἔρως ascribed to Socrates in this work. It is quite hard to grasp the exact meaning of this expression. Nonetheless, the ἔρως φιλίας—where the genitive is to be understood as *objectivus* rather than *definitivus*[37]—seems to be a kind of love that can entail mutuality, unlike ἔρως directed towards ἀφροδίσια (*stuprum*). Therefore, as an analysis of the central paragraphs in Socrates' speech has shown, this concept turns out to be particularly apt to illustrate this distinctive trait of the love for the soul that Socrates praises in chapter eight.

Xenophon's Socrates distances himself from the traditional view on pederastic relationships on a double level, disregarding two criteria that generally regulate them. Firstly, he uses the term φιλία *also* with regard to the lover, as clearly emerges from at least three of the above-mentioned passages: in 8.13 the feeling of those who love the ἐρώμενος because of his character is defined as φιλεῖν; in 8.15 the love of the ἐραστής who loves the soul of his favourite is called τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία and, finally, in 8.16 Socrates expressly speaks of a lover who φιλεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον. Secondly, Xenophon's Socrates ascribes to the highest form of ἔρως the nature of a mutual affection (see especially 8.16–18), breaking the rules of the traditional *ethos*. But, unlike Plato's Socrates, in order to make the love for the soul a mutual affection, Xenophon's Socrates must envisage it as a form of spiritual φιλία and not of ἔρως. Presumably, it is by virtue of this semantic usage that Socrates can introduce erotic (non-physical) mutuality in a sphere—that of pederastic relationships—from which it was generally excluded. This seems to be further confirmed by a comparison with Pausanias' speech. Pausanias uses the term ἔρως and the corresponding verbal forms to define the kind of love which stems from the 'Heavenly' Aphrodite: those who are inspired by *Ouranos* ἔρως 'love' (ἐρῶσι) boys only when 'they begin to acquire some mind' and, beginning to love (ἀρχόμενοι ἐρᾶν) them at this age, they are prepared to be with them 'as long as life shall last' (181d).

As I pointed out above, even in non-mutual relationships the term φιλία was used for the boy. Therefore, the way Xenophon breaks the rules of the traditional *ethos* is by defining also the lover's disposition as a φιλία and by replacing the ἔρως of the ἐραστής with a feeling that includes affection and admiration. In short, we can contrast Xenophon's and Plato's accounts also with regard to the

37 This emerges, for instance, from the expressions ἐρῶντες τῆς φιλίας in 8.18 and τῆς φιλίας ἐφιέμενος in 8.25.

different way they disrupt the traditional paradigm: while Xenophon alters the role of the lover, by conceiving it in terms of a φιλία that traditionally belonged to the beloved, Plato transforms the role of the beloved, by attributing him a ἐπιθυμία that traditionally belonged to the lover. In the first case, the role of the ἐραστής gets close to the role of the ἐρώμενος; in the second case it is the other way round.

In Plato's *Symposium*, Socratic erotics implies overcoming the traditional opposition between activity and passivity, as we can infer from Alcibiades' words in 122a–b. As I briefly noted before, Plato's account is much less explicit in that sense, and in Diotima's ladder of love we find only hints of mutuality. Nonetheless, according to several scholars (see *supra*, 381), it is only when the beloved experiences ἀντέρως that he can ascend the *scala amoris*. So, as it engenders in the beloved the desire that transforms him into a lover, erotic mutuality can be understood as an essential phase in the path leading to the Beautiful.

From a more general perspective, Socratic παιδεία engenders a role reversal that produces the impulse to achieve virtue in the ἐρώμενος and thus makes him actively involved in an erotic relationship that is at the same time a model for philosophical enquiry. This understanding connects Socratic erotics to the art of midwifery, and in particular to the famous passage from the *Theaetetus*, in which Socrates compares his maieutic activity to the τέχνη προμνηστική. The former—he says—differs from the latter 'in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labour (τὰς ψυχὰς τικτούσας), not their bodies (150b)'.[38] 'Sterile in point of wisdom' because of a divine will which has never allowed him 'to bring forth', but compels him 'to act as a midwife', Socrates questions others yet gives no reply about anything (150c). As he knows nothing, he does not 'give birth' to anything himself, but can only help other 'souls in labour' to beget their ideas. In order to do so, Socrates has to change from ἐραστής into ἐρώμενος. By resorting to irony, Socrates pretends to be in love with the young man; then, when the 'beloved' realises that he is not able to satisfy the love of the philosopher, because he lacks true beauty, he becomes the ἐραστής of Socrates and of the beautiful λόγοι which are within him, just like the images of gods in Silenus-figures (cf. 215a–b). As in Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, what emerges here is the idea of a παιδεία that does not consist in teaching, but in improving other people by means of simple 'association' (συνουσία). According to Plato's Socrates, philosophical enquiry can be carried out only in a συνουσία between 'teacher' and 'pupil': Socrates does not teach in terms of παίδευσις, but

38 Transl. by H.N. Fowler (1925).

rather helps the young man's soul to beget. Within this erotic dimension of pedagogy, ἀντέρως is ultimately a privileged means to achieve knowledge. Within the erotic doctrine expounded by Diotimas in the *Symposium*, it directly leads to the Forms.

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Socratic Economics and the Psychology of Money*

Tazuko Angela van Berkel

Introduction

It is no secret that Socrates had a profound distaste for the sophists' habit of teaching for pay. He seems to have had a variety of reasons to disapprove of this practice.[1] Some of these reasons are only conditional: the sophist's practice of charging fees for lessons in virtue raises questions about the nature of virtue (e.g., no one seems to know what virtue is) or its teach ability (does charging money for lessons in virtue imply that it can in fact be taught?) (See Corey 2002: 191–195).

Occasionally, Socrates' objections to fees imply particular preconceptions and ideas about the effects that money itself has on teaching practices. For instance, Socrates argues that money changes the economics of education in a fundamental way: fees make teachers select their students on grounds that are not relevant for education in virtue; i.e., fees make teachers *not* available *enough* (only available to the rich)[2] or *too* available (instead of only to those susceptible for the inculcation of virtue; Pl. *Euthyd.* 304c1–5; cf. Corey 2002: 196–203). In this paper, I shall attempt to reconstruct these seemingly contradictory preconceptions and to see whether Socrates' refusal of pay is based on a coherent set of economic assumptions, i.e., on an understanding of the phenomenon of money, its workings on the human soul, and its effects on interpersonal relationships. I shall bring out some similarities and differences

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1 See Blank 1985 for an overview of sources; Corey 2002 for an evaluation for various objections raised by the Socratic authors against teaching for pay; Tell 2009 for an assessment about the historical reality and ideology behind the Socratics' hostile representation of sophistic practice (the Platonic representation is largely slander); Fredal 2008 for a hypothesis about the sophists' motivation to charge fees (to demystify the economics of gift-giving in which wisdom and rhetoric used to circulate among aristocrats).

2 E.g., Pl. *Soph.* 231d3: sophists (only) hunt young rich people; Xen. *Cyn.* 13.8. Cf. Corey 2002: 196–203.

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between Plato's and Xenophon's treatment of the topic and attempt to account for them in the context of other motives in their respective oeuvres. I shall do so on systematic terms, without making any claims as to chronology or the precise relation between Plato and Xenophon.[3]

The discussion will proceed in three steps. First, I will briefly sketch the outlines of both Xenophon's and Plato's attitude toward riches, wealth, possessions, and money (Section 2) and articulate the systematic differences between the two (Section 3; for more elaborate treatment, see Leshem 2013, Figueira 2012, Desmond 2006, Perrotta 2004, Danzig 2003, Danzig & Schaps 2001, Lowry 1987, Trever 1916). Next, the economic ideas underlying Plato's rejection of fee-taking will be discussed (Section 4) and Xenophon's monetary theory behind his rejection of fee-taking will be scrutinized (Section 5). It will be argued that while Plato's problematization of fee-taking centers around the ontological status of money and the things that can be exchanged for money, Xenophon's rejection of fee-taking concentrates more on the way money affects the dynamics of interpersonal bonds and, hence, the very substance of Socrates' teaching.

Some Principles of Economics: Common Ground

When it comes to monetary theory and reflection on economic phenomena, commentators have traditionally admired Xenophon's grasp of economic principles[4] and thought little of Plato's understanding of money and economic processes. Xenophon is credited with an understanding of the principle of supply and demand and hence with a contribution to the theory of value,[5] the connection between the size of the market and the degree of division of labor,[6] the law of diminishing utility (*Hiero* 1.17–19, *Cyr.* 8.2.20; Lowry 1987: 45–82), marginal gains (*Oec.* 8.11–23, 9.11–17, 11.16, 12.19–20; *Symp.* 7.1–5; *Hiero* 9.6–11; cf. Figueira

3 For discussion of the precise relation between Xenophon and Plato and the problems related to this kind of enquiry (the issues of cross-reference, mutual intertextuality and direction of influence, and the Socratic Question) see, among others, in this volume, Danzig in the Introduction, Johnson, and Dorion.

4 Sedlacek (2011, 102): "In many ways, Xenophon was ahead of his time and its greatest thinkers."

5 *Vect.* 4.6–10: the exchange value of goods varies with supply and demand. *Vect.* 3.2: supply and demand have direct effect on the stability of silver. Cf. Trever 1916: 64.

6 *Cyr.* 8.2.5–6. See Figueira (2012: 671) for an argument that in the *Cyr.*-passage task specialization not only produces qualitative improvement (as Finley (1970) had it), but also enhances productivity in the quantitative sense.

2012: 678), principles of sharing risk to lower risk level (Perrotta 2004: 19), and the importance of stability of value in a currency.[7]

Plato's understanding of money and economic processes has been deemed naïve and shallow.[8] His concept of value seems essentialist: in discussing the topic of "just prices", he merely stipulates that one ought to sell goods according to their "real worth" (ἀξία),[9] without offering any theory of value;[10] he regarded money merely as a "token of exchange" (hence not itself a commodity to be trafficked in)[11] that functions as a medium of exchange and as a measure of value;[12] he did not appreciate the productive function of money as representative capital;[13] his theory of interest was superficial.[14] This contrastive image seems valid when it comes to such technical issues.[15] However, when it comes to ideas about the morality of money and the market, there is considerable common ground in the Socratic works of both authors.

7 *Vect.* 4.5–11: the increased output of silver will not decrease its value; silver is the least changeable of the monetary metals. Figueira 2012, Lowry 1987, Trever 1916: 64–72, Perrotta 2004: 19–20.

8 But see Danzig & Schaps 2001 for a more nuanced account of Plato's monetary theory and economic thought.

9 *Laws* 11.921a–b. Moreover, a seller may only mention *one* price for his goods, not two (*Laws* 11.917b); the idea seems to be that just as objects can only have one *real* name, a product can also have only one *real* price.

10 Schefold (1989: 26): "Auch eine Werttheorie werden wir bei Platon vergeblich suchen. Bevor sich ein Wertbegriff entwickeln kann, muss erst die Vorstellung dass Waren einen einheitlichen Preis am Markt haben, entwickelt sein. Plato geht ganz einfach davon aus, dass man Güter möglichst ihrem Wert entsprechend verkaufen soll."

11 *Resp.* 2.371b. In Plato's market trade means "exchanging this for money or money for things." *Laws* 8.849e.

12 *Laws* 5.742a–b, 11.918b (money makes thing commensurable and even).

13 Trever 1916: 39. Contrast the Aristarchus episode in Xenophon's *Mem.* 2.7 where Socrates does seem to appreciate the productive function of money.

14 *Laws* 5.743d; *Resp.* 8.555e. Trever (1916: 39). See *Laws* 5.742c, 8.849e, 11.915d–e, 11.921a–d for proposed regulations about money-lending. Cf. Morrow (1960: 138–139). Cf. Xen. *Vect.* 4.6 where it is at least *described* how citizens with resources turned away from investment in agriculture toward other economic sectors, such as τοκισμός, in which their capital was put to work. See Figueira (2012) on this passage.

15 It should be noted that this contrastive image works best for the non-Socratic works of both authors: Xenophon's *Vect.* and Plato's *Laws*.

Being Rich is Relative

Central to both thinkers is, first of all, a relative definition of πλοῦτος (*ploutos*, "being rich") and πενία (*penia*, poverty).[16] Both are defined relative to what one needs ([προσ]δεῖσθαι, *prosdeisthai*): according to Xenophon's Socrates, being rich (πλουτεῖν, *ploutein*) is having an excess of goods over wants;[17] to Plato poverty consists not in decreasing property but in increasing insatiability (ἀπληστία, *aplestia*; Pl. *Laws* 5.736e).

Hence, when Critoboulus repeatedly tries to direct the conversation to the topic of increasing his estate in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (Xen. *Oec.* 2.1), he jokingly asks Socrates whether he believes that they are rich enough already (ἱκανῶς πλουτεῖν, *hikanos ploutein*). As a matter of fact, Socrates does believe so and Critoboulus is made to agree that on Socrates' relative definition, Socrates, with his humble possessions,[18] is indeed wealthier than Critoboulus with his vast fortune (Xen. *Oec.* 2.9): Socrates' needs and desires are limited, hence his wealth is enough (ἱκανά), but Critoboulus' lifestyle renders him poor (cf. Xen. *Oec.* 2.2: πένεσθαι, *penesthai*). If wealth is the total of things that are useful for satisfying one's needs, it is by implication finite.[19] This finite notion of wealth and need presupposes a conceptual distinction between the objective requirements of

16 It is difficult to translate the relevant terminology consistently throughout both authors' oeuvre. Henceforth, I shall render πλοῦτος (*ploutos*, and related words from the same root) as "riches," "richness," or "being rich"; τὰ χρήματα (*ta chremata*) as "wealth" or "commodities"; τὰ κτήματα (*ta ktemata*) as "possessions." See Gernet (1981) for the argument that the term κτῆμα (*ktema*), in contrast to the noun χρῆμα (*chrema*), always contains reference to the object's mode of acquisition. Cf. Gottesman 2010.

17 Xen. *Hiero* 4.6–10; *Mem.* 4.2.37; 1.6.1–10. On the latter passages, see Chernyakhovskaya in this volume 318–339.

18 Pomeroy (1994: ad loc.): "With five minae, or 500 dr., Socrates would belong to the class of 322 thetes. Socrates' poverty is attested by Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Diogenes Laertius. But see Ch. 3, sec. c, for the deterioration in Socrates' finances so that he fell from hoplite status to thete. (…). With more than 8 tal. 2,000 dr. Critobulus is a member of the liturgical class."

19 The subjective and relative definition of wealth casts an interesting light on the meaning of economic growth in the *Oeconomicus*. Throughout the dialogue, Critoboulus insists that the οἰκονομικός (*oikonomikos*), a person versed in the skill of estate management, is someone who knows how "to increase the estate by making a surplus" (1.5: περιουσίαν ποιῶν αὔξειν τὸν οἶκον, *periousian poion auxein ton oikon*). This has led commentators to infer that "the thrust of much of the *Oeconomicus* is to apply purposive, opportunizing behavior to increase the *oikos*" (Figueira 2012: 677) and that "[a]ccording to the *Oeconomicus*, profit is the chief goal of estate management" (Pomeroy 1994: 52). However, as the discussion in *Oec.* 2.1–2 makes clear, the objective of growth is never wholeheartedly endorsed by

a good life ("needs" in modern terminology), which are finite in quantity, and desires that are psychologically defined ("wants", i.e. "things that I want")[20] and infinitely expandable.[21]

Similarly, in Plato's oeuvre too we find a relative notion of poverty, where poverty (πενία, *penia*) is said to consist not in decreasing property, but in increasing insatiability (Pl. *Laws* 5.736e): the fewer wants the better. This presupposes the notion that wealth consists in an excess of goods over wants. Poverty is psychologically defined in terms of insatiable wants. This insatiabil-

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Socrates. Although Socrates' take on wealth as subjective and relative seriously affects the function (ἔργον, *ergon*) of *oikonomia*, Critoboulus refuses to see its implications and perseveres in his quest of knowledge that can help him increase his estate. I follow Danzig (2003; rev. 2010) in attempting to read the *Oeconomicus* not so much as either a simple book of prescriptions or an "ironic" negation of these prescriptions, but rather as a polyphonous dialogue that aims to *problematize* (as opposed to prescribe). On the topic of irony, cf. Strauss 1972; see also Stevens 1994 for an interesting ironic reading of the *Oeconomicus*. See also Dorion 2008a on the vexed problem of the relation between Socrates' philosophy and Ischomachus' ideas.

20 Skidelsky (2012: 25–26). προσδεῖσθαι (*prosdeisthai*, and in general cognates of δεῖ [*dei*]) tends to refer to external objective constraints or causal necessity as opposed to XPH-terminology that refers to "subjective, internally based needs, requirements, and constraints" Mourelatos 1970: 652.

21 It has been pointed out (e.g., Perrotta 2004) that Socrates' idea that wealth is a finite concept contradicts Xenophon's famous statement in *De Vectigalibus* 4.7 about the need for silver in the Athenian *polis*. He states that silver is qualitatively different from other possessions, because of silver "no one ever yet possessed so much as to want no more; if a man finds himself with a huge amount of it, he takes as much pleasure in burying the surplus as in using it" (ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδείς πω οὕτω πολὺ ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μηκέτι προσδεῖσθαι· ἀλλ' ἤν τισι γένηται παμπληθές, τὸ περιττεῦον κατορύττοντες οὐδὲν ἧττον ἥδονται ἢ χρώμενοι αὐτῷ). However, the tension may only be apparent. In *de Vectigalibus*, Xenophon merely makes an observation about the psychological effects of money without evaluating it. In Aristotelian vein, he claims that there is no natural limit to the amount of money or silver that people wish to acquire (Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1). This is a general observation about the insatiability of human wants that does not necessarily contradict the Socratic wisdom that *needs*, the objective requirements of the good life, are finite. Moreover, the topic here is silver (ἀργύριον, *argurion*), not *genuine* wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*), as becomes evident in the psychological observation that people, insatiable for silver, take as much pleasure in burying the surplus as in using it (χρώμενοι αὐτῷ, *chromenoi autôi*)—implying that in such situations silver is being used improperly (by an owner who does not know how to use it correctly), and hence is not wealth at all. In his observation that human desire for money or silver lacks a limit, Xenophon is drawing on an archaic tradition. Cf. Solon 13.71–73, Thgn. 227–232, 595–602, 1157–1158, Bacchyl. 1–160, Pind. *Nem.* 11.44–48. See also Figueira (2012, 681).

ity of wants is rooted in the lowest part of the soul,[22] which is "most insatiate by nature of wealth."[23] Furthermore, Plato's notion that unlimited acquisition should be prevented (*Laws* 5.736e, 5.741e) presupposes a conception of wealth that is limited, and hence also an implicit distinction between needs and wants.

Wealth is Subjective

The psychological construction of the notions of richness and poverty is related to a central feature common to both Plato's and Xenophon's understanding of wealth: wealth is subjective, i.e. defined subjectively, in relation to its subject. According to Xenophon's Socrates, the same thing can be wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*) for a person who knows how to use (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) it while not being wealth for the person who does not know how to use it (Xen. *Oec*. 1.10–11); and for Plato's Socrates, the value of the possession of wealth (ἡ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις, *hê ton chrematon ktesis*) depends on the ability of the owner to use (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) goods rightly (E.g. Pl. *Euthyd*. 280b–e). In both authors, we see that the prime strategy in their reflection on the subjective nature of wealth consists in their analysis of ΧΡΗ-terminology in terms of a subject who "uses" (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) possessions that are "useful" (χρησιμός, *chresimos*) to *him*.[24]

22 Pl. *Resp*. 4.442a: ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον. Or: "by nature most insatiable where money is concerned."

23 Cf. the notion of happiness as absence of wants: according to Socrates, those who want nothing (οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι, *hoi medenos deomenoi*) are happy (Pl. *Grg*. 492e)—a position that Callicles, overtly attaching a positive value to appetitive needs, reacts to with disgust. Socrates attempts to make Callicles choose a life that is contented with what it happens to have (493c: τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον) over one of insatiate licentiousness (493c: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος), and compares the soul to a leaking jar (493b–d, 493e–494a)—clearly locating insatiability, and hence poverty, in the soul. See also Xen. *Mem*. 1.6, discussed by Chernyakhovskaya in this volume, 322.

24 In modern conceptualizations, "useful" applies to something that is a means to an independently defined end as opposed to an "end in itself" Cf. Anderson 1993: 144–145, Graeber 2005. The Greek term χρῆσθαι (*chresthai*), however, displays a semantic pluriformity denoting states of affairs ranging from "being in want of" to "having," "using," "experiencing," and "dealing with" something; applied to persons the verb may denote "to treat X as," "to be intimate," or "to have intercourse with" X. This semantic range suggests a sense of "usage" that is broader than purely pragmatic and that implies an order of things that is not solely dependent on what subjects unilaterally decide to do with objects: χρῆσθαι (*chresthai*) implies an adaptation or accommodation of *both* subject and object to the requirements of a given context. Cf. Rédard 1953. I argue this in more detail in Van Berkel

For instance, at the outset of the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates and his conversation partner Critoboulus, in their attempts to define possessions (κτήματα, *ktemata*),[25] the realm of οἰκονομία (*oikonomia*),[26] establish a criterion of value: wealth, χρήματα (*chremata*), is defined in terms of usefulness.[27] Using the example of a flute, Socrates redefines χρήματα (*chremata*) so as to cover anything beneficial (*Oec.* 1.9: τὰ ὠφελοῦντα χρήματα ἡγῇ, *ta ophelounta chremata hegêi*), provided that the user in view knows how to use it (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*; *Oec.* 1.10–11). This redefinition leads to the paradoxical observation that even money (ἀργύριον, *argurion*) is not wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*) to one who does not know how to use (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) it—obviously drawing on the polyvalence of χρήματα (*chremata*, also used for money; Xen. *Oec.* 1.10–12). Utility becomes a quality of an object that refers not primarily to its potential utility but rather to the ability of the owner to use it rightly. Knowledge is a crucial component of wealth, because it "transforms otherwise useless objects into tools which serve a good purpose" (Danzig 2003 rev. 2010: 59–60).

Moreover, in the example of the flute, Xenophon's Socrates appears to make a rudimentary distinction between an object's "value in use" (which is dependent upon the subject's ability to use it) and its "value in exchange" (one can sell an object for money if one is not capable of using it oneself; Sedlacek 2011: 101; Lowry 1987: 77). However, this distinction between the purely individual subjective notion of value in use and a more objective concept of wealth is only apparent, as even exchangeability for money does not insure value in anything: the seller needs to know how to sell, i.e. how to exchange an object for something that he does know how to use.[28] Hence, even money, wealth *par excellence*, is only *real* wealth in a conditional sense: only if its owner knows how to use it.[29]

2010 and 2012. Hence, XPH-terminology is underdetermined in comparison with modern conceptions of utility.

25 Gernet (1981) for the argument that the term κτῆμα (*ktema*), in contrast to the noun χρῆμα (*chrema*), always contains reference to the object's mode of acquisition. Cf. Gottesman 2010.

26 Critoboulus' first definition of *oikos* is that it encompasses "everything a man possesses." *Oec.* 1.5.

27 As Schaps (2003: 142) notes, Critoboulus here makes a shift from Socrates' κτήματα ([*ktemata*], which contains both wealth, χρήματα [*chremata*], as well as liabilities, ζημίαι [*zemiai*], such as enemies) toward χρήματα (*chremata*). Socrates leaves the shift unjustified, but takes the conceptual space to explore the etymology of χρήματα (*chremata*).

28 Note that in this analysis of exchange value the value to the *buyer* is left out of account.

29 This subjective knowledge-oriented definition of wealth has implications for Socrates' take on the art of economics. Because wealth is by its very definition assumed to be

Similarly, in Plato's *Republic* it is the soul that makes goods such as riches (πλοῦτος, *ploutos*) good and beneficial (ἀγαθά [*agatha*], ὠφέλιμα [*ophelima*]) or harmful (βλαβερά *blabera*).[30] Here too, value is subjective, in the sense that it is defined with reference to the owner: the possession of wealth (τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν, *ten ton chrematon ktesin*) is of most value (πλείστου ἀξίαν, *pleistou axian*) to the good man (ἐπιεικεῖ, *epieikeî*; *Resp.* 1.331a–b) and value depends upon the ability of the owner to use (χρῆται, *chretai*) goods rightly (*Euthyd.* 280b–e, 281b, 281d, 288e–289a. Cf. *Meno* 88d–e): in order to be happy, one must not only have acquired (κεκτῆσθαι, *kektesthai*) goods (ἀγαθά, *agatha*) but use (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) them too; moreover, one must use them *correctly* (ὀρθῶς, *orthos*; *Euthyd.* 280d–e). Here, just as in Xenophon, it is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, *epistemê*) that makes right use (ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι, *orthos chresthai*) possible (*Euthyd.* 281b): goods are not good or evil by themselves. It is right use, made possible by the prudence and wisdom (φρόνησίς τε καὶ σοφία, *phronesis te kai sophia*) of the owner, that makes them good (*Euthyd.* 281d). Thus, the notion of the "proper use" of wealth seems to be a common theme among the Socratic authors.[31]

"good" (ἀγαθόν [*agathon*], 1.8), "economics" is not confined to the realm of means (as is Xenophon's *De vectigalibus*), but implies the realization of the good. If the function of economics is "to increase the *oikos*" (1.1–4) and if the *oikos* in turn consists of χρήματα (*chremata*) that are defined by reference to the good, *real* economics is not value-neutral but by its very definition oriented toward the good.

30 Cf. Pl. *Meno* 88d–e. A comparable position we find in Socrates' famous statement in the *Apology* (30a7–b4): 'Οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.' Following Burnyeat (2003), I reject the common translation "Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue money and all other things come to human being," which would yield the (from a Socratic point of view) absurd position that virtue is a money-maker: The subject of the sentence is χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἅπαντα; ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is predicate. Hence, the interpretation by Desmond (2006) seems faulty (and also somewhat far-fetched): "the soul's proper excellences lead to material advancement. Without the various virtues, one would not work (the unjust prefer not to), nor work intelligently, nor use wisely what one gains, nor be temperate enough to accept the natural limits of bodily need. Thus, the virtuous and just should profit, for they are the actual producers of wealth" (36). Rather the point is fairly tautological: it is on the basis of ἀρετή (ἐξ ἀρετῆς, *ex aretes*) that money and the other things become good. Virtue is what gives value; goodness is what makes things good.

31 Similarly, in the pseudo-Platonic *Eryxias*, the sophist Prodicus' stance on wealth is remarkably reminiscent of Socrates' take on wealth and money in the *Oeconomicus*. In *Eryx.* 397e, it is argued that being rich (τὸ πλουτεῖν, *to ploutein*) is good for καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (*kaloikagathoi*, those of noble birth) and those who know how to use wealth (ἐπισταμένοις ὅπου δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς χρήμασι, *epistamenois hopou dei chresthai tois chremasi*) but bad for the μοχθηροί

Some Principles of Economics: Differences

The most fundamental difference between Plato and Xenophon with respect to their moral economics is a difference in conceptual architecture. Central to Plato's discussion of money and the proper use of wealth and money[32] is the body-soul dichotomy. "Money" and "wealth" are relegated to the realm of the body[33] and subordinated to other goods.[34] Riches (πλοῦτος, *ploutos*) pervert the soul[35] and gold, silver and coin money cause degeneration in state and individual.[36]

(*mochtheroi*, the poor) and the ignorant. Later on in the dialogue, Socrates professes to have the same opinion on wealth as everyone else: being rich (τὸ πλουτεῖν, *to ploutein*) means possessing a lot of χρήματα (*chremata*). This begs the question what χρήματα (*chremata*) are, as some property (e.g., pieces of leather) are considered riches (πλοῦτος, *ploutos*) among some people (the Carthaginians), but not among others (the Greeks, *Eryx.* 400a–b). Similarly, whereas houses are χρήματα (*chremata*) among the Greeks, they are not χρήματα for the Scythians, because they have no use for houses (*Eryx.* 400e): Wealth (χρήματα) is what is useful (χρήσιμος, *chresimos*) for its owner. Carthaginian coinage (νόμισμα, *nomisma*) is not χρήματα among Greeks because it is useless (ἀχρεῖον, *achreion*) for them. This pseudo-Platonic notion of "usefulness" corresponds with the notion of proper usage in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. Nestle (1936) suggests Prodicus as a common source of the idea of proper usage in both the *Oeconomicus* and the third century *Eryxias*. See also the dialogue *Callias* by Aeschines Socraticus (Fr. 17) for a paradoxical twist to the idea of ὀρθὴ χρῆσις (*orthê chresis*) of wealth: the correct use of poverty is even more admirable (because it is harder) than the correct use of wealth.

32 Plato never seems to systematically distinguish between wealth and money. Cf. Schaps (2003: 154).

33 Money is related to the lowest part of the soul (*Resp.* 9.581a); the concern for money ranks lowest, after concern for the body (*Laws* 5.743e). Cf. the ps.-Platonic *Eryxias* 401a–e where wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*) is predominantly described with reference to the body. See Plato, *Phaedo* 64d–67a for Plato's little regard for the body. Cf. Sedlacek 2011: 109 ff.

34 Material wealth is inferior to other goods; e.g. *Laws* 3.697bl; Cf. *Resp.* 9.581 ff.: love for gain and money is the lowest of the different types of pleasure. *Laws* 9.870a2–c1: bodily goods should serve the body and the body should serve the soul. Cf. *Laws* 3.679a10–c3, 5.727c7–728a5, 5.743e1–8, 11.913b3–c1.

35 *Laws* 11.919c. However, in Pl. *Meno* 88d–e "wealth and the like" (πλοῦτός τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, *ploutos te kai ta toiauta*) are characterized as being "sometimes good and sometimes harmful" (τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερά, *tote men agatha tote de blabera*); it is the soul that, through right use and guidance (ὀρθῶς χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη, *orthos chromenê kai hegoumenê*), makes wealth beneficial (ὠφέλιμα, *ophelima*).

36 In the *Republic* the guardians of the state are not allowed to possess money. In the constitution of the *Laws*, Magnesia, money is reduced to token-money that is useless beyond the boundaries of the state (5.742a), the citizens are restricted in the amount they may

Whereas Plato embeds his criticism of material wealth in a hierarchy of goods,[37] Xenophon's discussion of money and wealth is shaped by an opposition between short-term and long-term goods, expanding the notion of the "proper use" of wealth to include interpersonal relationships.[38] Hence, Xenophon's Socrates unscrupulously talks about friends as being "useful" (χρήσιμος, *chresimos*) or "more useful (χρησιμωτερος, *chresimoteros*) than servants."

This notion of the "utility" of friends should be understood in line with Socrates' understanding of genuine wealth and its proper use (Xen. *Oec.* 1.14): if one knows how to deal with (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) friends so as to benefit from them, friends may be called wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*) too—perhaps even more properly so than cattle or money (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.1–3). "Using" friends (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*, i.e. "dealing with" friends) implies knowing how to treat them (Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.7); just as one has to know how to use something (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) in order to turn it into wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*), one has to know how to deal (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) with some person in order to make him more useful (χρησιμώτερος, *chrestimoteros*).

Contrary to what our own post-Enlightenment sensitivities may suggest,[39] to Xenophon's Socrates "knowing how to use" friends is not exploitative at all.[40] In *Mem.* 2.3 Socrates' advise to Chaerecrates to make his brother Chaerephon an asset (χρήματα, *chremata*, wealth) instead of a liability consists in the uni-

accumulate, and contact with gold and silver (and hence with ship-owning, trading, retail trading, inn-keeping, mining, lending, interest, etc.) is restricted to non-citizens (8.842d). *Laws* 5.743d, 5.742a–b, 7.801b. Superabundance of gold and silver coins (νομίσματος ἀργυροῦ καὶ χρυσοῦ, *nomismatos argurou kai chrusou*) is most fatal to the state (*Laws* 4.705e).

37 Whereas in the *Republic*, Plato only issues the warning that in a society where wealth and the wealthy are honored, virtue and the virtuous tend to be neglected (8.551a), in the *Leges* he plainly states that a very rich person cannot be a good one (5.742e–743c).

38 Therefore, it need not surprise us that in the *Memorabilia* Socrates often uses economic imagery in developing ideas about friendship: friends are conceived of as wealth (*Mem.* 2.3: friends as χρήματα, *chremata*), possession (*Mem.* 2.4: friends as κτήματα, *ktemata*), having a precise cash equivalent (*Mem.* 2.5), and being objects of acquisition or even the fruit of rational investment (*Mem.* 2.10).

39 As I argue in Van Berkel 2010 and 2012, this conflicts with our post-Enlightenment thinking, where there is a strong moral impediment against framing friendship in terminology of use: following Immanuel Kant we prefer to think that our fellow-humans should be valued as ends in themselves as opposed to means to our own ulterior ends. E.g. Anderson 1993: 144; Badhwar 1993.

40 In fact, in *Mem.* 2.3 the dialogue closes with an analogy between the synergy of limbs and the relationship between brothers: they are designed for mutual benefit (ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν, *ep' opheleiai alleloin*).

versal imperative of Active Partnership: to make the first move (2.3.14: πρότερος εὖ ποιεῖν, *proteros eu poiein*).[41] Taking the initiative is an imperative in all kinds of reciprocal relationships.[42]

This ideal of Active Partnership, of outdoing the other in taking the initiative, is intertwined with the Socratic orientation toward the long-term good.[43] The central concept in this dialectics of the long term is ἐγκράτεια, *enkrateia*, self-mastery, a repression of the impulses of short-term appetites that may yield satisfaction in the short run but that pose a threat to the realization of long-term goods.[44] *Enkrateia* is not only the precondition for the development of virtue in an individual (*Mem.* 1.5.4–5; Dorion 2006), (as virtue is the result of practice (ἄσκησις, *askesis*; *Mem.* 1.2.19–23, 2.1.20, 2.1.28, 2.6.39, 3.3.6, 3.5.14, 3.9.1–3) requiring a complete mastery of body and soul);[45] since *enkrateia* is the ability to suspend the desire for immediate gratification and to reflect upon what is *really* useful, it is also the prerequisite to initiating and sustaining relationships that are genuinely beneficial to both partners (see below in Section 5).

The broad application of the notion of "proper use" to interpersonal relationships is distinctly Xenophontic. This has implications for the way Xenophon's

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41 Gabriel Danzig has pointed out to me that a similar idea occurs in Aristotle's discussion of the sanctuary of the Charites on the *agora* (*NE* 5.5) as a reminder of the principle that one should always "pay it forward," i.e., take the initiative and be the first in benefactions. See also Danzig 2000.

42 For the political implications of Xenophon's conception of friendship and reciprocity, see Azoulay 2004 and Tamiolaki in this volume 433–460. The imperative of active partnership appears to be a motive under the Minor Socratics. E.g., DL mentions a conflict between Aristippus of Cyrene and his friend Aeschines of Sphettus. Aristippus makes the first move toward reconciliation; (frg. 112b Mannebach) Cf. 112a (= Plut. *Cohib. ira* 14.462d–e), 112c (= Stob. 4.27.19). A similar story is attributed to Euclides of Megara who attempts to assuage a conflict with his brother Stob. 4.27.15.

43 The distinction between short- and long-term goods does not stipulate anything as to the precise identity or substance of this good and the vexed question whether to Xenophon virtue and the good are in the end instrumental in nature. For this discussion, see Danzig in this volume 340–364.

44 *Mem.* 1.2.14, 1.3.5–14, 1.5.1, 1.5.6, 1.6.8, 2.1, 3.14, 4.5.9, 4.8.11. According to Dorion (2006), ἐγκράτεια (*enkrateia*), together with the concepts of καρτερία (*karteria*) and αὐτάρκεια (*autarkeia*), forms the core of Socratic ethics in the *Memorabilia*. See however Edmunds in this volume 252–276 who argues that there is no such "triad": ἐγκράτεια (*enkrateia*) is primary; καρτερία (*karteria*) overlaps somewhat in meaning with *enkrateia* whereas αὐτάρκεια (*autarkeia*) is of a different order.

45 *See* Dorion (2006) for an overview of the functions of ἐγκράτεια (*enkrateia*) in Socrates' moral philosophy in the *Memorabilia*.

Socrates frames the sophistic phenomenon of charging fees for lessons: as I will argue in Section 5, Xenophon's criticism of teaching for pay is more substantially integrated into Socratic ethics than Plato's anecdotal banter about the sophists' fees—Plato's hostility towards money and wealth occurs consistently in political contexts (Schaps 2003: 147) and is rarely brought up in connection to Socrates' poverty.[46] Therefore, the theoretical connection between Plato's economic ideas and Socrates' dismissal of sophistic fee-taking is never made explicitly. Plato's Socrates teases and banters the sophists for charging fees, often in the prologue-parts of dialogues as a kind of philosophical "warming-up", but it never seems to become programmatic. Because of his consistent disavowal of knowledge and of being a teacher, Plato's Socrates does not need to defend his not charging fees; this may explain in part why he is less invested in pointing out explicitly what exactly is wrong about taking fees as a professional educator.[47] Whenever Plato's Socrates does discuss the sophistic practice, the focus lies more on problems of ontology than on questions of social logic, as we will see in the Sections 4 and 5.

Plato and the Ontology of Money

What struck contemporary Athenians most about the sophistic practice of charging fees is the fact that they seemed to be outrageously hefty (See Blank 1985: 3–4 for sources). Plato's depiction of sophistic fees is in line with this: whenever Socrates mentions sophists' fees in passing, he never omits reference to the sheer *size* of the fees. Jibes about fee-taking are peppered with quantifiers: πολὺ ἀργύριον (*polu argurion*; Pl. *Tht.* 178e8–179a3; [Pl.] *Thg.* 127e8–

46 Exceptions mentioned by Schaps (2003) are Pl. *Ap.* 20b–c and Pl. *Resp.* 1.330b.

47 The closest Plato's Socrates comes to making any programmatic statement about fee-taking is in *Apology* 19d8–e4, where the reason why Socrates refrains from taking pay is conditional: he only abstains from earning money by teaching (παιδεύειν, *paideuein*) people, because he does not know what virtue is, in contrast to sophists such as Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias who do. Cf. Corey 2002: 191–195. It is hard not to read this compliment to the sophists ironically, as in dialogues such as *Protagoras* and *Meno* Socrates eventually finds out that the sophists have no clue what the virtue they claim to teach entails (e.g., Pl. *Meno* 71a), or whether this virtue is teachable at all (Corey 2002: 191–195). However, it should be noted that in the context of the *Apology*, the teaching of virtue is not explicitly at stake; the point Socrates is making concerns a yet unspecified sort of *paideia*. Therefore, in the rhetorical context of the *Apology*, Socrates' conditional reserve against charging a fee makes sense.

128a4 Cf. Xen. *Symp*. 1.5), πλέον ἀργύριον (*pleon argurion*; Pl. *Hp. mai*. 282d3–5), πλεῖστον ἀργύριον (Pl. *Hp. mai*. 283b1–c1), πολλὰ χρήματα (*polla chremata*; Pl. *Tht*.167c7–d1 *Hp. mai*. 282b4–9; 281b1–8; *Cra*. 391b10–11), πλείω χρήματα (*pleiô chremata*; Pl. *Meno* 91d2–5; *Hp. mai*. 282d7–e8), χρήματα πλεῖστα (*chremata pleista*; Pl. *Hp. mai*. 284a4–7. Cf. Philostr. *VS* 1.11), μέγαλοι μισθοί (*megaloi misthoi*; Pl. *Tht*. 161d8–e3).

This preoccupation with the quantity of the sophists' wages, as I shall argue, implies two ideas about the nature of money: (1) the idea that money *itself* is a quantifier and the related, but distinct, idea that (2) money, far from being a neutral medium, entails its own standard and system of valuation. The first idea pertains to problems of quantification: if money is capable of expressing value in terms of quantity, does use of money imply that everything of value can be *reduced* to its quantitative dimensions? The second idea raises the question whether money can be the measure of *everything*. In the following section, both ideas will be discussed.

The Absurdity of Quantifying Wisdom

Plato credited the man who invented money (τὸ νόμισμα, *ta nomisma*) as a benefactor who made retail trading (καπηλεία, *kapeleia*) possible by providing a medium that makes items of wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*) "even and commensurable" (ὁμαλήν τε καὶ σύμμετρον, *homalen te kai summetron*).[48] This makes money a measure, the measure of all things. The idea that money is capable of quantifying heterogeneous entities is implicit in several of Plato's jests about sophistic fee-charging. For instance, in the *Cratylus*, Socrates refers to Prodicus' variously priced lectures:[49]

> Ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου Ἑρμόγενες, παλαιὰ παροιμία ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά ἐστιν ὅπῃ ἔχει μαθεῖν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ **σμικρὸν** τυγχάνει ὂν μάθημα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου **τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον** ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώ-

48 Pl. *Laws* 11.918b–c. Plato assumes that money developed from barter and was invented to facilitate trade (Pl. *Rep*. 2.371d).

49 [Pl.], *Ax*. 366c; Arist. *Rh*. 3.14.1415b12 for the anecdote that Prodicus, when the audience of his one-drachma course began to doze and look bored, threw some of the material of his fifty-drachma course in, just to keep his audience eager. Cf. Pl. *Lach*. 186c for Socrates' claim that he cannot afford the teaching of the sophists.

λυέν σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν. οὔκουν οἶδα πῇ ποτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν τοιούτων·

Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that knowledge of high things is hard to gain; and surely knowledge of names is no small matter. Now if I had attended Prodicus's fifty-drachma course of lectures, after which, as he himself says, a man has a complete education on this subject, there would be nothing to hinder your learning the truth about the correctness of names at once; but I have heard only the one-drachma course, and so I do not know what the truth is about such matters.

PL. *Cra.* 384a8–c2; translation by FOWLER 1926

The indirect (and more serious) criticism here is the recurring reproach that by raising fees sophists restrict the accessibility of their courses to those with money;[50] as the doctrine about correctness of names here is framed in terms of truth (ἀλήθεια, *aletheia*), the question is raised whether access to truth should be mediated by money. The playful reasoning underlying this point of criticism is that differentiating courses in terms of different price categories presupposes that knowledge can be quantified and parceled along the same lines as money or commodities with concrete extensions. The doctrine about the correctness of names is called "not small" (οὐ σμικρόν, *ou smikron*)—an everyday way to talk about knowledge, in terms of more or less, much or little, but here to be taken literally: a big doctrine costs a lot of money.[51] Of course, this is only a jibe in

50 E.g., Xen. *Cyn.* 13.9; Corey 2002: 195–196. See also Fredal 2008 for the interesting argument that the sophists' practice of raising fees may also have been a way to "demystify" the economy of gift-giving and beneficence in which philosophical wisdom used to circulate; by putting a concrete price on their lessons in rhetoric, the sophists (1) pulled their education out of a closed aristocratic circuit of privilege and (2) demystified the veiled economics of gift-giving as not different from monetary pay.

51 A reverse joke, based on a similar "ontological" critique, is made in Pl. *Soph.* 234a3–9 by the Eleatic Stranger who compares the sophist to a husbandman who "makes" animals quickly and sells them for little money (σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται, *smikrou nomismatos apodidotai*). Similarly, the sophist is a man who claims to know all things (πάντα, *panta*) and to be able to teach them in a little time for a small price (ὀλίγου, *oligou*). Here too, the idea is that monetary economics assumes a correlation between quantity and quality: knowledge of everything is a big thing; small prices for big things are absurd. Of course, this is only a joke (a παιδιά, *paidia*, as the Eleatic Stranger himself indicates).

passing; elsewhere, however, Plato problematizes this relation between quality and quantity in a more sustained, and philosophically interesting, manner when he addresses the problem of valuation.

Money as a Measure of Value

The idea that money is a measure of value raises the question whether money is the measure of *everything*. Aristotle famously states that "money is the measure of all things" (Arist. *NE* 9.1.1664a1–2; *NE* 5.5.1133a20–23), only to modify this claim in two important respects: on closer analysis, it is not money (χρήματα [*chremata*] or νόμισμα [*nomisma*]) that is the real measure of things, but need (χρεία, *chreia*)[52] that is the commensurating property; moreover, neither need nor money are the measure of *all* things, because in contexts of virtue it is purposive choice (προαίρεσις, *prohaeresis*) that is the measure of value (Arist. *NE* 9.1.1164a35–64b5). Whereas the sophists make wisdom a commodity for sale, to Aristotle, wisdom, virtue and happiness are not possessions (κτήματα, *ktemata*) that can be objects of exchange, but activities that are realized in Virtue Friendships.[53] Those who attempt to sell wisdom make a category mistake, for the "coin" of Virtue Friendships, the good, cannot be changed into the legal tender of utility: there is no common measure to the good (an activity) and the useful (an object). The goods of utility are fundamentally incommensurable with the goods of virtue.

52 Arist. *NE* 5.5.1133a27–30. Here, I follow Judson (1997) (whose analysis is indebted to Meikle's (1995)) in his interpretation of the *chreia*-proviso as a qualifier of the domain of commensurability: money (τὰ χρήματα, *ta chremata*) only makes things commensurable with respect to their dimension of need (χρεία, *chreia*), the logical counterpart of utility (τὸ χρησιμόν, *to chresimon*). As I argue elsewhere (Van Berkel 2012), Judson's interpretation of *chreia* gains strength when read against discussion of non-uniform friendship (friendships between partners who operate with different measures of value and that lack a common measure) in *NE* 9. But see Danzig 2000: 414 for an alternative reading of this phrase.

53 In *NE* 1.8.1098b32–1099a7 it is argued that the chief good (τὸ ἄριστον, *to ariston*) is located not in the possession (κτῆσις, *ktesis*) of excellence but in its use (χρῆσις, *chresis*), i.e. in its ἐνεργεία (*energeia*): διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. This suggests not only that dealing with property is an instance of excellence, but also that there is an *analogy* between property and virtue. Cf. Frank (2005: 70): "It is by understanding property as a verb and not strictly as a noun, as an activity of use and not strictly as a fungible thing, that we see that property is bound to, is indeed a site of, virtue. And it is by understanding virtue as a verb and not strictly as a noun, as an activity and not strictly as a thing, that we see virtue as a kind of property."

Plato addresses similar questions about valuation. In the *Hippias Major*, Socrates (ironically) develops the *quid pro quo* notion implicit in sophistic practice into the explicit endorsement of money (ἀργύριον, *argurion*) as a measure of value (ἠξίωσεν [*exiosen*], ἄξιον [*axion*]):

> τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἠξίωσεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδ' ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας· οὕτως ἦσαν εὐήθεις καὶ ἐλελήθει αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον ὡς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἴη. τούτων δ' ἑκάτερος πλέον ἀργύριον ἀπὸ σοφίας εἴργασται ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφ' ἧστινος τέχνης· καὶ ἔτι πρότερος τούτων Πρωταγόρας.
>
> But none of these early thinkers thought fit to charge a monetary fee or give displays of his wisdom for all comers. They were so simple they didn't realize the great value of money. But either Gorgias or Prodicus made more money out of wisdom than any other craftsman made from any skill whatever. And Protagoras did the same even earlier.
>
> PLATO, *Hippias Major* 282c6–d2; translation by WOODRUFF 1982

In contrast to the present-day sophists, such as Gorgias and Prodicus, the seven sages, were, according to Socrates, too naïve to realize the value of money (ἀργύριον ὡς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἴη, *argurion hos pollou axion eiê*). Clearly, the reader is invited to read this passage ironically:[54] throughout the Platonic oeuvre, Socrates' disdain and indifference towards money is persistent (Schaps 2003). Both Gorgias and Prodicus are known to have earned more money from their wisdom than any δημιουργός (*demiourgos*) has from his τέχνη (*technê*, 282d3–4). Still, Hippias may have made more money than any other two sophists together—as he himself boasts (282e).

Socrates ironically interprets Hippias' commercial success as a strong testimony to his σοφία and to his superiority over the ancient thinkers, in particular Anaxagoras, who, though heir of substantial property (καταλειφθέντων αὐτῷ πολλῶν χρημάτων), lost his entire property through carelessness, "so senseless (ἀνόητα, *anoeta*) was his wisdom (σοφίζεσθαι, *sophizesthai*)" (282e9–283b1)—ἀνόητα (*anoeta*) clearly intended as a pun on νοῦς (*nous*).[55] According to Socrates, it is popular sentiment that being σοφός (*sophos*) means being σοφός for oneself (αὑτῷ, *hautôi*):

54 See Woodruff 1982: 35 for an argument that Hippias probably did recognize and appreciate Socrates' irony, but made "the best of a bad situation by not responding to it."

55 The pun is made quite parenthetically. The fact that Hippias is not represented as explicitly reacting to it cannot be taken as a sign that he does not understand the joke.

> {ΣΩ.} (…) λέγουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τῶν παλαιῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καλὸν τεκμήριον ἀποφαίνειν περὶ σοφίας τῶν νῦν πρὸς τοὺς προτέρους, **καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ ὅτι τὸν σοφὸν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ μάλιστα δεῖ σοφὸν εἶναι· τούτου δ' ὅρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὃς ἂν πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσηται.** καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω·
>
> So this seems to me fine testimony that you adduce for the wisdom of the men of today as compared with the earlier men, and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that.
>
> PLATO, *Hippias Major* 283b1–4; translation by LAMB 1925

Here, the criterion of wisdom is the ability to make the most money (πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσηται, *pleiton argurion ergasetai*).[56] Socrates makes a psychological observation about the way the majority of people understand wisdom and about the measure that most people apply when judging wisdom: money. The irony is evident—but not elaborated upon.

"Merchandiser of Food for Soul": Questions of Quality

As we have seen, Plato's objections against teaching for pay, though hardly systematic, hinge around the ontological status of knowledge, wisdom and virtue: he is preoccupied with the absurdity of quantifying wisdom (*Cra.* 384a–c, *Soph.* 234a), and he raises the question, by irony, whether money is really the measure of value (*Hp. mai.* 282c–d) and whether the capacity to earn as much money as possible is a measure of wisdom (*Hp. mai.* 282e–283b).

At one point we do find psychological concerns involved in Socrates' criticism against the notion of paying a sophist for his teachings. This is in the prologue of the *Protagoras*, where Plato's Socrates drives the idea of teaching for pay to an absurd extreme by developing an analogy between food for the body and food for the soul. Overtly, this analogy serves to point out the differences between buying food for the body and purchasing food for the soul; indirectly, it raises concerns about the realm of the soul being contaminated with money that is associated with the realm of the body.

56 Cf. Philostratus who states that Protagoras' fee-raising is "not to be criticized, since we esteem more highly that which is expensive than that which is free" (*VS* 1.10.4).

In the prologue of the *Protagoras*, the topic of sophists charging fees serves as an experimental garden for Socrates to explore the nature of knowledge transmission. In anticipation of their meet-and-greet with Protagoras, Socrates raises several questions about the nature of sophistic practice: what kind of person is the sophist to whom Hippocrates is willing to pay a fee (Pl. *Prt.* 311b1–c3)? Is the trade of the sophist analogous to that of the physician and the sculptor: does a sophist educate people to become sophists themselves?[57] Or is it another kind of learning (μάθησις, *mathesis*) that one expects to receive from Protagoras, more analogous to the grammar-school teacher, the music teacher or the gym teacher who do not provide vocational instruction in order to master a particular craft (ἐπὶ τέχνῃ, *epi technêi*) but education (παιδεία, *paideia*) for becoming a nonprofessional (τὸν ἰδιώτην, *ton idioten*) and a free citizen (τὸν ἐλεύθερον, *ton eleutheron*)?[58] And if it is all παιδεία (*paideia*), will Hippocrates really entrust (παρασχεῖν, *paraschein*) his soul to the care of a man whose profession he does not sufficiently understand?[59]

Socrates and Hippocrates proceed to establish a preliminary definition of the sophist as someone "who has knowledge about wise things" (a τῶν σοφ-ῶν ἐπ-ιστ-ήμων, *ton soph-on ep-ist-emon*, an etymology of the name σοφιστής, *sophistes*), being the master (ἐπιστάτης, *epistates*) of a specific subject area, i.e. of being a clever speaker (δεινός λέγειν, *deinos legin*). But this again raises the question of subject matter: being a clever speaker *about what* (312c–e)? At this point, when Hippocrates again fails to find an answer, the conversation reverts to the topic of concern about the soul. The analogy between body and soul is elaborated in closer detail: entrusting one's body to an expert calls for careful thought and consideration beforehand; hence, the soul, which is valued more highly than the body, requires even more serious counsel and consultation. It is here that Socrates, in attempting to enforce his warning, embarks on an elaborate analogy between the sophist and the merchant:[60]

57 311c4–312a2. Hippocrates is uncomfortable about this suggestions, not because Protagoras, as a sophist, is a shameful person, but because it is shameful for Hippocrates, in his quality as gentleman, to become a professional (in any occupation) at all. Cf. Blank 1985: 10; Corey 2002: 191.

58 312a7–b2. As has often been noted, Plato frequently emphasizes this distinction between professional and liberal education (e.g. *Laws* 1.643d); the term παιδεία (*paedeia*) is reserved for the latter (*Grg*. 485a, *Resp*. 6.492c).

59 The term παρέχω (*parechô*) occurs often in the context of entrusting one's body to the hands of a doctor (e.g., *Grg*. 456b; Xen. *Mem*. 1.2.54). Here in this context, the analogy is presumably with physical training (with the παιδοτρίβης γυμναστική [*paidotribes gumnatikê*] from 312b2): physical training requires entrusting one's body to the expertise of the trainer.

60 Although for us this analogy is an intuitively plausible one, it is important to bear in

Ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὢν **ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος**[61] τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν **ψυχὴ τρέφεται**; φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις. {—} Τρέφεται δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι; {—} **Μαθήμασιν** δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος.

"And so, Hippocrates, the sophist turns out to be a merchandiser or hawker of the wares by which a soul is fed? It appears to me of course that he is someone of this sort." "Socrates, by what *is* the soul fed?" "By [the things] it learns, I do suppose," I said. "And how, my friend, won't the sophist, praising what he sells, in fact deceive us [about the food *for our soul*], just as the merchandiser and hawker do about the food for our body?"

PL. *Prt.* 313c1–d1; Translation by ARIETI & BARRUS 2010, adapted

The "food for the soul" metaphor activates the notion of "intake" or "consumption," which turns doctrines or knowledge into invasive forces that enter the soul and have immediate effects on its constitution. The point of the analogy is that merchandisers praise their wares irrespective of their quality (Pl. *Prt.* 313d). Just as food for the body requires experts who can inform you about the quality of the wares, so too one needs to be informed about the quality of the doctrine one buys from Protagoras (Pl. *Prt.* 313e–314b). In the process of buying foods and drinks for the body, one still has the opportunity to have those wares checked before intake, because one receives them in a separate vessel. With buying doctrines there is no such possibility: because doctrines cannot be transported in separate vessels, buying a μάθημα (*mathema*) implies immediate intake.[62] Paying for teaching reveals a careless attitude towards the soul:

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mind that these *are* metaphors: Socrates is making a conceptual step from the "sophist as wage-earner" to the "sophist as merchandiser of food for the soul." In our modern economic worldview, with the concept of "labor markets" and the commoditization of labor readily at our disposal, the concepts of money as a medium of exchange and money as a means of payment are more smoothly integrated than they were in antiquity. Socrates' metaphor facilitates the reification of sophistic expertise: it becomes an object to be transacted and transported (see the reifying nouns τὰ ἀγώγιμα [*ta agogima*] and μαθήματα [*mathemata*])—as opposed to an (Aristotelian) notion of wisdom and virtue as activities. Cf. Pl. *Soph.* 223c–224e, 231d for the definition of a sophist as a salesman of learning.

61 Cf. *Soph.* 231e (ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα, *emporos tis peri ta tes psuches mathemata*), *Soph.* 223c–224e.

62 It should be noted that whereas Xenophon's Socrates expresses his concern over the fact that sophists, by *accepting* fees, place themselves under the obligation (ἀνάγκη, *anankê*) to deliver (e.g., *Mem.* 1.2.5–7. See also Section 5); here the threat lies at the other side of the

one should not approach food for the soul in the same way as food for the body (by buying it), because it simply does not work the same way for soul and body.

Hence, in the *Protagoras*, we first find the idea that paying a sophist for his teachings may have psychological repercussions. However, these concerns are not causally related to the nature of money or the workings of monetary economics: doctrines are not dangerous *because* they are to be paid for. Doctrines are dangerous if they are bad. The problem is that there is no way of checking doctrines before intake and the problem with the market is that merchandisers are not motivated to scrutinize the quality of their wares in the way that Socrates the midwife distinguishes his "real children" from mere wind-eggs.[63] Hence, it is the quality of the merchandise that is controversial. The elaborate analogy with merchandise merely serves to facilitate the metaphor "food for the soul" and to highlight the invasive quality (and hence, the danger) of sophistic doctrines.[64]

As we have seen, Plato's objections against teaching for pay hinge around the ontological status of "knowledge", "wisdom", "virtue" and "doctrines". His preoccupations with the absurdity of quantifying wisdom, his thematization of the popular opinion that money is the measure of wisdom and his elaborate analogy between food for the body and food for the soul seem to indicate that to his view money unduly reifies knowledge and virtue. Although it is never made explicit, Plato appears to agree with Aristotle that the metaphysical structure of money is incommensurable with the metaphysical properties of virtue or knowledge.

Xenophon and the Social Logic of Money

Xenophon's Socrates expresses a critique of the practice of teaching for pay in terms more firmly integrated in a set of moral and social principles. The central point is not that there is any harm in money as such, but that money often entails a particular way of interacting with other people that is at odds with the aims of friendship and realizing virtue. Here two different types of objections can be distinguished: there is the formal objection, that accepting

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transaction. It is the customer who, after having *paid* the sophist, finds himself compelled (ἀνάγκη, *anankê*) to take in the μάθημα (*mathema*) into his soul.

63 Pl. *Tht.* 150c1–3. Cf. Blank 1985: 9.

64 This "mechanical model" of knowledge transmission recurs in Pl. *Euth.* 271d3 where Socrates notes that "whoever pays" (ἄλλον, ὃς ἂν διδῷ μισθόν, οἵω τε ποιῆσαι) is made skillful by Dionysodorus and Euthydemus.

pay presupposes a wrong interpretation of the teacher-student relationship and of the good realized in this context; and there is the substantive objection, that demanding pay is incompatible with the contents of Socrates' moral-philosophical teaching that takes as its point of departure the principle of ἐγκράτεια, *enkrateia*.

The Formal Objection

The formal objection has its roots in the historical context of attitudes towards market trade. Although historically the connection between monetization and the rise of retail trade was problematic and complex,[65] from quite early in the Classical period the phenomena of coinage, money, trade and credit formed a conceptual cluster.[66] This cluster, symbolized by the *agora*, was imagined to dictate a rationality of its own and to impose its own norms:[67] it was the place of weighing and calculating,[68] boasting and bargaining,[69] trickery and deceit,[70]

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65 Money did not evolve from international trade and barter. See Seaford 2004, Schaps 2004, Kurke 1999. However, it did *facilitate* retail trade and stimulate the development of the *agora* as commercial center in sixth-century Athens. Schaps 2004, Von Reden 1995, 147 ff., Snodgrass 1991.

66 Aristotle and Plato assumed that money developed from barter and was invented to facilitate trade (Pl. *Resp*. 2.371d; Arist. *Pol*. 1257a19–40, *NE* 1133a17–20). Although historically this is not correct, it does tell us something about the way people in the fourth century had come to *see* money: as a medium of exchange and an important instrument for trade. Cf. Plato's remark that the man who invented money made goods commensurable (Pl. *Laws* 11.918b–c; see n. 47 above). Herodotus, in ascribing paratactically the invention of both coinage and retail trade to the Lydians (they were the first κάπηλοι, *kapeloi*, Hdt. 1.94.1) closely associates money with retail trade. Money and trade were interrelated phenomena in Greek popular thinking. See Osborne 2007: 294 for the conceptual association of money with retail trade.

67 E.g., Aristotle's low opinion of the "market mob" (ἀγοραῖος ὄχλος, *agoraios ochlos*) (Arist. *Pol*. 1328b40). See Millett 1998 on the mixing of activities and persons in the space of the *agora*.

68 Standardized measures were only mandatory in retail trade. See Johnstone 2011: 54.

69 E.g., the bargaining scenes in Aristophanes' comedies: e.g. *Pax* 1197–1264, *Ach*. 867–958. Cf. Johnstone 2011.

70 E.g., the trick of placing ripe figs on top of a basket to mask the bad ones: Alexis *PCG* 133. For framing of market activity as deceit, see e.g. Hdt. 1.153.1 where the Greek *agora* is misrepresented by the Persian king Cyrus as the scene of double-dealing. Cf. Xen. *Mem*. 3.7.6 where κάπηλοι (*kapeloi*) are represented as suspicious deceitful individuals who buy cheap and sell dear.

and fast information.[71] In a market situation, overt pursuit of self-interest is not only accepted, but normative:[72] giving something away for free is considered stupid[73]—a mentality constructed as anti-social in other areas of life.[74]

It is at the heart of this market that the sophist's activity is situated. Hippias' trade, for instance,[75] is located in the *agora* "at the tables of the money changers" (ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις, *epi tais trapezais*)—an image suggestive of monetary transactions and haggling and deceit perhaps, but also the very location where Socrates conversed with Athenian youngsters (Pl. *Ap*. 17c).

The rationality of the market presupposes particular norms of interpersonal interaction. Hence, for Xenophon's Socrates, the question whether economic relations are a suitable context for exchanging or disseminating wisdom and virtue becomes acute. A salient example is Socrates' encounter with Antiphon the sophist in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.[76] Antiphon disqualifies Socrates' refusal of fees as irrational behavior:

> Πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει εἶπεν· Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ τοί σε δίκαιον μὲν νομίζω, **σοφὸν** δὲ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· **οὐδένα** γοῦν **τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττῃ**. καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο **τι ὧν κέκτησαι** νομίζων **ἀργυρίου ἄξιον** εἶναι οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι **προῖκα δοίης**, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ᾤου **τινὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι**, καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς **ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου**. δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ **πλεονεξίᾳ**, **σοφὸς** δὲ οὐκ ἄν, **μηδενός γε ἄξια** ἐπιστάμενος.

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71 E.g., Ar. *Ach*. 758–759; Theophr. *Char*. 4.15. Cf. Pl. *Laws* 11.917b–c. Harris 2002, 76–77 on price fluctuations on the agora.

72 Van Wees 1998: 19–20. Cf. Morris 2002.

73 Cf. Hdt. 3.140.1: Syloson resents his own stupidity for giving away a beautiful cloak, regarding the gift as a "loss." On the ideology of "business" that propagates norms to seek "value for money" and ridicule the "sucker" who pays over or undercharges, see Davis 1992: 7–8, 56–58. Cf. Polanyi 1968: 69.

74 E.g., Ar. *Ach*. 28ff.. Harris (2002: 76): "An Athenian might think about politics in the Assembly, cultivate friendships in the gymnasia and at symposia, and at home try to avoid quarrels with family and neighbors. But when he set foot in the agora, the main thing he thought about was *kerdos*, getting a bargain."

75 Pl. *Hp. mi*. 368b3–5. Other sophists merely used the agora as a pick-up place for customers. E.g. Eupolis, *Kolakes* fr. 159 Kock. Cf. Blank 1985: 6.

76 This section (the analysis of the Antiphon-episode) is based on, and quotes from, Van Berkel 2010.

> On another occasion when Antiphon was talking to Socrates, he said, 'You know, Socrates, I think that you are an honest man, but not at all a wise one. And it seems to me that you realize this yourself; at any rate, you don't charge anyone for your company. But if you thought that your cloak or your house or any other item of your property was worth money, so far from giving it away, you wouldn't even accept a price lower than its value. So obviously, if you thought that your company was worth anything, you would charge a fee for it no less than its value. Therefore, honest you may be, since you don't deceive with a view to your own advantage; but wise you cannot be, if your knowledge is worthless.'
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 1.6.11–12; Translation by TREDENNICK & WATERFIELD 1990

Antiphon interprets Socrates' refusal of fees as giving away commodities for free. This, according to Antiphon, is indicative of the seller's own low valuation of the goods he supplies:[77] not charging a fee is tantamount to pricing the goods on offer (in this case Socratic conversation) as worthless—that is: if and only if one accepts Antiphon's commercial framing of the exchange in question.

Antiphon's world view is imbued with the language of the market. Like the merchant he only acknowledges one single standard of value, monetary currency, to which everything should be reduced; this entails a commodification[78] of education, i.e. Socrates' company is characterized as a possession (something one acquires, κτάομαι [*ktaomai*]) on the same line as a cloak or a house. The assumption that *not* charging a fee is tantamount to giving away services for free betrays a distinct sort of rationality, the rationality of the market[79] that reduces σοφία (*sophia*) to the mercantile cleverness that enables one to sell one's goods with profit (Cf. Pl. *Hp. mai.* 283b1–d2. See Section 4 above).[80]

77 Pl. *Soph.* 234a may be read as Plato's answer to a similar sophistic challenge. See Section 4 above.

78 Commodities are commonly defined as entities that have use value and that can be exchanged in a discrete transaction for a counterpart that has, in the immediate context, an equivalent value. Cf. Kopytoff 1986: 68. Cf. Appadurai 1986: 3–16, for the argument that the distinction between gift and commodity lies in a distinction in modes of exchange. The same physical object can be both gift and commodity, its meaning shifting with the ideology attached to the situation of exchange. For a similar point, see Kopytoff 1986: 64.

79 Cf. anecdotes about Protagoras who allowed pupils less than the standard fee if they were prepared to state on oath that they did not think his teaching worth so much. E.g., Pl. *Prt.* 328bc. Cf. Arist. *NE* 1164a24–26, DL 9.56.

80 On *sophia* in the *Memorabilia*, see Chernyakhovskaya 2014, Dorion 2008b, and Morrison 2010.

The term συνουσία (*sunousia*: company, intercourse), with its obvious sexual connotations, paves the way for Socrates' reaction:[81]

> ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· Ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τήν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μέν **τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ**, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν **ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας** σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.
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> To this Socrates replied, 'In our society, Antiphon, the same rules with regard to what is creditable and what is not are thought to apply equally to the disposal of physical attractions and of wisdom. A man who sells his favors for a price to anyone who wants them is called a catamite; but if anyone forms a love-attachment with someone whom he knows to be truly good, we regard him as perfectly respectable. In just the same way, those who sell wisdom at a price to anyone who wants it are called sophists; but if anyone, by imparting any edifying knowledge that he possesses, makes a friend of one whom he knows to be naturally gifted, we consider that he is behaving as a truly good citizen should behave.'
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> XEN. *Mem.* 1.6.13

Socrates' move consists in two conceptual steps: Socrates substitutes Antiphon's more neutral terminology of wage-earning (of "exacting pay": ἀργύριον πράττῃ [*argurion prattêi*], ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών [*elatton tes axias labon*], ἀργύριον ἐπράττου [*argurion eprattou*]) with the explicit vocabulary of selling (ἀργυρίου πωλῇ [*arguriou polêi*], ἀργυρίου πωλοῦντας [*arguriou polountas*]). Moreover, and more crucially, Socrates draws a systematic contrast between Antiphon's commercial discourse and an alternative understanding of Socratic practice by means of an analogy with physical beauty and its exploitation.

According to Socrates' analogy, there are two ways of dealing with beauty and wisdom. The shameful way, "the commercial way", means selling it irre-

81 See Tarrant (2005) on the use of the term συνουσία (*sunousia*) and cognates (σύνειμι [*suneimi*], συγγίγνεσθαι [*sungignesthai*]) in Plato's Socratic works; in Plato's authentic dialogues the terminology, although referring to Socratic conversation, is non-technical and under-specific, mostly used for its sexual overtones.

spectively to anybody (τῷ βουλομένῳ, *tôi boulomenôi*), thereby rendering oneself a prostitute (πόρνος, *pornos*) in the case of beauty and a sophist in the case of wisdom.[82] The right way is selecting one's partner on the basis of moral qualities and initiating honorable relations of reciprocity (φιλία, *philia*) with them: in the case of beauty sharing it with a gentleman-lover,[83] in the case of wisdom bestowing it on a selected friend.[84]

It is instructive to scrutinize Xenophon's use of the distinction between body and soul that is implicitly present in this episode. Whereas to Plato the dichotomy serves to dismiss wealth and money by relegating them to the realm of the body,[85] and hence as subordinated to other goods,[86] it has a different function in Xenophon's Socratic thought. The dichotomy does not construct an opposition between the economy of the body and a distinct economy of the soul. Rather, *both* body and soul are potentially involved in two different types of economies: a shameful one, oriented towards immediate gratification of short-term needs, as opposed to an honorable one, informed by moral concerns.[87] This accords with the overall tenor of Xenophon's Socratic work, where a soul-body distinction is acknowledged (e.g. *Mem.* 4.1.2), but rarely to the extent that the realm of the body and the physical is dismissed as secondary,

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82 Xenophon is obviously drawing on the etymological derivation of πόρνος/πόρνη (*pornos/pornê*) from πέρνημι (*pernemi*), to sell. Cf. Chantraine 1977.

83 On the complication that in *Symp.* 8 Xenophon seems to oppose homoerotic long-term bonds, see Pentassuglio in this volume 365–390. Cf. Van Berkel 2012, chapter 5.

84 It is in line with Xenophon's understanding of Socratic didactics, that this analogy, by implication, assigns the role of the ἐρώμενος (*erômenos*, the object of desire and seduction) to Socrates. The encounter with Antiphon can be read in close relation with Socrates' conversation with the hetaera Theodote in *Mem.* 3.11, where Socrates attempts to teach Theodote, the self-proclaimed expert on φιλία (*philia*), the principle of Active Partnership. See Tamiolaki in this volume 433–460 and Van Berkel 2012, chapter five. On the motif of erotic role-reversal in the Socratic authors, see Pentassuglio in this volume 365–390.

85 Money is related to the lowest part of the soul (*Resp.* 9.581a); the concern for money comes last, after concern for the body (*Laws* 5.743e). Cf. the ps.-Platonic *Eryxias* 401a–e where wealth (χρήματα) is predominantly described with reference to the body. See Plato, *Phaedo* 64d–67a for Plato's little regard for the body. Cf. Sedlacek 2011: 109 ff.

86 Material wealth is inferior to other goods; e.g. *Laws* III.697bl; Cf. *Resp.* IX.581 ff.: love for gain and money is the lowest of the different types of pleasure.

87 Here I disagree with (the otherwise admirable and spot-on) analysis of Tell (2009), who reads in this episode "a thematic sequence consisting of wisdom, money, and prostitution, in which the interference of the intermediary phase—money—runs the danger of corrupting and even *conflating the things of the mind with the sphere of the body*" (16, my emphasis).

subservient or hostile to that of the soul.[88] Xenophon's Socrates insists just as much on caring for the body as for the soul (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.4, 3.12; Cf. Dorion 2006: 96, 2011: 16).

Although not made explicit by means of terminology, Socrates' reaction to Antiphon appeals to the idea of "proper use" in two ways. First of all, there seems to be a proper use to both physical beauty and wisdom: they can be wealth to their owner if he knows how to use them; but they are worthless for the prostitute and the sophist, who are incapable of proper use. Moreover, bearing in mind the *Oeconomicus*' distinction between use value and exchange value (see Section 2 above), the implicit suggestion may be that just as the flute is only sold for money if one does not know how to use it oneself, one only sells wisdom if one does not know how to use it oneself.

The prostitute/sophist-analogy opposes erotic and didactic transactions on a commercial basis to the type of erotic and didactic exchange embedded in a long-term relationship.[89] This long-term relationship is characterized by the economics of sharing:

> ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον **ἥδομαι** φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ' ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι **ὠφελήσεσθαί** τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν· καὶ τοὺς **θησαυροὺς** τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλεγόμεθα· καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν **κέρδος**, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις φίλοι γιγνώμεθα.
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> "As for myself, Antiphon, I take as much pleasure in good friends as other people take in a good horse or dog or bird—in fact, I take more; and if I have anything good to teach them, I teach it, and I introduce them to any others from whom I think they will get help in the quest for goodness. And in company with my friends, I open and read from beginning to end the books in which the wise men of past times have written down and bequeathed to us their treasures; and when we see anything good, we take it for ourselves; and we regard our mutual friendship as great gain."
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> XEN. *Mem.* 1.6.14

88 With the possible exception of Socrates' notorious speech in *Symp.* 8.6–41. On this speech, see Pentassuglio in this volume 367–374.

89 The opposition between φιλία and prostitution recurs in Xen. *Symp.* 8.21 where Socrates asks the rhetorical question how there can be any more commitment (στέργειν) between a prostitute and customer than between a buyer and a seller.

Whenever Socrates has something good to teach his friends, he does so;[90] and when he expects a friend to profit from others who may help him, he introduces the friend to them too. Socratic "teaching" turns out to be: reading collectively (κοινῇ, *koinêi*), exploring the treasures (τοὺς θησαυρούς, *tous thesaurous*)[91] of the wise men of old, and extracting the good things out of them.

Here we see Socrates dismissing Antiphon's commercial framework by contrasting it with an alternative model in a series of oppositions. First, Socrates brings in the element of selection:[92] selling means delivering to anyone, whereas within the friendship model one elects the receiver on basis of his moral qualities. Secondly, in contrast to Antiphon's value monism, his propensity to value everything in monetary currency, Socrates propagates the sharing (i.e. reading κοινῇ, *koinêi*) of wisdom and virtue of the "treasures" of wise men (who, by implication, are sharing *their* wisdom too). This propagation of sharing reveals that the economy of intrinsic valuables is not a zero-sum game: their value structure promotes sharing without diminishing.

In Antiphon's monistic universe, valuing something implies reducing it to a mere means, setting a price on it so as to sell it and to part from it—converting use value into exchange value; his worldview only allows for short-lived relationships which are immediately dissolved after the discrete transaction has taken place, where goods are valued irrespective of the relationship in which they figure and where relations are merely means for obtaining ulterior ends. Socrates' interpretation of the same exchange event is radically different: his notion of value always contains reference to relationships; relationships are never merely a means, but also part of the end: wisdom and virtue are not commodities for sale, but goods that arise out of a process of friends sharing virtues and sharing friends becoming virtuous.

Finally, the opposition between being a prostitute, engaging in short-term exchanges, and practicing self-restraint (being σώφρων, *sophron*) suggests an analogous opposition between being a sophist and being a gentleman-citizen. Although the example of prostitution is obviously chosen for its moral

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90 The image of the horse, dog, and bird refer to gifts given to *erômenoi*. Cf. Pl. *Lys*. 211d and the horses that are exorbitantly expensive gifts to the Corinthian boys in Ar. *Plut*. 157.

91 Although the use of *thesauros* for treasuries of metaphorical, non-material, "wealth" such as wisdom and learning is quite common in Attic literature (e.g. S. *Ant*. 30, Pl. *Phlb*. 15e), in this context the term also underscores Socrates' attempt to redefine wealth, making wisdom, not money, the *real* treasure. Further on in the *Memorabilia* (4.2.9), this line of thought is made explicit.

92 Interestingly, Xenophon elsewhere (1.2.60–61) apparently feels the urge to exonerate Socrates from the charge of being too "elitist." Cf. Corey 2002 on this point.

charge,[93] the analogy is salient for what it presupposes: an understanding of prostitution and sophistry as incompatible with self-restraint—as we will see in the next section.

The Substantive Objection

The formal objection that charging fees for lessons in wisdom presupposes a misguided understanding of the teacher-student-relationship shades into the substantive objection that demanding pay is incompatible with the very subject matter of teaching virtue. According to Xenophon's Socrates, interacting with others with the mediation of pay (μισθός, *misthos*), yields a distinct type of relationship with its own dynamics. The effects of μισθός (*misthos*) on the quality of relationships is frequently thematized in Xenophon's oeuvre:

- There is a tension between the logic of wage-earning and trust: paying guardians μισθός (*misthos*) does not optimally guarantee loyalty in them; giving gifts[94] to friends is more effective because they are πιστοτέροι (*pistoteroi*) and prone to reciprocate.[95]
- Offering compensation by sale or wage discharges all parties from further obligations to one another; *charis*-exchanges and benefactions incite positive emotions in the recipients and make them be of service permanently.[96]

93 For philosophers' dismissive attitudes and proposed constraints on sex, see e.g. Pl. *Resp.* 4.458d–461b, *Laws* 8.840d–841e, Arist. *Pol.* 1334b29–35b37, 1335b38–36a2.

94 E.g., 8.2.17: δῶρα (*dora*).

95 Cf. the wealth contest between Cyrus and Croesus in *Cyr.* 8.2.16–19 (Von Reden 1995: 87: "an experiment which proved the effect of gift-giving") in the context of their conversation about the good life (*Cyr.* 8.2). The idea is that μισθός (*misthos*), typically belonging to the short-term conception of resources and wealth that Croesus embodies, does not guarantee loyalty in guardians. The wealth contest between Cyrus and Croesus has a Socratic analogue, when Socrates defends the counter-intuitive claim that he (owning a total sum of five minae) is wealthier than Critoboulus who owns a hundred times that sum (*Oec.* 2.2–9). In making the point that Socrates, with his limited needs and desires has enough wealth, whereas Critoboulus' expensive lifestyle renders him poor, Socrates adduces an argument very similar to Cyrus': Critoboulus' friends only cost him money, whereas Socrates can be certain that should he be in dire need he will not have a lack of friends to help him out. (Cf. *Hiero* 4.6–10; *Mem.* 4.2.37, 1.6.1–10). For the Croesus episode as a literary reaction on Herodotus' representation of the encounter between Croesus and Cyrus, see: Lefèvre 1971; Gray 2011: 151, 170 ff.

96 E.g., Xen. *Ages.* 4.4.1: doing free favors is preferable over taking payment for services,

charis-exchanges are a more effective model for forging, maintaining and legitimating a position of superiority.[97]

– Accepting *misthos* implies acting out of compulsion; actions performed out of compulsions cannot be qualified as acts of *charis* and do not deserve to be reciprocated with *charis*.[98]

In Xenophon's non-Socratic works χάρις (*charis*) and εὐεργεσία (*euergesia*) are explicitly propagated as methods of governance that are more successful than coercion. There is some continuity between Xenophon's characterization of the ideal leader and his portrayal of Socrates, who is also prone to maintain "his position at the head of the benefaction chain".[99] Moreover, Xenophon makes the incompatibility of μισθός (*misthos*), belonging to a short-term system of immediate compensation and gratification, with long-term moral relations shaped by χάρις (*charis*) and πίστις (*pistis*), philosophically productive: long-term moral economics not only constitutes a precondition for the trans-

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because gratuitous (προῖκα, *proika*) favors presuppose trust (προεπιστεύθησαν, *proepisteuthesan*) and hence breed structural (ἀεί, *aei*) gratitude (it is a παρακαταθήκη χάριτος [*parakatathekê*], a deposit of χάρις, *charis*) that the recipient is happy to reciprocate (ἡδέως ὑπηρετοῦσι, *hedeos huperetousi*).

97 On this mechanism, see also Azoulay 2004, a thorough study about the role of χάρις (*charis*) in Xenophon as a political tool that establishes moral relationships of indebtedness. See also Tamiolaki in this volume 433–460.

98 E.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 4.2.12: Cyrus' followers join their leader not out of compulsion (οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ, *ouk ananke*), but willing (ἐθελούσιοι, *ethelousioi*) and "for χάρις (*charis*)". Here *charis* is ambiguous between prospective ("for the sake of future *charis* from Cyrus," i.e., "in order to obtain *charis* from Cyrus") and retrospective ("because of *charis* toward Cyrus," i.e., "because they have received χάρις *charis* from Cyrus"). Cyrus' reaction is in keeping with their *charis*: he prays that he may be able to return the favor (χάριν ἀποδοῦναι, *charin apodounai*) of their readiness (προθυμία, *prothumia*). There is an effective contrast between ready and willing behavior that yields *charis* and the idea of compulsion, a disjunction between moral obligations and enforceable obligations. Actions performed out of compulsion cannot be qualified as acts of *charis* and do not deserve to be reciprocated with *charis*. Cf. the opposition between compelling followers by means of coercion (ἀνάγκη, *anankê*) and "persuasion of the willing" (τὸ ἑκόντας πείθεσθαι, *ta hekontas peithesthai*) (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.21); and the opposition between serving out of compulsion (ἀνάγκῃ, *anankê*) vs. out of goodwill and friendship (εὐνοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ, *eunoiai kai philiai*) (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.28). Cf. Empedocles fr. 116: Charis "στυγέει δύστλητον Ἀνάγκην" (*stugeei dustleton Ananken*).

99 O'Connor (1994: 57). E.g., in Xen. *Ap.* 17, Socrates defends his refusal to accept money for teaching, emphasizing that he is indebted to nobody (χάριτας ὀφείλειν, *charitas opheilein*).

mission of wisdom and virtue; it constitutes its very substance. In *Memorabilia* 1.2, dedicated to a systematic defense of Socrates' life and teachings, Xenophon attempts to dismiss the charge that Socrates would have "corrupted the youth". Among the accusations that Xenophon invalidates is the reproach that Socrates would have made his associates "money-lovers" (ἐρασιχρηματους, *erasichrematous*):[100]

> οὐ μὴν οὐδ' **ἐρασιχρηματους**[101] γε τοὺς συνόντας ἐποίει. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔπαυε, τοὺς δ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐκ ἐπράττετο χρήματα. τούτου δ' ἀπεχόμενος ἐνόμιζεν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ λαμβάνοντας τῆς ὁμιλίας μισθὸν **ἀνδραποδιστὰς** ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει **διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι παρ' ὧν ἂν**[102] **λάβοιεν τὸν μισθόν**. ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἴ τις ἀρετὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀργύριον πράττοιτο καὶ μὴ νομίζοι τὸ μέγιστον κέρδος ἕξειν φίλον ἀγαθὸν κτησάμενος, ἀλλὰ φοβοῖτο μὴ ὁ γενόμενος καλὸς κἀγαθὸς τῷ τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν μεγίστην **χάριν** ἕξοι. Σωκράτης δὲ ἐπηγγείλατο μὲν οὐδενὶ πώποτε τοιοῦτον οὐδέν, **ἐπίστευε** δὲ τῶν συνόντων ἑαυτῷ τοὺς ἀποδεξαμένους ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἐδοκίμαζεν εἰς τὸν πάντα βίον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι.
>
> Nor again did he make his associates money-lovers: he rid them of all other desires except for his company, and for that he charged no fee. In eschewing fees, he considered that he was protecting his own independence; those who accepted a fee in return for their services he nicknamed 'self-enslavers', because they were obliged to converse with *all from whom they could take a fee*. He expressed surprise that a man who offered to teach goodness should demand to be paid for it and, instead of anticipating the greatest possible gain through obtaining a good friend, should be afraid that the person who has become truly good will feel less than the deepest gratitude to his supreme benefactor. Socrates never made any such offer to anyone, but he believed that those of his associates who

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100 For love for money, *philarguria*, as a negative quality in Plato, see Pl. *Resp.* 1.347b, *Grg.* 515e, *Ap.* 29e, 30b. For the sophists' reputation of being money-lovers, see, e.g., Plato Comicus, *Peisander* fr. 103 (Kock). Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4.62.

101 This adjective is a neologism of Xenophon, coined by analogy with φιλαργυρία (*philarguria*), probably to bring out that love for money is on a par with other desires (τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν, *ton allon epithumion*); it seems to highlight the compulsory aspects of money-driven behavior.

102 'ἄν' is deleted by Dindorf (1910).

> accepted the principles which he himself approved would be good friends all their life long to himself and to one another.[103]
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.5–7

Fee-taking is condemned by means of the imagery of being an "enslaver of oneself" (ἀνδραποδιστής ἑαυτῶν, *andrapodistes heauton*). In this case, the trouble with taking fees is not so much that it makes it impossible to choose one's conversation partner on the basis of his moral quality,[104] but that it yields a dynamics of its own, a dynamics hostile to the very substance of Socratic education.[105]

Accepting payment not only puts one under the legal obligation to deliver;[106] it is even suggested that the very mediation of money makes one cultivate the wrong ἐπιθυμίαι (*epithumiai*) and hence causes compulsory behavior: one is under compulsion to διαλέγεσθαι (*dialegesthai*, to converse) with whomever one *can* get money from.[107] Socratic economics strikingly stands out from this sophistic discourse ruled by compulsion (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, *to anankaion*) and fear (φοβοῖτο, *phoboito*): for Socrates, the greatest gain is making friends and making one's friends morally excellent; in light of this objective, fear turns into trust (ἐπίστευε, *episteue*), and obsession with gain (κέρδος, *kerdos*) is replaced by a belief in *charis*, of generosity and gratitude. The practice of fee-taking flies in the face of the sophist's claim of teaching virtue, for fee-taking is a symptom of distrusting one's pupil—of which there is no need if one has succeeded in making the pupil virtuous![108] The bottom line is that *charis*, virtue and trust pre-

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103 Translation by Tredennick & Waterfield (1990), adapted.

104 *Pace* Corey 2002: 196–197: "Taking pay places constraints upon the free discretion that any conscientious teacher will want to exercise."

105 It is on this passage that Blank (1985) bases his argument that the main problem with the fee-taking is that it is an infringement of the teacher's freedom: submitting oneself to the necessity to "deliver the goods" after payment is effectively enslaving oneself. Cf. Gigon 1953: 34.

106 Blank 1985. A similar objection is raised in *Mem.* 1.6.5: once you take money, you are under an obligation (ἀναγκαῖον, *anankaion*) to carry out the task whereas when you refrain from it you can talk to whomever you like (οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι, *ouk Ananke dialegesthai hoi an mê boulomai*). Alternatively, in *Mem.* 1.5.6 the image of slavery recurs: whoever takes money makes himself a δοῦλος (*doulos*) of a δεσπότης (*despotes*).

107 This reading diverges from current interpretations of this passage. I read the optative ἂν λάβοιεν as a potential optative instead of a secondary sequence replacing a distributive-iterative subjunctive. I argue this in more detail in Van Berkel 2010.

108 This paradox recurs on several occasions in Socratic literature and other manifestations of criticism against the sophists. E.g. Pl. *Grg.* 519c, 460e; Isoc. *C. soph.* 5–6.

suppose a time-frame that surpasses the short-term world of the businessman, sophist, and prostitute. By refraining from accepting fees Socrates contributes to the character formation of his followers: in the immediately preceding paragraphs it is explained that although Socrates never professed to teach people a desire for goodness (ἀρετῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν, *aretes epithumein*), he inspired his disciples to imitate him and hence attain excellence (*Mem.* 1.2.3). This goes for the entire repertory of Socrates' behavior: by demonstrating his own *enkrateia* over his passions and appetites, his endurance of cold and heat and toil, and the way he trained himself to be moderate in his needs (τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι, *to metrion deisthai*) so as to be easily satisfied (ἀρκοῦντα, *arkounta*) with very few possessions (πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος, *panu mikra kektemenos*), he (unwittingly) set an example and a standard to his students. His attitude towards fees fit in this picture.[109] The judgment that the connection between refusing pay and criticizing love of money is a case of "sloppy causal reasoning" is unwarranted (*pace* Corey 2002: 209).

In short, we may say that to Xenophon's Socrates, the problem with demanding and accepting pay for his conversations is twofold. The formal objection is that accepting pay presupposes a wrong interpretation of the teacher-student relationship, confusing friendly reciprocity premised on trust, generosity and gratitude with a commercial notion of exchange. The substantive problem is that demanding pay is in itself incompatible with the contents of Socratic moral-philosophical teaching that takes as its point of departure the principle of *enkrateia*.

Pay *and* χάρις: Plato's Demystification

Plato's oeuvre does not seem to offer a comparable reflection on the dynamics of personal relations. One possible exception could be Plato's *Gorgias* that figures a trope very similar to the one in *Mem.* 1.2.5–7: that raising fees for lessons in virtue is somehow self-contradictory. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates constructs an alternative version of the paradox of charging fees:

109 Cf. Dorion (2000), who, in articulating the thematic organization of Book 1, points out that the themes of *enkrateia* and Socrates' indifference to money appear three times in Book 1 and every time in sequence: 1.2.1–4 (*enkrateia*) and 1.2.5–7 (indifference to money); 1.5.1–5 (*enkrateia*) and 1.5.6 (indifference to money); 1.6.1–10 (*enkrateia*) and 1.6.11–14 (indifference to money). A similar sequence occurs in Xen. *Ap.* 16.

καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὐτούς], **τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες**, εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε;

"The sophists, in fact, with all their other accomplishments, act absurdly in one point: claiming to be teachers of virtue, they often accuse their pupils of doing them an injury by cheating them of their fees and otherwise showing no recognition of the good they have done them. [519d] Now what can be more unreasonable than this plea? That men, after they have been made good and just, after all their injustice has been rooted out by their teacher and replaced by justice, should be unjust through something that they have not! Does not this seem to you absurd, my dear friend?"

PL. *Gorgias* 519c3–d7; translation by FOWLER 1926

Good teachers succeed in instilling their students with virtue. Virtuous students cannot fail to reciprocate *charis*. Hence, teachers of virtue who accuse their students of non-payment and ingratitude are being absurd: either they haven't done their job well enough (in which case they do not deserve to be paid) or they have (in which case, the student's education being successful, they will be paid). Although this paradox resembles the one in *Mem.* 1.2.5–7, there are some subtle differences that may be instructive for the differences between Plato and Xenophon as to their attitudes towards money and *charis*. First of all, here in the *Gorgias*-passage, the paradox is in complaining and accusing students of non-payment *after* the lessons have taken place—in which case, the very accusation proves to be an unwitting diagnosis of the teacher's failure. In the *Memorabilia*-passage, the point is that the very act of asking a fee *beforehand* is a gesture of mistrust on the part of the teacher that is incompatible with the ethics of *charis* that is all about taking the leap of faith and paying it forward. The teacher's complaints in the *Gorgias*-passage are not inherent to the workings of money; the analysis in the *Memorabilia*-passage concern the very logic of exchange.[110]

110 At first sight, anecdotes about Protagoras' valuation practices do not seem to fit into either of the lines of thought. Protagoras famously let the customer fix the value of the education

Another, more subtle, difference is that here in the *Gorgias*-passage, the *charis*-economy is not imagined as an *alternative* for *misthos*-payment, but is presented in close juxtaposition with it (τούς **τε** μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες **καὶ** ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες), perhaps *subsuming* μισθός (καὶ **ἄλλην** χάριν). This points to a broader tendency in Plato's work where sophists, despite the fact that they charge money for their lessons, are prone to represent their relations with their students as more than a purely commercial transaction. Above and beyond the objectifiable compensations, there is an "additional" *charis*, material or symbolical, that adds a moral or social dimension to the exchange at hand: sophists will help you if you pay money and put down χάριτες (*charites*),[111] and they convince the young to pay money (χρήματα διδόντας, *chremata didontas*) for their associations and be grateful in addition (χάριν προσειδέναι, *charin proseidenai*).[112]

These formulations seem to be ironical echoings on Socrates' part of the sophists' self-presentation in terms of civic service.[113] Using the terminology

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(*NE* 1164b23–34) and allowed pupils to pay less than the standard fee if they were willing to state on oath that they did not think his teaching worth much (Pl. *Prt.* 328bc; Cf. DL 9.56, Arist. *NE* 1164a24–26). Aristotle frames Protagoras' practice as one of the two sophistic solutions to the valuation problems implied in the exchange of wisdom (from the realm of the good) for money (the realm of utility); the other solution is the one presented in the *Gorgias*, i.e. fixing the price in advance when the customer is still unaware of the true value of the sophist's wisdom. In general, these anecdotes seem not so much to vouch for Protagoras' trust in the moral quality of his pupils, but in his confidence in the persuasive character of his own teachings. Demont (1993: 41–44) argues that this anecdote refers to "χρήματα (*chremata*)" in Protagoras' Man/Measure-fragment (*chremata* in its narrow and specific sense as "money"). I am inclined to think this is an *ad hominem*-interpretation of the Man/Measure-fragment and a product of negative spin and hostile reception by Plato and later authors. Cf. Van Berkel 2013.

111 Pl. *Cra.* 391b10: χρήματα ἐκείνοις τελοῦντα καὶ χάριτας κατατιθέμενον. Here the plural suggests that χάριτες (*charites*) should be taken to be material manifestations of *charis*; however, material or not, the *charites* are mentioned separately from χρήματα (*chremata*), which suggests an additional reward outside a payment that is agreed upon in advance. Cf. Socrates on the appropriate response to those who try to help him escape: Pl. *Cri.* 48d (χρήματα τελοῦντες (…) καὶ χάριτας, *chremata telountes … kai charitas*).

112 Pl. *Ap.* 19e–20a. Cf. a passage in the Platonic *Theages* where the young men who are persuaded by sophists are said to "pay down beside a large sum of money as fee, and to be grateful in addition" (προσκατατιθέντας ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ μισθόν, καὶ χάριν *πρὸς τούτοις* εἰδέναι; 127a6–7).

113 Similarly Isocrates reports how the parents of his students not only pay him (χρήματα διδόασιν, *chremata didoasin*), but also react very positively (χαίρουσιν) to their children's education. Is. 15.241. The verb χαίρειν (*chairein*) may evoke the *charis*-rhetoric in the rest of the speech where Isocrates consistently characterizes his education as a form of civic

of *charis*, some sophists may have attempted to cloak the mercenary nature of their practice, or to "upgrade" it: immaterial *charis* is an additional asset, above and beyond the payment of a teacher.[114] A professional teacher is more than a business man, mercenary or prostitute—until Plato's Socrates exposes this *charis*-talk as a mere euphemism[115] for money.[116]

service. Cf. Too 1995: 109–110, 2008: 6–7. The *charis*-terminology serves to characterize the exchange between teacher and pupil as not entirely commercial or socially detached; the education offered by Isocrates not only involves long-term bonds between teacher and the students' parents but also participates in the long-term social order of the city.

114 This may also be the background to the recurring idea that some sophists offer *more* than what they are paid for. Plato represents Hippias as the sophist who earns exorbitant amounts of money from his teachings. In *Hp. mai.* 281b–c, the sophist's practice is emphatically *not* represented as a *quid pro quo*-matter. Rather, Hippias has the capacity to confer private (ἰδίᾳ, *idiai*) and public (δημοσίᾳ, *demosiai*) benefits (ὠφελεῖν [*ophelein*], εὐεργετεῖν [*euergetein*]) that *exceed* (ἔτι πλείω, *eti pleiôi*) the amount of money that he receives (πολλὰ χρήματα, *polla chremata*). Cf. also Pl. *Prt.* 328b. Although Blank (1985: 7) categorizes these remarks as an instance of the idea that "a sophist must give his customer his money's worth" (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.11); this is, by implication, true, but the rhetorical gist of the passage is that *Hippias*' practice is emphatically *not* represented as a *quid pro quo*-matter. Plato's propensity to see *charis* merely as euphemism for *quid pro quo*-exchanges may also explain why he does not think of reciprocity as a viable alternative to market trade (as noted by Danzig & Schaps 2002): to him, personal reciprocity is in the end only an informal variety of market trade or barter—not a qualitatively and morally distinct one.

115 Or, as Fredal (2008), calls it: "mystification". Interestingly, Fredal's argument is that the sophists' practice of charging fees is a practical analogue to their demystification of myth and religion: by putting a concrete and precise price on their teachings, the sophists would demystify the elite practice of gift-giving. Although I find this thesis attractive, Plato's portrayal of the sophists seem rather to indicate that the sophists were prone to fashion themselves as participants in a *charis*-economy as opposed to wage-earners.

116 E.g. Pl. *Resp.* 1.338b1–9, where Thrasymachus complains that Socrates shows himself to be ungrateful in response to his teachings (τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, *touton mede charin apodidonai*). Socrates makes plain that his gratitude simply does not take a monetary form. He pays gratitude according to his means, in the alternative "coin" of praise, i.e. he gives praise to those who he thinks are speaking well—a more proper form of reciprocating in reaction to λόγος, *logos*.

Concluding Remarks

When it comes to ideas about money and economics, the contrast between Plato and Xenophon tends to be overstated. As we have seen, both Plato and Xenophon operate with relative notions of "rich" and "poor", defining these categories in terms of wants: poverty consists in insatiability; being rich is having enough. Both conceptualize value and wealth as subjective, i.e. relative to its owner, as it depends upon the ability of the owner to use it correctly. Both authors share a consistent concern with the "proper use" of χρήματα (*chremata*), anticipating Aristotle's clear articulation of the idea that money, although a mere means and not an end, yields the danger of confusing means with ends.

Rather than fundamental differences in understanding of economic processes, the differences in economic philosophy between Plato and Xenophon seem to be a matter of conceptual architecture. Whereas Plato shapes his theory of value around a body-soul dualism, associating the perverting effects of money with the realm of the body and making value dependent upon the soul, Xenophon embeds his theory of value systematically in the Socratic doctrine of "proper use", organizing his economic ideas more around the opposition between the short and the long term.

This subtle difference recurs in the attitudes toward teaching for pay. Plato's treatment of the topic of the fee centers around the ontological status of money, questioning the valuation of wisdom and problematizing its reification. Xenophon's rejection of teaching for pay has two aspects. The formal objection holds that accepting pay presupposes a wrong interpretation of the teacher-student relationship; this objection is in line with the doctrine of proper use: accepting pay is an improper use of wisdom because it presupposes that the seller does not know how to use wisdom in ways other than selling it. The substantive objection claims that demanding pay is itself incompatible with the virtues of gratitude and trust, i.e. with the proper use of friends, and hence with the very contents of Socratic teaching that centers around *enkrateia*.

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PART 3

From Friendship to Politics

Xenophon's Conception of Friendship in *Memorabilia* 2.6 (with Reference to Plato's *Lysis*)*

Melina Tamiolaki

Friendship was a cardinal concept of ancient Greek civilization. The term φιλία and its cognates (φίλος, φιλότης, φίλιος, φιλέω) are amply attested in ancient Greek literature and inscriptions and covered a wide range of relationships (between parents and children, husband and wife, two individuals, animals and men).[1] Epics and tragedies present famous friendships (e.g., between Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades),[2] historiographical texts contain episodes of friendships as alliances or guest-friendships, while friendship was also associated with politics, as a φίλος often denoted a political ally.[3] The maxim of "helping friends and harming enemies" also played an important role in Greek ethical thought.[4] From the fourth century onward, the debate on friendship began revolving around theoretical issues, such as the good, utility, and virtue. Although friendship was not on the agenda of topics Socrates was seeking to define, the Athenian philosopher was interested in exploring the foundations and purpose of friendship, as the works of his best-known pupils, Plato and Xenophon, demonstrate.[5] Aristotle later provided a system-

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1 For friendship in classical literature, see Konstan 1997. For friendship in the inscriptions, see the essays collected by Peachin 2001.

2 See Konstan 1997: 4–42, 53–60.

3 For guest-friendship, see Herman 1987. For friendship and politics, see Konstan 1997: 60–67. Friendship in historiography has not attracted scholarly attention. See Tamiolaki (forthcoming a) about the role of friendship in Herodotus.

4 For this maxim, see Dover 1974: 180–184, Blundell 1989: 26–59.

5 See, for instance, the topics Socrates wished to define, as they are listed in Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.16: αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων. Cf. also Sedley 1989 and Dorion 2004: 162–163, 172–174, on Plato's *Lysis*: both scholars observe that although this work stages a discussion on friendship, it should not be considered a dialogue of definition.

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atic treatment of friendship in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (books 8 and 9), and other authors, such as the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers and Cicero, continued to reflect on this topic.[6]

The present study deals with Xenophon. By focusing on chapter 2.6 of the *Memorabilia*, it aims at illustrating his specific contribution to the history of the concept of friendship. Friendship is inscribed into the apologetic purpose of this work. One of the accusations raised against Socrates was that he put too much emphasis on the utility of friends:

> ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὔνους εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται.
>
> He (the accuser) said that, concerning friends, Socrates maintained, that their goodwill is not useful, unless they are able to be useful themselves.[7]
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.52, my translation

The second book of the *Memorabilia* offers a multi-faceted refutation of this charge: through a presentation of a series of discussions between Socrates and several Athenians of his time, Xenophon strives to show that Socrates encouraged his fellow citizens to be useful to each other and, above all, that he proved himself to be beneficial to everybody he encountered.[8] Chapter 2.6, more specifically, constitutes the most detailed theoretical treatment of friendship. In this chapter, Socrates converses with a young Athenian, Critobulus, on the traits of a good friend, as well as on the value and difficulties of acquiring friends. This conversation raises several questions: what is the relationship between the elaboration on friendship in *Memorabilia* 2.6 and friendship as it is presented in Xenophon's other works? For instance, a recurrent issue in Xenophon is the relationship between leaders and their friends. Some scholars have also emphasized the problems associated with such friendships, deriving from: lack of trust, friendship as concealed dependency, friendship depending

6 Aristotle distinguished three types of friendship, which he classified from the lower to the most elevated, according to the criteria of their formation: friendship based on utility, pleasure, and virtue, respectively (*Eth. Nic.* 1156a7–1165b9). For friendship in Aristotle, see Stern-Gillet 1995, Schroeder 1997, Pangle 2003; for Cicero, see Konstan 1997: 122–128; for the Stoics, Hurka 2013; for the Epicureans, Armstrong 2011.

7 With few exceptions, translations of the *Memorabilia* in this paper are from the Loeb edition 2013, often adapted.

8 For discussions of the second book, see Gray 1998: 129–137, Bevilacqua 2010: ad loc., Dorion 2011, vol. II: ad loc., Danzig 2018 and Danzig this volume.

on social status.[9] Does the *Memorabilia* show awareness of these problems? Furthermore, it has been observed by modern critics that Xenophon's analysis in chapter 2.6 shares some remarkable affinities with Plato's *Lysis*.[10] How can these affinities be interpreted? Does Xenophon enter into dialogue with Plato?

This study will attempt to answer these questions by offering a close reading of *Memorabilia* 2.6. I will argue that Xenophon's conception of friendship in this section is inextricably interwoven with his ideas about politics and that Xenophon thinks primarily in political terms: he either projects political realities onto individual friendships, or he is inspired by political images. The political dimension of friendship in Xenophon will be better brought to light through a comparison with Plato's treatment of this concept in the *Lysis*. My paper is divided into three parts: in the first part, I show the connections between Xenophon's conception of friendship in *Mem.* 2.6 and his ideas about leadership; in the second part, I turn to two important common themes between Xenophon and Plato, the image of a friend as a possession and the metaphor of hunting, and highlight their political dimension in Xenophon. Finally, in the third part, I examine some political images in Xenophon's elaboration of friendship in chapter 2.6 of the *Memorabilia*.

Leaders as Friends and Friends as Leaders

A central theme in Xenophon's works is the interconnection between the private and the political sphere: the qualities needed for the good administration of the house do not greatly differ from those needed for successful leadership in a city, an army, or an empire. Ischomachus, the ideal leader of the household, thus shares some important virtues with Cyrus or Agesilaus, such as gentleness, benevolence toward his subordinates, and an interest in mutual benefit.[11] The question that arises is whether Xenophon valorizes equally the two spheres (private and political) or whether one of them has precedence in his thought:

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9 For friendship in Xenophon as foreshadowing Hellenistic unequal relationships, see Azoulay 2004: 281–326, *contra* Gray (2011: 291–329), who emphasizes mutual benefit. For friendships in a Persian context, see Hirsch 1985. For friendship and leadership in Xenophon, see Buxton 2017 and Tamiolaki forthcoming b.

10 See Gigon 1958: 160–172 and Dorion 2011, vol. II, "Annexe 2": 415. Both scholars observe that despite some common themes, we cannot conclude that Xenophon's chapter depends directly on the *Lysis*.

11 For this interconnection, see Brock 2004, Gray 2011: 7–24.

does he politicize the private sphere, or does he personalize politics? He usually does both; but in certain instances, the political sphere seems more privileged in his thought.

First of all, it is important that *poleis* are often used as models for individuals rather than vice versa. We find a characteristic example of this tendency in the first book of the *Memorabilia*, in which the surprising idea occurs that cities and nations should be considered as *models of piety for men* because they are the most ancient and wise (!):

> οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολυχρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι … ;
>
> Don't you see that the most ancient and the wisest of human things—cities and nations—are the most pious toward the gods …?
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 1.4.16, my translation

Xenophon's great interest in the political sphere can be observed also in the conversation about friendship between Socrates and Critobulus. Socrates makes the astonishing claim that not only do moral men often quarrel with each other, but also "moral" *poleis*. In this way, he amplifies morality by attributing it to cities:[12]

> Καὶ οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, οἱ ἰδιῶται τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις αἱ τῶν τε καλῶν μάλιστα ἐπιμελόμεναι καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἥκιστα προσιέμεναι πολλάκις πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας.
>
> "Yes," said Critobulus, "and not only do private individuals do this but also the cities that are most attentive to the noble things and least admit the shameful are frequently in a state of hostility with one another."
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.18, my translation

Last but not least, Socrates himself in Xenophon is a highly political figure. As commentators have noted, he is a sort of ideal leader since he shares some qualities with leaders in Xenophon: like Cyrus or Agesilaus, he has many followers, and he proves to be beneficial to all the people of his entourage.[13]

12 It is difficult, though, to know which cities Xenophon had in mind. Bevilacqua 2010: 448, n. 43 thinks Athens and Sparta.

13 Azoulay 2004: 396–413, Gera 2007. Cf. Tamiolaki 2012: 580–586 for some qualifications

Moreover, contrary to the Platonic Socrates (hereafter Socrates^{P}), who advocates abstention from politics, Xenophon's Socrates (hereafter Socrates^{X}) offers the young Athenians detailed advice about politics.[14] The strongly political profile of Socrates^{X} could account for another trait of his image, his emotional detachment. Socrates^{X} constantly gives advice to the people of his entourage (about *eros*, politics, friendship, etc.), but he is presented more as an observer and advisor of potential ἐρασταί (lovers) than as an active seducer himself. Even his self-description as erotic (ἐρωτικός) is not deprived of some ambiguity:

> … because I am erotic, perhaps even I might be able to assist you in some way in the hunt for those who are noble and good. For—whatever human beings I desire—I set out with complete intensity to love them and be loved by them in return, and long for them, to be longed for in return, and to desire to be together with them, to have them desire in return to be together with me.
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.28–29

This statement conveys a subtle irony: it is uttered in a context of mockery toward Critobulus (Socrates seems to doubt that Critobulus is really capable of achieving the virtue that will make him the perfect friend). This irony undermines rather than enhances Socrates' erotic activity and opinions about love affairs. Furthermore, Socrates advises Critobulus to avoid kissing handsome boys (Xen. *Symp.* 4.25–26). Socrates' emotional detachment brings him close to Cyrus, who also advises his peers about love affairs, but avoids himself kissing Artabazus and is characterized as "cold" (ψυχρῷ βασιλεῖ: Xen. *Cyr.* 8.4.22).[15]

These elements testify to the importance Xenophon attributes to the political sphere and can serve as a background for his contribution to the discussion of friendship. In what follows, I would like to suggest that Xenophon's elaboration of friendship in *Memorabilia* 2.6 becomes more intelligible if it is viewed as a projection of his ideas about leaders as friends into interpersonal relation-

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concerning Socrates' assimilation with other leaders. See also Bevilacqua in this volume 461–486; Dillery (2016: 251), on the contrary, is reluctant to view Socrates as a leader.

14 For the differences between the two Socrateses, see Morrison 1994, Johnson 2005, Dorion 2013b.

15 For Cyrus' emotional detachment, see Tatum 1989. For the kiss in Xenophon and its use in a Persian context, see Pontier 2012. For the connotations of Cyrus' characterization as ψυχρός, see Demont 2014: 205–209. Even Cyrus' abundant φιλανθρωπία (loving of humanity) has a strong political dimension and is not deprived of some ambiguity. See Sandridge 2012: 79–96.

ships. Xenophon's original contribution will become more evident through a comparison with Plato's *Lysis. Memorabilia* 2.6 shares many common themes with Plato's *Lysis*, but we can also observe important divergences *within the convergences*. If we admit, following the current scholarly consensus, that there was an ongoing dialogue between Plato and Xenophon,[16] and that *Memorabilia* 2.6 was written with knowledge of Plato's *Lysis*, the Xenophontic chapter could be viewed as a response to the Platonic treatment of friendship.[17] Xenophon's different treatment indicates that he intended to offer his original contribution to the topic of friendship.

Having these preliminaries in mind, we can now turn to the discussion between Socrates and Critobulus. This conversation initially proceeds negatively; instead of defining the qualities of the good friend, the two interlocutors first describe the traits that a good friend *should not possess*:

> "Tell me, Critobulus," he said, "if we wanted a good friend, how would we attempt to search for him? (εἰ δεοίμεθα φίλου ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς ἂν ἐπιχειροίημεν σκοπεῖν;) Should we seek first (ζητητέον) for one who is no slave to eating and drinking, lust, sleep, idleness? For someone mastered by these cannot do his duty by himself or a friend."
>
> "No, of course not."
>
> "Then you think we should avoid (ἀφεκτέον) one who is subject to them?"
>
> "I do certainly."
>
> "Now what about the spendthrift who is never satisfied, is always appealing to his neighbors for help, does not repay what he received, and is resentful if he receives nothing? Don't you think he too is a troublesome friend?"
>
> "Certainly."
>
> "Then we must avoid him too? (ἀφεκτέον)"
>
> "We must indeed."
>
> [….]

16 See Danzig 2002 for the relationship between Plato's *Laws* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. Cf. Johnson in this volume 71–98.

17 For a detailed discussion of the chronology of *Lysis*, see Bordt 1998: 96–106, who concludes that it belongs to the early but not first dialogues of Plato and places its writing after 394 BCE. For the complexities involved in dating Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, see Bandini and Dorion 2000: CCXL–CCLII, who considers 370 BCE as a *terminus post quem*, because of the reference to the battle of Leuctra in this work (Xen. *Mem*. 3.5.25–27).

"And what about the man with such a passion for money (διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι) that he has no time for anything but the selfish pursuit of gain?"

"We must avoid him too (ἀφεκτέον), I think. There is no profit in acquiring him as a friend."

"And what about the man who loves strife (στασιώδης), who is willing to provide his friends with plenty of enemies?"

"We must shun him too (φευκτέον), of course."

"Then how can we test these qualities (δοκιμάσαιμεν), Socrates, before becoming friends with him?"

"What test do we apply to a sculptor? We don't judge by what he says but we look at his statues, and if we see that the works he has already produced are beautiful, we feel confident that his future works will be as good."

"You mean that anyone whose good treatment of his old friends is evident will clearly prove a benefactor to new friends also?"

"Yes, as when I find that someone has habitually treated his horses well, I think that he will treat other horses equally well".

XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.1–8

After the rejection of all these types of individuals, Socrates concludes that a good friend should possess the opposite qualities from those mentioned above:

Οἶμαι μέν, ὅστις τἀναντία τούτων ἐγκρατὴς μέν ἐστι τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὔοικος δὲ καὶ εὐσύμβολος ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ φιλόνικος πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις.

We shall look for one who is a master of his bodily pleasures, who is truly hospitable and fair in his dealings and prompt to do as much for his benefactors as he received from them, so that he is beneficial to the people of his entourage.

XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.5

This conversation calls for several observations. The initial question and the ensuing conversation suggest that the issue of a spontaneous friendship (e.g., such as the kind of friendship that can be developed between young men depicted by Aristotle[18]) is not raised in Xenophon. Instead, we observe a strong

18 Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1156a31–33: ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν.

agency: leading individual x is seeking a good friend; the terms σκοπεῖν (inquire), ζητητέον (what should be sought, a *desideratum*), ἀφεκτέον (something/somebody that should be avoided), δοκιμάσαιμεν (test) clearly point to that direction. The leading individual should inquire, check, avoid some people, and choose others. Socrates' argumentation in this passage is thus based more on calculation than on emotions. The same impression is conveyed by Socrates' comparisons: one should check the value of a (potential) friend by examining how he has treated his previous friends, in the same way he checks the value of a sculptor or a horse-breeder by looking at their achievements. These comparisons suggest that Socrates conceives of friendship as a matter of competence (in the sense of the capacity to discern the potentially good friend) rather than of emotional attachment.[19]

Xenophon's emotionless basis of friendship becomes all the more evident if we compare the treatment of friendship in Plato's *Lysis*. Contrary to Xenophon, Plato includes emotions in his discussion of friendship. At the beginning of the *Lysis*, he presents the suffering experienced by Hippothales, because of his love for the young Lysis.[20] And when Socrates begins his theoretical investigation about friendship, he asks Menexenus to define friendship in terms of love (not of usefulness):

> Καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐπειδάν τίς τινα *φιλῇ*, πότερος *ποτέρου φίλος* γίγνεται, ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος· ἢ οὐδὲν διαφέρει;
>
> So tell me, when one person *loves* another, which of the two becomes friend of the other—the *loving* of the *loved*, or the loved of the loving? Or is there no difference?[21]
>
> PL. *Lys.* 212b1–2

19 For the value of friends, see Van Berkel 2010 and in this volume 391–432.

20 See Pl. *Lys.* 204b5–204d5, for Hippothales' embarrassment (expressed by his blushing) at the revelation of the fact that he is in love with the young Lysis. For an analysis of the *Lysis* from the perspective of the emotions, see Schultz 2013: 17–37, who analyzes how Socrates exploits the emotional responses and dispositions of his interlocutors. However, emotions are present at the beginning of the dialogue; the Platonic *theory of friendship*, which is developed later in the dialogue, does not concentrate on the emotions, but on the idea of the good. Cf. also Vlastos 1973, Wolfsdorf 2007.

21 See also the conclusion of the dialogue about the οἰκεῖον (familiar) being φίλον (Pl. *Lysis* 221–223). Again usefulness does not play a role here. Unless otherwise noted, translations of Plato's *Lysis* are from Penne and Rowe 2005, sometimes with modifications.

The absence of emotions in Xenophon's discussion of friendship is telling. It reveals the political background of Xenophon's conception of friendship: the individual seeking the best friend can be easily assimilated with the leader who seeks the best alliances.[22]

The political dimension of friendship can be further corroborated by some additional elements. First of all, it is noteworthy that the most important feature of the good friend (self-mastery) is also the most indispensable virtue for a good leader: in the conversation between Socrates and Aristippus at the beginning of the second book of the *Memorabilia*, Socrates praises self-mastery as the quality *par excellence* that a man destined to be a leader should possess.[23] The same goes with benefaction, the key quality Socrates advertises for the acquisition of a friend; it is also the essential precondition for a leader to acquire the benevolence of his followers (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.24). Furthermore, the topics of χρηματισμός (getting money for one's own profit) and στάσις (discord) also have strong political connotations: χρηματισμός was a serious problem for politicians in Athens, and the term στάσις refers to the quarrels between cities or the internal conflicts within a city and is not usually employed to describe interpersonal relationships.[24]

That Xenophon has leaders in mind in the discussion of friendship in *Mem.* 2.6 is also clearly indicated by Socrates' argumentation about the value of friendship. This argumentation almost exclusively relies on examples from political life. In fact, Socrates explains to Critobulus how the noble people (καλοὶ κἀγαθοί) possess the necessary qualities that enable them to handle negative situations (such as strife and envy) and work together with other moral people for the benefit of the polis:

> Surely, then, it is likely that the best people will share public honors too not only without harm to one another, but to their common benefit. For those who desire to win honor and to rule in their cities (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἄρχειν) that they may have power to

22 This is a model Xenophon applies on the *oikos* as well, but Xenophon's perception of economy is out of the scope of this paper.

23 Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.3–5. For the centrality of the concept of ἐγκράτεια in the *Memorabilia*, see Dorion 2013d. Cf. also Tamiolaki 2010: 371–386 for the connection between self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια) and freedom (ἐλευθερία).

24 See, for instance, Thucydides' characterization of Pericles as χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος (Thuc. 2.65.8). For the problem of *stasis* in the political life of the classical world, see Gehrke 1987.

> embezzle, to treat others with violence, to live in luxury, are bound to be unjust, unscrupulous, and incapable of unity. But if a man seeks to be honored in a state that he may not be the victim of injustice himself and may help his friends in a just cause, and when he exercises leadership (ἄρξας) may try to do some good to his country, why should he be unable to join with one like himself? Will his connection with other gentlemen render him less capable of serving his friends? Will he be less able to benefit his city with the help of other gentlemen? (Πότερον τοὺς φίλους ὠφελεῖν μετὰ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἧττον δυνήσεται; ἢ τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν ἀδυνατώτερος ἔσται καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἔχων συνεργούς;) Even in the public games (ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι), it is clear that, if the strongest competitors were allowed to join forces against the weaker (εἰ ἐξῆν τοῖς κρατίστοις συνθεμένους ἐπὶ τοὺς χείρους ἰέναι), they would win all the events, they would carry off all the prizes. True, that is not permitted in the games; but in politics, where the gentlemen are the strongest, nobody prevents anybody from forming any combination he may choose for the benefit of the city. Surely, then, in public life it is a gain to make friends with the best, and to see in them partners and fellow workers in a common cause, not rivals (ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἐν οἷς οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ κρατιστεύουσιν, οὐδεὶς κωλύει μεθ' οὗ ἄν τις βούληται τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν, πῶς οὐ λυσιτελεῖ τοὺς βελτίστους φίλους κτησάμενον πολιτεύεσθαι, τούτοις κοινωνοῖς καὶ συνεργοῖς τῶν πράξεων μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνταγωνισταῖς χρώμενον).
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.24–26

This discussion begins with a general statement about the naturalness of friendship (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.21: φύσει μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά) but ends being centered on *the individuals who want to exercise leadership* within the polis. Socrates argues that even these people can (and should) be friends with each other. More specifically, he distinguishes two categories: those who want to be leaders in order to commit injustices and those who wish to exercise leadership in order to benefit the city. He concludes that it will be easier for the latter to create friendships, with the aid of which they will be able to benefit the city. Obviously, these friendships are political alliances, as the broad meaning of the term φίλος in ancient Greek suggests. The comparison between public games and politics further underlines the political dimension of friendship. Socrates suggests that in athletics the better athletes cannot compete against the worse athletes; otherwise, there would be no meaning in the contest: if the best united, they would always beat the worst. In politics, on the contrary, the gentlemen (καλοὶ κἀγαθοί) are free to collaborate with each other for the sake of the city. This comparison rather distracts the

reader from the topic of individual friendship: friendship is not at all mentioned in the description of athletics; instead, the terminology of collaboration is employed (note the word *συνθεμένους*, which parallels the *καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς συνεργούς* in the field of politics). Xenophon seems here to be more concerned about presenting the techniques of exercising successful leadership. That is why he uses them as an argument for interpersonal relationships. In this way, he introduces a new concept of individual friendship, which relies on political premises.

Possessing and Hunting a Friend: Political Connotations

We can now turn to two central themes in Xenophon's treatment of friendship, the concept of the friend as a possession and the metaphor of hunting. These themes deserve closer examination, not least since they are also attested in Plato. In what follows, I will show that Xenophon's distinctive features reflect again his political interests.

Concerning the concept of a friend as a possession, Socrates^{x} states:

> ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ' ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν·
>
> Others take pleasure in a good horse or dog or bird: but I take an even greater pleasure in good friends. And if I have something good, I teach them, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some benefit with regards to virtue.
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 1.6.14

This statement bears some striking resemblances to Socrates' declaration in the *Lysis*:

> τυγχάνω γὰρ ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιθυμῶν *κτήματός* του, ὥσπερ *ἄλλος ἄλλου*. ὁ μὲν γάρ τις ἵππους ἐπιθυμεῖ κτᾶσθαι, ὁ δὲ κύνας, ὁ δὲ χρυσίον, ὁ δὲ τιμάς· *ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα πράως ἔχω, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν πάνυ ἐρωτικῶς,* καὶ βουλοίμην ἄν μοι φίλον ἀγαθὸν *γενέσθαι μᾶλλον* ἢ τὸν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὄρτυγα ἢ ἀλεκτρυόνα, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἢ ἵππον τε καὶ κύνα—οἶμαι δέ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Δαρείου χρυσίον κτήσασθαι δεξαίμην πολὺ πρότερον ἑταῖρον, μᾶλλον ⟨δὲ⟩ ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον—…

> Since I was a boy I've actually always had a desire for a certain kind of possession, like everyone else, only it's different things for different people: one person has a desire to get horses, while for another it's dogs, for another gold, for another, public honors; but as for me, I don't get excited about these things—what I'm absolutely passionate about is acquiring friends, and I'd wish for a good friend more than for the best example any man has of a quail or a cock, and—Zeus!—I'd wish, myself, more for that than for the best horse and dog; and I do believe—I swear by the dog!—more than the gold of Darius I'd much sooner get me a friend or, rather, more than getting Darius himself.
>
> PL. *Lys.* 211d7–e9

Both Socrateses compare themselves with other people (note the expression ὥσπερ ἄλλος) who valorize their possessions, and both compare the acquisition of friends with the acquisition of other possessions (horses and dogs are common in the two authors, gold and honor are mentioned only in Plato). They both conclude that a good friend is preferable to these possessions. It would be tempting to see here an "intertextual Socrates," according to David Johnson's apt characterization.[25] However, Plato does not further elaborate on the concept of possession, whereas Xenophon dwells on it more and qualifies it further.[26] A bit later he reiterates the idea of the friend as a possession:

> Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένου ἐξ ὧν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστ' ἄν τις ὠφελεῖσθαι πρὸς φίλων **κτῆσίν τε καὶ χρείαν**. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ δὴ πολλῶν ἔφη ἀκούειν, ὡς **πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον ἂν εἴη φίλος σαφὴς καὶ ἀγαθός**· ἐπιμελομένους δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς ἢ φίλων κτήσεως.
>
> I heard him once conversing about friends; he said such things as, in my opinion at least, might be especially beneficial to someone regarding the acquisition and use of friends. For he said that he heard from many people that a sure and good friend is the best of all possessions. But he said that he saw the many taking care of anything rather than the acquisition of friends.
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.4.1

25 See Johnson in this volume 71–98.

26 Dorion (Bandini and Dorion 2000: 163) also notes some different emphases between the Xenophontic and the Platonic passages. He observes that Xenophon might have been

More importantly, he presents Socrates establishing a comparison between friends and other possessions with regard to usefulness:

> καίτοι πρὸς ποῖον **κτῆμα** τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλόμενος φίλος ἀγαθὸς οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ κρείττων φανείη; ποῖος γὰρ ἵππος ἢ ποῖον ζεῦγος οὕτω χρήσιμον ὥσπερ ὁ χρηστὸς φίλος; ποῖον δὲ ἀνδράποδον οὕτως εὔνουν καὶ παραμόνιμον; ἢ ποῖον ἄλλο **κτῆμα** οὕτω πάγχρηστον;
>
> And yet on comparison, which of the other possessions wouldn't a good friend appear far superior to? For what horse or what ox team is as useful as a good friend? What slave is so well intentioned and constant? Or what other possession is so universally useful?
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.4.5

We can observe here a subtle difference between the two Socrateses: although they both attribute a great value to their friends, Socrates^{X} compares also *the usefulness of friends in relation to the usefulness of other possessions*; in these terms, he maintains that a friend is the best *of all possessions*.[27] The implication is that among his possessions Socrates^{P} enjoys *only* the company of his friends, whereas Socrates^{X} can take pleasure in *all his possessions*, friends being singled out as the most valuable among them. Distinctive elements in Xenophon's treatment are the emphasis on permanence (παραμόνιμον) and the comparison of a friend with useful animals and slaves.[28] These concerns are in reality political: they evoke the interest of a leader in acquiring permanent subordinates (people or animals), an issue which is problematized in the *Cyropaedia*. In the proem of this work, Xenophon expresses his admiration for Cyrus the Great who managed to acquire the willing obedience of a large number of subjects throughout his empire (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.1). Socrates' elaboration on friendship in *Mem.* 2.6 could thus also be viewed not just as advice about interpersonal relationships, but also (and perhaps mostly) as a guide to tackling political matters.

We can reach similar conclusions if we examine closely the hunting metaphor. Xenophon has recourse to this metaphor twice in the *Memorabilia*: in

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influenced by Plato, but that he also proceeds to an adaptation of the Platonic text according to his interests and intentions.

27 For the centrality of the concept of utility in Xenophon's conception of friendship, see Dorion 2013c, who rightly observes that utility does not occupy a central position in Plato's elaboration of friendship in the *Lysis*.

28 In Plato's *Symposium* (183e), Pausanias also stresses the importance of duration in the relationship between the lover (*erastes*) and the beloved (*eromenos*). However, the con-

the conversation between Socrates and Critobulus and in the dialogue between Socrates and the courtesan Theodote. In the first conversation, Socrates makes a comparison between hunting animals and hunting friends and concludes:

> Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ κατὰ πόδας, ὥσπερ ὁ λαγῶς, οὐδ' ἀπάτῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ ὄρνιθες, οὐδὲ βίᾳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐχθροί· ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον **ἑλεῖν** ἐργῶδες· χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ **δήσαντα κατέχειν**, ὥσπερ δοῦλον.
>
> "By Zeus," he said, "not by following on his heels, as the hare is hunted, nor with deception, as the birds are, nor with violence, as one's enemies are. For it is troublesome to conquer a friend contrary to his will, and it is hard to hold him bound like a slave."
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.9

Furthermore, he encourages Critobulus to undertake the hunting of noble men (θηρᾶν ἐπιχείρει τοὺς καλοὺς κἀγαθούς), and Critobulus urges Socrates in return to teach him the art of hunting friends (δίδασκε τῶν φίλων τὰ θηρατικά, Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.6.32).

In a similar way, Theodote invites Socrates to become συνθηρατής τῶν φίλων (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.15). Socrates reaches the same conclusion as before:[29]

> Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀνθρώπῳ προσφέρεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ βίᾳ μὲν οὔτ' ἂν **ἕλοις** οὔτε κατάσχοις φίλον, εὐεργεσίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἡδονῇ τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο **ἁλώσιμόν τε καὶ παραμόνιμόν** ἐστιν.
>
> "And yet," he said, "it makes a big difference to approach a human being according to nature and correctly. For to be sure you would neither take nor hold a friend by violence, but this prey is both captured and kept constant by means of benefaction and pleasure."
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 3.11.11

In Plato, this metaphor is used to describe the activity of the lover (*erastes*) toward the beloved (*eromenos*). Socrates (in a playful mood) tries to explain to Hippothales how he should treat *ta paidika*:

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nection between conquest, possession, and permanence is more prominent in Xenophon. See also the conversation with Theodote on the next page, where the term *paramonimos* also appears.

29 The striking parallels between the two conversations have led some critics to assume that they should form part of the same chapter. See Delatte 1933: 149–160. Cf. also Goldhill 1998, Narcy 2004, Chernyakovskaya 2014: 177–195.

ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἕλῃς **τὰ παιδικὰ** τοιαῦτα ὄντα, κόσμος σοι ἔσται τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ᾀσθέντα καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐγκώμια ὥσπερ νενικηκότι, ὅτι τοιούτων παιδικῶν ἔτυχες· **ἐὰν δέ σε διαφύγῃ**, ὅσῳ ἂν μείζω σοι εἰρημένα ᾖ ἐγκώμια περὶ τῶν παιδικῶν, τοσούτῳ μειζόνων δόξεις καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐστερημένος καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ὅστις οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὦ φίλε, σοφός, οὐκ ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον **πρὶν ἂν ἕλῃ**, δεδιὼς τὸ μέλλον ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται [...] Ποῖός τις οὖν ἄν σοι δοκεῖ **θηρευτὴς** εἶναι, εἰ ἀνασοβοῖ θηρεύων καὶ **δυσαλωτοτέραν τὴν ἄγραν** ποιοῖ;

On the one hand, if you catch your beloved when he is as you describe him, what you have said and sung will be an ornament to you, and truly encomia, as if you were the victor for having succeeded with a beloved like that; but on the other hand, if he escapes you, the greater the encomia you have uttered about your beloved, so much greater will seem the goods you have been deprived of, and you will seem ridiculous as a result. So the person who is an expert in love matters, my friend, does not praise the one he loves until he catches him, out of fear for how the future will turn out … So what sort of hunter would it be, in your view, that started up his pray and made it more difficult to catch?

PL. *Lys.* 205e2–206a10

The *Lysis* also contains a self-reflective statement on hunting. Socrates has recourse to this metaphor in order to describe his (temporary) delight in having deciphered the meaning of friendship.

Καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάνυ ἔχαιρον, ὥσπερ θηρευτής τις, ἔχων ἀγαπητῶς ὃ ἐθηρευόμην.

And beyond that, I was myself very much delighted, like a hunter, because I was satisfied with having what I was hunting.

PL. *Lys.* 218c5–6, my translation

In this context, the metaphor of hunting has a philosophical dimension and expresses the search for (and capture of) ideas. At the same time, this statement, which is uttered immediately after the agreement of Lysis and Menexenus on Socrates' elaboration of friendship, also alludes to Socrates' success as a seducer of the two boys. In this way, the two spheres (philosophical and seductive/erotic) are unified in Plato.

At first sight, the only difference between the two authors seems to be the presence of intellectual hunting advocated by Socrates[P]. However, a closer examination allows us to better evaluate Xenophon's original contribution. Of

course, the use of hunting metaphors is no surprise for an author who has probably devoted a treatise to the art of hunting.[30] Xenophon's works attest to a rich terminology on hunting, which shows that Xenophon was familiar with all the technical matters related to hunting[31] and that he exploited his expertise on hunting to describe the process of hunting friends. But the hunting metaphor in Xenophon has also a political dimension. The emphasis on preservation and permanence is again decisive for Xenophon's conception. It is not enough for somebody to hunt and capture a friend, it is also necessary to preserve him. In this case, it is again important that Xenophon does not formulate this in emotional terms. The terms "possess" (κατέχειν: Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.9), "permanent" (παραμόνιμον: Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.11), and "acquire" (κτήσασθαι: Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.14,15,16) come from the political sphere. This image differentiates Xenophon from Plato, who does not dwell on permanence in the *Lysis* and presents instead the stages of an *ars amatoria* in the *Phaedrus*.[32] The concern to preserve a friend evokes again the proem of the *Cyropaedia* (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.1): Xenophon observes that human beings, contrary to animals, are more prone to resistance, so it is difficult to keep them obedient forever. The image of preserving friends is thus likely to draw inspiration from a political concern, which is the preservation of an empire. Leaders of fifth-century Athens, like Pericles, were strongly preoccupied with this topic (Thuc. 2.63.2), and Xenophon also presents Cyrus the Great as having this concern about his empire (Xen. *Cyr.* 4.1.15, 4.5.15).

The conversation with Theodote further confirms that Xenophon's interests are primarily political. Although this conversation begins in a heterosexual context, focusing on Theodote's friends (i.e., lovers), it ends up as a reflection on how to gain the benevolence and friendship of people *in general*. Xenophon in this way eliminates gender from his discussion of friendship: it does not matter whether a man hunts a woman or another man, given that the techniques that should be employed are the same—benefaction and pleasure. The inspiration in this discussion is again political since it is emphasized again that *a leading individual* should employ the right means to acquire friends. And, of course, these techniques, as we mentioned earlier, are the same a leader should possess to gain the benevolence of his followers. Theodote is thus transformed into the female counterpart of Critobulus and also has the potential, if she follows Socrates' advice, to acquire the qualities of an ideal leader.

30 For Xenophon's *Cynegeticus*, see L'Allier 2008 and 2012.

31 For the terminology of hunting in Xenophon, see Dumoulin 1967.

32 For Plato's *ars amatoria*, see Dillon 1994.

The political dimension of hunting also accounts for certain innovative traits of this discussion: first, contrary to most metaphorical images of hunting provided by the texts of ancient Greek literature, in which we often observe a blurring of boundaries between hunters and hunted,[33] the role of the hunter in Xenophon remains stable: he (or she in the case of Theodote) assumes the role of the leader and is always the superior party, who should make use of the correct techniques in order to attract friends. Second, and more intriguingly, the traditional roles of hunter and hunted are reversed in the conversation between Socrates and Theodote. In ancient Greek literature, the role of the hunter was mainly undertaken by the male; whenever the female undertook this role (in a heterosexual context, hunting a male), it ended in disaster.[34] The fact that both Theodote and Socrates can potentially be good hunters/leaders of people suggests that the role of the hunter can be assigned to anybody regardless of gender and further throws into relief Xenophon's political concerns.

Friendship: A Moral or a Political Issue?

The discussion between Socrates and Critobulus is marked by a remarkable intrusion of the political sphere into personal matters. This intrusion mainly takes two forms: (a) the introduction of political categories in order to address moral issues; and (b) the recourse to images from the political sphere in the discussion of friendship between individuals.

We can observe the first tendency at the beginning of the discussion. Socrates asks his interlocutor whether somebody who is vicious can have moral persons as friends. In this way, he raises the question of whether good (in the sense of moral) people can easily become friends with each other. These topics are discussed in Plato's *Lysis* as well. In the theoretical investigation led by Socrates^{P}, it is conceded that vicious people cannot be friends either with good people or with anybody else: ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτε ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται (Pl. *Lys.* 214d6–7). According to Socrates^{P}, good people (ἀγαθοί) cannot have friends either, because they are self-sufficient, so their moral perfection does not necessitate interpersonal relationships whatsoever (Plat. *Lys.* 215a5–215c1). On the contrary, those who are "neither good nor bad" do have friends and need friends because of the presence of something evil: for exam-

33 For the blurring of boundaries between hunter and hunted, see Schnapp 1997: 17–47, Barringer 2001: 70–89.

34 See some examples in Barringer 2001: 112–117, 123–124.

ple, people become friends with doctors because of an illness (Τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν φίλον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν: Pl. *Lys*. 217b4–6).

Interestingly, Xenophon's conception of friendship is compatible with this Platonic insight [i.e., Platonic ideas] in certain respects. Like Socrates[P], Critobulus comments on the impossibility of friendship between vicious people: οἱ μὲν οὖν πονηροὶ πάντως ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐχθροὶ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι πεφυκέναι (Xen. *Mem*. 2.6.19–20). However, the *Memorabilia* attest to a constant shift from moral to political categories:

> "I think you mean, Socrates, that if we are to win a good man's friendship, we ourselves must be good in speech and action alike?" (Δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς, εἰ μέλλοιμεν **ἀγαθόν τινα κτήσασθαι φίλον**, αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς **ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ** γενέσθαι **λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν**.)
>
> "Did you think," said Socrates, "that it is possible for a bad man to win the friendship of an honest man?" (Σὺ δ' ᾤου, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷόν τ' εἶναι καὶ **πονηρὸν** ὄντα **χρηστοὺς** φίλους κτήσασθαι;)
>
> "I did," answered Critobulus, "for I saw that vicious orators have good speakers among their friends, and some who are incapable of commanding an army are intimate with great generals." (Ἑώρων γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ῥήτοράς τε **φαύλους ἀγαθοῖς** δημηγόροις φίλους ὄντας, καὶ στρατηγεῖν **οὐχ ἱκανοὺς** πάνυ **στρατηγικοῖς** ἀνδράσιν ἑταίρους).
>
> XEN. *Mem*. 2.6.15

In response to Critobulus' question about acquiring a good friend (ἀγαθός: in the moral sense), Socrates introduces the opposition between "morally bad" (πονηρός) and "honest" (χρηστός), while Critobulus immediately afterward uses another distinction, that between "vicious" (φαῦλος) and "good" (ἀγαθός).[35] These shifts are significant. The distinction between πονηρός and χρηστός has political connotations. In fifth-century Athens, the opposition between πονηροί and χρηστοί was employed to characterize democrats and aristocrats respectively, while during the fourth century, these labels could be manipulated according to the (different) audiences addressed.[36] Critobulus' paradigm about bad orators having good orators as friends also reflects a political reality in fourth-century Athens: bad politicians usually asked the assistance of famous

35 Cf. Dorion 2011, vol. II: 208: "la réponse de Critobule est plutôt hors sujet."

36 For the political connotations of the distinction between πονηροί and χρηστοί, see Ober 1999: 100, n. 30. See also McGlew 2002: 71, n. 30 who observes that in court orators often characterized the jurors as χρηστοί, although they belonged to the *demos*, in order to elevate them, thus assimilating them with the aristocrats.

orators and, conversely, good politicians could be surrounded by weak orators.[37] In this case, the opposition φαῦλος/ἀγαθός orator refers to personal competence. It is obvious then that in the course of the conversation, the interest in the moral aspect of friendship fades.

Similar shifts can be observed in the rest of the conversation:

> ἀλλ' εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι πονηρὸν ὄντα **καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς** φίλους κτήσασθαι, ἐκεῖνο ἤδη μέλει μοι, εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν **καλὸν κἀγαθὸν** γενόμενον ἐξ ἑτοίμου **τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς** φίλον εἶναι.
>
> If it is impossible that the bad should gain the friendship of gentlemen, then I am anxious to know whether it is quite easy for a gentleman, as a matter of course, to be the friend of gentlemen.
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.16

The shift from ἀγαθός to καλὸς κἀγαθός is again revealing. Καλοκαγαθία is a political term. The καλοὶ κἀγαθοί in classical Athens were the aristocrats, the people who combined physical beauty and nobility of character.[38] In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, Ischomachus is depicted as the καλὸς κἀγαθός *par excellence*.[39] Interestingly, the conversation in the *Memorabilia* dwells on the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. Socrates defines ideal friendship as an excellent collaboration between the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί: "Nevertheless through all these barriers friendship slips, and unites the best people." (ἀλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς) (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.22). Furthermore, he urges Critobulus to hunt the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (2.6.28). This emphasis is another indication of the political dimension of friendship in Xenophon and further differentiates him from Plato, in whose work we observe the hunt of the καλοί.

The focus of the conversation on the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί enables Xenophon to comment on another political issue, the quarrels between people of this class:

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37 For the use of the term ῥήτωρ as a synonym for politician, see Ober 2003: 172–174. Cf. Apostolakis 2003: 126–127, who provides examples from the fourth century about good politicians being surrounded by bad orators. I thank Kostas Apostolakis for his guidance on this point.

38 For the aristocratic connotations of *kalokagathia*, see Bourriot 1995. Cf. Bevilacqua 2010: 187–196, 448 n. 42, 454 n. 66 and in this volume 461–486. See also Tamiolaki 2013, for further aristocratic ideas in the *Memorabilia*.

39 Xen. *Oec.* 7.2–3.

> Your trouble is, Critobulus, that you often find men who do good and abstain from evil not on friendly terms, but apt to quarrel and treat one another more harshly than worthless people (Ὃ ταράττει σε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις ἄνδρας καὶ ⟨τὰ⟩ καλὰ πράττοντας καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπεχομένους ὁρᾷς ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι στασιάζοντας ἀλλήλοις καὶ χαλεπώτερον χρωμένους τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων ἀνθρώπων).
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.17

> And if we must add that the practitioners of virtue strive with one another for leadership in cities and hate and envy each other, who then will be friends and where shall loyalty and faithfulness be found? (εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οἱ ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε περὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, τίνες ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται καὶ ἐν τίσιν ἀνθρώποις εὔνοια καὶ πίστις ἔσται;)
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.20

> Ah, Critobulus, but these matters are quite complex. Some elements in human nature make for friendship: men need one another, feel pity, work together for their common good, and, conscious of this, are grateful to one another. But other elements are hostile: holding the same things to be honorable and pleasant, people fight for them, fail out and take sides. Strife and anger lead to hostility, covetousness and enmity, jealousy to hatred. (φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά· δέονταί τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλεοῦσι καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος).
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.21

The use of political categories in the *Memorabilia* contributes to the further qualification of the Platonic ideas. In fact, Xenophon presents here a more realistic alternative to the Platonic perfect ἀγαθός: contrary to the Platonic ἀγαθός, who does nothing blameworthy and consequently has no need of friends, the Xenophontic καλὸς κἀγαθός is not deprived of weaknesses and can at times even enter into quarrel with other καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. It would be tempting to view the Xenophontic καλὸς κἀγαθός as the political counterpart of the philosophical "neither good nor bad" mentioned in Plato's *Lysis*. As we saw above, in Plato's *Lysis*, Socrates observes that people who are neither good nor bad seek the friendship of the good because of the presence of evil. Xenophon also con-

siders evil (in this case war, strife, and envy) and concludes that friendship between the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί can be raised above these negative elements since it is based on common *arête*. In this way, he seems to bring to (political) life Plato's abstract ideas.

We can now turn to the images from the political sphere. Right from the beginning of the conversation, when Critobulus asks Socrates about the best techniques of hunting and capturing a good friend, Socrates answers by giving examples first from the mythical and then from the political sphere. He claims that the best technique is the use of love charms (φίλτρα), such as those used by the Sirens to attract Odysseus.[40] However, these kinds of love charms are deceptive since they correspond to untruthful praise. Yet the political sphere provides more successful examples:

> Ἄλλας δέ τινας οἶσθα ἐπῳδάς; Οὐκ ἀλλ' ἤκουσα μὲν ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπίσταιτο, ἃς ἐπᾴδων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτόν. Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ πῶς ἐποίησε τὴν πόλιν φιλεῖν αὐτόν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἐπᾴδων, ἀλλὰ περιάψας τι ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ. Δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς, εἰ μέλλοιμεν ἀγαθόν τινα κτήσασθαι φίλον, αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν.
>
> "Do you know other incantations?" "No, but I have heard that Pericles knew many, which he chanted to the city, thus making it love him." "What about Themistocles? How did he make the city love him?" "Not by chanting incantations, by Zeus, but by attaching some good to it." "In my opinion, Socrates, you are saying that if we are going to acquire some good friend, we ourselves must become good in speech and action".
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.13

In this passage, Socrates seems to contrast two ways of acquiring benevolence: the Periclean one (praise) and the Themistoclean one (benefaction).[41] The connection of Pericles with praise probably alludes to the funeral oration, the

40 For Homeric references in Xenophon, see Yamagata 2012.

41 There is a debate as to whether Socrates here undermines Pericles or not. The last comment by Critobulus could dispel this impression, since it seems to suggest that both Pericles and Themistocles are positive models (the former of speech and the latter of action). However, Socrates does not confirm Critobulus' comment and replies instead with a question (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.13: "Do you think that it is possible even for someone who is wicked to acquire good friends?"), thus leaving readers to wonder about the value of praise. See a detailed discussion in Dorion 2011, vol. II: 203–208, who links incantations with Pericles'

praise of democracy *par excellence*. We can observe in this passage an elaboration of an idea that is presented in the funeral oration, according to which the Athenians should become lovers (ἐρασταί) of their city (Thuc. 2.43.1). Xenophon adapts this idea, by directing the love *from the city to the leaders* and by subsequently projecting this love to interpersonal relationships: the love that Pericles and Themistocles managed to inspire in their cities can serve *as a model for the love that men should try to gain in friendships*.

The positive evaluation of praise is another element that considerably differentiates Xenophon from Plato. For instance, Socrates^{P}'s opinion (and subsequent practice), which is presented in a playful context in the *Lysis*, is that a lover *should not praise* his beloved, but try to humble him instead (Pl. *Lys.* 210e: ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα). In Xenophon, the context is not the lover/beloved relationship, but that of friendship (φιλία). The fundamental divergence between the two Socrateses is that while Socrates^{P} seems to dismiss praise altogether, Socrates^{X} attributes a great importance to it and offers a more elaborate analysis of it: as we saw before, he employs the metaphor of incantations (ἐπῳδάς) and love charms (φίλτρα) to describe praise (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.12),[42] and he contrasts excessive praise (for unreal qualities) with truthful, deserved praise; of course, he openly approves of the latter.[43] More intriguingly, Socrates^{X} promises Critobulus that if he is virtuous, he will praise him *to other people* whom he might want to acquire as friends (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.33–39).[44] Xenophon's positive evaluation of praise can be linked again with his political interests. The emphasis on truthful praise has political connotations: the right kind of encomium for successful politicians was an important concern for authors of the fourth century BCE, like Xenophon and Isocrates, who developed this new genre.[45] Furthermore, in his other works, such as the *Cyropaedia* (Xen. *Cyr.*

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capacities to persuade his fellow-citizens. Cf. also Tamiolaki (2016) for the image of the Athenian leaders in the *Memorabilia*.

42 See Dorion 2011, vol. II: 200–201 for incantation in Plato as a metaphor for the Socratic dialectic.

43 Dorion 2011, vol. III: 75 remarks that in another instance (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.8–9), Socrates^{X} seems to contradict himself, by practicing the kind of praise he condemns in his discussion with Critobulus, that is, by praising Euthydemus not sincerely, but ironically. He further suggests that this feature assimilates Socrates^{X} to Socrates^{P} of the *Lysis*, who uses the *elenchos* to humble his interlocutors. In our view, it is important that in Plato *there is no theoretical elaboration for the value of praise*.

44 During the conversation with Theodote, Socrates states again that he teaches his students incantations and love charms (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.16), but these statements are part of his effort to ingratiate himself with her.

45 See Noël 2014.

1.6.20) and the *Oeconomicus* (Xen. *Oec.* 14.9), Xenophon also problematizes the need for a leader to praise one's followers as an incentive for keeping them obedient willingly.

Finally, the description of ideal friendship by Socrates also seems to be politically inspired:

> ἀλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἱροῦνται μὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολέμου πάντων κυριεύειν …
>
> Nevertheless, slipping through all these things, friendship unites those who are noble and good. Because of their virtue, they choose to possess less without toil rather than conquer all things through war …
>
> XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.22–23

This passage follows the conversation about people (and cities) quarreling with each other, notwithstanding their morality. As we noted earlier, it is marked by the shift from ἀγαθοί to καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. But it also contains a peculiar statement: the idea of acquiring moderate possessions without toil sounds somewhat odd for an author like Xenophon, who continually valorizes toil.[46] I would like to suggest that this inconsistency is explained if we take into consideration the fact that Xenophon thinks primarily in political terms. In fact, the concept of conquest of everything through war points to that direction: this idea can be traced back to the political discourse about Athens. The Athenians of the fifth century BCE are presented as restless and always willing to acquire more. The following passage from the speech of the Corinthians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War illustrates the character of the Athenians:

> καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι …
>
> And they have acquired these, because they continuously labor, undertaking toil and dangers. And they enjoy very little of what they have, because they continually acquire more.
>
> THUC. 1.70.8, my translation

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46 For the valorization of toil in Xenophon, see Johnstone 1994. Dorion 2011, vol. II: 214 notes the paradox, but gives a philosophical explanation: "peut-être n'y a-t-il pas de contradiction: l'acquisition de la vertu nécessite l'effort, mais la vertu, une fois acquise, permet d'obtenir des biens sans effort."

In this context, toil (πόνος) is linked with restless imperialism. Consequently, the phrase ἄνευ πόνου in the Xenophontic description of *philia* makes better sense if it is interpreted as absence of imperialism and is viewed as an adaptation of the political discourse about fifth-century Athenians. Xenophon is not an advocate of imperialism, and the idea of avoiding the conquest of everything is present in his other works as well, again in contexts related to empires (Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 1.6.45, Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.3.16). In the *Memorabilia*, it is transposed to individuals. Xenophon seems to imply that, concerning individuals, noble men/ideal friends do not display greediness. But he expresses this idea in a markedly politicized way.

Conclusion

Our investigation has shown that Xenophon's conception of friendship in *Mem.* 2.6 has a strong political dimension: Xenophon establishes a parallel between leaders as friends and friends as leaders; he has recourse to various political metaphors and images, and he amply employs political terminology in his theoretical elaboration of friendship. The comparison with Plato's *Lysis* contributes to further illustrate the political connotations of friendship in Xenophon. Although the two authors share some common themes, Xenophon seems to offer a political alternative to Plato's philosophical elaboration of friendship: the intrusion of political categories in the discussion of moral issues clearly proves this. Furthermore, it has to be noted that the insistence on political matters in *Mem.* 2.6 is so prominent that the reader risks forgetting the main purpose of this work, which is the defense of Socrates. In fact, Xenophon seems to be caught in a tension: on the one hand, he wished to defend his master against the accusation of putting too much emphasis on the utility of friends; on the other hand, he was also interested in promoting his own political ideas (about the importance of benefaction, the value of truthful praise, the necessity of permanence in a conquest, the qualities of the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί). His efforts to reconcile these two tendencies may affect negatively the apology for Socrates, but they ultimately result in an original contribution to the topic of friendship.

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Socrates' Attitude towards Politics in Xenophon and Plato

Fiorenza Bevilacqua

In this paper I intend to discuss briefly Socrates' role as a political teacher in *Memorabilia* and then consider a passage (*Mem.* 2.6.22–27) that has not so far obtained all the attention it deserves but is politically very important because it expounds a clear political plan in an explicit way. Finally, I will consider two passages from Plato (*Ap.* 31c–32a; *Cri.* 51c–53a) that, if taken together and carefully read, show us a Socrates whose political attitude is not too different from the attitude that comes out in *Memorabilia*, a Socrates whom we could therefore suppose to be not too different from the historical Socrates.

Xenophon's Socrates as a Political Teacher

One of the fundamental functions that Socrates performs in *Memorabilia* is the function of a political teacher. This function stands out, though not quite in a plain way, first of all in the first part of the work, the openly apologetic one (*Mem.* 1.1–2). In this section, Socrates is shown as a teacher in the political field: in 1.2.17–18, Xenophon, facing the hypothetical objection that Socrates should not have taught his followers politics before he taught them moderation (1.2.17: μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν), answers that Socrates was a model to his followers because he showed himself to be a *kalos kagathos*[1] (I return later to this statement) and therefore, implicitly, provided with that *sophrosynē* / *enkrateia*[2] that he taught through the example of his

1 Here and elsewhere I chose to avoid translating the expressions *kalos kagathos* and *kaloi kagathoi* owing to their not univocal meaning; see below.

2 In Xenophon's works, in fact, *sophronein* / *sophrosynē* (moderation) and *enkrateia* (self-control with regard to bodily pleasures) are nearly synonymous; they constitute a preliminary and necessary requisite for those who are appointed to be in command, as it can be seen in the first conversation with Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1; see particularly 2.1.1–7); in *Mem.* 2.6.22, *sophrosynē* and *enkrateia* are described as typical and, so it seems, exclusive features of the *kaloi kagathoi*. On *enkrateia* in *Memorabilia*, and particularly on Xenophon's Socrates' *enkrateia*, see Edmunds 252–276 in this volume.

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own behaviour.[3] Moreover, just above (1.2.14), Xenophon had also emphasized Socrates' absolute self-sufficiency (αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα), in spite of his very modest means of subsistence (ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων), and his uncommon *enkrateia* (ἐγκρατέστατον ὄντα), self-control. But the most important point for us is that Xenophon, while denying the second half of this hypothetical charge—that Socrates did not teach moderation—does not deny at all that he taught politics. In addition, still in the course of the long refutation (1.2.12–47) of the second charge brought by Polycrates,[4] who saw in Socrates Critias' and Alcibiades' teacher (1.2.12), Xenophon does not hesitate to acknowledge that they had both resolved to follow Socrates because they were persuaded that in this way they would become 'very clever at speaking and acting', that is at acting in politics[5] (1.2.15). Certainly we may grant that Critias and Alcibiades were two bad followers of Socrates, but that does not affect the value of Socrates' teaching, since Critias and Alcibiades did not share Socrates' way of life at all. On the contrary they would have preferred dying rather than living as he did (1.2.16), and as soon as they thought they were superior to their companions, they ran away from Socrates to go into politics (1.2.16): it was in view of entering politics that they had resolved to become his followers (1.2.16; see also 1.2.47).

On the other hand, in this first part of the work, still in the course of the refutation of Polycrates' charges, Xenophon names those whom we could call the good followers, in opposition to Critias and Alcibiades: they, as Xenophon states, had associated with Socrates not to become clever at speaking in assemblies or courts of law (with an implicit but clear allusion to Critias and Alcibiades),[6] but to become *kaloi kagathoi* and, as soon as they became *kaloi kagathoi*,

3 The didactic value of teaching by example is a leitmotiv not only in *Memorabilia* (1.2.3; 1.2.17–18; 1.31; 1.5.6; 1.6.3; 4.3.18; 4.4.1; 4.4.10–11; 4.4.25; 4.5.1) and in the other Socratic works (*Oec.* 12.17–19; *Symp.* 8.27), but in Xenophon's whole literary production (see, e. g., *Ages.* 7.2; 10.2; *An.* 1.9.3–4; *Cyr.* 1.2.8; 7.5.86; 8.6.10; 8.6.13).

4 As is common knowledge, the first part of *Memorabilia*, the apologetic one (*Mem.* 1.1–2), can be divided into two clearly distinct sections: in the first one (1.1.1–1.2.8) Xenophon aims at defending Socrates against the charges brought against him at his trial, while in the second one (1.2.9–61) he intends to defend Socrates against the posthumous charges of an unnamed *kategoros*, an unnamed accuser. Relying on a passage of Isocrates (*Bus.* 1–5), Cobet 1858: 662 ff., was the first scholar who identified this *kategoros* with the rhetor Polycrates. This identification is accepted now by almost all scholars: a list of scholars who accepted this identification is given by Bandini et Dorion 2000: 80.

5 As Dorion (Bandini et Dorion 2000: CCVI–CCIX) has nicely shown, this expression (ἱκανώτατω λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν) denotes the ability to act effectually in the political field: see also 4.2.1; 4.2.4; 4.2.6; 4.3.1.

6 The allusion seems certain, even if neither Critias nor Alcibiades, as far as we know, employed

to be able to manage properly their *oikos*,[7] their slaves, their household members, their friends, their city and their fellow citizens (1.2.48). Undoubtedly this list of good followers of Socrates given by Xenophon is perplexing. The most celebrated among them, such as Plato, Antisthenes, Aeschines of Sphettus, and Aristippus[8] are not mentioned; and while there is no reason not to believe that those Xenophon does mention (Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas) were *kaloi kagathoi* and therefore able to manage properly their *oikos*,[9] their slaves, their household members,[10] and their friends, and to be good citizens,[11] it is also true that none of them became

their eloquence in courts of law or intended to learn judicial eloquence: Xenophon probably expresses himself in this way because he thinks that there is only one kind of eloquence, only one art of speaking effectively, which can be employed in any field, in the assembly as in courts of law.

7 Here and elsewhere I chose to avoid translating the word *oikos* owing to its untranslatable polysemy, since it refers to the house as well as to the family and to the estate.

8 It is possible that Xenophon's silence arises from a feeling of rivalry, jealousy and even hostility towards other Socratics who were probably more renowned than he was (Plato and Antisthenes above all). Antisthenes however, besides being one of the characters of *Symposium*, is mentioned as a regular follower of Socrates in *Mem.* 3.11.17 and is Socrates' interlocutor in a short dialogue about friendship (*Mem.* 2.5) while Plato is mentioned only once in *Memorabilia* (and never in any other work of Xenophon), in 3.6.1 (see n. 22). Different ancient sources (see, e.g., Gellius, 14.3; Athenaeus, 504e–505b; Diogenes Laertius, 2.57; 3.34) also hint at a rivalry between Xenophon and Plato. On the contrary, there is nothing to be astonished at in Xenophon's absence from this list, because it was clearly impossible to state that Xenophon, sentenced to exile, never met with any charge. Moreover Xenophon, even if we suppose that his sentence to exile had nothing to do with his service in the Thirty's cavalry, could not in any case be mentioned as an exemplary follower, since he was at any rate involved in the oligarchic government.

9 This is true undoubtedly of Crito, who owned a wealthy *oikos* to run, and probably also for Simmias and Cebes, presumably well-off, since Crito, in the homonymous dialogue, mentions them among those Socrates' friends who were ready to pay out money to allow him to escape from prison (*Cri.* 45b). We are unable to say anything about Phaedondas, mentioned only in *Phaedo* with Simmias and Cebes (*Phd.* 59c). Hermogenes is often mentioned by Plato and is abundantly present in Xenophon's Socratic works: in *Apology* he is Xenophon's declared source on Socrates' trial, whereas in *Symposium* he is introduced as wealthy Callias' poor half-brother; in *Memorabilia* he is quoted again as a source on Socrates' trial (4.8.4–10) and as a close friend of Socrates, who recommends him as a competent *oikonomos* (estate manager), thus providing him a job that will allow him to get out of his condition of indigence (2.10.2–6).

10 As far as Chaerecrates is concerned, it is Socrates who explains to him how he should manage his relationship with his brother Chaerephon (*Mem.* 2.3).

11 Above all Chaerephon, an exile during the Thirty's government, should certainly appear

a politician of any importance. While that need not concern us, it is very important to stress the close connection between being *kaloi kagathoi* and being able to manage properly the things mentioned above, which ultimately consist of just two spheres: the *oikos* (to which slaves and household members belong, the *oiketai* and the *oikeioi*, whose connection with *oikos* is also etymologically clear) and the polis, while the friends, the *philoi*, form a link between those two areas.[12] As a matter of fact, even if *oikos* and polis are two distinct spheres, we should never forget that in Xenophon the difference between *oikos* and polis is of a merely quantitative nature, as is explicitly stated in *Mem.* 3.4.12. Therefore the qualities that are necessary to run one's own *oikos* well are the same that are necessary to govern a polis (see again 3.4.12; see also 3.4.6; 3.6.4; 3.6.14–15) and, as we will see, consist of some necessary technical competence as well as the gift of gaining willing obedience, in other words the ability to exercise true leadership. Of course reflection on the subject of leadership is a leitmotiv that can be found in all Xenophon's works in all their variety, in *Memorabilia* as well as in *Oeconomicus*, in *Anabasis* as well as in *Cyropaedia*, in *Agesilaus* as well as in *Hiero*.[13]

But it is especially in the second part of *Memorabilia*, the apomnemoneutic section, that Socrates' function as a political teacher stands out clearly: this is nothing to be astonished at because the apomnemoneutic section, as shown by V.J. Gray in her classic book,[14] amplifies a set of subjects that are already present in the apologetic section. This function of political teacher is especially evident in *Mem.* 3.1–7 and, as we will see later, acquires very important significance in the last two conversations, the conversation with Glaucon and the conversation with Charmides. Nor should we forget the political weight of the first dialogue with Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1), and above all we must bear in mind

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to Athenians as a good citizen, and even a model citizen: it is probable that Xenophon mentioned him because, owing to his close friendship with Socrates and his political vicissitudes, he was particularly suited to disprove Socrates' supposed sympathies with oligarchy.

12 Moreover the dialogues of books 2 and 3 (more exactly those of 2.2–3.7) also seem to follow this pattern of progressive broadening: while the dialogues of 2.2–3 concern the relationships inside the *oikos*, the dialogues of 2.4–10 regard the relationships with the *philoi*, the friends, and the dialogues of 3.1–7 are about matters concerning the government of the polis.

13 This leitmotiv is not even absent in works which, at first sight, could seem innocent technical treatises: it is sufficient to consider, in order to give one and only instance, a work such as *Hipparchicus*.

14 Gray 1998: see particularly 123–158. On Gray 1998 see Bevilacqua 2002.

that Socrates takes on the role of a political teacher with Euthydemus, who can be rightly regarded as his paradigmatic follower and who aims at becoming an important politician, a leader in his city, as is openly stated. Euthydemus indeed intends to surpass all his fellow citizens 'in skill in speaking and acting' (*Mem.* 4.2.1: τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν), i.e., in skill in politics, and is persuaded he can do that without any teacher and without learning the most difficult art, the art of acting effectually in politics (4.2.3–7). So, when Socrates asks him if he craves 'that virtue by which men become skilled politicians and managers, able to rule and be useful to others and themselves' (4.2.11: ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς … δι' ἣν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίγνονται καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἄρχειν ἱκανοὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς), Euthydemus can only acknowledge he aims for that virtue that immediately afterwards Socrates defines as 'the most beautiful virtue and the greatest art: it belongs to kings and is called royal' (4.2.11: τῆς καλλίστης ἀρετῆς καὶ μεγίστης … τέχνης· ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη καὶ καλεῖται βασιλική).[15] After this premise, Socrates guides Euthydemus through a course of study that also can be rightly regarded as paradigmatic. First of all Euthydemus is subjected to an *elenchos*, indeed to a very hard succession of *elenchoi* (4.2.11–39), which aim both at destroying his wrong opinions, his false knowledge, and at testing if he is inclined to follow Socrates in an exemplary course of study. The *elenchos* indeed, as shown by Dorion,[16] aims at selecting those who are worth becoming his followers, i.e., those who, like Euthydemus, after the upsetting experience of *elenchos*, instead of running away from Socrates, resolve to frequent him with great assiduity (4.2.40). As for Socrates, as soon as the potential follower shows that he has positively passed the hard test of the *elenchos* and therefore is ready to welcome his teaching, Socrates spares him such further torments (4.2.40: ἥκιστα μὲν διετάραττεν) and guides him through a succession of didactic conversations, of straightforward lessons. The first lesson is about divine providence and the cult of the gods (4.3), the second one is about *enkrateia*, i.e., self-control (4.5), while the following conversation (4.6), which is rather heterogeneous and fragmentary, is concerned with definitions of piety (4.6.2–4), justice (4.6.5–6), knowledge (4.6.7), the good (4.6.8), the beautiful (4.6.9), and courage (4.6.10–11) and ends in a series of Socrates' considerations (in reported speech) about the difference between monarchy and tyranny (4.6.12) and about the tasks and competences of a good citizen (4.6.14). I do not believe that it is by chance that, in a kind of

15 On the *basilichē technē*, the royal art, see Dorion 2004 and, more recently, Edmunds 2015.

16 Bandini and Dorion CLXXVI–CLXXVIII; the function of selection of the *elenchos* in *Mem.* 4.2, was already stressed by Morrison 1994: 185–191.

Ringkomposition, political considerations conclude Euthydemus' educational training, which had begun precisely with his need to learn the art of politics. The next chapter (4.7) indeed, though it completes the road of Socratic educational training, does not consist of a dialogue with Euthydemus but just reports, again in reported speech, Socrates' opinions about the importance and care required by different subjects of study, opinions that strictly limit the study of those subjects to the aspects susceptible of practical utilization. But it is very important to stress that, before beginning to relate the different steps of the education of Euthydemus, a follower of Socrates and would-be politician, Xenophon provides a further reply to the hypothetical charge mentioned in 1.2.17 (according to which Socrates should not have taught his friends politics before moderation). He declares resolutely that Socrates did not hasten to make his friends become 'skilled in speaking and acting', i.e., in politics, but believed that, before going into politics, they should acquire *sophrosynē*, moderation, because he was persuaded that those who are clever at politics, without being provided with moderation, would only be more unjust and more able to do evil than anybody else (4.3.1: ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ δυνατωτέρους κακουργεῖν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι). If we compare this statement with the first conversation with Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1), which clearly has *enkrateia*, self-control, as its central subject (2.1.1) and stresses that *enkrateia* is necessary to those who want to rule (2.1.1–5; 2.1.7; 2.1.17–19), but also, more generally speaking, to those who want to run their *oikos* well, benefit their friends and be useful to their city (2.1.19), that is be good citizens,[17] we cannot help drawing the conclusion that *enkrateia*, besides being the foundation of virtue (*Mem.* 1.5.4), is the necessary prerequisite, so to say, of any political action and therefore of a good citizen and, even more so, of the politician, of the political leader.

Therefore Socrates offers himself explicitly as a political teacher of those whom we can regard as his followers[18] and this is his way of participating in

17 To run one's *oikos* well, to benefit one's friends and to avail one's city are placed on a line of continuity, in a prospect of a progressive broadening (see above and n. 12); they are all eminently political activities, because between *oikos* and polis there is a merely quantitative difference (see above), and the relationships with friends also have strong political connotations. On political connotations of *philoi* (friends) and *philia* (friendship) in *Memorabilia* and particularly in *Mem.* 2.6, see Tamiolaki 433–460.

18 As far as Socrates is concerned, Xenophon, as is common knowledge, never uses the word μαθηταί, 'pupils', but almost always the expression οἱ συνόντες / οἱ ξυνόντες (or, less frequently, other similar expressions), i.e., literally 'those who were together with him', 'those who associated with him', because Xenophon asserts that Socrates never proclaimed himself a teacher (*Mem.* 1.2.3), even though elsewhere he acknowledges that Socrates was

politics: he does not intervene in politics personally[19] but commits himself as a teacher to enable as many men as possible to do so, as he openly states in the answer to Antiphon (*Mem.* 1.6.15). But in *Memorabilia* Socrates does not confine his activity as a political teacher or at least as a political counsellor to his followers: in the first seven chapters of book 3 we see him engaged in giving his advice to politicians, all but one of whom are outside the circle of his habitual followers. Indeed it is only in 3.1 that the conversation takes place between Socrates and a follower of his, an anonymous figure who aims at becoming a *strategos*, a commander-in-chief of the army.[20] In the following dialogues Socrates' interlocutors are an anonymous *strategos* who has just been elected (3.2); an equally anonymous *hipparchos*, a cavalry commander,[21] he too just elected (3.3); a citizen, Nicomachides, disappointed and irritated because he has not been elected as a *strategos* (3.4); Pericles the Younger, he too just elected as a *strategos* (3.5); and then two particularly important interlocutors, Glaucon and Charmides, who appear in the last two dialogues, which form a kind of sub-unit within these seven chapters. The dialogue with Glaucon (3.6) and the dialogue with Charmides (3.7) in fact constitute a kind of diptych: in the former Socrates deals with a young man who wants to go into politics, even though he does not possess, as Socrates will show, the necessary competence; in the latter, on the contrary, Socrates' interlocutor, Charmides, is a man provided with all the necessary abilities, as Socrates himself will state, but who is reluctant to come forward and enter politics. Therefore Socrates will endeavour to dissuade Glaucon from his plan and will advise him to prepare himself with the utmost care for the tasks he intends to perform, while he will strongly encourage Charmides to go into politics. We remark incidentally that, also in reference to their relationship with Socrates, they form a special group of their own: they are neither followers of Socrates, like Euthydemus, Antisthenes, Apollodorus, Aristippus, Aristodemus, Epigenes, and the other men mentioned

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engaged in teaching (*Mem.* 1.2.10; 1.2.17; 1.2.27; 1.2.31; 1.6.1; 1.6.3; 1.6.14; 2.6.30–32; 3.7.5; 4.2.40; 4.7.1; see also *Ap.* 20–21; 26).

19 On Socrates' refusal to dabble personally in politics and the different motivations given by Xenophon and Plato a really valuable contribution is offered by Dorion 2013b.

20 But actually, on this occasion, Socrates' speech is also addressed not to his follower, who aspires to be a *strategos*, as much as to Dionysodorus, a self-styled expert and master of the art of war, to whom the follower of Socrates incautiously had applied.

21 The *hipparchoi*, the two commanders of Athenian cavalry, though subordinate to the *strategoi*, held an office of remarkable military importance, even if of scarce political weight; it was also an office that, on the ground of his personal experience of cavalryman, Xenophon deemed of great importance, as it is shown by his *Hipparchicus*.

in *Mem.* 1.2.48, nor strangers, like the interlocutors of the four previous dialogues. Glaucon is Plato's brother, and Xenophon himself states that Socrates resolves to act to deter him from his awkward and useless attempts, owing to his benevolence towards Charmides (Glaucon and Plato's uncle) and Plato[22] (3.6.1: εὔνους ὢν αὐτῷ διά τε Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ διὰ Πλάτωνα). As for Charmides, though he is never called a follower of Socrates,[23] nevertheless he is introduced as a man who deserves his appreciation (3.7.1), which Socrates himself will demonstrate during their conversation. But these two dialogues have another side in common, their great political significance. In the dialogue with Glaucon the specific competencies of the politician are singled out and defined, while in the dialogue with Charmides Socrates gives voice to a very harsh criticism of democracy, which he regards as a political system with serious structural faults.[24] In the dialogue with Glaucon, in fact, Socrates discloses Glaucon's total inadequacy in regard to a politician's necessary skills: on the one hand specific competencies in economic (3.6.4–6) and military fields (3.6.7–11), on the other hand the ability to obtain other men's confidence, other men's spontaneous obedience, an ability that is the essential feature of a true leader[25]

22 As is common knowledge, this is the only circumstance in which Xenophon mentions Plato and it is ambiguous: on the one hand Xenophon acknowledges Socrates' special favour towards Plato, on the other hand Plato is implicitly included among those relatives who had unsuccessfully tried to deter Glaucon from his inconsiderate designs, and this certainly does not do Plato credit and sounds subtly mocking of him.

23 Probably owing to residual apologetical purposes, since Charmides' role in the Thirty's government was not a secondary one at all. Rather similarly Plato, who introduces Charmides as Socrates' principal interlocutor, together with Critias, in the homonymous dialogue, at the end of the dialogue shows us a Socrates who somewhat distances himself from young Charmides, saying that he is worried about what Charmides could do in future (*Chrm.* 176c–d).

24 It would not be excessive to say that in the dialogue with Charmides democracy appears to be a system undermined by structural vices (not eliminable because they relate to the decisional power of the popular assembly, which is formed by a mass of incompetent men), and is therefore not a system that could be reformed. So it is not astonishing that *Athenaion Politeia*, a product of a much sharper mind, was included among Xenophon's works, since there is a substantial political consonance between this short work, which stresses that it is not possible to reform democracy, and the firm beliefs that come out in this dialogue (and not only in it): a consonance that certainly the contemporaries and the immediately following generations could grasp much better than we could.

25 The reflection on the problem of leadership runs through Xenophon's whole production, but undoubtedly this reflection is the main subject of *Cyropaedia*, whose composition takes place over a long period of time, the same period to which we should probably assign *Memorabilia* 2.2–3.14, a section which seems to have been written not only after the apolo-

(3.6.15). The importance of this conversation lies not only and not so much in confirming the conception of politics as a *techne*, as specific professional knowledge, which is another leitmotiv of *Memorabilia*,[26] but also and above all in making explicitly clear the constituents of that *techne*, i.e., the specific competencies in the economic and political military fields, as well as the distinctive feature that is the basis for true leadership, i.e., the ability to obtain spontaneous and voluntary obedience.[27]

But on the political ground the conversation with Charmides appears even more meaningful because there is a contemptuous, severe, merciless criticism of Athenian democracy, and Socrates does not hesitate to take on explicitly the role of a political teacher, if only in a destructive way.

Xenophon's Socrates as a Political Teacher: *pars destruens*

The choice of Charmides as Socrates' interlocutor and, what is more, as a figure Socrates himself positively characterizes from a political point of view at the beginning of the dialogue,[28] seems already to foreshadow an intransigent criticism not only of political life in the Athens of the late fifth century, but of Athenian democracy *tout-court*. In this dialogue, in fact, all legitimacy is denied to any decision made by the *ekklesia*:[29] the *ekklesia* (i.e., the assembly of all

getic section, but also after that part of apomnemoneutic section formed by 1.3–2.1 and 4.1–8. For this hypothesis about the different periods of composition of *Memorabilia* (a hypothesis which I intend to examine again and more closely with all necessary caution and exactitude) see Bevilacqua 2010: 42 n. 173.

26 See *Mem.* 1.2.9; 1.2.59; 2.6.38; 3.1.2; 3.1.4; 3.5.21–23; 3.6.2–18; 3.7.7; 3.9.10–11; 3.9.15; 4.2.2–7.

27 Another politically important aspect of this dialogue is the purely quantitative difference established, in a more explicit way than elsewhere, between *oikos* and polis (see above, n. 17); therefore the qualities that are necessary to run the *oikos* and to govern the polis are substantially the same: see also *Oec.* 13.5; 21.2–9.

28 A positive judgement of Charmides and of his qualities as a politician is indirectly attributed to Socrates in the formulaic introduction of the dialogue (3.7.1: Χαρμίδην δὲ τὸν Γλαύκωνος ὁρῶν ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὄντα καὶ πολλῷ δυνατώτερον τῶν τὰ πολιτικὰ τότε πραττόντων: 'When he saw that Carmides, son of Glaucon, was a remarkable man and much more capable than the politicians of that time') and then is confirmed by Socrates' statements in the course of the conversation (see particularly 3.7.2–3; 3.7.5; 3.7.7; 3.7.9). We should also not forget that Charmides also appears in a favourable light in *Symposium*, where he gives voice to a series of well-known commonplaces of antidemocratic propaganda (*Symp.* 4.29–32).

29 Therefore the procedure that was an alternative to the use of the lottery to select public

Athenian citizens) is composed of craftsmen, farmers, merchants and people who care only for their little everyday trades (3.7.6) and therefore by incompetent people (3.7.7), by the weakest and most stupid men of all (3.7.5). So Charmides, who can rightly regard himself as superior not only to the incompetent men who form the *ekklesia*, but also to the politicians (3.7.7), must attend to public affairs, must engage in politics: not only will Athenian citizens benefit from it, but also will Charmides' friends and Charmides himself, as Socrates states in the close of his speech and of the whole dialogue (3.7.9). This statement is not as innocuous as we might think at first sight, because the word *philoi* (friends) certainly is not devoid of a political meaning. Even if we do not think of a proper *hetaireia*,[30] nevertheless this passage hints at a group of friends bound together by very definite political aims, those who are powerfully elucidated in one of the conversations about friendship, the conversation with Critobulus (*Mem.* 2.6): it is just during this conversation that Socrates goes so far as to outline an explicitly political plan, whose nature is unmistakably oligarchic. So the *pars destruens* of Socrates as a political teacher, his radical criticism of democracy, is linked with a *pars construens*, a plan of an oligarchic government entrusted to the group of the *kaloi kagathoi* bound together by a pact of mutual *philia*, of mutual friendship.

Xenophon's Socrates as a Political Teacher: *pars construens*

In the dialogue with Critobulus about friendship and more precisely about what kind of men should be chosen as friends (*Mem.* 2.6), Socrates outlines a political plan of openly oligarchic nature (2.6.22–27), a plan that has generally passed unnoticed by scholars, perhaps because it is not expounded in those dialogues whose nature is clearly political (the first seven of book 3), but in a dialogue about friendship. First of all we should consider what Socrates says and try to single out the most important and significant aspects of his speech, and then we should try to answer two crucial questions. Socrates begins by saying that men nourish contradictory feelings towards other men, both friendly

officials (to which Xenophon does not deny that Socrates was adverse: see 1.2.9), i.e., the election, is implicitly deprived of its legitimacy; for an explicit denial of legitimacy of both procedures see 3.9.10.

30 We should remember, however, that the *hetaireiai* (a kind of political clubs) had a very long life: in Athens, particularly, they were still active and working in the fourth century; see the classic book of Pecorella Longo 1971. About the political connotations of words *philoi* and *philia* in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* see above n. 17.

and hostile (2.6.21), but he says also that nevertheless friendship links together the *kaloi kagathoi* (2.6.22) because, owing to virtue (2.6.22: διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετήν), they are able not only to be content with a modest wealth without aiming at increasing it exceedingly through war,[31] but also to master their yearning for food, drink, and sex (2.6.22), as well as to give up avidity and share their goods with their friends (2.6.23). Immediately afterwards Socrates will explain his political plan, but we should dwell upon these two sections (2.6.22–23) that are the necessary introduction to such a plan. Here in fact Socrates articulates those moral features which, according to him, are peculiar to the *kaloi kagathoi*, showing that they are provided (and implicitly are the *only* men so provided) with *sophrosynē* (2.6.22: αἱροῦνται … τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι) and, above all, that they possess the *enkrateia* that is the basis of virtue (*Mem.*1.5.4), necessary to anyone who aims at power, and which here is laid as the foundation of collaborative behaviours that (mark this point!) are carried out only within the group. Once this premise is grasped, here is the crucial passage: 'And how would it not be natural that the *kaloi kagathoi* share among themselves also public offices, not only without any harm, but, on the contrary, with mutual benefits?' (2.6.24). Here Socrates puts forward, with utmost, brutal clearness, a political proposal that aims at establishing a political system of openly oligarchic nature. In fact, one of the distinctions, if not the fundamental distinction, between democracy and oligarchy is the extent of the citizenship: inclusive in the democracy, which extends it to all free males,[32] exclusive in the oligarchy, which restricts it to a narrow group, usually the group of those who own land properties, and denies citizenship to the *banausoi*, the craftsmen who live on manual labour only.[33] A model case, in this sense, is Sparta, where citizenship is the exclusive priv-

31 We should remember that a belligerent foreign policy was always supported by democratic leaders in view of the advantages that it brought to the poorer classes.

32 As a matter of fact, democratic cities were also inclined to make laws in order to restrict citizenship: we should remember that in 451/450 the Athenians themselves, perhaps to avoid that the *metoikoi* (foreign residents) could make claims to citizenship, introduced a law that restricted citizenship to those whose parents were both Athenian.

33 We should not forget that in *Oec.* 4.2–3, Xenophon, through Socrates' mouth, asserts that the so-called *banausikai* occupations (i.e., the occupations of the *banausoi*) leave a man no spare time to be concerned about his friends and city, and so those who practise those occupations seem to treat their friends badly and to defend their countries badly too; then he adds, with a clear allusion to Sparta, that in the cities that excel in war none of the citizens is allowed to work at the *banausikai* occupations, which implies that those who practise them are excluded from citizenship. Aristotle's opinion is not dissimilar, as he admits that the polis cannot do without *banausoi* (*Pol.* 4.4.1290b38–1291a4), but maintains that the *banausoi* must be excluded from citizenship (*Pol.* 3.5.1277b33–1278a13).

ilege of a class of warriors, the Spartiates, each of whom owns an inalienable allotment of land. Both supporters of democracy and of oligarchy were aware of this basic distinction: it is clearly shown by the Thirty who, led by Critias, had hastened to limit citizenship to three thousand citizens (*Hell.* 2.3.18); and we must remember that the disagreement between Critias and Theramenes (with whom Xenophon sympathizes) about this matter concerned the number of citizens, which Theramenes deemed arbitrarily chosen,[34] not the principle of restricting citizenship to an elite (*Hell.* 2.3.17–20; 2.3.48–49).

Here we can see a first point: Socrates' political proposal shows a significant, not casual coincidence with the Thirty's political plan, a plan which, in its moderate version (Theramenes' version), Xenophon had shared, as it is shown by his service in the Thirty's cavalry,[35] a plan he thought excellent when he was writing this dialogue between Socrates and Critobulus (an interlocutor, as we will see, not casually chosen). The dialogue between Socrates and Charmides not only proves that, in the period when it was written,[36] Xenophon, though he had not forgotten his purpose of apologizing for Socrates, deemed it less important, but also and above all shows that Xenophon intended to reclaim the moral dignity and the political competence of a man who, like Xenophon himself, had believed in the Thirty's political plan: a kind of posthumous rehabilitation of Charmides, but also, indirectly, of Xenophon himself.

Socrates suggests that the government of the city, the public offices, should be the exclusive privilege of the *kaloi kagathoi*, and does not hesitate to compare political competition to athletic contests,[37] with the difference that, while in athletic contests the strongest men are not allowed to join together in order to defeat the weakest because in this way they would win all the prizes, in the political competition, on the contrary, nobody prevents the *kaloi kagathoi*, who

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34 In *Hell.* 2.3.19, Theramenes maintains that the number of three thousand citizens does not necessarily coincide with the number of the *kaloi kagathoi*, who must be all included in the list of citizens.

35 On Xenophon's service in the Thirty's cavalry see Delebecque 1957: 61–64; the first scholar who formulated the hypothesis that Xenophon served in the Thirty's cavalry was Schwartz (1889: 165).

36 A comparatively late period, perhaps the same in which the dialogue between Socrates and Critobulus was written: some clues could induce one to think that, within the apomnemoneutic section, the section 2.2–3.14 was written after the part that could have been the original core of the apomnemoneutic section, a core formed by 1.3–2.1, and 4.1–8; see n. 25.

37 In *Cyr.* 1.5.9–10, we find a comparison between military action and athletics, but without any allusion to the possibility of the strongest athletes joining together in order to defeat their competitors.

are the strongest, from 'benefitting the city with the help of those they like better' (2.6.26), as Socrates euphemistically says. In other words, as the comparison with athletic contests suggests, nobody prevents the *kaloi kagathoi* from monopolizing all the prizes, i.e., public offices. The *kaloi kagathoi* indeed are the strongest and this is indirectly corroborated by the fact that, according to what Socrates says (*Mem.* 3.7.5–6), the craftsmen, the merchants and those who practise their trades in the agora are not only 'the most stupid' (ἀφρονέστατοι), but also 'the weakest' (ἀσθενέστατοι). The *kaloi kagathoi* are the strongest, first of all, economically, as is shown by *Mem.* 4.2.37, where it is openly stated that the *demos* is formed by the poor: therefore it is clear, though Socrates does not mention it, that the *demos* appears as the group opposed to the *kaloi kagathoi*.[38] But the *kaloi kagathoi* are not only the strongest: immediately afterwards (2.6.27), Socrates does not hesitate to establish an equivalence, on the one hand, among 'the best' (βέλτιστοι), the 'minority' (ἐλάττονες), the 'good' (χρηστοί), i.e., the *kaloi kagathoi* (after all, the wealthy), and, on the other hand, among 'the worst' (χείρονες), the 'majority' (πλείονες), the 'wicked' (πονηροί), i.e., the *demos* (ultimately, the poor). It is a typical equivalence of antidemocratic propaganda, but here, more emphatically than in other contexts, it plays on the semantic ambiguity of such words as *beltistoi* / *cheirones* and *chrestoi* / *poneroi*, which are provided with a double connotation, both ethical and social. Besides, as we have just seen (2.6.22), the *kaloi kagathoi* have been shown to be the only men provided with the *enkrateia* that is not only the basis of virtue, but is also necessary to anyone who aims at power. Therefore in 2.6.22–27, Socrates does not just suggest a plan of an openly oligarchic political system, in which political offices are the exclusive privilege of the *kaloi kagathoi*, but also gives this plan an important ethical legitimation: only the *kaloi kagathoi* are provided with the *enkrateia*[39] that enables them not only to practise a mutual collaboration, devoid of any kind of greed and envy (2.6.23), but even to share food and drink (2.6.22), wealth (2.6.23) and last public offices (2.6.24), of course for the declared purpose of doing the city good (2.6.25–26). And this ethical legitimation for an oligarchic political system is the other point of great significance offered by this passage.

38 The *demos* appears as the group opposed to the *kaloi kagathoi* in Thucydides, 8.48.5–6, where there is also a clear connection between the oligarchy and the *kaloi kagathoi*.

39 The fact that the *kaloi kagathoi* are satisfied with the modest patrimony they own (2.6.22: τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι) should be included more in the sphere of *sophrosynē* than in the sphere of *enkrateia*, though in Xenophon's works the two are nearly synonymous: see n. 2.

We should also add that the description of these *kaloi kagathoi*, with its emphatic insistence on their 'putting in common'[40] food, wealth, public offices within the group, cannot help reminding us of the Spartiates, the most well-known example of a class of warriors who are exclusive holders of citizenship and of the exclusive privilege of public offices. It was, of course, precisely the *politeia* (i.e., the political system) of Sparta that represented a model, and even a myth, for the supporters of oligarchy: a model that Critias, the Thirty's leader, had tried to bring into Athens,[41] a model in which Xenophon himself had believed and which he had exalted, in spite of the bitterness of a partial disappointment,[42] in his *Spartan Constitution*.[43]

That in 2.6.22–27, a political system of an openly oligarchic nature is described and even presented as desirable seems to me a conclusion that does not allow many doubts. Nevertheless there are two important questions left; I shall not try to answer them, but only define their range and implications. The first question is: what is denoted, in this passage but more generally in Xenophon, by the expression *kaloi kagathoi* (that I have so far deliberately avoided translating), an expression usually translated as 'gentlemen' or equivalent expressions in the different languages ('*gentiluomini*' / '*galantuomini*' in Italian, '*hommes de bien*' in French by Dorion)? Which political group and / or which social class does it refer to? The extreme complexity of the problem is reflected in the broad semantic range of this expression and in the different meanings in which it was used: a full and detailed study of this matter has been made by F. Bourriot

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40 See 2.6.22: κοινωνεῖν; 2.6.23: κοινωνεῖν; 2.6.24: κοινωνοὺς εἶναι; those expressions are connected with κοινωνία, a key word of Greek political lexicon: see Finley 1970: 7–9; 17; 22–23.

41 Not accidentally, in his history of Greek literature, L. Canfora entitles the chapter concerning Critias *Crizia e la 'laconizzazione' dell'Attica* (Canfora 2001: 341–352; see particularly 342–345).

42 A disappointment which, as is common knowledge, is expressed in the second to last chapter of *Spartan Constitution*, wrongly regarded as spurious by some scholars; this disappointment, however, does not concern in any way the political system established by Lycurgus, but on the contrary it arises from the observation that Lycurgus' laws are not any longer respected.

43 As is common knowledge, there are ironic readings of *Spartan Constitution*, beginning from the renowned essay by Strauss 1939. For a more nuanced but still somewhat ironic reading of the *Spartan Constitution*, see Humble 547–575 in this volume. In this paper I cannot argue against this reading of *Spartan Constitution*, I can only note that, generally speaking, an approach of this kind, based on an ironic reading of the text, looking for a concealed message (which only the 'happy few' can grasp), has given rise to well-grounded doubts and strong objections: see, for instance, Gray 2011: 246–290; Dorion 2001.

in an essay that is a fundamental starting point for any future research (Bourriot 1995). As far as Xenophon is concerned, another equally fundamental starting point is the important contribution which F. Roscalla, making good use of his rigorous and innovative studies of *Oeconomicus*,[44] has devoted to the use and meaning of the words *kalogathia* and *kaloi kagathoi* in Xenophon (Roscalla 2004). According to Roscalla, the expression *kaloi kagathoi* in Xenophon points to a very definite political group, which had its reference point in Theramenes, a group of moderate conservatives who intended to keep its distance from the crimes committed by the Thirty under the leadership of Critias. As I have already mentioned, Theramenes himself, as Xenophon states, was well-disposed to a restriction on citizenship and reservation of political rights to a limited group of citizens (even if larger than three thousand citizens imposed by Critias), but on what ground? It is probable that it was an economic criterion: indeed, as Xenophon states, Theramenes had suggested that the new *politeia* should arise from the support of those citizens who fought as cavalrymen and as hoplites (*Hell.* 2.3.48). Therefore he had in mind a kind of citizenship depending on wealth and so he intended to exclude from citizenship the thetes, that is the poorest citizens;[45] and the next words in Theramenes' speech (*Hell.* 2.3.49) seem to show that the citizens he referred to with the expression *kaloi kagathoi* were precisely the cavalrymen and the hoplites.[46] Nevertheless, if we look into *Oeconomicus*, certainly a key text about this matter (and where, not by accident, Socrates' interlocutor is Critobulus again), the *kalos kagathos* who in this work takes a prominent part and plays such an important role, Ischomachus, is a wealthy landowner, belonging to the wealthiest class, the class which was obliged to offer heavy liturgies (*Oec.* 11.9), the same class to

44 Besides Roscalla 1991, see also Roscalla 1990a and Roscalla 1990b.

45 It is not easy to determine how much the patrimony that separated the hoplites from thetes amounted to: according to Pomeroy 1994: 224, it is likely to be in the fourth century a patrimony of 2.000 drachmas. Nevertheless we should not forget that it is not quite certain that the service as hoplite was tied to the class (and therefore to the income) of the zeugitae: according to Rosivach 2002, the ancient sources do not offer convincing evidence of this supposed connection. The problem is complex and certainly deserves further research; but in this passage it is undoubted that Theramenes is speaking of the hoplites as a precisely determined group, as well as the cavalrymen's group: even if we admit that it is not a group determined on the ground of their incomes, nevertheless it appears as a group fairly well determined on a *social* ground.

46 It is significant that in *Mem.* 3.5.19, *kalokagathia* (an abstract noun which clearly derives from *kaloi kagathoi*, a neologism created by Xenophon) appears as a distinguishing and exclusive feature of cavalrymen and hoplites. See also Bourriot 1995: 289 and 314.

which Critobulus belongs (*Oec.* 2.3; 2.5–6).[47] Therefore, according to *Oeconomicus*, the expression *kaloi kagathoi* seems to indicate a much narrower class, the class of landowners who were well-off enough to fight as cavalrymen[48] and be obliged to offer liturgies to the city. As we can see, the problem of a more precise definition of the *kaloi kagathoi*, who are the central element of the political plan of *Mem.* 2.6.22–27, is still unanswered. And there is another question that remains open, a question I mentioned in the beginning of this paper: in *Mem.* 1.2.18, Xenophon says that Socrates proved to his friends that he was a *kalos kagathos*: now, in the light of the context, it is certainly possible to understand it, looking at the ethical connotation of this expression, as 'virtuous man', and indeed I translated it as 'uomo virtuoso'.[49] Nevertheless I think that there is another problem: that is whether we can define Socrates too as a *kalos kagathos*, giving this expression the meaning that we have just seen in the case of Ischomachus, a meaning with a strong political and social connotation. In my opinion, particularly according to *Oeconomicus*, where he appears quite different from Ischomachus, Socrates is not a *kalos kagathos*, a gentleman;[50] but, also regarding *Oeconomicus* and exactly regarding *Oeconomicus*, there are opposite points of view: it is enough to mention Dorion's interesting essay, just republished.[51]

But another question still remains, a question that is certainly of minor interest, perhaps, but not entirely insignificant. Socrates does not explain, not even fleetingly, how the plan described in *Mem.* 2.6.22–27 could be carried out. Is that an intentional reticence by Xenophon, a wonderful master in the art of reticence? Does it arise because a regime like that of the Thirty could not be proposed again? Or, as seems more likely, it is because Xenophon, who had borne

47 Critobulus' patrimony amounts to more than 50,000 drachmas (*Oec.* 2.3), while it is not precisely stated how much Ischomachus' patrimony amounts to.

48 Ischomachus indeed practises riding constantly and his riding emphasizes the manoeuvres that a cavalryman must perform in war (*Oec.* 11.17).

49 Bevilacqua 2010: 289. Similarly in *Mem.* 1.6.13, where it recurs twice, though used as an adjective, I chose to translate it as 'virtuoso'.

50 On the opposition between the *kalos kagathos* Ischomachus and Socrates see Danzig 2003, now in a revised version in Danzig 2010: 239–263. On Danzig 2010 see Bevilacqua 2012. Danzig (2010: 246 and n. 17) however maintains that the true *kalos kagathos* is Socrates.

51 Dorion 2008. Roscalla too (2004: 117–121), while he thinks that Plato's Socrates has nothing to do with the *kaloi kagathoi*, whom Socrates in fact sets himself against, maintains that Xenophon introduces Socrates as the *kalos kagathos* above all, and thus includes him among the historical *kaloi kagathoi*.

the burden of that ruinous experience,[52] though he did not disown it entirely, ultimately tended towards a pacific course, which aimed at an agreement among the *kaloi kagathoi* and relied on their economic and political strength in order to establish an oligarchic government, free from brutality and excesses but firmly in their hands? Last there is a third possibility that cannot be excluded. The political plan outlined by Socrates could be read in a soft version, as a plan that does not aim at overthrowing the institutions of democracy in order to replace them by an oligarchic political system, but aims in a simpler way (and in a way doubtless easier to carry out) at securing all public offices, all positions of power, for the *kaloi kagathoi*, but still within an institutional system of a democratic kind. Exactly because the *kaloi kagathoi* are the strongest, both politically and economically, they easily could, through an agreement to keep their group united, achieve a peaceful sharing of public offices and therefore the total control of the polis: essentially an oligarchic system *in actual fact* within a *formally* democratic system.[53]

And Plato's Socrates?

A long interpretative tradition has stressed the loyalty of Plato's Socrates to the laws of democratic Athens, a loyalty that led as far as self-sacrifice, and in which many scholars have claimed to discover his genuine assent to the principles of democracy.[54] This tradition has been and is still so deep-rooted that it

52 Even if we admit that the sentence to exile was not caused by an event that occurred during his service in the Thirty's cavalry, but by his presence at Cyrus' expedition (see *An.* 3.1.5) or by the circumstance that he fought at Coroneia on the side of the enemies of Athens, nevertheless it is certain that the active role he played during the Thirty's government was a decisive factor in inducing him to escape the awkward situation of the democratic restoration and to leave Athens in order to follow Cyrus, with all the adventures and misadventures that expedition led to.

53 Even if we dutifully keep in mind the difference between democracy as the Greeks intended and put into practice and democracy that characterizes the political systems of those states that we call democratic today, it is impossible not to point out that within undoubtedly democratic states (and even in states ruled by principles of a radical democracy) oligarchic groups, strong in their economic power (which today means also the control over the media) and in their political weight, can get hold of the power (not simply of the government).

54 This interpretation is also likely to have risen because, in our cultural tradition, Plato's Socrates always appeared not only as the archetype of 'the just man unjustly condemned' (to put it in M. Montuori's words: see Montuori 1998: 64–68), but also as the paradigmatic

does not hesitate to disregard a whole set of passages that, however, should at least stir some doubts. Even a scrupulous scholar like G. Vlastos does not deny that Socrates was regarded by the Athenians both of his time[55] and in the following generation,[56] as hostile to the *demos* and entertaining secret oligarchic feelings, but Vlastos firmly maintains that this opinion, though widespread, was wrong.[57] As is common knowledge, Vlastos thinks that historical Socrates should be identified to a great extent with the Socrates of the earlier dialogues of Plato:[58] but are we really sure that the Socrates of the earlier dialogues of Plato and, above all, of *Apology* and *Crito*, the dialogues from which scholars usually try to grasp his political thought, is a true democrat, firmly convinced of the excellence of Athenian democratic institutions or at least convinced that these institutions, as distinct from the behaviour of Athenians of his time, were better than those of any other polis? This is undoubtedly a complex problem that would require a larger and more detailed treatment than is possible in this paper. Therefore I will confine myself to only two passages, which seem to me particularly significant.

The first is *Ap.* 31c–32a: Socrates begins by recalling that in him there is something divine and demonic (31c–d: θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον) which, since he was a boy, has intervened like a kind of voice (31d: φωνή τις) to deter him from what he is about to do, and it is because of the intervention of this voice that Socrates

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teacher to whom we, instinctively and unconsciously, shrink not only from attributing an attitude hostile toward democracy, but even simply critical towards that democracy of which we think we are the heirs.

55 The oration against Socrates written by the rhetor Polycrates a few years after the trial and the death sentence against Socrates is exemplary of this attitude. This oration, as is common knowledge, is lost, but we can reconstruct its contents through *Mem.* 1.2.9–61, where Xenophon commits himself to refuting Polycrates' charges, charges of a merely political kind, which pitilessly and unequivocally reveal to us the backstage of a trial of an exquisitely political nature, the archetype of many trials against philosophers and intellectuals. (We must remember that charges like Polycrates' could not be made against Socrates in the trial, because the amnesty of 403, confirmed in 401 after the so-called war of Eleusis, explicitly forbade the prosecution of anyone who had sided or sympathized with the Thirty, unless he had committed a blood crime.)

56 See Vlastos 1994: 87–88, where he quotes a very significant passage of Aeschines (*In Tim.* 173), where the death sentence against the 'sophist' Socrates is connected to the fact that Socrates had been Critias' teacher.

57 See Vlastos 1994: 87; 90–108. The whole chapter on the attitude of historical Socrates towards democracy is a revised version of Vlastos 1983.

58 This thesis characterizes particularly his best-known work: Vlastos 1991: see above all 45–106.

never engaged in politics (31d). As for this statement there is nothing to be astonished at. But Socrates does not confine himself to explaining his absence from political life as a dutiful act of reverence towards the divine and demonic voice that is in him. Socrates instead wants to make clear that the intervention of this voice is fully justified by the risk of death faced by anyone in Athens who intends to fight for justice (*Ap.* 31d–32a):

> You know very well, Athenians, that if I had long ago undertaken to go into politics, I would long ago be dead, without being of any use either to you or me. And do not get angry with me if I tell the truth: there is no man who can save himself if he frankly sets himself against you or any other populace (πλήθει) and tries to prevent many unjust and unlawful actions (πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα) from happening in the city; but it is unavoidable[59] that the one who really intends to fight for justice (ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου), if he wants to survive even for a short time, must live as a private citizen and not go into politics.

It is impossible, in my opinion, not to see in these words a very harsh attack both on Athenian democracy and on any other democracy. First of all on Athenian democracy: indeed, if it is true that unlawful actions throw discredit on those who do these actions, on those who infringe the laws,[60] it is also true that a situation of *widespread* unlawful actions (πολλὰ … παράνομα) certainly casts a shadow on the excellence, on the effectiveness, of the laws themselves. Ultimately the political system itself is called into question. In other words: if breaking the laws is a fault that can be imputed to the citizens and to the citizens only, then the value of the laws and of the political system is not diminished, but when breaking the laws becomes a current, widespread practice, how is it possible to acquit from any responsibility the laws themselves and the political system that is incapable of preventing systematic abuse? Moreover Socrates does not confine himself to speaking about unlawful actions, but also speaks explicitly about unjust actions (ἄδικα), clearly distinct from unlawful actions (παράνομα): and in the case of unjust actions, though the personal responsibility of those who commit unjust actions is undeniable, it is clear that, if unjust actions and not only unlawful actions happen, this involves the global system of the laws in force, which clearly allows unjust actions, not punished

59 'Unavoidable' is indeed the meaning of the Greek *anankaion* in this passage.

60 Vlastos 1994: 93–95 stresses the responsibility of individuals in order to maintain that Socrates does not make charges against the laws of Athens, but simply against the behaviour of his fellow citizens.

by any penalty, to happen. The responsibility is still greater when these actions are many, i.e., repeated, frequent and, very likely, of different kinds:[61] a situation of unjust actions, not sporadic, not episodic, but repeated and widespread, systematically done, shows—together with unlawfulness and still more—the inadequacy of the system of the laws and, in conclusion, of the whole political system. But there is more: Socrates indeed goes so far as to say that in this situation of widespread unlawfulness and injustice there is no possibility for a remedy, no possibility for a change: on the contrary whoever commits himself to this purpose is destined not only to failure, but also to paying with his own life for his care for justice (ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου). It is difficult to imagine a more explicit and severe indictment against the laws of Athens and, more generally, against Athenian democracy, an indictment that denies any possibility of change, of improvement within the political and legislative system in force, which therefore in the end appears not only flawed but also beyond reform. An indictment that is confirmed a little later, in not too different words, in *Ap.* 32e–33a, when Socrates does not confine himself to stating that, if he had gone into politics and come, as a good citizen, to the support of justice (εἰ … ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις),[62] he could not have survived, but also adds that no other man would be able to survive. Therefore it is not the subjective inadequacy of Socrates that appears powerless and destined to failure, but the objective situation of Athenian political life, of its laws and of its institutions, which means that anyone who intends to fight for justice and put an end to the spreading unlawfulness and injustice is destined to failure and physical destruction. Therefore Athenian democracy in the end appears as a political system that cannot be reformed, that cannot be saved, and also as a cruel system. But the indictment goes beyond Athenian democracy and seems to extend to any other democratic polis, any other democracy. Let us examine again *Ap.* 31e. Socrates says openly that 'there is no man who can save himself if he frankly sets himself against you or any other populace (πλήθει)', but this word, πλῆθος, does not have a univocal meaning: it certainly means 'populace',[63] but also often denotes the popular assembly, i.e., the physical and political place where the populace

61 In my opinion, indeed, in this context, πολλά entails that these unjust and unlawful actions, precisely because they are many, are not all of the same kind, but of different natures.

62 The Greek text (*Ap.* 31e) is more precise and meaningful. Indeed literally it means: 'if I had come to the aid of justice', which powerfully gives an idea of a justice that is threatened, despised, in need of help.

63 See, e.g., Plato, *Plt.* 291d: ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή, δημοκρατία τοὔνομα κληθεῖσα: 'the rule of the populace, called by the name of democracy'.

gathers and expresses itself. If we consider this second meaning too, we can see that the indictment uttered by Socrates is pointed at any democratic polis, as it is based on the supremacy of the popular assembly.

The other passage I intend to consider is in *Crito*, a dialogue that has been very often regarded as the most convincing and most touching evidence of the loyalty of Socrates (or at least of Plato's Socrates) towards the laws of Athens, and also as definitive proof of his attitude in favour of democracy. The passage is *Cri.* 51c–53a, a very significant part of the long speech that, in successive steps, the Laws address to Socrates. The Laws, after reminding Socrates that they begot him,[64] reared him, brought him up (51c), and last that they distributed all available goods to him and to all his fellow citizens (51c–d), state that they at any rate allow the citizen who does not find them, the Laws, acceptable to move elsewhere, anywhere he likes, carrying his own goods (51d–e). Therefore, if a citizen, seeing how the Laws administer justice (τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν) and govern the polis in all other matters (καὶ τἆλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν),[65] resolves to remain, that means that *through his deeds* (ἔργῳ)[66] he consents to do what the Laws order (51e), and that means not only obedience to the Laws, but also the implicit acknowledgement of their positive value. Then from the universal the Laws proceed to the particular case, i.e., to Socrates himself, saying that they have important proofs (μέγαλα … τεκμήρια) that show Socrates was pleased with the city and its laws, proofs that are punctiliously elucidated: Socrates, apart from military expeditions, left Athens only once, to attend the Isthmian games, never travelled, as many others used to do, was never seized with the wish to know another city and other laws (52b). From these proofs the Laws draw the logical conclusion that Socrates liked the laws of Athens better than the laws of any other city and agreed to live his life as a citizen according to the laws of Athens (52c). To this statement the Laws add two further proofs: Socrates, among other things, also resolved

64 Because his father and his mother got married according to the laws of the city: see *Cri.* 50d.

65 While the first sentence could concern also criminal law and civil law, this second sentence undoubtedly concerns the global political system of the city, ruled by those laws that Vlastos 1994: 92, anachronistically calls constitutional (the very conception of constitutional law, as distinguished from ordinary laws and provided with a specific status, is indeed totally alien to Greek juridical thought). Nevertheless Vlastos is right when he maintains that in *Crito* the Athenian laws that are in question, the laws that Socrates seems to like better than the laws of other cities, are laws of a constitutional nature, because they are the laws which regulate and define the political system of the polis.

66 As we will see, this word is not at all insignificant: see below.

to bring his sons into the world precisely in Athens, thus showing that he was pleased with the city (ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως); and even at his trial he confirmed his affection for the city by stating that he preferred a death sentence to exile (52c).[67] So Socrates showed that he liked Athens and its laws better than other cities and their laws, and therefore he consented to live as a citizen according to the laws of Athens, and that not *in words* but *in deeds* (ἔργῳ ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ): that is the conclusion that the Laws draw (52d). Last, the Laws maintain, Socrates has had at his disposal no less than seventy years to think it over and resolve to go elsewhere, if he was not pleased with the laws of Athens: nevertheless Socrates not only never moved either to Sparta or Crete, about which he nonetheless goes on repeating that they have good laws,[68] or to any other Greek or barbarian city, but on the contrary he left Athens much less than crippled people, blind people and other disabled persons did (52e–53a).

If now we consider again the whole passage (*Cri.* 51c–53a), the speech appears clear and seems to admit a single interpretation, a linear and univocal one: Socrates, by his behaviour in a whole, long life showed that he liked Athens and its laws better than any other city and did not even like Sparta or Crete better than Athens, though he had always praised the laws of these places. But this interpretation, at first sight convincing and quite obvious, becomes problematic as soon as we ask (and this exactly is the turning point) about the nature of this preference: in other words does the preference, which Socrates showed in no less than the seventy years of his life for Athens, its laws and therefore the

67 See *Ap.* 37b–e. This reference is very interesting. It is true, indeed, that we could think it was made for the readers of *Apology*, but it is unlikely that it is without any relation to the speech delivered by the historical Socrates at his trial, a speech that would certainly be remembered by all those who were present (besides the five hundred jurors, the many Athenian citizens who were present at such an important trial).

68 The words addressed to Socrates by the Laws are literally: 'You did not choose either Sparta or Crete, about which you say, whenever the occasion arises (ἑκάστοτε), that they have good laws' (*Cri.* 52e). The expressive effectiveness of the adverb ἑκάστοτε is remarkable. It emphasizes that Socrates is ready to praise the good laws of Sparta and Crete whenever the occasion arises. It is necessary to observe that 'to have good laws' is the correct meaning of εὐνομεῖσθαι. Vlastos (1994: 92 n. 13), on the contrary, since he maintains that Socrates likes the laws of Athens better than the laws of any other city and reproaches Athenians only for not obeying the laws, says that in this passage εὐνομεῖσθαι does not mean that Sparta and Crete have good laws, a good political system, but that in Sparta and Crete, unlike in Athens, the laws are obeyed by citizens. But this is clearly interpretative twisting on Vlastos' part, which finds no support in the text nor corroboration elsewhere (the only possible, but dubious, example is in Aeschines, *In Tim.* 5).

democratic institutions of the city, automatically entail a *political* preference for the Athenian democracy, or is it simply a preference *in fact* for Athens and its democratic institutions? I think that this second interpretation, certainly less obvious, deserves to be considered with the utmost attention. We should not forget that *Crito*, no less than *Apology*, is marked by a very strong apologetic purpose, nor should we forget Plato's uncommon skill in manipulating his readers, preparing apologetic strategies of wonderful effectiveness, which at the same time shrink from lies and thus secure the precious advantage of eluding refutation.

Therefore let us try to ask what Plato had at his disposal to show a Socrates not only abiding by, but also devoted to the laws of Athens, the laws of a radical democracy. Certainly not the speeches that Socrates used to make, that anyone could have heard in the *agora* (the marketplace) or in the streets of Athens. On the contrary from *Crito* we conclude exactly the opposite: not only does it not appear that Socrates praised the laws of Athens, but it turns out that he did not miss an opportunity to praise the laws of Sparta and Crete, two strongholds of oligarchy in the mind of the Greeks. Then Plato devises the only possible way to shield Socrates from the suspicion of a disquieting attraction towards oligarchy and to prove his preference for Athenian laws and institutions: to establish an opposition between *words* and *deeds*, to the full advantage of the latter. So, while Socrates' repeated statements about the good laws of Sparta and Crete are reduced, with kind indulgence, to the harmless talk that Socrates used to repeat when he had the opportunity, his choice of continually living in Athens is presented not only as a choice tenaciously confirmed in seventy long years, but also as a *fact*, provided with enormously greater value than the *words*. Moreover, while the praise bestowed by Socrates upon the laws of Sparta and Crete forms only a very brief mention in passing (52e), his choice of living in democratic Athens, a choice involving his sons as well, is given much space, in a quite central position (51d–53a) in the long speech of the Laws (50a–54d). At this point it is nearly impossible not to be persuaded by Plato's clever argumentation, by his subtly deceiving logic, whose power is increased (as nearly always in Plato) by the moving beauty of the text. Our spontaneous reaction is not to ask further questions, to be caught defenceless, to give up the necessary critical distance,[69] but with Plato, no less than with his Socrates, such an atti-

69 Rossetti has drawn attention many times to Plato's uncommon cleverness in causing his readers to be carried away by the modalities of the Socratic dialogue, until they lose the necessary critical distance: see, above all, Rossetti 2011: 121–194; 215–244; 245–263. On Rossetti 2011 see Bevilacqua 2014.

tude is dangerous. It is appropriate, and even necessary, to be able to retain a little distrust.

If now, provided with such distrust, we read the passage in question again, we can see that the text says essentially three things: that Socrates used to express his appreciation of the laws of Sparta and Crete by his *words*; that in *fact* he had chosen to live in Athens accepting its democratic political system; last that from this choice of his it is right to infer that, beyond and against his own statements, Socrates all his life had shown that he liked Athenian democracy better than the oligarchies of Sparta and Crete. So Plato, though careful not to say so openly, skilfully instills in his readers' minds the proposition that this preference *in fact* entails a political preference for democracy, but it is a proposition without any foundation. Indeed the choice of living in Athens entails only the *acceptance* of its laws and its institutions and not any *preference* for that kind of political system. Loyalty to the laws and the institutions of a democracy can be joined with the yearning for a different political system. At the same time the scant appreciation for a democratic political system does not at all require an automatic choice to move elsewhere. As far as this last point is concerned, the counter-check is provided historically by the fact that nobody among the supporters of oligarchy ever decided to move on his own initiative to Sparta or to other cities ruled by an oligarchic political system. As is clearly shown both by the short-lived *coup d'état* of the Four Hundred in 411 and, above all, the *coup d'état* of the Thirty in 404, the aim of the oligarchs was to establish an oligarchic government in Athens and to turn Athens into another Sparta.[70] Of course I certainly do not want to suggest that the Socrates of *Crito* and *Apology* wished to see democratic institutions overthrown and an oligarchic government established in their place; I only want to stress that neither of these two texts shows a Socrates persuaded of the excellence of the Athenian laws and of the democratic political system. Even in *Crito*, it is worth repeating, we find only heroic loyalty towards the laws of Athens, loyalty that Socrates shows by his self-sacrifice, but there is nothing that declares a positive political opinion about those laws.

It would certainly be excessive to maintain that in *Apology* and in *Crito* the picture of Socrates as a supporter of oligarchy and philo-Spartan is introduced, but undoubtedly he does not appear as a supporter, even a critical supporter, of that Athenian democracy to which he addresses very strong censures, to such a point that he presents it as a political system that cannot be improved.

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70 See above and n. 41.

Therefore the Socrates of *Crito* and *Apology*, though he cannot be superimposed on the Socrates of *Memorabilia* (who is openly oligarchic, in spite of Xenophon's apologetic engagement), nevertheless offers remarkable points of contact with Xenophon's Socrates; and it is above all the comparison with the Socrates of *Memorabilia* that leads us to a more cautious reading of *Crito* and *Apology*, one which allows us to grasp the political attitudes expressed by Socrates without being distracted by Plato's apologetic strategies, by his cleverness in manipulating his readers, by the emotional impact of his writing.

The argument that has been presented here is enough if we confine ourselves to a study of a comparative kind, which is certainly a necessary sort of study. But if we think that both Plato's earlier dialogues and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, though in a different measure and in different ways, can shed some light on the opinions of the historical Socrates, the passages that I have just considered, taken together, seem to support the picture of a Socrates who looked critically not only at the political life of the Athens of his time, but also at democracy itself as a system.

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Plato and Xenophon on the Different Reasons that Socrates Always Obeys the Law

Louis-André Dorion

Plato and Xenophon agree that Socrates always obeys the law. In the *Crito* and the *Memorabilia* (4.4 and 4.6), we see that they also agree that Socrates gives reasons for his obedience to the law. Despite this common ground, Plato and Xenophon disagree about the reasons that justify obedience to the law, as can be shown by a comparative analysis of Plato and Xenophon on the important Socratic theme of obedience to the law. I intend to show, as I have done for other Socratic positions shared by Plato and Xenophon, that the *Crito* and the *Memorabilia* provide different reasons for holding the same Socratic position on obedience to the law. Although Plato's *Crito* has been the subject of numerous studies and greater attention is now being paid to Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 4.4,[1] it appears that no one has yet attempted a comparative analysis of these two texts. However, I will not provide a new interpretation of the *Crito*. My aim is to compare the *Memorabilia* with the *Crito* in order to highlight what is unique to the argument of the *Memorabilia* and, consequently, to the argument of the *Crito* as well. I will limit myself to the most noteworthy differences.

The Context of the Discussion

It is probably not a coincidence that Plato and Xenophon situate their respective discussions of obedience to the law in an apologetic context. In the *Crito*, the immediate context is the prison where Socrates awaits the day of his execution after his trial. In *Mem.* 4.4, the four first paragraphs also recall the context of the accusation against Socrates and underline his opposition to tyranny. The two discussions have without doubt an apologetic goal: both Xenophon and Plato want to show that Socrates was respectful of the laws of the state and that his teachings did not subvert its institutions and laws.[2]

1 Cf. Morrison 1995, Johnson 2003, Gray 2004, Stavru 2008, Dorion 2010.

2 Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.9: "But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established laws (τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων) by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in

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While the two texts share the same apologetic aim, their dramatic settings are very different. In the *Crito*, it is Crito's offer to help Socrates escape from prison that sets the stage for the discussion of obedience to the laws of the state; in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon never mentions such an offer, although the character Crito is present. Xenophon even has Socrates discuss with Crito how one ought to deal with sycophants (2.9), but he never attributes the intention of helping Socrates escape from prison to Crito. In the first four paragraphs of *Memorabilia* 4.4, where he enumerates instances when Socrates refused to break the law, Xenophon makes no allusion to Socrates' refusal to accept Crito's offer to help him escape. Why this silence? Arguments from silence are usually weak, but in this case there is one plausible argument from silence that needs to be addressed: Xenophon insists on a number of occasions that Socrates was useful to his companions and that he rendered them virtuous, indeed, so virtuous that he even says that in their entire lives none of them, including Crito, ever "did evil or incurred censure" (*Mem.* 1.2.48, tr. Marchant). Given this position on Socrates' usefulness, it would probably have been unwise, from an apologetic viewpoint, to write a scene in which a close friend of Socrates openly offers to commit an injustice by helping him escape from prison.

However, this explanation is at odds with a passage from Xenophon's *Apology* (23) where he tells us unequivocally that Socrates turned down his friends' offers to help him escape from prison: "In the second place, when his friends (τῶν ἑταίρων) wanted to get him secretly away, he refused to go, but instead seemed to make fun of them, asking them whether they knew of some spot beyond Attica's borders which was inaccessible to death!" (*Ap.* 23, tr. Tredennick/Waterfield). This passage from Xenophon's *Apology* calls for two observations: *first*, Xenophon says that it was some of Socrates' friends who had devised the plans for his prison escape but, giving no further details, he does not mention Crito. In Plato's *Crito*, it is sometimes suggested that Crito is the unique instigator of the escape plan (44b9–c2), but at other times, the plan is attributed to a group of Socrates' friends that includes Crito (44c5, 44e2–45a3, 45b1–5, 45e1–46a4). Let me remark in passing that other Socratics credited disciples other than Crito for planning Socrates' escape from prison. Diogenes Laertius (2.35, 2.60, 3.36) reports that Plato replaced the name of Aeschines by that of Crito because of his hostility to Aeschines. True or not, this story is a very good example of what O. Gigon called *Sokratesdichtung*. *Second*, in Xeno-

which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft. Such sayings, he argued, led the young to despise the established constitution (τῆς καθεστώσης πολιτείας) and made them violent" (tr. Marchant).

phon's *Apology*, the reason Socrates refuses to escape has nothing to do with obedience to the law and is not found in the *Crito*. In fact, the reason Socrates provides in Xenophon's *Apology* is no reason at all; it is only a form of mockery as Xenophon makes a point of emphasizing. The real reason for Socrates' refusal to escape from prison is perhaps most clearly expressed by Xenophon at the beginning of his *Apology* (1–9) where he explains why Socrates refused to prepare a speech for his defense: since the gods have informed him that the time has come for him to die, Socrates can neither prepare a speech to save his life, nor agree to run away from a death he considers at once timely and a gift from the gods. The gods have not repealed what they have communicated to him, so that it remains in effect after the trial and extends to the time of his imprisonment. This means that Socrates' refusal to escape from prison is based not on his respect for the law, but on his respect for the gods.

The discussion in the *Memorabilia* about obedience to the law takes place in the context of an examination of the concept of justice, not in the context of a consideration of a prison escape. It is to Hippias, who keeps insisting that he reveal his position on justice, that Socrates says that justice consists in obedience to the laws of the state. In *Mem.* 4.6.5–6, where Socrates once again maintains that justice consists in obeying the law, the context of the discussion is slightly different. Once again, the matter in question is the definition of justice, but this time Socrates is not talking with a sophist, he is instructing Euthydemus, one of his disciples. The discussion in *Mem.* 4.6.4–6 has no equivalent in Plato. For since the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues says that he has no knowledge and recognizes his own ignorance, and since he claims that he does not teach and has never been anyone's teacher (cf. *Ap.* 19d, 33a), he cannot explain the nature of justice to one of his disciples. We have to wait until the *Republic* before we see Socrates both seeking a definition of justice and explicitly offering one.

Positivism versus Idealism

To the extent that Xenophon's Socrates reduces justice to what is legal (*nomimon*; cf. *Mem.* 4.4.12–13), purely and simply, he can be considered a "legal positivist" (see Morrison 1995: 324–342). Although one can debate the merits of this conception of justice on the basis that it seems to exclude the possibility that a law can be unjust, it remains one of Xenophon's deeply held beliefs and can be found elsewhere in his works (cf. *Mem.* 4.6.6, *Cyr.* 1.3.17, 1.6.27). Xenophon, for example, praises Agesilaus for having been the greatest servant of his country's laws (*Ages.* 7.2). In any case, because this definition of justice is the

same one Socrates argues for when speaking to Euthydemus (cf. *Mem.* 4.6.6), and because Xenophon attaches great importance to respect for the law,[3] I am inclined to believe that Xenophon endorsed, fully and sincerely, the definition of justice that equates it with what is legal; so we have no good reasons for doubting that the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* is a legal positivist.[4] The *Constitution of the Lacedemonians* also provides us with an argument in favor of legal positivism: since the laws of Lycurgus are very old (10.8) and have secured the city's happiness (1.1–2), there is no reason to modify them, and the cause of Sparta's decline is that the Lacedemonians no longer abide by them (14). Among those who refuse to believe that Socrates could have been an advocate for legal positivism, some suspect that Xenophon, to purely apologetic ends, is simply ascribing to Socrates a conception of justice that would rehabilitate him in the eyes of the state (see Erbse 1961: 275, Nadon 2001: 49). Unlike these commentators, who are convinced that Xenophon's intention is to persuade the reader that Socrates conceived of justice in terms of the law and obedience to the laws, Strauss believes that Xenophon is trying to suggest, to the reader who knows how to read between the lines, that this definition of justice cannot be taken literally and is really no more than a façade intended to clear Socrates' name in the eyes of the state, and that Socrates' real position as concerns the state is far more subversive (see 1939: 518–520, 1972: 105–114); but Strauss' repeated efforts to justify his interpretation are far from persuasive (see Dorion 2010).

Alcibiades' criticism of Pericles' definition of the law (*Mem.* 1.2.40–46) takes its inspiration from an "idealist" conception of the law, since having been decreed by the constituent power is not a sufficient condition for it to be qualified as a law: one must also persuade the citizen body of the rightfulness of the decree (see Morrison 1995: 332). Commentators have been divided on why Alcibiades and Socrates are on two sides of the same definition of the law (cf. 1.2.42 and 4.4.13): some of them do not hesitate to claim that Alcibiades is expressing the real Socratic position and that Xenophon credited Socrates with an innocuous position more in keeping with his apologetic aims.[5] But I argue that any interpretation that holds that Socrates only *apparently* subscribes to legal positivism, and that his real position is the one expressed by his "disciple"

3 Cf. *Mem.* 1.1.18, 4.3.16, 4.4.2–4, *Lac.* 1.2, 4.6, 8.1–5, *Cyn.* 12.14, Luccioni 1947: 130–132.

4 Cf. also Sinclair 1951: 90–91, Romilly 1971: 121–125, Gera 1993: 74–75, Morrison 1995, Gray 2004, Dorion 2010.

5 Cf. Strauss 1939: 520 n. 1, 1972: 15; Buzetti 2001: 22–23. Johnson (2003: 277–279) has a more nuanced interpretation, but it still amounts to saying that Xenophon deliberately attributes a position to Alcibiades that he does not dare to attribute to Socrates.

Alcibiades, seems to me unacceptable because we lose sight of the fact that Xenophon would ruin his defense of Socrates if he were ever to suggest that Socrates endorsed Alcibiades' refutation of Pericles (see Bandini and Dorion 2000: CLX–CLXIX).

Xenophon's Socrates would not subscribe to the "idealist" position held by Plato's Socrates, who holds that a law is a law only if it satisfies very precise criteria, not simply because it was the result of a human decree.[6] Given that these conditions are not always met by human legislation, it is possible to challenge a positive law passed by a human legislative body if it does not meet the criteria of an ideal law. So what about the position defended by Plato's Socrates in the *Crito*? In a well-known passage, he says that one must do everything ordered by the state: you must "obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must obey. To do so is right (ποιητέον ταῦτα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει), and one must not give way or retreat or leave one's post, but both in war and in courts, and everywhere else, one must obey the commands of one's city and country" (51b; tr. Grube): if this were all Socrates had said, his position would be the same as his namesake in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* since justice would seem to be co-extensive to positive law and the city's orders; but Plato's Socrates does not stop there, as he adds: "one must obey the commands of one's city and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice (ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ᾗ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε)" (51b–c, tr. Grube). That is an unequivocal acknowledgment, on Socrates' part, that a law or an order can in some instances fail to satisfy the conditions of justice. Since Socrates acknowledges on several occasions that, in cases when we disagree with the laws of the state we must either persuade the state to modify its laws (*Cri.* 51b, 51c, 51e–52a) or leave the state and chose to live elsewhere (51d, 52b, 52e), and since he openly mentions the possibility that the laws could be at fault (51e7, 52e4–5), it is therefore possible that the just and the legal do not coincide.

But what is justice? Since Socrates invokes the nature of justice in 51c1 to argue, when we deem laws are unjust, that we must try to persuade the state to modify them, then he must appeal to a definition of justice. But Socrates does not put forward any definition of justice in the *Crito*, or in any other dialogue written prior to the *Republic*. This is one of the major differences between the two Socrateses: while for Xenophon's Socrates, justice is identified with what is legal—which means that laws cannot be criticized or modified—Plato's Socrates never defines justice (see Brisson 1997: 196) and even though

6 Cf. *Hp. mai.* 284d–e; cf. also [Plato], *Minos*, 314b–315b.

he says that one should obey the laws, he suggests on several occasions that it sometimes happens that laws are not just, so that there are times when it becomes necessary to try to persuade the state to have them modified. For these reasons, it seems to me inaccurate to claim, as some commentators have done,[7] that Socrates' position in *Mem.* 4.4 is essentially the same as the one defended by his namesake in the *Crito*.

Socrates and the Expert in Justice

In *Mem.* 4.4.5, Socrates seems to recognize that there is no expert in matters of justice:

> Hippias had arrived at Athens after a long absence and joined Socrates just as he was saying to some of his friends how remarkable it was that if one wanted to have somebody taught cobbling or joinery or metalwork or horsemanship, there was no difficulty about knowing where to send him for this purpose, but if one wanted to learn oneself what is right, or to have a son or a slave taught this knowledge, one did not know where to go in order to get it.
>
> tr. TREDENNICK/WATERFIELD

As Socrates seems to concede that no one is an expert in the field of justice, some have concluded that the just cannot be reduced to the law (see Strauss 1939: 520, Johnson 2003: 268). But Socrates does not say there are no experts in the field of justice; he says that he is surprised that nobody knows who to go to in order to learn what justice is. But this expert in matters of justice does exist—it is Socrates himself. Comparing the quoted passage (*Mem.* 4.4.5) with *Mem.* 4.2.2–7 will help shed light on Socrates' position: in *Mem.* 4.2.2–7 Socrates explains that political competence is just like any other type of expertise: it must be learned from an expert. Now, in *Mem.* 4.2.2–7 Socrates lets his interlocutors know he is an expert in the field of politics and is able to teach it (cf. *Mem.* 1.6.15, 4.3.1). We can understand Socrates' surprise when he hears that

7 Cf., among others, Adam 1903: XIII: "the whole political bearing of the dialogue [*sc.* the *Crito*] may be summed up in the words which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Socrates: φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸν νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι (Mem. IV.4.12)"; Humbert 1967: 196: "Ainsi, par des moyens tout différents, le témoignage des *Mémorables* rejoint celui du *Criton*: pour Socrate la loi établie était aussi indiscutable que les ordres d' un père."

people do not know who to turn to when they want to learn the nature of justice because in all likelihood he also considers himself an expert in the field of justice and so believes he can teach others what justice is. If Socrates had wanted to say that no one has the expertise to teach justice, then it becomes difficult to understand how he can give Hippias a long lecture on the nature of justice (cf. 4.4.12–25) and teach one of his disciples, Euthydemus, what justice is (4.6.5–6). This is neither surprising nor contradictory since Xenophon's Socrates, unlike Plato's, never professes to be ignorant on moral questions.

One can also, following Kahn (1996: 397), compare Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 4.4.5 to Plato's *Meno* (89d–90e), where Socrates explains that anyone wishing to learn a craft can only learn it from an expert, so that if no expert can teach virtue, one can only conclude that virtue cannot be taught. But in contrast to Kahn's position—Kahn includes 4.4.5 in his list of passages that Xenophon simply borrows from Plato—I do not believe Xenophon simply repeats what Plato says in the *Meno*, since, as regards the possibility of teaching virtue, he comes to the opposite conclusion: while Plato's Socrates stresses the difference between the case of virtue (which cannot be taught) and the case of all other crafts (which an expert can teach), Socrates' Xenophon chooses to stress the similarity of these cases: justice can be taught just like any other craft. Xenophon is therefore not stealing arguments from Plato's dialogues—that is, plagiarizing Plato; instead, he seems to be debating with Plato on the principles of Socratic thought.

In Plato's *Crito*, Socrates asks his friend the following question:

> [W]ith actions just and unjust (περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων), shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we are now deliberating, should we follow the opinion of the many (τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ) and fear it, or that of the one, if there is one who has knowledge of these things (ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τις ἐστιν ἐπαίων) and before whom we feel fear and shame more than before all the others?
>
> 47c–d, tr. GRUBE

Not surprisingly, Socrates rapidly convinces Crito that "we should not then think so much of what the majority (οἱ πολλοί) will say about us, but what he will say who understands (ὁ ἐπαίων) justice and injustice, the one, that is, and the truth itself (καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια)" (48a, tr. Grube). Just as the discussion on obedience to the laws in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* is preceded by a passage where Socrates underlines the importance of learning from an expert in the field of justice, the discussion on obedience to the laws is preceded in Plato's *Crito* by a passage where Socrates states likewise that they should seek guidance on mat-

ters of justice from the expert (ἐπαΐων, 47d2, 48a6) in this field, the expert that he identifies with the truth itself (καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, 48a7). But while Xenophon's Socrates is not reluctant to be considered an expert on justice, Plato's Socrates could hardly do so. In Plato's *Crito*, when Socrates tells Crito to consult an expert, the choices are very limited: Socrates means either himself or the Laws. But, as D. Bostock has stressed: "it would be distinctly odd, to say the least, if we are supposed to take Socrates as here implying that he himself is the moral expert, since everywhere else in Plato's dialogues he is consistently portrayed as disclaiming this status" (1990: 19). It seems, then, that the Laws themselves stand for the expert in justice (19–20), and that the *Crito*'s personified Laws play a similar role as Diotima's speech in Plato's *Symposium*: in each dialogue, Plato has Socrates disclaim knowledge of the question under discussion and, in an obvious case of a *mise en abyme*, has Socrates tells the story of an expert having his say about the issue at hand in the primary dialogue. The literary technique is not meant to deceive since the reader understands Socrates is playing ventriloquist: both Diotima and the Laws are speaking for him.

Reasons for Obeying the Laws

Some commentators[8] claim that Xenophon's Socrates never attempts to justify his legal positivism and that he is content to show that it is always *advantageous* to obey the law (cf. 4.4.16–17), and as a consequence it is always *just* to obey the law; but Socrates does in fact try to justify his legal positivism in 4.4.13. His argument can be broken down in the following way:

a) The person who lives in accordance with the state decrees (ὁ κατὰ ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος) shows respect for the law (νόμιμος).
b) The person who obeys the decrees (ὁ τούτοις πειθόμενος) does just things (δίκαια).
c) The person who does just things (τὰ δίκαια) is just (δίκαιος).
Conclusion: The person who is respectful of the law (νόμιμος) is therefore just (δίκαιος).

This argument is fallacious since premise b), which is essential to the argument because without it there would be no bridge from νόμιμος to δίκαιος, begs the

8 Striker 1987: 89, Johnson 2003: 263, 272, Danzig 2009: 282.

question: it takes for granted that the person who is respectful of the laws does just things, which is precisely the point that needs to be proven.

Once Socrates has "demonstrated" that justice consists in obeying the law, he tries to show that obedience to the law is always advantageous to the state and the individual. The rewards of obedience to the laws are reasons to obey them. For the state, the advantages are the following:

(i) The best leaders are law-abiding, and it is because it is law-abiding that Sparta is superior to other states (4.4.15).

(ii) Obedience to the laws ensures prosperity to the state in times of peace and invulnerability in times of war (4.4.15). Concorde, the result of obedience to the law, ensures the state's prosperity and strength (4.4.16).

The advantages accruing to law-abiding individuals appear even more numerous:

(iii) The law-abiding individual is sheltered from punishment and receives more honors (4.4.17).

(iv) Respect for the law increases the chances of success in a court of law (4.4.17).

(v) States and individuals place greater trust in law-abiding individuals. Even enemies, when concluding a truce or a treatise, place greater trust in law-abiding individuals (4.4.17). In short, the law-abiding individual is worthy of trust.

(vi) The law-abiding individual is more fair-minded (4.4.17).

(vii) The law-abiding individual is the best ally (4.4.17).

(viii) Since the law-abiding individual shows his gratitude (showing gratitude for a received benefit is a divine law, cf. 4.4.24), he is in turn more often rewarded (4.4.17).

(ix) Everyone prefers to be the friend of a law-abiding individual and everyone avoids being his enemy or waging war against him (4.4.17).

When Socrates, in conversation with his disciple Euthydemus, once again defines justice in 4.6.5–6, he develops a very different argument than the one he developed when in conversation with Hippias (4.4). Socrates once again identifies justice with what is legal, but he no longer justifies obedience to the laws by appealing to the incurred advantages; instead, his argument is reminiscent of his thesis on the impossibility of *akrasia*. In maintaining that it is not possible to do anything other than what one thinks one should do (4.6.6), Socrates reasserts his thesis that one always acts in conformity to what one believes

is best (cf. 3.9.4). Since laws express what is just, which corresponds to what must be done, and since humans always do what they know they must do, it follows that it is sufficient to have knowledge of the laws to do what is just. Socrates' definition of the just man closely parallels his definition of the pious man (cf. 4.6.4): just as it is sufficient to know the laws concerning the gods to be a pious man, which implies that it is not possible to act counter to this knowledge, in the same way, since humans always act in accordance with their knowledge of what they must do, and since laws are the expression of what they must do, it is sufficient to know the laws concerning humans to be a just man.

Let's move on to the *Crito*. The reasons for obeying the laws given in the Laws' speech[9] are very different than the ones given by Socrates in *Memorabilia*. Before going over these reasons, I wish to emphasize that the underlying principle at work in the *Crito* (that is, that one should never inflict wrong in return nor mistreat anyone in return, cf. 49b–c, Woozley 1971: 311) is a bone of contention between the two Socrateses since Xenophon's Socrates does not disapprove of harming one's enemies.[10] Let me list the main reasons for obeying the laws according to *Crito*, without trying to analyze how these reasons are related:

a) Breaking the law leads to nothing less than the destruction of the laws and of the state (cf. 50b, 50d1, 51a5, 52c9, 53b7, c1, 54c8).
b) Socrates made the commitment to obey the laws (cf. 50c4–6, 51e3, e6, 52a7–8, 52d8–e1, 53a5–6, 54c3–4).
c) Obeying the laws is an even more overriding duty than obeying one's parents inasmuch as the laws have borne, nourished, and educated Socrates (cf. 50d–51c).
d) Socrates would be doing harm to himself and his friends if he did not obey the laws (53a8–54a, 54c4–5).

It must be noted that none of these reasons is found in *Memorabilia*, not even the one (= c) that invokes the gratitude and gratefulness one must show toward the laws. Since Xenophon considers gratitude to be of great importance, most notably in 4.4.24, and since he discusses (2.2) the gratitude we owe our parents, one would have expected him to appeal to an argument similar to that

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9 It is clear that the Laws themselves present these reasons and that Socrates merely plays the role of their intermediary; however, for the purposes of the present study, I maintain that Socrates could have presented these reasons in his own name. Cf. Vlastos 1974: 519: "the harangue of the Laws is meant to develop a line of reasoning which in a different dramatic setting would have been laid out in the familiar Socratic style."

10 Cf. next section: *To mistreat or not to mistreat others*.

of the *Crito*. Moreover, it is surprising how Xenophon's Socrates is content to highlight the many advantages that come with obeying the law without ever alluding to the unfortunate consequences of disobeying them, while Plato's Socrates is content, on the contrary, to enumerate the fateful consequences of breaking the laws without ever alluding to the positive consequences of obeying them. This difference stems no doubt, in large part, to the context of the *Crito*: since Crito is proposing that Socrates escape and since that would constitute a flagrant case of disobedience to the state, it is natural that Socrates insist above all on the consequences of breaking the law. Although both Socrateses consider that virtue is useful and beneficial,[11] and should then agree that to be law-abiding is always advantageous, we cannot deny that it is only Xenophon's Socrates who highlights the advantages of legal obedience. I cannot then fully agree with D. Morrison when he compares the differences between the arguments of the *Crito* and of the *Memorabilia*:

> A comparison between Socrates' argument here (*sc. Mem.* 4.4) and his argument in the *Crito* will be useful. In the *Crito* Socrates argues that it is wrong to break the law because doing so damages the laws, and to damage the laws even a little bit is to wrong them, and one must never wrong anyone. This is a deontological argument. Here in *Memorabilia*, Socrates argues that it is wrong to break the law because the bad consequences over time of breaking laws outweigh any good consequences of the particular activities involved in the lawbreaking. This is a consequentialist argument.
>
> 1995: 337

In fact, Xenophon's Socrates does not say in *Mem.* 4.4 that breaking the law brings harm to the state or the individual, or that breaking the law, inasmuch as it is a form of injustice, corrupts the soul of the law-breaker. That is a position that seems specific to Plato's Socrates (cf. *Cri.* 47e). The great advantage of divine laws over human ones, for Xenophon's Socrates, lies in the fact that the transgressor cannot avoid divine punishment (cf. 4.4.21), which by implication means that it is not only possible to break human laws with impunity, it is also possible to break human laws without incurring any harm whatsoever, even the harm that one inflicts on one's soul simply as a result of breaking the law and committing an injustice.

11 Cf. *Cri.* 47e7, *Chrm.* 169b, *Alc.* I 118a, *Meno* 87e, 88c–d, 89a; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.6.9, 2.1.19, 2.6.1, 4.2.11, 4.5.3–6, 4.5.10.

One last difference I would like to emphasize is that, as regards the reasons for legal obedience, in the *Crito* there is no objection comparable to the one Hippias makes to Socrates in *Mem.*: "How can one regard laws or obedience to them as a serious thing when the very same people who enacted them often repudiate and alter them?" (4.4.14, tr. Tredennick/Waterfield). If laws are unstable and constantly being modified, it seems difficult to defend the position that justice is reducible to what is legal. Socrates' attempt to answer the objection is unsatisfactory (cf. Bandini and Dorion 2011b: 31 n. 2, 4).

To Mistreat or Not to Mistreat Others

As we saw in the last section, the fundamental principle underlying the argumentation of Plato's Socrates is that one must not answer injustice with injustice and that one must not mistreat someone in return (49b–c). In Socrates' view, mistreating other persons (Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους, 49c7) is no different from committing an injustice (τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει, 49c7–8). If mistreating other persons is equivalent to acting unjustly (ἀδικεῖν), this is not above all because doing so is illegal, but instead because mistreating other persons does harm to them, does wrong to them, which is one of the main meanings of the verb ἀδικεῖν. In this passage from the *Crito* (49b–c), it is no doubt significant that Socrates never alludes to the laws. Socrates is well aware that most people think that it is just to respond to mistreatment by mistreating in return (49c4–5). He knows that his position on this issue is not and never will be shared by the majority (49d2); therefore, it follows that his justification for this position cannot be based on an existing law. In other words, it is not an appeal to an established law that allows him to argue that it is unjust to respond to mistreatment by mistreating in return, but instead a shift in the meaning of the verb ἀδικεῖν. This verb can be translated by "harm" or "mistreat" and by "do wrong," so that if to harm or mistreat (κακουργεῖν, 49c2, c4; κακῶς ποιεῖν, 49c7, c10) others is to do wrong (ἀδικεῖν) to them, then it is unjust (οὐ δίκαιον, 49c5) to harm or mistreat others.

There is no choice but to admit, along with several other commentators,[12] that Xenophon's Socrates is far from sharing the position defended by Plato's Socrates and that, in complete opposition to him, he agrees with the many who

12 Cf. Luccioni 1953: 57, Vlastos 1971: 2, 1991: 297–300 ("Additional note 7.1: Plato vs. Xenophon on Socrates' rejection of retaliation"); Weil 1983: 472 n. 23, Morrison 1987: 16–18, Due 1989: 196–197, Bandini and Dorion 2011b: 44 n. 3 and Dorion 2013: XVI–XVII; for a contrary view, cf. Johnson 2005: 55–58.

believe (ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, 49b10–11) that it is just to answer injustice with injustice. In book 2 of the *Memorabilia*, Socrates has no scruples about stating that "the best quality in a man is to outdo his friends in acts of kindness and his enemies in acts of hostility (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς)" (2.6.35, tr. Tredennick/Waterfield). This is not the only passage in Xenophon where the principle that one should treat friends with kindness and enemies with hostility is stated with approval. In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates often indicates that it is an important principle that should be respected (see 2.2.2, 2.3.14, 4.2.15–17), and even Virtue (!) mentions it in the fable of Heracles at the crossroads (2.1.28). Moreover, Xenophon has various characters in his other works commend this principle.[13] But given that Plato's Socrates says, "One should never do wrong in return, nor mistreat any man, no matter how one has been mistreated by him" (49c10–11, tr. Grube), it is obvious that he could not possibly agree with Xenophon's Socrates when the latter claims that a man's virtue consists in his treating his enemies with hostility. It is true that Xenophon's Socrates does not explicitly say that it is just to mistreat one's enemies, but it seems clear that he does in fact hold this position, at least implicitly, for it is difficult to see how he could claim that a *man's virtue* (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν) has to do with his ability to commit unjust actions. However, the question of whether or not it is just to mistreat one's enemies is explicitly raised in *Mem.* 4.2.15–17. The passage in question confirms, beyond any possible doubt, that Xenophon's Socrates sees the mistreatment of enemies as just. And the fact that Euthydemus rapidly accepts Socrates' position—so rapidly that the latter has no need to present a long argument to support the claim that it is just to deceive one's enemies, to enslave them, and to plunder their possessions—clearly shows that his position is exactly the same as the one held by the majority of men. Does this mean that Xenophon's Socrates himself would mistreat anyone who mistreated him? There is no question that Xenophon's Socrates fully approves of the principle that he states in *Mem.* 2.6.35; however, it is legitimate to ask whether he himself actually put it into practice. At the very end of the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon praises Socrates' virtues and qualities one last time, he says that Socrates was "so just that he never did the slightest harm to anyone (δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα)" (4.8.11, tr. Tredennick/Waterfield, slightly modified). If Socrates never mistreated anyone, does this mean that he did not fully accept the principle

13 Cf., among other passages, *Cyr.* 1.4.25, 1.5.11, 1.6.17, 1.6.27, 3.3.15, 5.3.32, 6.3.24, 8.7.7, 8.8.28, *An.* 1.9.11, 5.5.14, 7.7.38, *Ages.* 1.17, 6.5, 7.7, 9.7, 11.12, *Hier.* 2.2, 6.12, *Hell.* 4.1.8, 4.1.10, 4.8.4, 4.8.23.

that one should treat friends with kindness and enemies with hostility? According to Johnson, this interpretation is indeed entailed by Xenophon's statement: "Xenophon says that Socrates was so just that he harmed no one even slightly, but was of the greatest benefit to those who dealt with him (4.8.10–11). This would imply that Xenophon's Socrates did not view the harming of enemies as just" (2005: 56; cf. also 2003: 270, Strauss 1972: 50). There are two reasons that prevent me from accepting this interpretation: 1) Johnson takes no account of the passages where Socrates explicitly approves of a general who harms his enemies (see, for example, *Mem.* 3.1.6); and 2) the context for this final recapitulation is exclusively Athenian in that, against those who maintain that Socrates' execution was justified, Xenophon wants to show that his teacher never did the slightest harm *to the Athenians*. In this apologetic context, it would be completely incongruous for Xenophon to suggest that Socrates never did the slightest harm to enemies!

Exemplary Political Leaders and Obedience to the Laws of the State

In his discussion with Hippias, Socrates stresses the exemplary nature of political leaders (*Mem.* 4.4.15). By providing the example of perfect obedience to the laws of the state, political leaders prompt their fellow citizens to obey them too. It is as if, in themselves, the laws of the state are incapable of imposing the respect that is their due, but that political leaders, through their own example of respect for the laws, can inspire their fellow citizens to emulate this respect.[14] Xenophon is very much convinced of the truth of this position, and he frequently appeals to it in his works:

> And it is the same with these as with everything else: whenever the officer in charge is better (ὅταν μὲν ὁ ἐπιστάτης βελτίων γένηται), the administration of the institutions is purer (καθαρώτερον τὰ νόμιμα πράττεται); but when he is worse (χείρων), the administration is more corrupt (φαυλότερον).
>
> *Cyr.* 8.1.8, tr. MILLER

> Among the greatest services he (sc. Agesilaus) rendered to his fatherland I reckon the fact that, though the most powerful man in the state, he

14 Cf. Azoulay 2008: XIII: Xenophon "n' accorde aucune confiance aux règles légales dès lors qu' elles ne sont plus garanties par la présence d' un gardien efficace."

> was clearly a devoted servant of the laws (φανερὸς ἦν μάλιστα τοῖς νόμοις λατρεύων). For who would be minded to disobey when he saw the king obeying (ὁρῶν τὸν βασιλέα πειθόμενον)?
>
> *Ages.* 7.2, tr. MARCHANT

> But at Sparta the most important men show the utmost deference to the magistrates: they pride themselves on their humility, on running instead of walking to answer any call, in the belief that, if they lead, the rest will follow along the path of eager obedience (τοῦ σφόδρα πείθεσθαι). And so it has proved.
>
> *Lac.* 8.2, tr. MARCHANT

Like Socrates in the *Memorabilia* (4.4.15), Xenophon, in the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* (8.1), praises Lycurgus for having made his fellow citizens very obedient to the laws and magistrates (see also 1.2, 2.10, 2.14, 4.6; Richer 2007: 422). Xenophon states many times that through the respect that they show for the laws, chief magistrates condition and predispose their fellow citizens to obey them too (cf. *Lac.* 15.7, *Cyr.* 8.8.5, *Vect.* 1.1). If citizens perceive that their own political leaders do not obey the laws of the states, it is very unlikely that they themselves will be inclined to zealously obey them. This is a new illustration of the great importance that Xenophon attaches to the virtue of providing examples (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.3 and Bandini and Dorion 2000: 74 n. 68). Thus the political responsibility of the state's leaders is tremendous, since the virtue of the state depends on theirs. To see that this is true, it suffices to read the introductory statement in *Ways and Means*: "For my part I have always held that the constitution of a state reflects the character of the leading politicians (ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ πρόσταται ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι)." This conviction, which is at the heart of Xenophon's ethical and political thought, is stated again in the epilogue to the *Cyropaedia*: "For, whatever the character of the rulers is (ὁποῖοί τινες γὰρ ἂν οἱ πρόσταται ὦσι), such also that of the people under them for the most part becomes (τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνονται)" (8.8.5).[15] It follows that if a depraved political leader who had come to power did not respect the laws of the state himself, then his people would inevitably not respect them either. The superiority that the political leader has over the

15 In these two passages, the causal connection between the morals of the political leaders and those of the people under them is clearly indicated by the succession of the verbs "be" and "become": the way that the political leaders *are* is the way that their subjects *become*. See also *Ages.* 11.6 and *Hell.* 3.2.7.

law is paradoxically acknowledged in a passage in the *Cyropaedia* where Xenophon acknowledges that written laws help to make men better:

> For he (*sc.* Cyrus) thought he perceived that men are made better (βελτίους) through even the written law (διὰ τοὺς γραφομένους νόμους), while the good ruler (τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα) he regarded as a law with eyes (βλέποντα νόμον) for men, because he is able (ἱκανός) not only to give commandments (τάττειν) but also to see the transgressor (ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα) and punish (κολάζειν) him.
>
> *Cyr.* 8.1.22, tr. MILLER

The superiority of the good ruler over written laws derives from the fact that, contrary to the latter, he can impose discipline as well as detect and punish those who are undisciplined. It follows that the good ruler can improve men even more than written laws can. For contrary to written laws, which are blind, the good ruler is a "law that sees" (βλέποντα νόμον).

In contrast to what we observe in Xenophon, Plato's Socrates never invokes the exemplary nature of political leaders as a possible basis or justification for obedience to the laws of the state. Given that Plato's Socrates is much more critical of political leaders than Xenophon's Socrates—indeed, so much more so that he never suggests that any political leader possesses the virtues and the competencies necessary for good leadership—it is not astonishing that he makes no appeal to the exemplary nature of leaders as a possible justification for obedience to the laws of the state. In the *Menexenus* (238c), Socrates asserts, not that political leaders give the *politeia* its good or bad character, but that, on the contrary, the *politeia* is responsible for the qualities and defects of character of individual citizens: "For a polity molds its people (πολιτεία γὰρ τροφὴ ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν); a goodly one molds good men, the opposite bad (καλὴ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐναντία κακῶν)." To the extent that the *politeia* is a political regime constituted by a set of laws, Socrates' position amounts to saying that it is the laws of the state, not its political leaders that shape men to be good or bad. In Socrates' discussion with the Laws in the *Crito*, we are given to understand that laws are in themselves a sufficient justification for our obeying them and that the exemplary nature of political leaders is neither necessary nor relevant to this obedience. Moreover, the exemplary nature of political leaders is never invoked in the *Crito* as a factor that would favor greater obedience to the laws of the state on the part of citizens. One could of course object that the discussion with the Laws is made possible by the rhetorical device of prosopopoeia, and that the very fact that the Laws make a justificatory speech, which differs from the letter itself of the laws of the state, demonstrates that the latter are inca-

pable, in themselves, of indicating the reason why citizens should obey them. On closer examination, however, the discussion with the Laws gives an example of a speech justifying obedience to the law that to a certain extent anticipates an argumentative device used in the *Laws*, namely the use of preambles before the actual texts of the laws to encourage obeying them and to provide valid reasons for doing so.

Be that as it may, there is an obvious parallel between, on the one hand, the importance that both Socrates are prepared, or not prepared, to give to the role of examples in the acquisition of virtue and, on the other hand, the importance that they are prepared, or not prepared, to give to the role of the exemplary nature of political leaders in prompting citizens to obey the laws of the state. In the same way that Xenophon's Socrates considers that the example of a teacher who embodies a virtue is a determining factor in the acquisition of that virtue by a disciple,[16] he also considers that exemplary political leaders who obey the laws of the city scrupulously provide essential encouragement to their fellow citizens to do the same. Adopting a completely opposite position because of his intellectualism, Plato's Socrates does not believe that imitating a teacher who embodies a virtue is sufficient for acquiring that virtue oneself. Thus it is not astonishing that he also does not believe that having exemplary political leaders suffices to ensure that the body politic obey the laws of the city.

Socrates' Instances of Disobedience

Both Plato and Xenophon report that on some occasions Socrates disobeyed an order, and even broke the law. These cases of disobedience raise the question of the coherence between Socrates' thought and his life. Let's first recall the cases of disobedience:

a) Socrates refused to obey the order of the Thirty to arrest Leon of Salamis (cf. Plato, *Ap.* 32c–d and Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.4.3).
b) Socrates disobeyed the order (perhaps even the law) of the Thirty that forbade him from conversing with the young (cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.4.3).
c) Socrates informs the judges that if they acquit him on condition that he stop philosophizing, he will disobey because of his loyalty to the god who orders him to philosophize (cf. Plato, *Ap.* 29c–d).

16 Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.3, 1.2.17–18, 1.3.1, 1.5.6, 4.4.10–11, *Oec.* 12.19, *Symp.* 8.27.

Although this last case (= c) is not an instance of actual disobedience, since in the end the judges did find him guilty and condemned him to death, it raises a serious problem of coherence since Socrates seems ready to disobey a judgment of the court, even though he says in the *Crito* (51b–c) that one must always accept the laws and orders of the state, including the judgments of its courts. It is a well-known problem, about which much has been written; for the moment I have nothing new to add to the numerous attempts at reconciling these two passages.

The only case of disobedience that is reported by both Plato and Xenophon is Socrates' refusal to obey the Thirty's order to arrest Leon of Salamis. Xenophon, however, provides an important detail that is missing from the parallel passage in Plato's *Apology* (see Kraut 1984: 19 n. 31). Xenophon points out that the order to arrest Leon of Salamis was illegal (παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, *Mem.* 4.4.3), while Plato's Socrates, who does point out that the common trial that condemned the ten generals who fought the battle of Arginusae was illegal, (cf. *Ap.* 32b4: παρανόμως; b6: παρὰ τοὺς νόμους), only says that the order to arrest Leon of Salamis was unjust (cf. *Ap.* 32d3: ἄδικον; d5: ἄδικόν τι). Does this mean the order was unjust but not illegal? If we accept Xenophon's testimony, as Brickhouse and Smith do (see 1989: 190–191), Socrates' refusal to comply with the order of the Thirty is not incompatible with the argument from the *Crito* that one should always obey the law. But in accordance with what law(s) does Socrates refuse to obey the order to arrest Leon? According to Ober (2000: 541, 548–550), it was the "ancestral law code" of the democracy. But why then does Plato not make it clear that the order was "illegal"? Furthermore, Xenophon's authority has been disputed by Colson in an article published in 1985. After recalling a passage from the *Constitution of Athens* (37.1) that reports "a law that gave the Thirty absolute powers to execute any citizens not members of the roll of Three Thousand," which means that by refusing to arrest Leon Socrates was breaking the law, Colson attributes to Xenophon's apologetic zeal his remark that the order to arrest Leon was illegal.[17]

Finally, Xenophon is alone in reporting that Socrates disobeyed the order prohibiting him from teaching the *logôn tekhnê* and conversing with the young. According to *Mem.* 4.4.3, Socrates disobeyed an *order* of the Thirty (οἱ τριάκοντα προσέταττον αὐτῷ) that appeared *illegal* to him (παρὰ τοὺς νόμους). One can of

17 Colson 1985: 140: "Xenophon seems to have been carried away by his admitted purpose [*sc.* "to demonstrate Socrates' 'scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required'" 139], so carried away in fact that he makes unfounded assertions. And, of course, if we doubt Xenophon's reliability in this matter, then the very strict reading of Brickhouse and Smith loses whatever ancient support it enjoyed."

course refuse to obey an order and be respectful of the law, but only if, of course, the order is illegal. The problem is that the order Socrates failed to comply with, according to 4.4.3, is said to be a law in 1.2.31 sq.: the prohibition of discussing with the young has the status of an order in 4.4.3 and the status of a law in 1.2.31 sq. We should not try to dodge the issue: the textual problem is real. When Critias and Charicles show Socrates the law that prohibits him from conversing with the young, Socrates answers that he is willing to obey the *laws* (1.2.34: παρεσκεύασμαι μὲν πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις). Does Socrates mean to say that he is willing to obey the laws put in place before the Thirty, which did not prohibit him from conversing with the young?[18] The laws Socrates says he is willing to obey in 1.2.34 are perhaps the very ones in the name of which he refuses to comply to the order of the Thirty according to 4.4.3. This hypothesis, however, raises another problem, the problem of the criteria that determine, in cases when laws conflict with one another, which law ought to be followed. To the extent that justice consists in obeying established laws (cf. 4.4.12), is Socrates not obliged to obey the laws of the Thirty, even when these laws are contrary to the laws of the previous regime? This is a necessary consequence of the definition of justice, unless Socrates considers the Thirty is a tyrannical regime that governs with no regard for the rule of law (cf. 4.6.12). This is the conclusion Morrison draws from 4.6.12: "Since the just is lawful, it follows that kingship, thus defined, is just, and tyranny unjust" (1995: 342). If tyranny is by definition unjust, because it governs without any regard for the rule of law, and if Socrates considers that the Thirty are tyrants, then it follows that Socrates did not break a law of the Thirty since the so-called "law" was not a law in the first place.

The Link between Human Laws and Divine Laws

After having shown, in the case of positive law, that justice consists in the law and strict obedience to the law (4.4.12–18), Xenophon's Socrates tries to demonstrate that the same holds for "divine" law, in other words that justice also consists in obeying the unwritten laws (ἄγραφοι νόμοι), which are of divine origin (4.4.19–24). Moreover, there is no conflict between positive law and divine law, as Hippias contends (*Prt.* 337d), since a great harmony reigns between positive laws and unwritten laws. One could argue that Socrates' demonstration does not consider the possibility of a conflict between human legislation and the unwritten legislation. In fact, Xenophon wants to show that: (1) the

18 Cf. Bandini and Dorion 2000: 18 n. 123, Dorion 2010: 311–313.

unwritten laws are not simply in agreement with the positive laws; they are their very foundation; (2) breaking the unwritten laws triggers inevitable divine retribution, so it is never profitable or advantageous to disobey them (cf. *Mem.* 4.4.22–24.); (3) justice coincides with obedience to unwritten laws, which confirms that justice also coincides with obedience to positive laws.

At the end of Plato's *Crito* (54c), the Laws point out to Socrates that the laws governing Hades are their "brothers" (καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι, 54c6–7) and won't provide a warm welcome when they hear that he undertook to destroy the laws of the state by disobeying them. Plato does not tell us much more about the link between the laws of the state and the laws of Hades: they have family ties (they are "brothers") and show solidarity (the laws governing Hades will not allow disobedience to the human laws to go unpunished), although the relationship between human and divine laws are not as close, and are not as fully worked out and detailed as they are in the *Memorabilia*.

The Refusal of Rhetoric and Respect for the Law

By way of conclusion, I wish to comment on a passage from *Memorabilia* where Xenophon appeals to the idea of respect for the law to justify behavior from Socrates that is also found in Plato's *Apology*, but that Plato, unlike Xenophon, does not justify by Socrates' respect for the law. This is the passage:

> When he was facing prosecution by Meletus, he rejected as illegal (παρὰ τοὺς νόμους) the usual practice in courts of law. All other accused persons used to address the jury ingratiatingly and flatter them and appeal to them illegally (παρὰ τοὺς νόμους), and many of them by this sort of behaviour often secured an acquittal. But although Socrates might easily have been acquitted if he had made even a moderate concession to common practice, he chose to abide by the law (τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων) and die, rather than break it (παρανομῶν) and live.
>
> *Mem.* 4.4.4, tr. TREDENNICK/WATERFIELD

In Plato's *Apology* (34c–35d, 38d–e), Socrates explains at length that he refuses to defend himself, and undoubtedly win an acquittal, by resorting to the customary "tricks" and behavior that defendants employ to appeal to the judges' pity. Socrates refuses to shed tears (34c), to parade his children and play for the gallery (34c–d), to call his family and friends to the stand (34c). Three times Xenophon says that resorting to this type of behavior is illegal (παρὰ τοὺς

νόμους (bis), παρανομῶν). But in the parallel passage in Plato's *Apology* (34c–35d), Socrates' refusal to resort to these means is not based on their being illegal but on the fact that it is unworthy of a man to be ready to say and do anything (ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, 38d5; πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, 39a6) to secure his freedom, as if death was the supreme evil that one needed to avoid at all cost. In fact, in Plato's *Apology* Socrates is hostile to these methods not because they are illegal[19] but because they belong to the arsenal of rhetorical flattery, as can be seen in a passage from the *Gorgias* (κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς, 522d7). After he learns the result of the vote that condemns him to death, Socrates repeats that his refusal to resort to the usual means of securing an acquittal stems from their indignity (cf. 38d–e). Nevertheless, Socrates acknowledges that these means are illegal, *in addition to being shameful*, because as a consequence of their use justice is being rendered as if it consisted in nothing more than obtaining the sympathy of the judges at the cost of shedding a few tears, and not in coming to a rational decision based on the facts of the case and compliance with the law (cf. 35c–d). In short, the appeals to pity are not in themselves illegal; what is illegal is their use to incite the judges to make decisions on the basis of reasons that are irrelevant to justice and the law, as a consequence of which the judges inevitably break their oath to judge the case in accordance to the law (cf. Lysias 14.22). It is for this reason, and only for this reason, that the appeals to pity are illegal.[20]

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19 Cf. Burnet 1924: 144–145, Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 202 n. 61–62, 206.

20 However, in an important passage at the beginning of the *Rhetoric* (1.1, 1354a14–26), Aristotle reports that some cities have laws that expressly prohibit the procedures that orators use to rouse the emotions of judges.

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Plato's *Statesman* and Xenophon's Cyrus*

Carol Atack

This paper examines the relationship between the political thought of Plato and Xenophon, by positioning both as post-Socratic political theorists. It seeks to show that Xenophon and Plato examine similar themes and participate in a shared discourse in their later political thought, and, in particular, that Plato is responding to Xenophon, with the *Statesman* exploring similar themes to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which itself responds to sections of Plato's *Republic*. Both writers explore the themes of the shepherd king and the *kairos* as attributes of the excellent leader, and both use temporality and political ontology to do so. As a result, Xenophon's original contributions to fourth-century BCE political theory should be re-evaluated; his account of episodes in Cyrus' political development shows him to be participating in a specific mid-fourth century BCE political discourse in which theorists, including Isocrates and later Aristotle as well as Xenophon and Plato, explored the virtue of the good leader.[1] Such a reading generates a different assessment from that produced by 'realist' readings of his work, which treat Xenophon as a utilitarian purveyor of Machiavellian power politics. It also answers the claims of analytic philosophers such as Gregory Vlastos, who rejected Xenophon's account of Socrates for its lack of philosophical rigour, by showing that both Xenophon and Plato engaged in the same discussions, at a point when both were keen to show that their political thought has moved on from concepts such as *basilikē technē* that they associated with Socrates.[2]

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1 As exemplified by readings of the *Cyropaedia* which position Cyrus as 'Xenophon's *Prince*', such as Tatum 1989, Newell 1983, and particularly Nadon 2001. However, reading Xenophon as a precursor to Machiavelli may not be the most fruitful approach (cf. Rasmussen 2009), and may fall foul of the danger of prolepsis, identified by JGA Pocock and Quentin Skinner as a weakness of non-contextualist readings of historical political thought (Pocock 2009, Skinner 1969: 22–27), also Skinner 2002: 72–79. Although Pocock and Skinner's Cambridge School methodology has been criticised from a Straussian perspective (e.g., Major 2005), the Straussian flavour of much scholarship on the *Cyropaedia* means that a Cambridge School reading can provide a valuable alternative route to interpreting Xenophon's arguments.

2 Vlastos 1983, criticised by Morrison 1987, and Wood and Wood 1986. For more on the contested concept of *basilikē technē* see n. 20 and 21, and especially Dorion 2004, now also Dorion 2013:

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This reading of Xenophon positions his theories of leadership and kingship within a broader debate on monarchy as a form of political rule that takes place within fourth-century Greek political thought. It shows how both Plato and Xenophon use the *topos* of single-person rule, with Xenophon's narrative account in the *Cyropaedia* addressing many themes that Plato in the *Statesman* explores through more obviously ontological and epistemological enquiry. That both works cover similar theoretical ground has been suggested by several scholars, each with differing approaches both to these texts and to their political theory (see Ray 1992, Breebaart 1983, and Skemp 1952: 59–61). To these readers, it is apparent that Xenophon's narrative addresses the same concerns as Plato's dialogue. By focusing on the presence of these more abstract concerns, identified through the appearance of key themes and terms within the narrative of the *Cyropaedia*, it is possible to develop a reading that acknowledges Xenophon as a political theorist and philosopher with complex ideas of his own and a deep engagement with the concerns of his contemporaries.[3] When Xenophon is resituated in his intellectual context, it becomes possible to discern the discourse in which he participates and his contribution to it more clearly.

Chronology and Context

There is no entirely secure, detailed chronology for the works of either Xenophon or Plato, but both the *Cyropaedia* and the *Statesman* are broadly held to date to the 360s BCE, and they can be read as more-or-less contemporary, and perhaps, overlapping contributions to the same discourse (see Brandwood 1992

147–169. *basilikē technē* will re-emerge at the end of Plato's *Statesman* (*Plt.* 311c1–2), but as a thoroughly reconceptualised and somewhat mystical process of weaving together good citizens into the secure fabric of a unified city.

3 Although this paper is focused on the relationship between the ideas of the *Cyropaedia* and the *Statesman*, this relationship also has implications for Aristotle's use of the *Cyropaedia* in sections of his *Politics*; where Kevin Cherry (Cherry 2012) explores in detail the well-known interchange between the *Statesman* and the *Politics*, he does not consider Aristotle's use of Xenophon (cf. Campbell 1867: liv–lvi). But key themes of both the *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, notably geometric mechanisms for distributive justice (e.g., *Eth. Nic.* 5.3.1131a10–b24, *Pol.* 3.12.1282b14–1283a3, Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.17–28, 2.3.7–16), and the friendship of rulers (*Eth. Nic.* 8.10.1160b22–32, *Pol.* 3.16.1287b25–36, *Cyr.* 8.2.1–4, 13, 19), are explored by Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia*; see also Tamiolaki's exploration of the relationship between Plato and Xenophon's thought on friendship in the *Lysis* and *Memorabilia* in this volume 433–460.

and Vlastos 1991: 45–53). 'Publication' is a fuzzy concept in a world of oral discussion, authorial revision, and copied manuscripts, and the diffusion of each author's ideas might not necessarily coincide with the completion and dissemination of a specific work. What we can say is that there was a period when both Plato and Xenophon were actively engaged with problems of the political life (often within an Athenian context), as was Isocrates, and that their works of this period address many of the same themes (see El Murr 2014: 112). In both the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia*, they explore the nature of the excellence of the good ruler.

The *Statesman* is usually held to be a late dialogue, on the grounds of both language and content (Skemp 1952: 13–17). In a developmental model of Plato's political philosophy, it is positioned between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, as a marker of a growing pragmatism; it also shows Plato repositioning his political philosophy, in presenting it through the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates.[4] Skemp, drawing on earlier scholarship, depends on similarities between the political philosophy of the *Statesman* and the Platonic epistles, especially the *Seventh Letter*, to date the dialogue to 366–362 BCE (although he also draws attention to the shared context of the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia*).[5]

Mapping Xenophon's literary career has been even more difficult. That Xenophon spent much of his adult life outside Athens, on his estate at Scillus, complicates the assessment of his involvement with his home city; his return to the city (probably in 369 BCE) may mark (in a developmental reading) the beginning of a re-engagement with Athenian culture.[6] But the circumstances under which he wrote remain uncertain, although unitarian models, such as that of Higgins, which place the bulk of his literary production towards the end of

4 Schofield (2006: 2–4, 120–121) suggests that there is a change of emphasis and context rather than substantive change of underlying philosophy between the *Republic* and *Statesman*; the Athenian context of the later sections of the *Statesman* (especially the democratic and legal language at *Plt*. 298d5–299e5) supports such a reading.

5 Skemp 1952: 13–17. One advantage of situating the *Statesman* in relation to the *Cyropaedia* is that it removes the need to depend on the *Epistles* or posited journeys to Syracuse to date or motivate Plato's political theory. For an overview of scholarship on connections between Plato and Xenophon, see Gabriel Danzig's introduction, 1–30 in this volume.

6 Delebecque 1957: 342–344; Higgins 1977; Gera 1993: 24. Delebecque emphasises the Athenian political context of the theorising he finds in the final sections of the *Cyropaedia*. Gera suggests that Cyrus' forgiving attitude to the Armenians' execution of the Socrates-like sophist (3.1.38–40) marks a rapprochement with the Athenians after their execution of Socrates. However, another function of this intriguing episode is to mark the space between Xenophon's thought in the *Cyropaedia* and the more Socratic thought marked by the direct presence of Socrates in the *Memorabilia*.

his life, are the more credible (Higgins 1977: 48, 156 n. 22). Historical allusions within his works suggest some dates, although questions over the date of the satraps' revolt and whether 8.8.4 provides an allusion to it mean that this does not determine a *terminus post quem* for the *Cyropaedia*.[7]

This context supplies motivations for both authors to participate in the discourse of kingship that flourished in Athenian political thought during this period.[8] Both Plato and Xenophon have been seen to be responding to the thought of Isocrates, particularly as expressed in his 'Cyprian' orations (thought to date from the late 370s or early 360s, so probably just prior to the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia*), which explore the possibility of ideal kingship through an exhortation to and address by Nicocles of Salamis, and an encomium to his father Evagoras, a tyrant honoured by Athens.[9] The common political imagery used, and topics addressed by all three writers, suggest that they may be participating in a shared discourse (Brock 2004: 247–251).

Since antiquity, commentators have linked the *Cyropaedia* and Plato's political thought. Aulus Gellius (*NA* 14.3.3) suggested that the *Cyropaedia* was a response to the early part of the *Republic*. In turn, Plato's presentation of Cyrus and the failure of Persian monarchy to transmit stable government (Pl. *Leg.* 3.694a–698a) has been read as a response to the *Cyropaedia*, in which the twin failings of political extremes represented by Athenian political and cultural decline into *theatrokratia* and Persian despotism are presented as parallels.[10] But explicit direct comparisons of the argument of the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia* have rarely been made, despite the overlap in subject matter, themes, and imagery.[11]

The relative chronological positions of the *Cyropaedia*, *Republic*, and *Statesman* within this framework are more problematic. Mueller-Goldingen has argued that the *Cyropaedia* is a response to the *Statesman*, but it is equally possible to read the *Statesman* as a response to the *Cyropaedia* (Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 51–52). The length of the latter text, and the possibility that some of its final sections are later additions (and that other significant passages may

7 Delebecque 1957: 404–405; Gera 1993: 23. Of course, this dates the end of the work, and the first books may well date from several years before this terminus.

8 See Atack, 'Debating kingship: models of monarchy in fifth- and fourth-century BCE Greek political thought', PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 2014) on this discourse, and Mitchell 2013 for its historical context.

9 See Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 61–63; Lane 2012: 194–195. On the dating of Isocrates' Cyprian works see Norlin and Van Hook 1928–1945: I.74–75, Mandilaras 2003: I.6.

10 Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 52–53; Dorion 2002; Danzig 2003; Hirsch 1985: 97–100.

11 Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 47–48 and Ray 1992 are notable exceptions to this.

be interpolations), complicate the picture. Bizos surveys a range of suggested dates centred in the 360s; Delebecque suggests a later context for the epilogue, as a response to the end of the reign of Artaxerxes II between 362 and 359 (Delebecque 1957: 405–409, Bizos 1971: xlvi–xlvii). So it remains possible that the early part of the *Cyropaedia* can both generate a response from Plato in the *Statesman* while the later parts respond to that text. This perhaps provides a motivation for the change of emphasis in the final books, and possibly even for the disputed final section.

Both texts present a political philosophy that moves on from that based on ideas attributed to Socrates, and for which Socrates was the appropriate mouthpiece. While Plato's *Republic* is conventionally held to show Plato moving beyond the teachings of Socrates, in developing his metaphysical and epistemological thought, and the *Statesman* is seen to complete that process, there is no such consensus on such a development taking place in Xenophon's work, which is usually held to lack the epistemological sophistication of the later Plato.[12] However, reading the *Statesman* and the *Cyropaedia* together suggests that Xenophon too is developing his political theory away from the close association with Socratic thought more evident in the *Memorabilia*.[13]

Just as Socrates in the *Statesman* stays in the background, with the Eleatic Stranger and Young Socrates participating in the discussion, Socrates seems marginal to the *Cyropaedia*, in which he obviously is not present as a character, unlike the *Memorabilia* and *Symposium* where he is a voluble presence. Socratic teaching is hinted at in the story of the sophist who taught Tigranes, the Armenian prince, but was put to death by his father (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.14, 38–40). Cyrus shows a great deal of interest in this story, remembering that the sophist 'used to hunt with them' (συνεθήρα, 3.1.14, 38). But this Socratic character belongs to the past, and his ideas cannot help Cyrus develop the political style he needs to govern the new political entity he is creating; Cyrus' eventual leniency towards Tigranes' father is based on his own assessment of the expedient rather

12 Although Xenophon shows some awareness of the language of Platonic metaphysics, for example at 7.5.44 where Cyrus assesses his separation from the *homotimoi* as a calculation (λογίζομαι) conducted in terms of parts (μέρος) and participation (μετεσόμενον, μετέσται). Vlastos' strong separation between Xenophon's focus on the practical and Plato's on the intellectual (Vlastos 1983: 508) is overstated.

13 The *Oeconomicus*, in which Socrates plays a supporting role as a facilitator rather than leader of the dialogue similar to that of some later Platonic dialogues, might provide a transition within Xenophon's work. The role of Socrates in this dialogue and its interest in Persian rulers and political arrangements (*Oec.* 4.18, 12.20, 14.6–7) can be taken to support the idea that Xenophon here developed his ideas beyond those he attributed to Socrates.

than Tigranes' argument. The dialogic style of some episodes of the *Cyropaedia* (such as the subsequent discussion between Tigranes and Cyrus, and the encounters between Cyrus and his father) may also suggest a Socratic flavour, but their dialogue is much more like the directed and plodding exchanges of the Eleatic and Athenian Strangers and their interlocutors in Plato's later dialogues than the lively wit of Socrates' dialogic exchanges in Plato's early dialogues, or even the humorous exchanges of Xenophon's own *Symposium*.[14] The absence of Socrates from the *Cyropaedia* makes it less clear which characters' views readers should prefer.[15] While various characters, including Cambyses (1.6.38–46) and Cyrus himself, present arguments that Xenophon might be thought to sympathise with, such speeches are not reported with the authorial approval that marks Xenophon's presentation of Socrates in the *Memorabilia*.[16]

Melina Tamiolaki has suggested that Xenophon operates a complex hierarchy of leadership, in which Socrates represents one form of virtual ideal, and characters such as Cyrus and Agesilaus achieve a separate kind of success; a separation between virtue and leadership drives this reading, in which Socrates as a paradigm of virtue cannot provide a suitable model for political leaders, and indeed his own involvement in politics might be detrimental to his own reputation for virtue (Tamiolaki 2012: 580–586). The effective distancing of Socrates in the *Cyropaedia*, through the story of Tigranes' teacher, supports this reading.[17] Tamiolaki suggests that Cyrus, as a non-ideal leader, inevitably fails to

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14 Whether either Plato or Xenophon uses characters other than Socrates, such as Cambyses or the Eleatic Stranger, as mouthpieces for arguments they wish readers to accept, is a further question here. Plato's use of the Eleatic Stranger may complicate interpretation, because he represents a philosophy with which Plato's own thought is in dialogue; the grand unity of Eleatic metaphysics seems to be parodied in the multiplicity of the cosmos represented by the cosmology of the Eleatic Stranger's myth, while the pedantry and pomposity of the divisions of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* occasionally seem to have a comic tone. However, there is no consistent presentation of the Eleatic Stranger in this respect. While his divisions and mythology early in the *Statesman* seem intended to be questioned, the slightly combative presentation of the Eleatic Stranger and his ideas falls away in the final part of the dialogue.

15 Although, as Deborah Gera has argued, other characters in the *Cyropaedia* may stand in for Socrates as intellectual authorities, and Xenophon's depiction of Socrates across his works is far from unified (Gera 2007).

16 For example, the chapter introductions at *Mem.* 1.4.1 (on the benefits of the *elenchos*) 2.4.1 (usefulness of Socrates' views on friendship), and 3.1.1 (Socrates helps the ambitious achieve their goals), which present Socrates as a source of useful advice.

17 On a historical reading, the presence of Socrates would be an anachronism, but the dis-

meet the standards that Xenophon sets with his idealised Socrates (Tamiolaki 2012: 571–578). The ambivalence that many readers find in Xenophon's presentation of Cyrus as king, particularly after his conquest of Babylon, confirms this. But Xenophon has already established Cyrus as a model of excellence in rule, and as possessing many physical and intellectual qualities in an extreme degree (1.2.1, 8.1.39). His question from 7.5.37 onwards, when Cyrus decides to present himself 'as he himself thought befitted a king' (αὐτὸς ὡς βασιλεῖ ἡγεῖτο πρέπειν), picking up and expanding the initial enquiry of 1.1, is how Cyrus can rule over an empire of disparate and separated peoples, rather than over a close-knit group of peers as a virtue king.[18] The problem that Xenophon explores in the final sections of the *Cyropaedia* is the difficulty in applying the virtue model to rule at the scale of empire rather than polis; his relationship with his peers changes as they become his subordinate satraps in governing peoples who will never, like the Persian commoners (2.1.9–31), benefit from his direct attention.[19]

Basilikē technē and Knowledge in Plato and Xenophon

The new model of virtue kingship provides a means for redescribing the difference between ruler and ruled. An existing model used by both Plato (*Euthydemus*, *Statesman*) and Xenophon (*Memorabilia*) was the concept of *basilikē technē*, the top-level science of rule within the polis, providing a distinction between ruler and ruled that might be identified either with reference to activities performed or the intellectual status of the ruler. Perceived differences in their use of this concept have formed the basis of attempts to distinguish Plato's Socrates from Xenophon's, but it is overly simplistic to say that Xenophon's

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tancing of a character who is clearly meant to represent Socrates achieves the effect of distancing Socrates himself.

18 The model of virtue kingship is developed by Isocrates in his *Nicocles* (29–47) and *To Nicocles* (9–39) and reflected by Xenophon most clearly in his *Agesilaus* (for example, in describing Agesilaus as being a model of virtue, *Agesilaus* 10.2). In this model, kings provide a 'model' (παράδειγμα, *Nicocles* 37) for their subjects to imitate, thus enabling them to share in human flourishing (cf. *To Nicocles* 31). Xenophon identifies Cyrus as a *paradeigma* for his nobles at 8.1.39, and Cyrus encourages the Persians to be good examples themselves (7.5.86).

19 Xenophon's account of Cyrus' arming and training the Persian commoners within his military structure thus provides a contrast to his different approach at the scale of empire, where he restricts access to arms by conquered peoples (7.5.79). For an account of the political theory of *Cyropaedia* 7.5.37-end as an exploration of the problem of maintaining virtue kingship at the scale of empire, see Atack 2014 (n. 8: 158–172).

Socrates identifies a more pragmatic and political version of the skill than the philosophical version offered by Plato's Socrates. What is interesting is the way in which, in the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia*, both authors move away from this concept of kingship, from this earlier point where their work seems in particularly close contact.[20]

Plato's use of *basilikē technē* in his *Euthydemus*—a very difficult dialogue to place within any developmental model of Plato's works—points to its Socratic origin and continues to analyse it, showing how it was contested within the Socratic tradition.[21] Both the *Euthydemus* and the *Memorabilia* are concerned with positioning Socratic thought against alternative education systems and philosophies. In the *Euthydemus*, *basilikē technē* appears to be the name for a science that governs other sciences, one that is the same as *politikē technē* (291c4–5), but that eventually eludes definition (291b1–c1), leaving this part of the dialogue aporetic.[22] Attempting to define this science and its relationship to other crafts is likened by Socrates to navigating a labyrinth (291b7)—itself a concept associated with kings, as in Herodotus' description of the Egyptian kings' labyrinth (Hdt. 2.148).

Xenophon's Socrates likewise makes use of the term, although the circumstances in which it is introduced as a concept in the *Memorabilia*, suggested by the political quietist Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1.17), suggest that the concept was one that featured in several Socratic traditions.[23] Aristippus' summary of Socrates' political thought has been used to identify a realist strain in Xenophon's

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20 Dorion 2004 outlines the similarities and differences in both authors' accounts of *basilikē technē* with a more sympathetic reading of Xenophon than that offered by Vlastos (1983). I explore Plato and Xenophon's use of *basilikē technē* in greater detail in my doctoral thesis (n. 8: 97–122).

21 That the concept of *basilikē technē* appears within Socrates' discussion with Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1), which also contains the important retelling of Prodicus' fable of the Choice of Heracles, suggests that it is an important concept in Socratic political thought (cf. Strauss 1972). Likewise its function in the *Euthydemus*, which also presents different philosophies in dialogue; but we cannot trace it to other Socratics through extant texts.

22 Roochnik 1990; Parry 2003. Parry argues that the problem of identifying the ruling craft is solved in the *Republic*, with the Form of the Good preventing the regress that threatens in the *Euthydemus*, as (on quite different grounds, based on the specific *technē* of Callipolis' guards) does Alex Long (2013). But the *Statesman* itself does not treat the problem as closed, finding a solution more closely grounded in political praxis than that suggested in Parry's reading of the *Republic*.

23 Vander Waerdt 1994 and Döring 2011 survey the range of Socratic traditions of the fourth-century BCE, which Xenophon represents in the *Memorabilia*; Tsouna-McKirahan 1994 explores the proto-Cyrenaic thought attributed to Aristippus by Xenophon.

thought, which can be linked to Cyrus' apparent opportunism, but such readings ignore the dialogic context of Socrates' response to Aristippus (2.1.14–16). Socrates here points out the state of nature that would arise if Aristippus' withdrawal from politics and *polis* community represented political reality. The realist strain here is thus the result of the exploration of a model proposed by Aristippus, which is rejected by Socrates beyond this immediate dialogic engagement.[24]

Scholarship on Plato pays more attention to *technē* and the craft analogy than to the way the term is modified by the adjective *basilikē*, but the nature of the relationship between noun and adjective can provide some insight into the thought of both Xenophon and Plato.[25] For Louis-André Dorion, *basilikē* functions within Xenophon's text as a metaphor to describe a superior quality, one that is possessed by rulers and leaders.[26] My suggestion is that the adjective is doing more work than simply denoting possession of the quality by kings and leaders, and also that it conveys important aspects of the nature of the quality itself. Being a king, and possessing the associated ethical and intellectual properties, is important for access to the *technē*, and this generates a qualitative difference of rule in those rulers who can access it.[27]

However, the concept of *basilikē technē* is left behind by both Plato and Xenophon in the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia* respectively. This suggests that as a concept it is a part of the Socratic heritage common to both. Xenophon does not describe Cyrus' skill as a ruler as *basilikē technē*, and Plato in the *Statesman* wavers between a range of combinations of *basilikē/politikē* and *technē/epistēmē*.[28] Although kingship remains part of the discussion, as does the craft analogy, the way in which they are combined is distinctively different from the

24 Strauss 1972: 32–36; Newell (1983: 890–891) argues that in the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon creates an intermediate category of extra-legal rule over willing subjects. On the importance of law in Xenophon's thought, see Louis-André Dorion, 487–509 in this volume.

25 T. Irwin (1977: 71–77) and D. Roochnik (1998) provide two contrasting interpretations of Plato's use of craft analogies.

26 Dorion 2004; Bandini and Dorion 2011: 141. Dorion provides a careful analysis of the distinctive qualities of both authors' models of *basilikē technē*, carefully outlining the ethical concept of *enkrateia* that underlies Xenophon's version but is absent from Plato's, and that clearly persists in Xenophon's presentation of Cyrus.

27 Donald Morrison (2004) provides a careful analysis of these qualities and the way that their possession differentiates kings from tyrants in Xenophon's thought.

28 Both M.L. Gill and M. Lane suggest that Plato moves between *technē* and *epistēmē* language in the *Statesman* without any clear division of labour between the terms: see Gill 2012: 178; Lane 1997: 3, n. 7. However, there is an increased emphasis on *epistēmē* in the *Statesman* compared with the *Euthydemus*.

earlier Socratic texts.[29] Both writers become more concerned with the knowledge that enables successful political action rather than the description of such action as the product of a craft. In this sense, Xenophon does not fail to grasp the importance of the epistemological approach to political thought represented by Plato's *Republic* and later works.

In book 1 of the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon presents knowledge as a reason why Cyrus is able to rule a vast empire and inspire obedient submission to his rule in those who have never met him. He argues that 'ruling over humans is not difficult or impossible if one does it with knowledge' (μὴ οὔτε τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὔτε τῶν χαλεπῶν ἔργων ᾖ τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν, ἤν τις ἐπισταμένως τοῦτο πράττῃ, 1.1.3). To understand how Cyrus ruled, it is necessary to understand what kind of origin (γενεάν) and nature (φύσιν) he had, and what kind of education (παιδείᾳ, 1.1.6) developed his nature.

Thus, both Plato and Xenophon can be seen in these works to engage in a discourse that aims to identify some special quality of the successful ruler. Although this draws from the Socratic idea that there is a master craft set over the others, it moves on to explore this in terms of knowledge and also contributes to the emerging discourse of the king as virtuous *paradeigma* for subjects to imitate. The *Statesman* and the *Cyropaedia* show both writers developing their thoughts on the special qualities of the excellent ruler beyond the concept of *basilikē technē* and placing greater emphasis on the epistemic capabilities of the ruler rather than the content of his existing knowledge; the capacity to respond to novel situations is more important than the mastery of a pre-existing body of knowledge.

The Shepherd King

In both the *Cyropaedia* and the *Statesman*, the traditional image of the king as shepherd is used to explore the nature of kingship. This image provides a formulation of the relationship between ruler and ruled that might explain the difference between the two, familiar from epic and tragedy but open to the question of what exactly it might mean in ontological terms for one human to be shepherd over another. Xenophon's initial presentation of the distinctive capability he will attribute to Cyrus is presented through the use of the

29 Various uses of the craft analogy also continue, including the analogy between statesmanship and weaving that dominates the final sections of the *Statesman*, but the latter is developed so that it clearly represents a kind of meta-craft; see Lane 1997: 163–181; Gill 2012: 188–189.

shepherd-king image and analogy (1.1.2). In this analogy, the human shepherd set over his flock is equated to kings set over people, an image familiar to Greeks from Homeric epic onwards but also found in the analysis of monarchy across the ancient Near East; so, for example, when Aeschylus' Atossa inquires about the military leadership of Athens, she asks who is its 'shepherd' (ποιμάνωρ, Aesch. *Pers*. 241).[30]

The literary image can be unpacked to reveal profound metaphysical problems about the nature of ruling and the relationship of ruler to ruled; does the shepherd analogy suggest that ruler and ruled are of different kinds, and what might those kinds be? It is usual when comparing Xenophon and Plato to remark that the more philosophical concerns explored by Plato, the epistemology and the metaphysics, are lacking in Xenophon's work. But Xenophon's claim about the uniqueness of Cyrus' rule (1.1.3) is based on the thought that the ability to use knowledge enables rule; thus equipped, ruling (otherwise intractable) humans would not be difficult. Xenophon's analysis suggests that he is aware of the metaphysical aspects of setting ruler over ruled, an important problem in ancient political philosophy given its most detailed treatment in Aristotle's later account of absolute monarchy, *pambasileia*, but also that there is some value in the analogy.[31] In this respect, Tatum's claim that Xenophon reduces the image to a fact seems to limit the scope of Xenophon's analysis unnecessarily.[32]

Older readings of the *Statesman* see the shepherd king and the myth in which he appears as drawn from Pythagorean thought and representing a tradition that would be developed further in Hellenistic kingship theory.[33] But Xenophon's use of the figure also seems to draw on its use in the development

30 Cf. Skemp 1952: 58–59. The image was a stock way to describe kingship and military leadership in tragedy; in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, the chorus identifies Agamemnon as a good shepherd (*Ag*. 795) while Clytemnestra criticises Agamemnon for failing to act as befits a good shepherd by sacrificing his daughter (*Ag*. 1412–1418), while in the *Persians* Xerxes' forces are described as a 'godly flock' (ποιμανόριον θεῖον, *Pers*. 75). See Brock 2013: 43–52, especially 51, n. 2–3.

31 Arist. *Pol*. 3.13–18; see Gastaldi 2009, Carlier 1993, Atack 2015. Aristotle's account does not refer explicitly to Cyrus but seems informed by Xenophon's analysis of Cyrus' rule; the special qualities of the king make submission to him a more obvious route to *eudaimonia* than participation in the collective self-governance of the polis, the principal route to such a state for Aristotle's political beings.

32 Tatum 1989: 61, part of an otherwise illuminating account of both Xenophon and Plato's use of the image and its implications that Cyrus has a detached attitude to his subjects (61–66).

33 Campbell 1867: xvi–xxvii; Barker 1947: 271–275; Skemp 1952: 59–66.

of utilitarian arguments about the benefit of the rulers' decisions, represented in Plato by the arguments presented by Thrasymachus in *Republic* 1.

This claim sits within an argumentative sequence that runs from *Republic* 1, through *Cyropaedia* 1, to the *Statesman*.[34] Plato criticised the shepherd king analogy in *Republic* 1, where it is introduced by Thrasymachus, who appears in the dialogue as the voice of both conventional thought and sophistic discourse, representing a utilitarian form of realism in which the consequences of political actions can be calculated by political actors. Thrasymachus uses the image of the shepherd to present his arguments: in his model, rulers rule solely for their own advantage (*Resp*. 1.343b1–d1), just as shepherds nurture their sheep with the goal of food and profit in mind. Socrates' response uses the craft analogy to respond to this and to demonstrate the distinction between Socrates' and Thrasymachus' value systems (Schofield 2006: 176–177). For Thrasymachus, shepherds are tyrants who manage their flocks for their 'personal benefit' (τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον, 343c7), not that of the animals they care for (1.343b1–d1); Socrates uses his principle of specialisation (345b8–d5, 346a6–8) to argue against this by separating the realisation of end-products of craft from the incidental benefits of performing the craft itself (346c2–d8). And for him the benefit a good ruler might expect is not a conventional, especially financial, reward (347b6–e4), such as tyrants might seek. The only compensation for ruling, within this craft structure, is relief from the fear of being ruled by one worse than you (347c3–5). There is no consideration of the potential mutuality of benefit between ruler and ruled that features in Xenophon's version of the model, in the authorial introduction and in the later elaboration attributed to Cyrus (8.2.14).[35] This mutuality sets Xenophon's use of the shepherd-king analogy apart from that of the *Republic*'s Socrates and Thrasymachus (Nadon 1996: 363, Gera 1993: 295).

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* appears to be ring-composed between two invocations of this imagery (1.1.2, 8.2.14).[36] Xenophon's opening analysis of Cyrus' rule

34 Lane 1997: 45. The development of Plato's political thought through the later dialogues has been challenged, notably by G. Owen's view that the *Timaeus* precedes these works (1953, 1973), but a focus on political thought shows quite clearly that Plato revises his political mythology through its representation by the Eleatic Stranger, Critias, and the Athenian Stranger: see Gill 1979.

35 Of course Cyrus' claim could be disingenuous or ideological, and Xenophon's authorial distancing from it might suggest that he did not support the claim.

36 If this is an instance of conscious ring composition, this large-scale ring structure may imply an overall authorial plan that works against a developmental reading of the composition of the *Cyropaedia*; on the other hand, it is the closing of the ring that identifies it

compares the rule of shepherd over flock to that of human over human, arguing that the former is easier than the latter owing to the intractability of humans when it comes to being ruled. Animal herds, on the other hand, consent to their shepherds taking profit from them ('they allow their shepherds to use in whatever way they wish the profits that accrue from them', τοῖς καρποῖς τοίνυν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐῶσι τοὺς νομέας χρῆσθαι οὕτως ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται, 1.1.2), a line of thought that twists Thrasymachus' model so that the shepherd effectively rules by consent. Xenophon contrasts animal herds, which consent both to rule and to profit-taking (τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ ὠφελουμένοις, 1.1.2) by their acknowledged rulers (though not by others) with human herds, which resist attempts to rule them.[37]

Cyrus, who unlike other human rulers appears to be able to rule men with their willing consent (ὅμως ἤθελον αὐτῷ ὑπακούειν, 1.1.3) and, thus, to render them as tractable as animals, represents an exception to the norms of human kingship (διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων, 1.1.4). That Cyrus is presented as an exception marks him as the equivalent of Plato's exceptional ruler, the *politikos*.[38] The unique features of Cyrus' rule will be examined in the penultimate section of the *Cyropaedia* (7.5.37–8.6.23), where the shepherd king imagery recurs in the context of Cyrus' complete assumption of the role of king. Cyrus as king acts as a shepherd to those who are not his equals; on hunting expeditions, he leads the slaves, who assist the hunting party and carry out essential support tasks, to water, as he does the pack animals (ὥσπερ τὰ ὑποζύγια, 8.1.44).[39] The distinction between human and animal as subject (1.1.3) is collapsed within the new regime.

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as a ring structure, and the imagery could be used to forge a connection between sections not envisaged in the writing of the first part.

37 Hierarchies of animals and their relationship to humans play an important part in Xenophon's thought, explored by Louis L'Allier (L'Allier 2004). The notion of profit or advantage (*ophelos*) in Xenophon is distinct from negative forms that imply *pleonexia*.

38 The extent to which Xenophon endorses or is aware of any ontological implications of the shepherd-king analogy is not clear. Brock (2013: 46–47) suggests that Xenophon appears untroubled by the philosophical issues raised by Plato in using the analogy, but as exploration of the nature of Cyrus' rule is a dominant theme, especially after his assumption of kingship, it seems difficult to exclude the possibility.

39 Gera 1993: 295. Xenophon's analysis of hunting acknowledges the role of slaves within hunting parties; in Athenian leisure hunting, slaves operate equipment such as the nets into which the hounds chase hares (*Cyn.* 2. 4–9, 6.5–10). The hunting expeditions of Cyrus also use nets to target larger prey than hares, but there is evidence for use of nets in such hunting in Egyptian and Ancient Near Eastern art (Phillips and Willcock 1999: 5–6) as well as in Xenophon's text (cf. *Cyn.* 10.2, 8–11, 19–20 on the use of nets in boar-hunting).

Plato's exploration of the shepherd-king analogy, subsequent to the *Republic*, develops the ambivalence within the analogy first seen there. The idea of herding humans, and the contrast between humans and animals as creatures that could be herded, is explored in the divisions of both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. Both the *Sophist*'s practice division, on angling (218b–221c), and its first attempt to define the sophist through division (221c–223b), in which the sophist is identified as a hunter of rich young men, problematise human-animal relations and their use as analogies for human-human relations; in the brief practice division, hunting and combat are separated by their openness rather than their targets (219e1–2), while in the next division, humans as tame animals are a target for hunters (222b5–c8).[40] The initial division of the *Statesman*, in which the possessor of political or kingly knowledge is first identified as a herdsman, brings the more abstract concerns of the *Sophist* (set on the previous day) to bear on this specific instance of the analogy.

If the *Cyropaedia* I discussion of the shepherd king is a response to *Republic* 1, the *Statesman* can be seen as a response to the re-animation of the shepherd king theme exemplified by Xenophon's work.[41] Using the (problematic) method of collection and division, the Eleatic Stranger and Young Socrates have eventually defined the *politikos* as a herdsman (*Plt.* 267a8–c3); the Eleatic Stranger has also asserted the identity of the *basilikos* and the *politikos*, opening and closing the division (they are 'the same', ταὐτὸν, 259d4–5, 267c2–3). In this opening section, the *Statesman* attacks the virtue model of kingship valorised by Xenophon and Isocrates, in which Plato can present the king's superiority to his subjects through an analogy with that of a shepherd over his flock (Carlier 1978: 134–135, Gray 2011: 26–27). The protracted division is a transparent manoeuvre to introduce the image of the shepherd-king and, perhaps, should

40 The Eleatic Stranger's methodology of collection and division has received much criticism. Walter Cavini has demonstrated serious flaws in its logical structure (Cavini 1995), against Ackrill's defence of the method (Ackrill 1997), but perhaps it is more relevant here to consider Plato's use of its rhetorical possibilities; in the *Sophist* it permits the introduction of powerful imagery such as that of the sophist hunting young men in lush meadows (*Soph.* 222a9–11). M.L. Gill provides a careful analysis of the structure of the *Statesman*'s initial division (2012: 179–185), showing that the errors made in the division by both participants contribute to its function in the context of the dialogue; the pedagogical function of the dialogue as an exercise in dialectic makes the inclusion of identifiable missteps useful (Sayre 2006: 25–35).

41 Although, as seen from the use of the image by Aeschylus, it was an image familiar within Athenian discourse, although, interestingly, not an image used by Isocrates.

be seen to operate as a *reductio ad absurdum* rather than a coherent and valid use of the method of collection and division.[42]

Plato's Eleatic Stranger insists, against young Socrates' protests (262a3–4), on ignoring the distinction between ruling animals and ruling humans (262a9–263a1), although the problem of rule between kinds and within kinds becomes a central problem for the dialogue and remains central to the discourse of kingship, most notably reappearing in Aristotle's exploration of the absolute king or *pambasileus*.[43] Plato also alludes to the theme in his account of Persia in the *Laws*; Cyrus acquired 'many flocks both of men and of other beasts' (ἀγέλας ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν πολλάς, *Leg*. 3.694e6–7) for his sons. But this acquisition was useless, just as the incorrect education he arranged for them was. No explicit link is made between the shepherding and the education, but both represent an epistemic failure in a dialogue in which knowledge is the ultimate claim to authority.

However, just as the precise identification of the kingly art failed in the *Euthydemus*, the attempt to define the *politikos* through division in terms of herding fails to deliver results because it cannot separate the specific skill of the *politikos* from the skills of other workers who nurture or develop those under their charge and support the well-being of citizens. Despite the detail of the gathered division (267a8–c3), and the assertion that the specific part of human endeavour it describes is that called both political and kingly, it is quickly evident that the attempted definition created through this division could be applied to a great many artisans within the polis. In showing the limitations of the herding analogy for generating a precise description of the unique qualities of the ruler, Plato may intend a critique of the resurgence of this imagery among his contemporaries, of whom Xenophon was the most notable; of course, the criticism is also still effective for epic and tragic uses of the image.

The Eleatic Stranger introduces the famous myth to deal with this failure of the initial division (268d5–e6) and to demonstrate why the divine shepherd model is unhelpful for political thought and the project of identifying or defining the possessor of kingly or political knowledge. This myth is presented as a 'demonstration (*apodeixis*) of kingship' (τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀπόδειξιν, 269c1–2, 273e5–6), the term with which Herodotus identifies the result of his inquiry

42 Miller 2004: 46–48. Lane (1997: 42–43) finds further humour within the division, such as the geometrical relation between number of feet of man and beast (266a–b), but concludes that the overall effect of the division is to demonstrate the weakness of it as a method.

43 See note 31.

(Hdt. 1. proem); Plato thus presents it as an alternative to a historical account.[44] In Plato's model, as it unfolds, the shepherd image is applicable only to a divine ruler, or at least to a ruler ontologically distinct from the ruled, as shepherds are from sheep. This is the fundamental problem of accounting for kingship in the context of the *polis* with its ideology of citizen equality, even for models of the oligarchic *polis* where that equality is highly restricted; Xenophon might praise Cyrus as a model leader, but the analogy between Cyrus and the leader of a Greek *polis* (or a general subject to democratic scrutiny) is somewhat fuzzy, as will be explored in the final sections of the work and particularly in regard to the problem of Cyrus' (as king) relation to his home 'polis' of Persia.[45]

The use of the myth as a device to resolve difficulties in defining the statesman is itself subject to critique within the dialogue, with the Eleatic Stranger admitting that the myth has somehow gone too far and exceeded what was needed (277b6–c3). It is also not clear that all forms of kingship are ruled out by the separation of the ages produced by the myth; the possibility of good kingship in the present age is suggested towards the end of the dialogue, although left as an improbable outcome (the conditional at 301b5–7 does not preclude its realisation).[46] What is more firmly suggested is that the criteria for human kingship, that is the rule of a king who shares our humanity, reside in the possession of the specifically kingly knowledge that is *basilikē epistēmē* (which Plato expects only to be something imitated not possessed in the ordinary run of things) rather than in the imitation of human exemplars who are already faulty instances of the *basilikos* or *politikos*. The existing typology of constitutions, developed earlier in the dialogue, is repurposed to reflect the ability of their different types of rulers and office-holders to imitate the ideal (300e11–301a6).

44 Plato exploits the versatility of *apodeixis*, which broadly means 'demonstration'; in a historiographic context, this may be a historical account with evidence, in a (later) philosophical context it may be an argumentative proof. But here, in introducing a political myth, the reference to Herodotus' proem seems clear.

45 Whereas earlier in the book, when Cyrus leads the *homotimoi*, he might conceivably be incorporated into a polis, his adoption of a formal style of kingship signals a clear departure from a form of rule easily assimilated to that found in the Greek polis (whether Athens or Sparta).

46 (Rowe 1995a.: 233) contrasts Plato's rejection of the spontaneous appearance of the *politikos*/king, compared to the emergence of king-bees in the hive (301d8–e4), with Xenophon's use of the metaphor to describe Cyrus' natural kingship, in which the natural desire of the bees to be ruled is extremely powerful (*Cyr.* 5.1.24).

The Shepherd King in Time

Plato responds to the shepherd king image by demonstrating its impossibility in current society. He develops this criticism through telling the myth of the Age of Cronus, which describes a golden age in which divine figures act as shepherds to humans (*Plt.* 269c–274e). The myth with which Plato delivers this point outlines a cosmology that makes it impossible for there to be a historical account of this example of excellence in rule, because of the impossibility of historical knowledge of the Age of Cronus in which such excellence is to be found. It also suggests that, if there were such a king, a great many things about the cosmos and human experience would have to be impossibly different. The most significant distinction is the role of the presiding god, who in the Age of Cronus steers the cosmos, but in the Age of Zeus (equating to our present epoch, at least in the more convincing two-stage analyses) lets go and observes without direct intervention (269d5–270a9).[47]

Plato marks the distinctive temporality of this and other myths, and their separate status as a source of knowledge through his use of the perfect tense (ἀκήκοας, 268e10; ἀκηκόαμεν, 269a8; εἴρηται, 269b8; εἴρηκεν, 269c1).[48] He often marks intellectual states reached through the persuasive action of myth by using verbs in the perfect tense, which suggests that stability and persistence characterise this form of knowledge.[49] Parallel examples are found in the *Phaedo* when Socrates repeats how he has 'been persuaded' by an account of the cosmos (πέπεισμαι, *Phd.* 108c8, e1, e4, 109a7) and the Noble Lie in the *Republic* (*Resp.* 3.414c4–7).

According to Xenophon, Cyrus 'asserts the similarity of the deeds of the good king and shepherd'; λέγοι παραπλήσια ἔργα εἶναι νομέως ἀγαθοῦ καὶ βασιλέως ἀγαθοῦ (8.2.14). Cyrus asserts that this similarity lies in working for the *eudaimonia* of citizens and flocks respectively. But he adopts this analysis when he has changed his role from successful general of the well-integrated Persian forces to king of multiple peoples, which he rules at a distance. This may be somewhat in contrast with Xenophon's earlier use of the shepherd king image as linked to Agamemnon, within the sequence of discussions of military and civic leadership of *Memorabilia* book 3. Socrates builds on his invocation of Agamemnon

47 See note 62.

48 The account of the Age of Cronus in the *Laws* repeats this: παραδεδέγμεθα (*Leg.* 4.713c2–3); γεγονέναι (713b2); διήλθομεν (the foundations of former cities) (713b1) compared with διεληλύθαμεν (Cronus), (713b5), cf. *Phd.* 114c7.

49 Usually to account for the state of receiving new information by perception or persuasion. Persuasion can also lead to *doxa*, which is unstable even if correct (*Meno* 97e2–98a8).

in the previous chapter (*Mem.* 3.1.4) and argues that Homer uses the analogy to show how the general's care for his troops is that of the shepherd's care for his flocks. In both cases, the individual in charge 'must oversee and take care of' (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, *Mem.* 3.2.1) the many entrusted to him; a king would be considered good 'if he were responsible for the happiness of those whom he ruled' (εἰ καί, ὧν βασιλεύοι, τούτοις εὐδαιμονίας αἴτιος εἴη, *Mem.* 3.2.2).

However, another feature that both the *Cyropaedia* and the *Statesman* share is the clear separation between kingship and generalship. This distinction is given dramatic emphasis in Plato's *Euthydemus* (290b7–d8), through the metaleptic interruption of the dialogue's dramatic framework, a conversation with Crito, into Socrates' reported protreptic exchange with the young Clinias. In the *Cyropaedia*, the distinction is emphasised by Cyrus' conscious change of status to kingship (7.5.37); in the *Statesman* the distinction between *politikos* and subordinate arts such as that of the *stratēgos* is made in the dialogue's final divisions (305a4–9).[50]

Xenophon's treatment of Cyrus as an exemplar shepherd king provides a context for Plato's exploration of the impossibility of such a form of rule in the *Statesman*, and a broader function for the *Statesman* myth. Where Xenophon presents in Cyrus a historical claimant to the title of the shepherd king, demonstrating his superior claim to rule through knowledge and delivering it through the happiness of his subjects, Plato through the *Statesman* myth argues that any such relationship between ruler and ruled cannot exist within the historical temporality of the human society of the Age of Zeus.[51]

Plato's use of temporality to render the shepherd king impossible is not answered by Xenophon within the main narrative sections of the *Cyropaedia*. The complex theory of monarchy developed in books 7 and 8 is presented as a solution to a specific contemporary problem arising from Cyrus' rule, posed in the opening chapter of the work (1.1.6), which suggests that the problem with the shepherd king image is its smallness of scale. Xenophon explores how it was possible for one man to rule over more men than could individually witness and assent to his rule directly and thus be influenced by his personal virtue.

50 This final section of the *Statesman* has had less attention than the parts that precede the definition of the *politikos* at 305a8–d5; its importance is stressed by Lane 1995, Sayre 2006:131–135 and particularly by Dimitri El Murr (2014: 263–286), who points to its discussion of the nature and content of 'la science politique'.

51 Plato softens this stance in subsequent reuses of the theme (*Timaeus*/*Critias*, *Laws* 4), in which the separation between the idealised age in which gods rule herds of humans and the current age is marked by localised geological destruction rather than a reversal of the entire cosmos.

Cyrus' charisma and ability to 'bewitch' (καταγοητεύειν, 8.1.40) his subjects at a distance is proposed as part of the answer, along with the *thauma* generated by the display of royal power in processions and buildings.

However, Xenophon does seem to acknowledge the problem of accommodating the shepherd king in the contemporary world through the distinctive coda of 8.8. In this chapter, Cyrus' successors are shown to fail to maintain the practices and values he had emphasised and introduced. This can be seen as a retrospective attempt to manipulate the temporality of the *Cyropaedia*, by repositioning the narrative of Cyrus' rise to power in a past to which access is difficult to maintain, just as Plato's shepherd king is rendered inaccessible by the changing direction of the cosmos.

Xenophon contrasts two time periods, usually identified simply as the past (πρότερον, 8.8.2; τὸ παλαιόν, 8.8.7; πρόσθεν, 8.8.8, 24) and the present (νῦν; 8.8.3, 7, 8, 24). No great cataclysm separates them, simply the passage of time and the kind of deterioration in human affairs that was a familiar theme of Greek political thought (for example, that of the decline of regimes in Plato's *Republic* 8–9, or the transition between ages in Hesiod's account of the five ages).[52] However, the theme of inversion of the past is replayed, with more specific detail of social and political practices that have deteriorated or been abandoned; failure to hunt (8.12), lack of education (13–14), increased effeminacy (8.15–16), and loss of military skills (20–24).

By repositioning the main narrative in a past that is now lost and whose qualities no longer seem to be achievable, Xenophon matches the main narrative of the *Cyropaedia* to the temporal structures used by Plato.[53] The era of Cyrus the shepherd king is lost; the question for Xenophon becomes one of whether it can be reconstructed or replicated based on the example that Cyrus provided. Where for Plato accurate knowledge of past heroic individuals is problematic (*Critias* 110a7–b5), for Xenophon Cyrus still represents a knowable *paradeigma*; knowledge of past excellence (albeit from a more recent past) is possible, and should be a spur to action. If the Persians themselves can no longer emulate the *paradeigma* of virtuous rule that Cyrus provided, perhaps Xenophon's readers can.

52 Hes. *Op.* 109–201, an account that Plato clearly uses as a source for the *Statesman* myth. The decline of the divine element in the kings of Atlantis is a further example (*Criti.* 121a8–b7).

53 A similar argument can be made for Chapter 14 of Xen. *Lac.* (see Humble 2004), where it also has the advantage of relieving Xenophon of the need to generate Straussian irony. See Gera (1993: 299–300).

The *kairos* and the King

Although both authors were leaving behind *basilikē technē* as a definition of the qualities that identify rulers/leaders as such, they still needed frameworks for identifying and evaluating good rule. The concept of the *kairos*, the right moment or opportunity, and the possibility that the knowledge required by rulers was knowledge of the *kairos* and how to use that knowledge, provided one such framework.

The *kairos*, a term with a long history and complex range of meanings, was used across a broad range of genres from Homeric epic onwards but emerging as a political concept in the fourth century BCE. It was familiar from tragedy, where characters aim to act in the right way, or act in the right amount, at the right time (Guillamaud 1988, Race 1981). The *kairos* had both a normative aspect (doing the right, or necessary, thing through the skilled deployment of resources to achieve desired ends), and spatial and temporal aspects that maintain contact with this normative aspect; the two would come together in the idea of the good leader's special capacity to do the right thing at the right time, as its usage in the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia* shows.[54]

The idea of the *kairos* was widely used across many kinds of discourse: Monique Trédé finds examples across poetic and prose genres, but notes its importance in didactic genres, and particularly Hesiod's *Works and Days*. The idea of the right time for particular actions is central to a work on the agricultural life, but also structures other sections, such as that on navigation, where it names the ability to act proportionately and appropriately in all cases ('Preserve due measure: the *kairos* is best in all things'; μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος, Hes. *Op*. 694, cf. Trédé 1992: 83–96). Pindar's epinician poetry also makes extensive use of the *kairos* as a criterion for correct action by both gods and humans (*Ol.* 1.57, 81 respectively).[55]

But poets were not the only ones to use the *kairos* as a structuring concept. Trédé also notes the prevalence of *kairos* terminology in historiography, medical writings, and rhetoric; she argues that the developing use of the term in historiography derives from the others, and that the distinction between Herodotus' relatively infrequent use of the term compared with Thucydides' more frequent use shows the development of the *kairos* as a concept under

54 Race argues for the dominance of the normative aspect of the *kairos* in fifth-century tragedy, and that the temporal aspect came to predominate later. Lane (1997: 132–136) also argues that a temporal aspect is important; of course, Plato's cosmology can be interpreted as collapsing any distinction between the two.

55 Trédé (1992: 130–138) analyses the structure of Pindar's *Olympian* 1 in terms of the *kairos*.

the influence of the sophists.[56] It is notable that these examples all relate to the craft analogy in recognising particular types of expertise, and as skills often cited by Plato and others as examples of *technē* where the skill of the practitioner is important (in the case of historiography, it is the skill of the general that is investigated, although unlike his fourth-century successors Thucydides is willing to describe the *kairos* as the objective of collective enquiry, as with the Spartans looking out for opportunity at Pylos, Th. 4.23.2). The *kairos* can also denote the necessary or the needed action; Melissa Lane also shows the close association of the *kairos* with the concept of due measure and what is appropriate or required, *to deon*.[57] For Lane, political expertise 'is knowledge of the relation between other forms of knowledge and the temporal demands of the moment of action, or the *kairos*' (Lane 1997: 3–4).

The *kairos* becomes a criterion for assessing political leaders through their choices and actions. In both the *Cyropaedia* and the *Statesman*, the same linkage between due measure and *kairos* is seen; the Eleatic Stranger draws together all the aspects of measurement in which excess might occur and attention to due measure is important (284e2–8).[58] In the *Cyropaedia*, the *kairos* is used as a mean in Cyrus' battlefield orders to Daüchus, commander of the baggage train, as they prepare for the decisive battle. His subordinates those 'who advance further than is appropriate or are left behind' (τοὺς προϊόντας τοῦ καιροῦ ἢ λειπομένους, 6.3.29).

56 Trédé (1992: 192–230) argues that the *kairos* becomes, for Thucydides, a central concept that drives human action (206). She points to Herodotus' mostly temporal use of the term: two uses of the phrase καιρός ἐστι, at Hdt. 4.139.3 and 8.144.5 appear in speeches where the speaker is demanding action that is both prompt and appropriate. Other uses with the definite article, at 6.90 and 8.79.3, and with demonstrative adjectives at 5.97.1 and 8.87.2, provide instances where 'la valeur temporelle et "stratégique" est indiscutable' (Trédé 1992: 193–197). On the other hand, Thucydides' histories mark 'le triomphe du *Kairos*,' in which the term is used to mark military opportunity and the skill of recognising it (as exhibited by Brasidas at Amphipolis, Th. 4.103.4, or Gylippus in Sicily, 7.5.2, for example: Trédé 1992: 207–220) as well as the political grasp of individuals (and collectives, or lack of it as Thucydides suggests Pericles saw in the Athenians, 2.65.9; Trédé 1992: 220–230).

57 Lane 1997: 125–132. Cf. Guillamaud (1988: 368–371), Race (1981: 200 n. 8).

58 The *Statesman*'s central discussion of the mean/due measure and assessing divergence from it (283a–287b) points to a new way of assessing individual's achievement of ethical and other qualities (Lane 1997: 72–75, 187–189). This topic will be explored in even greater detail by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; certain virtues explored in that work, especially those that relate to greatness (*megaloprepeia*, chapter 4.2; *megalopsucheia*, chapter 4.3), are particularly applicable to Xenophon's Cyrus and his circumstances.

As the *Statesman*'s argument shows, effective political action is both temporal and dependent on a range of other circumstances; while the shepherd king in the Age of Cronus operates in an apolitical world, the *politikos* in the Age of Zeus must act at the right time for his actions to succeed. The *kairos* provides an instance of the ruler exercising his own intellectual skill, the skill that defines him as a *politikos*; in the final definition of statesmanship as the weaving together of different citizen-types into the fabric of the city (305a8–9), doing so in accordance with the *kairos* becomes an essential part of this process that marks the statesman as a statesman (305c10–d5, Lane 1997: 142). The Platonic *politikos* knows when it is the 'right occasion' (ἐγκαιρίας, 305d4) and 'wrong occasion' (ἀκαιρίας, 305d4) to command his citizens in different ways. In the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon follows Thucydides and Plato in using the *kairos* as a measure of the skill of the leader; he uses the *kairos* as a marker of Cyrus' development as a leader and king, emphasising his grasp of the *kairos* at key stages in the narrative.[59]

For both writers, possession of the ability to grasp the *kairos* is something had by individuals, not collectives; in this respect, their usage differs from that of Thucydides, who describes armies in the field collectively determining it.[60] In restricting possession of the *kairos* to powerful individuals, Plato and Xenophon make a significant claim about the nature of political expertise and the forms that it might take. A similar but stronger restriction is evident in Isocrates' thought on monarchy, as Melissa Lane has shown, citing his claim (*Nic.* 19) that monarchies do not let the *kairos* pass by (Lane 2012: 194–195). Isocrates' use of the term illustrates its association with the monarch as the possessor of the ability to discriminate and make good judgements by using the *kairos* as a criterion. For Isocrates, monarchs, unlike private individuals, 'do not let opportunities slip by but act as they should on each occasion' (οὐκ ἀπολείπονται τῶν καιρῶν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ δέοντι πράττουσιν, Isocrates *Nicocles* 19). The *kairos*, it seems, is something grasped through individual activity; it does

59 Plato's description of the *politikos* and his activities in recognising opportunity, and later in weaving together the different types of citizens shows, along with other features of this section of the dialogue, an unusual awareness of contingency and practical politics, perhaps with a close eye on Athenian practice, or the exemplars of grasping the *kairos* provided by Isocrates and Xenophon; I thank Gabriel Danzig for this suggestion.

60 For example, *kairos* is the object of plural verbs at Thuc. 4.93.2, 5.13.1, 6.86.4 and 7.17.3, and determined by a number of different groups. One could object that this is a more limited and concrete version of the concept than Plato's version, but Xenophon's *kairos* seems more closely linked to its historiographical and rhetorical predecessors.

not seem to be something that can be ascertained through collective deliberation. In this sense, it is different and opposed to the collective judgement created by deliberation and debate in the assembly or the council of city and camp.[61]

The conditions of the world of the *Statesman* myth, however, are less suited to assessment using *kairos* than those of the non-ideal polis. In a golden-age world of abundance, there can be no correct amount, no need to be concerned with due measure. The shepherd ruler also need not deploy temporal *kairos*, because perceived time itself is lacking in the Age of Cronus; there are no seasons or extremes of weather (272a6–7). It is the god overseeing the cosmos who knows when the correct number of generations have passed and that it is time for a cosmic reversal; he lets go of the tiller with which he steers the cosmos at the right time, κατὰ καιρόν (270a6).[62]

Most of all, the *kairos* in its combined senses provides evidence of the epistemic capability of a leader. This is the sense in which Xenophon uses it in the *Cyropaedia*. He frequently embeds it within indirect questions where skill is required to work out the appropriate quantity, location, or time for action; for example, the captain assesses 'when it is the right time' (ὁπότε δ᾽αὖ ἐδόκει αὐτῷ καιρὸς εἶναι, 2.3.22) to command his men to change their formation.[63] The *kairos* becomes identified with the epistemic superiority of the good leader or ruler,

61 Aristotle would oppose this claim about the epistemic superiority of individual judgement with his 'wisdom of the multitude' argument in *Politics* 3.11, an argument counterfactually opposed with the account of the *pambasileus*; J. Waldron (1995) provides a classic interpretation of the argument, while Cammack (2013) and Lane (2013) provide further assessment of the possible deliberative contexts in which this collective wisdom could be generated.

62 I follow two-stage readings of the *Statesman* myth, along with Horn (2012), Kahn (2009) and El Murr (2014: 145–153); the various three-stage (and more) readings suggested by Brisson (1995), Rowe (1996, 2010) and others fail to generate the contrast that Plato needs between the ages. Plato needs to establish a two-fold division of ages both to position his political philosophy against that of his rivals and to retain the entropy of the Age of Zeus in the present as a motivation for human *technai*. Luc Brisson's recent restatement of his three-stage model (Brisson 2014) seeks to justify his three-stage reading, through a link to the theology of *Laws* x, and argues that the Age of Zeus is a thought-experiment, one that creates a world unlike the present world in which the gods do show concern. But this insight should not invalidate the greater significance of the opposition between the ages that the two-stage reading provides and the better motivation for human ingenuity, in replacing the direct care of the gods.

63 Other examples where determining what is *kairos* provides an answer to a question are at *Cyr*. 1.4.6, 2.3.21, 2.4.17, 3.2.1, 6.3.21, 7.3.2, 8.7.9, cf. Thucydides 4.77.1, 4.126.6, 6.93.3.

representing a form of knowledge, an ability to judge that identifies its holder as superior to those he leads and the ability to act with appropriate economy.

The *kairos* is a key concept in the *Cyropaedia*, with the term appearing much more frequently throughout the work than it does in the *Statesman*.[64] It marks Cyrus' development as a leader, showing the political development and status of Cyrus in relation to other characters. The state of Cyrus' progress to monarchy can be assessed through the command of the *kairos* that Xenophon ascribes to him (and to other characters with whom he interacts) at different points in the narrative.

The concept of the *kairos* works on at least two levels in the *Cyropaedia*. At the tactical level, it marks the right time to act in pursuing a present opportunity, or the right resources to deploy to meet a particular challenge, so it can be used to evaluate the performance of individuals at specific events, particularly key confrontations such as battles. At a more strategic level, possession of the ability to determine what is *kairos*, to anticipate opportunities when the *kairos* might appear, and to position resources in readiness to maximise the opportunity presented, demonstrates the relative capacity of leaders and so provides a marker for when Cyrus' capacity to lead has surpassed that of rival leaders. Both aspects unite in the central episode in which Cyrus seizes the initiative from his uncle Cyaxares, and subsequently commands greater authority with the Medes (4.1–5.1). Whether Cyrus' actions here are excessive or appropriate is a key question for interpreters of the work, but using the *kairos* as a framework to examine this episode suggests that Xenophon's intention is to demonstrate Cyrus' complete grasp of the *kairos* and thus to establish his claim to leadership over further forces such as the Medes.

Before this central confrontation, perhaps the most significant episode in the work, takes place, Cyrus has had a long education in the *kairos*, much of it delivered by the Medes of his grandfather's court.[65] Cyrus' moral and intellectual development as an adolescent is marked by his changing relationship with his grandfather's cup-bearer, Sakas (1.3–4). As a youthful Persian used to equal access to other citizens, Cyrus initially takes a dislike to the servant who, on the one hand, restricts his access to his grandfather, and on the other hand, pours the wine that makes the drunken Astyages appear to have been poisoned

64 Over 30 times as a concept (typically ὁ καιρός), plus some instances where it is a temporal marker, ἐν καιρῷ (5.1.17, 8.5.5, 7); the latter also appears at *Hell.* 3.4.10, 4.3.2, 5.1.19, and is used to identify a specific occasion (ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ) at *Hell.* 3.1.16 and *An.* 1.8.14.

65 The importance of the Medes in developing Cyrus' grasp of the *kairos* perhaps explains why they seem to contribute so much to his education, when Median characteristics often seem to be denigrated in Xenophon's value system.

(1.3.10).[66] Sakas acts 'to hinder access [to Astyages] for those whom he deemed it not opportune to admit' (ἀποκωλύειν οὓς μὴ καιρὸς αὐτῷ δοκοίη εἶναι προσάγειν, 1.3.8). Cyrus objects to being included in this category by the cupbearer, describing him with a powerful superlative 'most wretched' (μιαρώτατος, 1.3.11). His impassioned attack on the cupbearer amuses Astyages and his dining companions (1.3.12), but when the youth takes on the role for the day, he demonstrates a greater ability than Sakas in anticipating the needs of Astyages and Cyaxares, learning what they need and finding it for them. This lesson in the *kairos* is soon shown to have been well learned.

Cyrus' transition from childhood is marked by him effectively 'having become his own Sakas' (αὐτὸς ἤδη Σάκας ἑαυτῷ ἐγίγνετο, 1.4.6), holding himself back from frequent visits to Astyages even though his grandfather has given him permission to visit at will (1.3.14). Cyrus himself determines whether it is appropriate (καιρός, 1.4.6) for him to disturb the king, the first instance in the *Cyropaedia* of him operating according to the *kairos*. However, Cyrus acts differently from Sakas, in using the *kairos* to practise self-restraint rather than to encourage consumption. This version of the *kairos* has a moral quality akin to the *sōphrosunē* and *enkrateia* that are key virtues in Xenophon's ethical thought (Due 1989: 170–181).

Beyond the language of *kairos*, Cyrus' behaviour as a youth has shown him to be acting in accordance with it, as when he first takes military action (1.4.19), converting his border hunting trip, practice warfare for an aspiring ephebe, into actual military engagement, the province of adults.[67] Cyrus further deploys the *kairos* in the context of feasting, using it to determine how many captains to invite to dine with him on campaign (2.1.30). But the discussion at such a dinner leads to a more political deployment of the *kairos*. The topic of the just distribution of booty has been raised, and the diners are divided between two distributive principles, those of arithmetic equality (strict numerical equality) and geometric equality (distribution by merit). Cyrus believes that 'the time is right to put the question to the vote' (καιρὸς οὖν ἐδόκει αὐτῷ εἶναι νῦν ἐμβαλεῖν περὶ τούτου ψῆφον, 2.2.21), despite his strong preference for geometric equality, but his command of the *kairos* is incomplete; further discussion ensues, and the matter appears to be decided with no vote recorded.[68]

66 Xenophon's stern views on drunkenness as lack of self-restraint and as a sign of failing leadership are expanded in *Cyropaedia* 8.8.10–12.

67 For more on hunting and the symbolic transition between youth and adulthood, see Vidal-Naquet 1986: 106–128.

68 Mastery of the *kairos* and the ability to distribute goods correctly are later shown to be twin features of the good leader (indeed, the acquisition of booty is dependent on seizing

The struggle for authority between the waning power of Cyaxares, emblem of Median leadership, and the developing power of Cyrus, is played out in part through references to the *kairos*. Cyaxares casually acknowledges the concept of the *kairos*, offering Cyrus his help as appropriate ('if it were somehow appropriate', εἴ που καιρὸς εἴη, 2.4.17) for his planned border expedition; perhaps the ironic, dialogic που suggests some superficiality in Cyaxares' deployment of the term, as if Xenophon were aiming to show that Cyaxares lacks the commitment and focus that Cyrus is developing.[69] Cyrus' development as a leader, on the other hand, is shown by his recognition of the need to take the initiative, which he expresses to Cyaxares in an important speech (3.3.11–19).

But the central episode of the work as a whole sees Cyrus himself act according to the *kairos* and become recognised for it by other characters. Cyrus is initially sceptical that it would be possible to pursue the fleeing Assyrians; the *kairos* rests with their best men, who will be fleeing fast on horseback (4.1.11). But acting on new information from the Hyrcanians, Cyrus sees an advantage to pursuing the opponents and consolidating his efforts; Cyaxares, who has retired for the day to feast, is reluctant to join the pursuit. But his reluctance costs him the loyalty of his best troops, who respond eagerly to Cyrus' invitation to pursue the enemy further, and he responds angrily, first sending reproving messages to Cyrus and then demanding that the expedition return (4.5.10, 18). Even the messenger carrying this message regrets his failure to take the opportunity to join Cyrus' expedition and has therefore brought the message slowly (4.5.13).[70]

That this episode has changed Cyrus' standing is acknowledged by the Medes, who acknowledge that Cyrus is the leader with access to the *kairos*, and whom they will now recognise as their own leader in battle (5.1.29):

> σύ, ὦ Κῦρε, καὶ ἐξήγαγες ἡμᾶς καὶ οἴκαδε ὅταν ἀπιέναι καιρὸς δοκῇ, σὺν σοὶ ἡμᾶς ἄγε.

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the opportunity to take it). It is notable that the distribution of booty from the raid on the Assyrians is discussed in detail (4.5.34–58) at the point in the narrative when Cyrus has begun to demonstrate mastery of the *kairos*.

69 Xenophon, like Plato, uses this particle as a marker for Socratic dialogue; Denniston (1934: 490–491) notes the ironic tinge often found in Plato's deployment of που, but does not analyse Xenophon's usage.

70 Cf. Thucydides' account of the 'slow and unenthusiastic' (οὐ σπουδῇ, Th. 3.49.4) journey of the Athenian trireme to Mytilene to carry out the decree against the Mytileneans, easily overtaken by the faster-rowing second boat reversing the assembly decision.

> You, Cyrus, have led us out here; lead us back home with you when the time is right to go back.

After the long discussion in which the two leaders air and resolve their differences, Cyaxares departs with the acknowledgement that it is now Cyrus' role to determine 'whether it is the right time to break up the camp or go to war' (πότερον ἔτι δοκεῖ στρατεύεσθαι ἢ καιρὸς ἤδη διαλύειν τὴν στρατιάν, 5.5.43). Cyrus in turn closes this episode by setting out his plans for further action with increased forces, which would enable him to act upon the *kairos* and the *deon* in the use of force and persuasion (5.5.45): 'whether it was time to use some force, or necessary to be persuasive', καὶ εἴ τι βιάσασθαι καιρὸς καὶ εἴ τι πεῖσαι δέοι.

Much scholarship on this episode has focused on Cyrus' apparent deception of his uncle in taking his troops on the raid; Cyrus' behaviour is interpreted as a *realpolitik* power grab that identifies him as a Machiavellian prince.[71] A more subtle reading has been suggested by Gabriel Danzig, in which Cyrus' behaviour does not exclude the possibility of benevolence, and the episode redistributes excess resources from Cyaxares to Cyrus, mirroring the 'big boy/little boy' case in which the young Cyrus redistributes clothing among his peers (1.3.16–17; see Danzig 2009, 2012).

As readers, we also have the opportunity to determine whether this episode is a demonstration of Cyrus' grasp of the *kairos*. In depicting Cyrus acting correctly at the right time, Xenophon asks the reader to approve of Cyrus' action and provides the grounds for doing so; the character he has created is displaying his true statesmanship, and readers, like the Median cavalry, should shift their allegiance to his rule. That Xenophon is aware of the ethical and normative component of the *kairos* provides further grounds for such a reading. Cyrus' behaviour is not merely that which is necessary; it is appropriate in both the temporal and normative senses in which the concept is deployed, and the way in which Xenophon has already incorporated it within his ethical system means that the normative aspects should not be overlooked, as realist or utilitarian readings tend to do. Cyrus has not let the opportunity slip by, as Cyaxares would have done.[72] By judging Cyrus' decisions in terms of grasping the *kairos*, Xenophon shows that Cyrus, by demonstrating his ability to take the right action at the right time, is the more deserving leader than his Median uncle. Cyaxares, in turn, has acknowledged this.

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71 Nadon 2001: 87–108; Tatum 1989: 115–133; Gray's reading of this scene as a patterned narrative downplays its political importance (2011: 232–243, 67–76).

72 Possibly through drunkenness, prefiguring 8.8, or another demonstration of lack of *enkrateia*.

After this point in the narrative, Cyrus takes on a new status as leader and eventually king. The great battle against his combined enemies (6.3) illustrates this. First Cyrus asks his subordinate Araspas to provide him with information filtered by the criterion of the *kairos*, ('that which it is timely for us to know', ἃ δὲ καιρὸς ἡμῖν εἰδέναι, 6.3.17). He repeats this at the end of their exchange ('What was appropriate for me to learn from you, I have heard', ἀλλ' ἃ μὲν παρὰ σοῦ καιρὸς μαθεῖν, ἀκηκόαμεν, 6.3.21), once Araspas has told him about the disposition of the Egyptian forces, before moving on to issue instructions to his own subordinate officers.

After this major victory, Cyrus' status is assured. His transition to kingship (7.5.37) is marked by changed behaviour, as Cyrus redefines his relationship with the friends who helped him to achieve this new status. After his friends have struggled to gain access to him through the disorderly throng of new subjects seeking their conqueror's attention (a scenario apparently set up by Cyrus himself), Cyrus explains his change in terms of the *kairos*; first, in a disputed passage, that it is now apt that he and his equals be separated (the Budé text follows the manuscripts closely in reading ἆρα, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, νῦν μὲν καιρὸς διαλυθῆναι; (7.5.40)). This applies both to the need to separate for that specific night, but also to the greater separation that is being established.[73] Both the new situation and the time of day demand a change in the established relationship between Cyrus and the Persian nobles. That the previous situation, before Cyrus elected to become a king, was different is confirmed at 7.5.46, where Cyrus explains that as a military leader he needed close communication, to be visible, and know what he should know and what it was *kairos* that he should know:

> ὅτι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου τοιαῦτα ἐγίγνωσκον ὄντα ὡς μὴ ὑστερίζειν δέον τὸν ἄρχοντα μήτε τῷ εἰδέναι ἃ δεῖ μήτε τῷ πράττειν ἃ ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ.
>
> It was … because I realised that the demands of war made it necessary for a commander not to be behind others in finding out what he ought to know nor in doing what it is expedient that he should do.

73 Delebecque (1978: 75) points to a parallel use of ἆρα at 4.6.4 (cf. Denniston 1934: 47). Miller (1914: 276, n. 4), Marchant (1910: ad loc. 7.5.40) and Gemoll (1968: 365) all read ὥρα for ἆρα, following Cobet (1858: 229–230), thus importing a temporal sense, and omitting καιρός. But Cyrus' point is not a purely temporal one (although ὥρα itself has connotations of appropriate, seasonal timing), and although ὥρα appears frequently in the *Cyropaedia*, there seems little reason to prefer it over καιρός here.

The field of the *kairos* has now, however, shifted from knowledge displayed on the battlefield, which required close proximity to subordinates, to knowledge of how to maintain a fitting distance from his subjects.

As Cyrus acts as a *paradeigma* to his followers, it would be appropriate to find them making use of the concept of the *kairos* to determine their own actions. Cyrus' friend Chrysantas acknowledges the change in Cyrus' status through the *kairos*; it is appropriate for Cyrus to have his own home, now that he rules not by persuading the multitude (7.5.55), but by 'being able to win over those whom he needs to in other ways' (ἄλλους ἀνακτᾶσθαι δύνασαι οὓς καιρὸς εἴη, 7.5.56). Cyrus also expects his friends to be able to make use of the *kairos*. This new relationship with his friends requires them to provide him with the requisite information when they act as his eyes and ears, enabling him to be the seeing law (8.1.22). He greatly rewards those who tell him what he needs to know ('what it was opportune for him to have discovered', ὅσα καιρὸς αὐτῷ εἴη πεπύσθαι, 8.2.10), although it is unclear whether they or he discern what portion of their reports contributes to his grasp of the *kairos*.

A final question is whether access to the *kairos* marks the king as being good in a purely practical sense (consistent with a realist reading of Xenophon), or good in a more moral sense, consistent with a virtue reading of Xenophon. Both Plato and Xenophon endow their *kairos*-empowered rulers with moral or religious qualities that suggest that access to the *kairos* is closely linked to religious concerns; Plato's statesman weaves the good citizens together in a divine bond in which the action of the kingly art appears to operate under the guidance of a muse ('with the muse of the kingly [art]', τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ, 309d1–2), while Xenophon emphasises Cyrus' piety and attention to the gods, for example, through the sacrifices he makes to Zeus *basileus* on becoming king (7.5.57).

Conclusion: Xenophon and Plato and the Discourse of Kingship

The exploration of the shepherd king analogy and the concept of the *kairos* play an important role in both Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and Plato's *Statesman*. Both works can be read as contributions to a discourse of kingship within Athenian political thought, in which the possibility of rule by the epistemically and/or ethically superior is explored.

There is not a complete match between all the themes of both works. It is in the later *Laws* that Plato shows the clearest evidence that he has read and responded to Xenophon's account of Cyrus, and in which other themes common to both the *Cyropaedia* and to Aristotle's political and ethical writings

appear (Hirsch 1985, Danzig 2003, Skemp 1952: 61 n. 9). As seen earlier, mechanisms for distributive justice are a recurrent topic in Xenophon's work; Plato addresses this directly in the *Laws* (6.756e–758a), and it is an important theme of Aristotle's ethical and political works (*Nic. Eth.* 5.5, *Pol.* 3.12). Likewise, the theme of political and virtue friendship, explored extensively in the *Cyropaedia* through Cyrus' close relationships with his Persian peers and other friends such as Tigranes and especially Pantheia, is noted in Plato's account of Cyrus (*Leg.* 3.695d1), but is most extensively explored in the account of friendship in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (books 8–9).

However, reading the *Statesman* and *Cyropaedia* together illuminates both texts. Plato's somewhat abstract account of the *politikos* gains further context from considering the models which he appears to argue against, such as the model of the king as shepherd. Xenophon's narrative gains depth from a clearer view of the concepts and conceptual language deployed throughout his writing, while rarely foregrounded as in the more obviously theoretical works of Plato and Aristotle. Reading his work as part of a theoretical discourse that takes place in a specific context enables us to develop a richer understanding of his original contribution to Greek political thought.

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PART 4

History

Sparta in Xenophon and Plato

Noreen Humble

Xenophon's status as a philosopher has long suffered from comparison with his contemporary Plato on virtually every imaginable level. This state of affairs has resulted in a tendency to avoid examining whether or not the two authors were engaged in dialogue with each other. If the possibility of dialogue is mentioned at all, it is generally in such a way as to reflect negatively on Xenophon: (a) he is viewed as insufficiently intellectual for Plato, et al., to engage with, and/or (b) any similarities between his works and those of other Socratics are regarded as semi-plagiarism on the part of Xenophon because he is incapable of original thought, and/or (c) his works are alluded to by Plato infrequently and only indirectly and negatively (e.g., *Cyropaedia* at *Laws* 3.694c–696b).[1] Such approaches by their very nature close off the possibility of an ongoing, mutually stimulating and beneficial dialogue between the two men (and indeed among the Socratics in general).

Recent work has explored in greater detail and with suggestions of greater complexity some of the ways in which implicit responses are made by Plato and Xenophon to each other's work. Although for the most part the conversation is regarded as one of rivalry and primarily one-sided (i.e., that Xenophon is responding to Plato rather than the other way around),[2] it does remind us at least that we should not regard Xenophon as writing in a state of isolation on his estate in the NW Peloponnese. If he is engaging with the ideas of others,

1 See Kahn 1996: 29–31 and appendix 1 for expressions of all these viewpoints. Partial impetus for these views comes, of course, from Imperial era authors (Aulus Gellius *NA* 14.3.2–4, Athenaeus 504f–505a, and Diogenes Laertius 2.56, who all mention some type of rivalry between the two men). These late sources, if not drawing on one another, are certainly using a common source, which itself seems to be drawing, as we do, simply on the writings of the two men. Swift Riginos 1976: 108–110 argues that this rivalry was a fabrication of Alexandrian scholars.

2 See, e.g., Vander Waerdt 1993 on their respective *Apologies* with a short section on the *Symposia* too, in each case arguing that Xenophon 'undertakes to respond to Plato's portrayal in the light of his own understanding of Socratic philosophy'. Dorion (2003) and Danzig (2003) examine the one passage, *Laws* 3.694c–696b, in which Plato is deemed to respond—critically—to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. Danzig 2005 proposes a more elaborate, two-way conversation between the two Socratics via their respective *Symposia*.

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notably Plato, there is no good reason—modern prejudices about Xenophon's limited intellectual capacity aside—why others, including Plato, should not be engaging with his.

In this paper, therefore, I want to use the possibility of a dialogue between Xenophon and Plato as a framework for comparing how they use Sparta in their respective oeuvres, since there are remarkable similarities as well as surprising differences in their Spartan reflections, both from a political and an ethical standpoint. The focus will be primarily, though not exclusively, on Plato's *Republic* and Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*. Though the latter work is not often regarded as philosophical in nature,[3] I will take as my starting point what I have argued elsewhere, i.e., that this is precisely how it should be read.[4]

Difficulties

Intention

One of the difficulties in comparing the view of these two Socratics on Sparta is, of course, their respective intentions when talking about Sparta. For example, Plato does not devote any of his works specifically to Sparta, whereas Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* is a focussed investigation about how Sparta came to be so powerful and so renowned. Certainly many features of Plato's ideal state in the *Republic* bear resemblances to Spartan practices, but Sparta is only explicitly mentioned once before the discussion of the different regimes in Book 8,[5] at which point Plato notes that the first regime to degenerate from the ideal aristocratic *politeia* he has just created in speech with Glaucon and Adeimantus 'is that which is praised by many, the Cretan and this one closer to home, the Laconian' (ἥ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη, 544c).[6] He then has to invent a name for this type of regime, timocracy

3 In a few instances it has been taken as so muddled that *even* Xenophon could not have written it (e.g., Talbert 1988). Note, interestingly, that Rawson, who declines to attribute definitively to the authorship of Xenophon the *Spartan Constitution*, in fact, considers the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon's 'most serious attempt at political literature' and a work that 'allows us to see that his attitude to Sparta was not unlike that of his fellow-Athenians' (1969: 33–34, 51).

4 See Humble 2004 and 2014.

5 *Resp.* 5.452c–d where the Spartans are said to have been the next after the Cretans to begin exercising naked.

6 Compare Xenophon, who goes one step further rhetorically by saying that not merely 'many' but 'all' praise Sparta (*Lac.* 10.8: 'All praise practices of this sort, but no city wishes to imitate

or timarchy, because it does not easily fit into one of the three other categories in his schema, but in doing so he is clearly keeping in mind 'the need of his overall project for an analogue of the rule of the spirited element in the soul'.[7] Plato's main aim is not to assess or critique Spartan practices, nor to give a history of the development and demise of the Spartan constitution,[8] but these need not be excluded as subsidiary aims, particularly when they mirror other discussions. If, therefore, there are details that emerge in the account of the timocratic regime and man that bear an uncanny similarity to those we find in Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*, this should give us pause. Is Plato engaging with or provoking other contemporary assessments of Sparta? Is Xenophon in the *Spartan Constitution* engaging with more theoretical speculation about Spartan-like regimes? Is his engagement actually on a more theoretical than historical level, particularly since the rhetorical structure of the work seems to signal philosophic intention?

The Spartan Question

Historical Sparta is nearly as hard to pin down as the historical Socrates. Just as Socrates left no writings, so we have no extant writings from a Spartan hand during the Classical period (though we know some existed)[9] and so can only reconstruct Sparta through the eyes of outsiders. Plato and Xenophon both knew Socrates at his peak and outlived him to write about him after his death; they both also knew Sparta at her peak and outlived her period of hegemony, writing about her during her peak and after her fall. It is frequently argued that Plato was closer to Socrates than Xenophon; whether or not this is true, certainly all the evidence suggests that Xenophon had a closer acquaintance with the Spartans than Plato. The difficulty of regarding Plato's comments on the timarchic regime and man in the *Republic* as his considered view, at the time, of Sparta or indeed as helpful for reconstructing the inner workings of ancient Sparta is, for the most part, acknowledged. Should we be applying the same caveat to Xenophon's speculations about Sparta? Certainly Xeno-

them' (ἐπαινοῦσι μὲν πάντες τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύματα, μιμεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰ οὐδεμία πόλις ἐθέλει)). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

7 Schofield 2006: 131 n. 10. Menn 2005: 13–14 is less convinced about the centrality of the analogy of parts of the soul.

8 See, e.g., Shorey's sensible comments on the limitations of regarding this material as intentional constitutional history (1935: vol. II, xlv–xlvi).

9 E.g., in the early fourth century from the hands of Lysander, written either by him or Cleon of Halicarnassus (Plutarch *Lys.* 25, 30.3 (citing Ephorus), *Mor.* 229f), King Pausanias (Arist. *Pol.* 1333b29, Strabo 8.5), and Thibron (Arist. *Pol.* 1333b5). See Boring 1979: 50–55.

phon makes clear that the *Spartan Constitution* is indeed his considered view on the matter of how the Spartans became so powerful, but it makes a difference to how we read it if we believe (a) that the broader context is a dialogue with other Athenian (Socratic) intellectuals about the nature of Spartan power, or (b) that he is little more than an amanuensis for the Spartan king, Agesilaus, who is pushing his own agenda internally in Sparta. Because we do not have a baseline for any sort of comparison we are justified, I think, in wondering whether, if there are uncanny resemblances between Xenophon's and Plato's analyses, these similarities are about historical Sparta or about the philosophical appropriation of the same. For while it is clear that appropriations of Sparta for philosophic purposes must bear some resemblance to reality, how much licence, literary or philosophical, is taken is perhaps not as disputed a point as it might be, particularly when the work of Xenophon is under scrutiny.

Chronology

Plato and Xenophon are exact contemporaries,[10] but the dating of the works of both is a vexatious issue. The paucity of direct references to each other means that we must resort to speculating on close readings of their texts to try to determine whether they are engaged in some sort of dialogue with one another. There will be little disagreement in placing Plato's *Republic* before his *Laws*, and in considering the latter a late (possibly the last) work of Plato,[11] and indeed in placing Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* prior to Plato's *Laws*. But the relative chronology of the *Republic* and *Spartan Constitution* is much more difficult to

10 It is interesting, however, how often discussion of their respective contributions to our knowledge about Classical Sparta does not reflect this. The preference for grouping Plato with Aristotle is based undoubtedly upon the traditional reluctance to categorise Xenophon as a philosopher. Thus, for example, in her magisterial work on the Spartan tradition, Rawson (1969) deals with Xenophon in her chapter on the fourth century, but saves serious discussion of Platonic views until her fifth chapter 'Plato and Aristotle'; likewise, Hodkinson 2000: 30–31 characterises Plato and Aristotle alone as the 'most serious fourth-century analysts of Spartan society'. His further comment, that 'they share a critical attitude towards both the tendency to eulogize Sparta and the approach that treated her fourth-century failings as the product of recent corruption', I would extend to include Xenophon as well; as indeed Hodkinson himself does in a later article (2005), in which even though he often notes that Plato's depiction is similar to Xenophon's, he does not examine whether this implies influence or what way the influence is to be read.

11 Theories about the relative dating of these two Platonic works all go back to Aristotle *Politics* 2.6; Bobonich 2010: 1.

ascertain. Because of the difficulty in securely dating both works,[12] we are not in a position to assert definitively from that angle a potential line of influence, although worry about precise chronology may be a red herring anyway since it has rightly been pointed out that the ideas in the *Republic* must have been in discussion both in and outside the Academy long before the work was 'published',[13] and the rhetorical structure of Xenophon's work, which seems to be replicating either his own thought process or conversations with others (see Humble 2014), suggests a similar scenario. As things stand, therefore, it behoves us to examine the matter both ways: (a) that the *Spartan Constitution* might be a response to the first degenerate regime and man in the *Republic*, and (b) the other way around.

Degree of Regard for Sparta

It can hardly be surprising that Athenian intellectuals, whether or not they were somewhat disillusioned with their own government, would in the early fourth century BCE be wondering about the nature of the Spartan *politeia*. Its longevity and stability had long been remarked upon, and Sparta's position as hegemon in the Greek world after the Peloponnesian War would naturally have led to enquiry into how such a state of affairs arose, perhaps even more so once it started more openly bullying other states after the King's Peace in 387 BCE.[14] Whether or not we are then automatically entitled to label those engaged in such enquiries laconophiles is another question, and certainly to what degree Plato and Xenophon should be so designated is not agreed upon. Consider, for example, the passage in the *Protagoras* where Plato has Socrates, just before expounding on a poem of Simonides, make the claim that the Spartans (and Cretans) are the most philosophic of all Greeks (342a–343c). There is no clear agreement on the degree of Plato's seriousness here. The passage is obviously a response to Protagoras' earlier eulogy of sophistry (316b–317e),

12 Though there are problems dating the *Republic* within Plato's own corpus, it is generally considered a work of the mid-370s (see recently Emlyn-Jones and Preddy 2013: x). There is next to no agreement, however, on when to date Xenophon's work. For example, I have argued that it was written sometime during the period 394–371 BCE (Humble 2004: 219–220); Lipka (2002: 9–13, 27–31) argues for the earlier end of that range, c. 395–394 BCE, for all but chapter 15 (and has a complicated account of the order of composition of the chapters), whereas Gray (2007: 42–43) views it as a late work, c. 360 BCE. Views on dating usually hinge on theories about the purpose of the work.

13 See the brief survey of views in Emlyn-Jones and Preddy 2013: xi–xiii.

14 Xenophon himself in his *Hellenica* marks this out as a turning point in Sparta's style of leadership.

but whether it has at its base 'a serious belief in Spartan good sense', or is seriously equating laconic speech with philosophical training,[15] or alternatively 'is a superlative example of how one can cleverly make a strong case out of a weak, even ridiculous, case', i.e., that the Spartans are philosophers,[16] is more difficult to ascertain. (And it is clear that different views reveal also the many different ways scholars approach the passage depending on their own interests.[17]) Likewise, there is disagreement about the degree of Xenophon's laconophilia. Views range from his being an uncritical mouthpiece for the Spartans, to his being a supporter of Agesilaus (but not necessarily of other Spartans), to his being able to maintain a critical distance despite living on an estate given to him by the Spartans.[18]

The starting assumption in this paper is that both Plato and Xenophon admired some features of Sparta's way of life that to them seemed quite clearly superior to the state of affairs in their native Athens, but that both also found much to criticise in Spartan practices, and that neither would ever have considered themselves anything other than Athenian in orientation.[19] The question is: are they in conversation with one another about Sparta as a political and/or ethical model?

15 The first view is that of Rawson (1969: 62), the second that of Ducat (2006: 52–53). Ducat points out that Plutarch took Plato's argument here seriously at *Lyc.* 19–20, but this fact is not secure evidence that Plato meant it seriously. Cf. also Seung 1996: 82 who brings in as support the fact that Sparta (along with Crete) is held up as an example of the regime closest in nature to the ideal in the *Republic*, and the fact that in the *Laws* a Cretan and Spartan aid the Athenian in the setup of the potential city of Magnesia.

16 Arieti and Barrus 2010: 30; cf. Lampert 2010: 90–91. De Brasi 2013: 62–81 likewise regards the apparent praise as ironic.

17 Compare, too, the *Hippias Major*. Whether or not it is genuinely Platonic, it again shows Socrates being made to hold up Spartan practices in order to bring a sophist down (282b–286a). How far this can be read as revealing Platonic approval of things Spartan is open to interpretation.

18 Humble 2004, 2014; Tuplin 1994 and Pontier 2006: 394–397 argue in different ways that Xenophon does not unconditionally support Spartan ways.

19 This assessment is not infrequently made of Plato's approach to Sparta (e.g., see Irwin 1992: 62) but is equally valid, I would argue, for describing Xenophon's (cf. De Brasi 2013: 235, who leans in this direction too).

Xenophon and Plato Compared: A Test Case

Though this analysis will be primarily about trying to discern whether or not there is a relationship—a dialogue—between Plato's *Republic* and Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*, I want to start with an example that I think clearly shows Plato, in the *Laws*, picking up on an image first found in Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*, the striking metaphor of the tyrannical ephors (*Lac.* 8.4):[20]

> τοσαύτην δὲ ἔχοντες δύναμιν οὐχ ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ἐῶσι τοὺς αἱρεθέντας ἀεὶ ἄρχειν τὸ ἔτος ὅπως ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἐπιστάται, ἤν τινα αἰσθάνωνται παρανομοῦντά τι, εὐθὺς παραχρῆμα κολάζουσι.
>
> Having such great power, they do not, as other states do, allow those who have been elected to rule however they wish for the whole year, but like tyrants and presiders at gymnastic contests, if they perceive that anyone is transgressing the law in any way, they punish him immediately on the spot.

There are only two other places where this image is employed. First, Plato uses the same metaphor in the *Laws* (4.712d, in the mouth of Megillus):[21]

> καὶ μὴν ξυννοῶν γε, ὦ ξένε, τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράζειν οὕτως ἥντινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ. καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσεοικέναι· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε. καί τοι ἐνίοτέ μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένῃ μάλιστ' ἐοικέναι.

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20 It is, of course, possible that we are simply missing other references to tyrannical ephors. For example, Pausanias may have referred to the ephors as tyrannical in his bid to abolish that magistracy (Arist. *Pol.* 1301b20), which, according to Aristotle, seems to have been part and parcel of his desire to make himself sole ruler (*Pol.* 1307a5)—despite the fact that Pausanias was able to re-establish democracy in Athens because he won over enough ephors to his point of view (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29). But if this is the case, very interestingly it would place Xenophon squarely in line with the camp opposing Agesilaus, which is quite contrary to the usual view.

21 Plato never refers to the Spartan ephors in any work other than the *Laws*. Their tyrannical nature, for example, is not part of the reason the timocratic regime collapses in the *Republic* (where Plato primarily focusses on social not political structures in the account of how regimes degenerate). It is not, in fact, set forth as a direct reason why Sparta collapses in Xenophon either.

> And besides, Stranger, when I reflect upon the Spartan *politeia*, I am not able to declare to you thus by what name one ought to call it. For it seems to me to resemble a tyranny, since the position of the ephors in it is amazingly tyrannical. And yet sometimes it appears to me to be, of all states, most similar to a democracy.

Plato actually says very little about the ephorate in terms of further defining it. Xenophon, on the other hand, clearly stated why he deemed it tyrannical: ephors could fine whomever they chose on the spot, deprive magistrates of office, imprison them, and even indict them on a capital charge (*Lac.* 8.4).

The other occurrence is in Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270b, 14–15): καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν αὐτοὺς ἠναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς ('and since the office was too great and equal to a tyranny, the kings too were compelled to curry favour with them').

Because Xenophon does not refer to the ephorate as tyrannical in the context of a discussion about how to define the Spartan constitution, as Plato and Aristotle do, his contribution—even if it amounts only to a particular way of viewing the ephorate, i.e., as tyrannical—has received less attention than it deserves.[22] Yet if he is—barring missing references (see n. 20)—the source of the very idea that the ephorate was tyrannical in nature, then neither Plato nor Aristotle is essentially disagreeing with or correcting his assessment, even though both also present a view that suggests in other lights the ephorate could be viewed as a democratic element.[23] What they are doing is taking Xenophon's

22 E.g., Richer 1998: 496–498 where Xenophon is not mentioned again after his evidence is presented. Hodkinson 2005: 240 does suggest that Xenophon 'may be the origin of the association of the ephorate and tyranny found later in Plato and Aristotle' but does not take the point any further.

23 Whether or not the Platonic passage above can be read in support of this, there is certainly an earlier passage in the *Laws* in which Plato presents an aspect of the ephorate that is more democratic in nature (3.692a): ὁ δὲ τρίτος σωτὴρ ὑμῖν ἔτι σπαργῶσαν καὶ θυμουμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁρῶν, οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως. ('Then your third saviour, seeing the government still acting insolently and fuming against you, threw upon it, as a sort of bridle, the power of the ephors, bringing it near to power bestowed by lot.') Their democratic nature comes from the fact that they are elected by lot (as implied here in Plato and confirmed in Aristotle—ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες, *Pol.* 1270b29–30—who also notes that the office gives the *demos* the feeling of having a share in running the state, 1270b19).

observation on board and appropriating it for their own more specific musings about the nature of constitutions.[24]

Xenophon and Plato Compared: *Spartan Constitution v. Republic* 544c–550c

In the points of comparison laid out below, passages from Plato are followed by passages from Xenophon without meaning to imply priority one way or another at this stage, but simply because the Platonic account is much more condensed. Further, since Plato divides up the attributes of the timocratic state first according to the features that resemble the best regime, then to those that are unique to itself, and then to those that resemble the next worst regime, oligarchy, I will also follow that order of discussion below. Some of the points of comparison are definitely peculiar to Xenophon and Plato, others are widespread, others still, though widely commented on, are noted in a singular fashion in Xenophon, Plato, or sometimes both. It is at locating and attempting to explain the more unusual confluences that the following survey is aimed.

At the start of his exposition of the degeneration of *politeiai*, Plato explicitly notes that he needs a name for the first degenerate regime, which resembles the Spartan and Cretan *politeiai* (8.544c, 545a), and he decides to name it after what he considers is its principal characteristic, 'love of honour' (545b):

> καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶτον μὲν τὴν **φιλότιμον** σκεπτέον πολιτείαν· ὄνομα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο· ἢ **τιμοκρατίαν** ἢ **τιμαρχίαν** αὐτὴν κλητέον.
>
> So now we must consider first the constitution which loves honour. Since I do not have any other name for it, it must be called either timocracy or timarchy.

24 Much is made of the fact that Xenophon attributes the ephorate to Lycurgus while Plato and Aristotle see it as a later addition (cf. *Pol.* 1313a.19 ff., where King Theopompus is specified as the one who established the ephorate). Xenophon is deemed, on the whole, to be naive and overly anxious to attribute everything to Lycurgus. This is, however, both to take Xenophon's use of Lycurgus too literally and to be somewhat careless in reading his text, which is slightly more complex (*Lac.* 8.2–3): it is the best men in the state (οἱ κρατίστοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει) along with Lycurgus who establish this office in order to secure the obedience of the rest of the citizens. In Herodotus 1.65 and in the (pseudo-)Platonic *Epistle* 8.354b–c, the establishment of the ephorate is also attributed to Lycurgus (even though the letter is quite clearly following *Laws* 3.692 in all other respects).

The three terms printed in boldface make no appearance at all in Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*,[25] but I will come back to note some of the conceptual similarities found in this work at the end of the basic comparison when Plato returns again to this point.

Plato's timocracy is said to have the following attributes in common with the best regime already set out previously in the work (8.547d):

> οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ χειροτεχνιῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται;
>
> Accordingly, on the one hand, in honouring its rulers and in having its warrior class abstain from farming and handicrafts and other moneymaking pursuits, and, on the other hand, in the establishment of *syssitia* and the cultivation of exercise and contests of war, in all such things will it imitate the previous *politeia*?

None of these points would make a contemporary Athenian raise his eyebrows—they are all, in one way or another, part of the standard portrait of Sparta—and all can be found in some form in Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*.

The first, that rulers were honoured in Sparta, is a fairly generic statement. It ties into many aspects of the Spartan image, including obedience to the laws and the stability of the Spartan constitution. But if we take the statement more narrowly, indeed literally, it is worth observing that Xenophon does use τιμάω and its cognates exclusively of two of the ruling groups in Sparta: the *gerousia* (*Lac.* 10.2: old age is more honoured (ἐντιμότερον) than youthful strength because the *gerousia* tries capital cases) and the kings (at 13.1 he says that he will set out the power and honour (τιμὴν) Lycurgus gave the kings on campaign, and conversely, at 15.8 he sums up by saying that he has set out the honours (τιμαὶ) given to them at home in their lifetime, which include honouring (ἐτίμησεν) them with a double portion of food so that they in turn can honour (τιμῆσαι) someone of their choosing).

Regarding the activities that full Spartiates are not allowed to engage in, Xenophon's list (*Lac.* 7.1–2) is remarkably similar to that of Plato:

25 In fact, they rarely appear in descriptions of Spartans in Xenophon. The notable exception is in the *Agesilaus* (10.4) where the king is called φιλοτιμότατος.

> ἐν μὲν γὰρ δήπου ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι πάντες χρηματίζονται ὅσον δύνανται· ὁ μὲν γὰρ γεωργεῖ, ὁ δὲ ναυκληρεῖ, ὁ δ' ἐμπορεύεται, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τεχνῶν τρέφονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ ὁ Λυκοῦργος τοῖς ἐλευθέροις τῶν μὲν ἀμφὶ χρηματισμὸν ἀπεῖπε μηδενὸς ἅπτεσθαι
>
> In other states, of course, everyone makes as much money as they can. One man farms, another is a ship owner, another a merchant, and others still support themselves through crafts. But in Sparta, Lycurgus forbade free men to engage in anything concerning money-making.

In addition to Plato's farming and handicrafts, Xenophon has ship-owning and mercantile activity, and he is slightly firmer in noting that Lycurgus *forbade* money-making as opposed to the formulation in Plato that Spartans *keep away from* money-making. The idea that Spartan citizens were to devote themselves to military matters rather than trades does appear in other contemporary material. In his *Busiris*, e.g., Isocrates notes (in comparing Egyptian and Spartan ways) that no citizen fit for military life spends his time in other crafts but turns his mind to weapons and campaigning (μηδ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, *Bus*. 11.18). But Isocrates' formulation here is more akin in substance, language, and context (i.e., the comparison with things Egyptian) to that found in Herodotus (2.166–167) who, after noting that those belonging to the Egyptian warrior-class are forbidden to follow any craft (τέχνην) and have an exclusively military training, remarks that almost all people rank craftsmen (τοὺς τὰς τέχνας μανθάνοντας) of lower social rank than those who do no manual work or those trained for war; all the Greeks, but especially the Spartans, he says, hold this view. If Livingstone is correct that Isocrates had the *Republic* in front of him when composing the *Busiris*,[26] Isocrates did not choose to echo closely the formulation of this principle as it was found in Plato and Xenophon.[27]

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26 Traditionally, the *Busiris* has been dated to either 388–384 BCE or the 370s; see Livingstone 2001: 48–56 for arguments placing it after, and in some senses parodying, Plato's *Republic*. Murphy 2013: 340 concurs with Livingstone.

27 Later in the *Panathenaicus* (339 BCE) Isocrates says that the Spartans neglected agriculture and the crafts (ἀμελήσαντες γεωργιῶν καὶ τεχνῶν) in order to devote themselves to warfare so as to engage in wars of conquest (46). The formulation is slightly closer with the addition of farming, but the action is deemed one of neglect rather than a directive to avoid or a prohibition. For a brief survey of Isocrates' employment of different opinions on Sparta in different rhetorical situations, see Livingstone 2001: 141.

The provision of public tables, *syssitia*, and the benefits derived from them encompasses a whole section of the *Spartan Constitution* (*Lac.* 5). That common meals were a distinctive part of the Spartan system had long been observed: Herodotus, for example, had noted them as one of Lycurgus' innovations (1.66).[28] Plato's reasoning for establishing *syssitia* in his best regime is, not surprisingly, positive: they are set up in order to free the warrior class from having to provide for their needs in order that they can devote themselves to the larger body of citizens that they are guarding. Direct comparison with why they were set up in Sparta is therefore not strictly reasonable, but it is instructive to note that in Xenophon's account the motivation is considerably less positive. There they are set up to prevent negative behaviour rather than to promote positive behaviour (*Lac.* 5.2):[29]

> Λυκοῦργος τοίνυν παραλαβὼν τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας οἴκοι σκηνοῦντας, γνοὺς ἐν τούτοις πλεῖστα ῥᾳδιουργεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἐξήγαγε τὰ συσκήνια, οὕτως ἡγούμενος ἥκιστ' ἂν παραβαίνεσθαι τὰ προσταττόμενα.
>
> Lycurgus, ascertaining that the Spartiates lived at home like other Greeks, came to the realisation that there was great slacking off among them, and so he brought them into the open into the common messes, thinking that in this way his decrees would be subject to the least transgression.

Finally, that the Spartans were devoted to physical exercise and war was a standard trope, and it is no surprise that we also find examples of this devotion in Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*. While endurance and obedience are more central in the section describing the education of boys, Xenophon does note that men were required to work out in the gymnasium regularly and were supervised while doing this (*Lac.* 5.8–9); and the superiority of Lycurgus'

28 Herodotus had also specifically linked the *syssitia* with other military innovations. And earlier in the *Republic* when the public messes are first mooted (3.416e), Plato specifically draws the comparison with military life: φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς ξυσσίτια ὥσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κοινῇ ζῆν ('coming together regularly into *syssitia* to live together in common just as those on campaign do'). Xenophon manages to draw the connection simply by using the alternative term *syskênia* (τὰ συσκήνια).

29 Even if, in fact, the most positive means of education in the whole treatise happens to emerge in the course of discussion of these *syskênia* (*Lac.* 5.5): the young learning from the example of their elders.

arrangements for organising the army on campaign is noted (11.1) and then set out (11–12), including provisioning, manoeuvres, and methods of encampment (see further below).

In terms of these first points, then, whether or not their inspiration came from Sparta directly or elsewhere,[30] there is nothing on the surface that would trouble anyone as a description of Sparta.

Plato next turns to certain features that he considers unique to the timocratic regime (8.547e–548a):

> τῷ δὲ γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγειν … ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ ἁπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν, καὶ πολεμοῦσα τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἕξει;
>
> In its fear to allow wise men to hold office … and its propensity to lean towards high-spirited and less complex men, more suited by nature for war than for peace, and its honouring the tricks and stratagems connected with these things, and its full-time pursuit of war, will it be idiosyncratic in most of these arrangements?

There is certainly nothing in Xenophon's treatise about spiritedness (θυμός and its cognates), but this is a reflection of the influence of the Platonic view of the soul as the overarching framework shaping Plato's vision in the *Republic*, in the sense that the timarchic regime/man is seen as the clear, and undesirable, ascendancy of the spirited part of the soul. In other respects, however, Xenophon is drawing a similar picture. For example, there is plenty in his treatise that reflects the same concern with the honouring of war: he notes that the education of boys is meant to make them more warlike (πολεμικωτέρους, *Lac.* 2.7); and young men who have not been chosen to be part of the 300 are at war with (πολεμοῦσι) those who have been chosen (*Lac.* 4.4). If those who are most successful in this war are most valued, they will be the ones who eventually end up in positions of authority. As a rule, Xenophon does not say much about the qualifications for ruling other than that the competition for positions in the *gerousia* is concerned with the virtue of the soul. On the face of it, this appears a positive sort of contest, but if we consider what is meant by virtue (ἀρετή) within the confines of Xenophon's own description of the Spartan system, then

30 On features in the *Republic*'s ideal state, which could be Spartan but which could refer to other things too, see Rawson 1969: 63.

we might consider that 'high-spirited and less complex' men were indeed the sort who would end up in positions of authority such as the *gerousia*.

Further, over a quarter of Xenophon's text deals with military matters (if we include section 8 on the penalties for cowardice and section 13 on the role of the kings in war along with sections 11, preparations and manoeuvres, and 12, encampment). Two summary comments within these sections bear highlighting. First, the conclusion to section 12 (*Lac.* 12.7):

> ὅτι δὲ πολλὰ γράφω, οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· ἥκιστα γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίοις εὕροι ἄν τις παραλελειμμένα ἐν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς ὅσα δεῖ ἐπιμελείας.
>
> There is no need to be surprised at the length of my description, because anybody would discover that where military matters are concerned the Lacedaemonians have overlooked very little that demands attention.

This is not a statement Xenophon makes about any other aspect of Spartan life. In addition, after setting forth the elaborate procedures involving the way sacrifices are conducted on campaign, he remarks (*Lac.* 13.5):

> ὥστε ὁρῶν ταῦτα ἡγήσαιο ἂν τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν.
>
> Consequently, if you were to see this you might consider others amateurs in military matters, and indeed think the Lacedaemonians alone craftsmen in warfare.

Of course, asserting that the Spartans were obsessed with things military was hardly, as noted above, an original observation. Since the time of Croesus, according to Herodotus (cf. 1.56–69), the Spartans had a reputation for military superiority; hence, awarding of overall leadership to them in the Persian Wars (cf. Thuc. 1.18.2). The idea that a harsh education system, the aim of which was primarily military in focus and worked at instilling courage, contributed to this military superiority was put into the mouths of both Archidamus and Pericles by Thucydides (Thuc. 1.84, 2.39, respectively), but there was nothing fundamentally negative about this assessment; such a focus was not viewed as a precursor of failure, but as a predictor of success.[31] The view from Xenophon

31 As Ducat notes (2006: 40), these are fundamentally positive views of Spartan education,

and Plato, however, is different: both see the harsh aspect and restricted focus of the education system as contributing to decline, as the following shows.

Plato's examination of the features characteristic of the timarchic regime closes with an account of how it resembles the next worse regime, oligarchy. While excessive focus on the military is the key feature of the timarchic regime and itself a point of degradation from the best regime, the cause of further degradation comes from a corresponding excessive desire for wealth, a desire that becomes the key feature of Plato's oligarchic regime, based as it is on the open pursuit of wealth. Further, Plato explicitly links unbridled desire for wealth with the education system (8.548a–c):

> ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, καὶ τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον, ἅτε κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους θησαυρούς, οἷ θέμενοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὖ περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας, ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες γύναιξί τε καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῷντο. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ οὐ φανερῶς κτώμενοι, φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρᾳ τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι, ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἠμεληκέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκέναι.

> Such men, I said, will be desirous of wealth, like those in oligarchies, and will fiercely honour gold and silver in secret, seeing that they possess treasuries and private strong rooms in which to place and hide these, within the protecting walls of their houses,[32] literally private nests in which they can make great and lavish expenditure on their women and any others they want.—Most true, he said.—And will they not be miserly about money since they honour it and don't possess it openly, but prodigal of others' wealth because of their desire, enjoying their pleasures in secret, just like boys from a father, running away from the law, since they have been educated not by persuasion but by force, through neglecting the true Muse, the Muse of reason and philosophy, and through valuing gymnastics over music?

but Thucydides, of course, died long before Sparta lost her hegemony, and so he was not engaged in wondering how Sparta fell from power.

32 This phrase, 'within the protecting walls of their houses', I have taken from Rowe's (2012) translation as it seems to render the thought best.

Xenophon's Spartans also desire wealth and hoard gold and silver in their homes secretly (*Lac.* 7.5–6). This observation comes at the end of the section of the text which starts by pointing out the prohibition on money-making. First a question is posed: how could money be an object of seriousness there when Lycurgus insisted on equal contributions of food and a similar standard of living for all? In answer to two hypothetical objections, namely that clothing and spending money on messmates might cause one to covet money, answers are given: that fitness is more admired than fancy clothing and toiling with one's body worth more to one's messmates than spending money on them. There must, however, be other reasons for coveting money since Xenophon proceeds to note measures put in place to prevent unjust money-making: making money too bulky to hoard and instituting searches for hidden caches of gold and silver. He then asks why money-making would be taken seriously when the pain of its possession outweighs the joy of its use. The rhetorical structure of the whole passage leaves us in no doubt that Xenophon is at one with Plato on this front: wealth was coveted in Sparta and was accumulated illegally.[33] Xenophon does not, like Plato, actually ever say what this wealth was used for (pleasing women and others within the confines of the home), only what it was not used for.

Just as secret coveting of wealth in the timocratic regime degrades to open pursuit of wealth in the oligarchic regime, so too does secret coveting of wealth degrade to open flaunting of wealth in the *Spartan Constitution* (*Lac.* 14.3).[34]

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33 This assessment also surfaces in Plato's *First Alcibiades* (122d–123a), illustrated there, with beautiful irony, by one of Aesop's fables. Denyer 2001: 14–26 argues for the authenticity of this dialogue (as does Johnson 2003: xiv n. 7) and would place it tentatively at least in the 360s or later (see under 'dating' in his Index).

34 De Brasi 2013: 143 compares *Resp.* 548a–c with *Lac.* 14.3 but misses the crucial parallel with the earlier passage, *Lac.* 7. Likewise do Denyer 2001: 185–186 (who reads *Lac.* 7.5–8.1 as Xenophon saying that the Spartans 'scrupulously obeyed the ban'), Menn 2005: 31, and Recco 2007: 149–150. Menn does take note of *Lac.* 7, but because he is starting from the assumption that Xenophon's work, barring chapter 14, is wholly positive, he can only conclude that *Lac.* 7 is an 'implicit' admission on the part of Xenophon of the failure of the Spartan education because 'Xenophon finds nothing wrong in the ideals themselves'. Overall, Menn is more apt to gloss Xenophon's points about Sparta to suggest a stronger parallel with Plato's ideal city than with the timarchy. For example, he argues that 'both in Xenophon and in Plato the children of the elite are not left under the control of their parents, but live collectively and are subject to a common state education' (2005: 28). In Xenophon, children certainly have a common state education under the control of a *paidonomos* (*Lac.* 2.2) and virtually anyone was allowed to inflict punishment upon them (*Lac.* 2.2; 2.10–11; 6.2), but there is absolutely no suggestion that they lived collectively, and

Indeed in the one chapter in which Xenophon describes what happens when the Spartans depart from following their ancestral (Lycurgan) ways, the emphasis is all on the desire to possess wealth openly and without penalty.[35] Since punishment results from being seen with this wealth, living abroad is desired (and Xenophon reiterates this point, 14.2 and 14.4). This desire to possess wealth openly leads to a corresponding desire to rule without being worthy of ruling and, consequently, the rejection by others of the Spartans as hegemon—a hegemony they won in the first place through their military superiority.

Being prodigal of others' wealth is not a point Xenophon makes directly,[36] though we might connect the strong desire among Spartans to serve abroad as harmosts and willingly expose themselves to flattery (*Lac.* 14.2, 14.4) as indicative of this tendency. By living abroad, at any rate, they are certainly 'just like boys from a father, running away from the law'. But whether or not we want to see any connection on that point, Xenophon's whole treatise certainly confirms the next point: that force of one sort or another, not persuasion, was the dominant means of education and the reason that the Spartans secretly coveted wealth. For example, consider the opening of the section on educating boys (*Lac.* 2.2):

> ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος ... ἄνδρα ἐπέστησε κρατεῖν αὐτῶν ἐξ ὧνπερ αἱ μέγισται ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ὃς δὴ καὶ παιδονόμος καλεῖται. τοῦτον δὲ κύριον ἐποίησε καὶ ἀθροίζειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντα, εἴ τις ῥᾳδιουργοίη, ἰσχυρῶς κολάζειν. ἔδωκε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἡβώντων μαστιγοφόρους, ὅπως τιμωροῖεν ὅτε δέοι, ὥστε πολλὴν μὲν αἰδῶ, πολλὴν δὲ πειθὼ ἐκεῖ συμπαρεῖναι.
>
> But Lycurgus ... appointed one man from among those who held the greatest magistracies, to rule over the boys. He is called the educational supervisor. He gave this man authority to gather the boys and watch over them and punish them harshly if they were caught slacking off. He gave to this man also whip-bearers from among the young men in order to punish

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indeed quite a bit of evidence that loyalty to one's *oikos* was strong (e.g., *Lac.* 1.9 shows concerns about the wealth of each *oikos*, and 6.3 quite clearly states that the sharing of servants, hunting dogs, and horses was done with deference to their owners).

35 Xen. *Lac.* 14.3: καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα αὐτοὺς φοβουμένους χρυσίον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ' ἔστιν οὓς καὶ καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι. ('Also I know that previously they were afraid to be seen with gold, but now there are those who take pride in its possession'.)

36 It is an image found, however, in the later works of Isocrates, who is likely drawing his rhetoric in this regard from Plato (cf. Isoc. *Peace* 96: ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων to Plato *Resp.* 8.548b: φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων δι' ἐπιθυμίαν).

> the boys whenever necessary. The result is that there is among the boys an equal manifestation of great shame and great obedience.

What slacking off entails and details about when or for what it might be necessary to punish boys are not noted. The main point is that obedience and shame are instilled through constant supervision and fear of punishment.[37] This pattern is repeated throughout the discussion of the upbringing and daily life of male citizens, though the mode of punishment varies.[38]

Finally, Plato's account of the timocratic regime concludes first with a remark by Glaucon—that the regime seems a mixture of good and evil—and then with the following comment by Socrates (8.548c):

> διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἕν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος, φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι.

> But the most obvious feature in it is one thing and one thing alone, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely, competitiveness and ambition.[39]

Plato has here come full circle: *philotimia* was precisely why he suggested the terms timarchy or timocracy for this type of regime (8.544b). Of these terms only φιλονικία is to be found, once, in the *Spartan Constitution* and then not

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37 Ducat 2006: 6–7 is mindful that this type of rhetoric can hardly be described as eulogistic (as it frequently is) and so argues that Xenophon is here defending the aspects of Spartan education that were deemed the worst by outsiders.

38 Unspecified punishment (*Lac.* 2.10, 10.6), whipping (2.8, 2.9, 6.2), exclusion from 'good things' (τὰ καλά, 3.3), fines (4.6, 7.6, 8.4, 10.5), social exclusion (9.4–5).

39 The translation of φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι varies greatly. I have used Waterfield's (1993) translation of the terms because he has chosen English terms that can be used both positively and negatively in the same way that the Greek terms can. Compare the more positive translation of Bloom (1968) 'love of victories and honours' and the more negative translation of Shorey (1935): 'contentiousness and covetousness of honour'; Rowe (2012) with 'coming out on top' and 'being honoured' and Emlyn-Jones and Preddy (2013) with 'contentiousness and ambition' are somewhat in-between. It is, I think, hard to capture Plato's meaning here. The Greek terms can be used in positive and negative senses, and I think Plato intended both the more positive and more negative aspects of the words to have force, the more positive because this is, after all, the second best regime, the more negative in that the regime is already one removed from the best regime. (Cf. the comments of Sheppard 2009: 129.)

even directly of the Spartans. This is not to say, however, that Xenophon did not view Spartan society as incredibly competitive, but his presentation of this fact is singular. Consider the passage in which *philonikia* is actually mentioned (*Lac.* 4.2):

> ὁρῶν οὖν, οἷς ἂν μάλιστα φιλονικία ἐγγένηται, τούτων καὶ χοροὺς ἀξιακροατοτάτους γιγνομένους καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας ἀξιοθεατοτάτους, ἐνόμιζεν, εἰ καὶ τοὺς ἡβῶντας συμβάλλοι εἰς ἔριν περὶ ἀρετῆς, οὕτως ἂν καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀνδραγαθίας.
>
> Observing, then, that for those in whom love of victory was particularly inbred, choruses were most worth hearing and athletic contests were most worth watching, he thought that if he could match together the young men in strife over virtue, they would thus reach the highest degree of bravery.

This 'strife over virtue' will be the result of the choosing of the 300, and those who are not chosen are at war with those who are chosen and then constantly fight one another (*Lac.* 4.3–6; see also above). This is a particularly bleak picture of what 'love of victory' can produce (made bleaker by drawing on the negative image of strife from Hesiod (*Op.* 11–25), rather than the positive), with the passage ending by noting that it was so difficult to separate young men sparring in the street that heavy fines had to be handed out to those who could not restrain themselves from continuing to fight after being ordered to stop. It is notable, too, that the penalties for cowardice are recounted in detail rather than the honours attained for bravery (*Lac.* 9). Fear of punishment rather than love of honour appears the main motivating factor in Xenophon's Sparta. He does not so frame it, but his Sparta appears more as a φοβοκρατία than a τιμοκρατία.[40]

What particularly stands out in the above survey as strikingly new additions to the standard images about Spartan practices is that both Plato and Xenophon see the following as distinctly characteristic of Spartan society: employment of an education system that is lacking in certain areas (Plato is explicit in

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40 Vandiver 2014 argues that *philotimia*, and indeed a defence of it, is central to Xenophon's political discourse in his *Cyropaedia*, and that the defence is made through engagement with Plato's *Republic*. If Vandiver's (not unproblematic) assessment is deemed correct, it would make it even more striking—at least from the point of view of those who regard the *Spartan Constitution* as a work of praise—that Xenophon does not engage with this concept here.

this regard—reason, philosophy and music; Xenophon implicit, in that he does not say what is not taught) and which uses force rather than persuasion as its prime pedagogical tool, and thus quite manifestly on both fronts fails to lead its citizens to internalise virtuous behaviour, which in turn leads to them lusting after wealth in private. Further, they both agree that a sign of the regime's degradation is that this covert desire for wealth turns to open pursuit of wealth. It is difficult, therefore, not to ask whether or not there is a dialogue of some sort going on here.[41]

Who is Influencing Whom?

Three scenarios present themselves as possibilities in terms of lines of influence.

(1) One scenario, of course, is that these points had been bandied about in Socratic circles much earlier and are now turning up coincidentally in the works of both men because they suit their respective literary and philosophic purposes. It is not difficult to imagine discussions with Socrates about the best way to inculcate virtue focussing on imitation and persuasion rather than on force (for example, throughout Xenophon's corpus—Socratic and non-Socratic works alike—the former are the preferred means of educating others) and, given Socrates' very public display of his own poverty, the pitfalls of excessive desire for wealth can hardly have escaped discussion either, regardless of whether any specific Spartan practice entered the picture.[42] That a more positive view of Spartan education is presented in what are likely earlier works by Plato is inconclusive in terms of disproving this notion, since it is not clear how far the positive presentation is dependent upon the need to show Socrates demolishing and/or satirising his opponents' arguments.

41 Hodkinson 2005: 251 talks of Plato echoing Xenophon on these points, but though this observation appears more a result simply of the order in which he examines the material (Xenophon before Plato before Aristotle)—analysing lines of influence is not a concern in this article—it does show that looking at this material in other ways still reveals the striking similarity between what Plato says about the timarchic regime in the *Republic* and what Xenophon says in the *Spartan Constitution*.

42 Old education in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (961–1023) may also be meant to recall, in certain aspects, Spartan education. There, too, corporal punishment makes an appearance but trying to tie that to Sparta specifically is difficult, since corporal punishment was hardly unknown in Athens (Golden 1990: 64, with further references also on 203 n. 64).

(2) The second scenario is that Xenophon had Plato's *Republic* in front of him as he was writing his *Spartan Constitution*. The situation is, of course, not the same as that which we find in the case of the two *Apologiai* and *Symposia* where form and purpose are mirrored and where the portrayal of Socrates is the bone of contention. Not only do the works not resemble one another in form (even though I would argue that the *Spartan Constitution* is a type of dialogue), but Xenophon's purpose in writing the *Spartan Constitution* is quite different from Plato's in describing the timarchic regime in the *Republic*. Since, however, in almost all cases, including that of Plato's presumed response in the *Laws* to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, the standard interpretation is to argue that Plato is correcting the view of Xenophon, it seems logical to examine whether or not this might be the case here too. Even though, therefore, the two accounts are reasonably in agreement on two fundamental points (education by force and secret hoarding of wealth), is Xenophon setting out to correct Plato regarding other aspects of the Spartan regime?[43]

If Xenophon is setting out to correct Plato, he can only be doing so to show that things in Sparta are not quite as positive as the description of the timarchic regime suggests. For example, Plato says that rulers (τοὺς ἄρχοντας) in the timarchic regime were honoured. Xenophon's assessment of rulers in Sparta (ephors, *gerousia* and the kings) is not quite the same. The ephors are not said to be honoured, but their power comes from fear of their tyrannical powers (*Lac.* 8.3–4). Of the *gerousia* it is certainly noted that old age is more honoured than youthful strength, but the reason for this is that the *gerousia* have been given the right to try capital cases (*Lac.* 10.2). This honouring, therefore, amounts to little more than fearing.[44] The kings are the only rulers in Sparta in Xenophon's work who are explicitly accorded honours (in war, at home, and after death: *Lac.* 13 and 15).

Concerning abstention from money-making, as noted above, Xenophon and Plato are remarkably close in their formulation. Xenophon could, however, be correcting Plato in pointing out money-making was forbidden rather than just

43 Certainly Xenophon's work has considerable intertextual credentials. For example, he engages with Critias on Spartan drinking and symposiastic practices (cf. *Lac.* 5.2–9 with Critias D.-K. 88b6 (= Athenaeus 10.432d–433b)) and does so, I would argue, with a corrective impulse; Hesiod's two kinds of strife (cf. above); Herodotus on, among other issues, Spartan kings (cf. *Lac.* 13, 15 with Hdt. 6.56–58; again likely with a corrective impulse, though not in as combative a spirit as that with which he engaged Critias' work).

44 A point that tempers the vaunted honouring of elders in Sparta, an idea that certainly had a wider pedigree and is found elsewhere in Xenophon (e.g., *Lac.* 9.5; also *Mem.* 3.5.15, where it is used to criticise Athenian practice).

to be kept away from, and it is possible to imagine his longer list of occupations to be eschewed as a sort of pedantic improvement on Plato's. Concerning common meals, if Xenophon's explanation for why Lycurgus instigated *syssitia* is intended as a response, it must be to point out that the institution, like so much else Lycurgus established, was not, in fact, done for so positive a reason as that Plato proposes for his best regime, i.e., to promote and enhance the capacity of the guardians to carry out their duties on behalf of those they are charged with protecting. Rather, common meals were established in Sparta, in Xenophon's view, to prevent negative behaviour: keeping citizens in the public eye more often was meant to improve their levels of obedience. Likewise, Xenophon's avoidance of the terms *philotimos* and *timocracy/timarchy* could be read again as a point of disagreement, a corrective response, to say that Plato's assessment once more is too generous (on the understanding that the timarchic regime is the second best regime and that these terms must be meant to be viewed in some part, at least, as positive in the context of Plato's discussion). In the *Spartan Constitution*, apart from when he is talking about the kings, Xenophon focuses more on punishments than on honours and could be arguing that fear of punishment motivates more than love of honour. Alternatively, Xenophon may be avoiding use of these terms because he knew that that part of Plato's analysis was intimately linked with his theory about the parts of the soul.

(3) Ducat suggests that if we are to regard the presentation of Spartan education in the *Hippias Major* and the *Protagoras* as positive (and this, as noted above, is far from certain, a point which Ducat himself also admits) 'we might accept that it was the reflections which accompanied the writing of the *Republic* which led him [Plato] seriously to qualify this opinion'.[45] What Ducat does not consider in following this train of thought, however, is the possibility that reflections that accompanied the reading of Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* might have led Plato seriously to qualify this opinion. The third scenario, therefore, is that Xenophon's work was in circulation and in Plato's hands as he was composing the *Republic* and that it influenced his presentation of the timarchic regime (and man).[46] Thus, though I am inclined to think Plato is being wholly

45 Ducat 2006: 53, though he does not discuss in his survey Plato's views on Spartan education in the *Republic*, skipping straight to the *Laws*.

46 I do not mean to limit this scenario to Plato literally reading Xenophon's work. It could equally be that Xenophon's ideas were in circulation and reached Plato via oral communication, or even that Plato visited Xenophon, and they discussed these issues together. For those who would like to maintain a picture of constant rivalry, this will perhaps seem ludicrous, but as far as we can tell during the 380s Plato travelled quite extensively, so why not to Scillus among other places?

ironic in his presentation of Sparta in the *Hippias Major* and *Protagoras*, if he was not, this third scenario could explain his more negative portrait of Spartan education in the *Republic*. Contemporary views certainly held that Spartan education was harsh and produced hardy soldiers, but no one except Xenophon presents such an extended account of the disciplinary punishments in force at every level.[47]

Indeed much of Plato's description of the timocratic regime (honouring its rulers, the institution of *syssitia*, devotion to military matters, etc.) could have been culled from standard tropes about Sparta (and Crete) that had been in circulation at least for the duration of Plato's lifetime; yet no other (extant) account of Spartan education and life bar Xenophon's represents good behaviour as being so thoroughly dependent on fear of punishment and constant supervision (i.e., education by force rather than persuasion), and no other contemporary account comments on their secret lusting after wealth, their consequent hoarding of it in their houses, and then connects their open flaunting of wealth with their decline.

Under this scenario, Plato's more extensive description of where they store wealth ('treasuries and private strong rooms') can be viewed as rhetorical enhancement of what he found in Xenophon (*Lac.* 7.6). Similarly, that his formulation regarding abstention from money-making is so similar to Xenophon's can be explained by its being dependent upon Xenophon. (If he has toned it down somewhat, it is because this is an element that belongs to his ideal regime.) And his comment about lavishing this wealth on women and others in private enclosures in their homes can be construed as yet another answer to Xenophon's question mentioned earlier (*Lac.* 7.3): 'how could money be an object of seriousness there when Lycurgus insisted on equal contributions of food and a similar standard of living for all?' In his own treatise, Xenophon appears to answer two objections when he follows this question in his text by noting that they would not need money to spend on clothes because physical fitness was more prized as an adornment and physical toil on behalf of one's

47 There is, likewise, no contradiction between what Plato says is neglected in Spartan education (reason, philosophy, and music) and what Xenophon presents as comprising Spartan education, though I do not think much can be made of this, since there are too many other factors at play here: (a) the general view of Sparta as surpassing others in military skills could easily lead to this argument; (b) Xenophon is aware of music in Spartan life generally (e.g., Ducat 2006: 263–264), and so he knows it was taught, he just does not see it as an important element leading to their renown and power (see Humble 2018: 586–588), and (c) Plato's own opinion of what topics of education were most important also feeds in here.

friends was worth more than spending money on them (*Lac.* 7.3–4). It may be, of course, that Xenophon could not think of further objections, but I doubt this very much. Xenophon's question (as I have argued elsewhere[48]) is meant to make the reader think. The two objections parried only draw attention to further obvious objections, such as spending money on women in the privacy of their own homes, precisely the point Plato makes in the *Republic*.[49] In this scenario, therefore, Plato is Xenophon's perfect reader![50]

It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Plato was interested in what Xenophon had to say about Sparta, recognising that Xenophon had greater experience of the Spartans. Xenophon was certainly in a better position to make authoritative statements regarding the private hoarding of wealth, being dependent on the Spartans for his estate at Scillus, and in the circle of King Agesilaus. In addition, his experience of campaigning with the Spartans from 399–394 BCE likewise gave him opportunity to see how they behaved abroad.[51]

Finally, Plato's idiosyncratic emphasis on *thumos* and *timê* and his creation of the terms timarchy or timocracy to describe his second best regime—all of which are easily explained by looking to his own broader analogy with his own partition of the soul—work better also as a more positive slant on what is seen in Xenophon's treatise than the other way around. And given the position of the timarchic regime in the hierarchy of regimes, Plato needed it to be a bit more positive than Xenophon in his presentation of Sparta. The very fact that the details that conform most closely to Xenophon's account are those in which Plato says the regime most closely resembles the next degenerate regime, oligarchy, signals to me that Plato knew exactly what Xenophon was doing in his *Spartan Constitution*: he knew that Xenophon had insider knowl-

48 Humble 2014.

49 Women are, however, present more than once as pernicious influences in Plato's account of the degradation of the regimes, so his negative opinion of their role in general may be guiding this particular point here, regardless of its obviousness as an answer to the question Xenophon poses. Xenophon, by contrast, in general does not take such a misogynistic stance at any point.

50 It could, of course, be the case that Plato's point about the women is corrective and so pointing out an obvious element missed by Xenophon, but that seems less likely in view of the overall agreement on the major points. Further, even if they are correcting one another on other matters, this does not mean that their rivalry was not friendly. See also Tuplin, this volume 602–605, for the suggestion that Plato is well aware of Xenophon's narrative strategies in the *Oeconomicus*.

51 Dercylidas, e.g., he notes is φιλαπόδημος (*Hell.* 4.3.2). I would not, however, press this point too far since Spartan behaviour abroad had long been under scrutiny, at least since Pausanias had been accused of medizing in the 470s.

edge of Sparta, he knew the *Spartan Constitution* was a philosophic enquiry (in the Socratic mode) into the nature of Spartan power, he knew that Xenophon's opinion about Sparta, like his own, was mixed, and he appreciated very keenly Xenophon's observations on the deficiencies of the Spartan education system, both in terms of content and mode of enforcement, which aimed only to make sure a limited type of virtue was practised in public (cf. *Lac.* 10.4–6), but did not ensure the practice of virtue in private; hence, the Spartans' penchant for covertly lusting after wealth.[52] Further, the observation made above—that Xenophon was the first to describe the ephorate as a magistracy with tyrannical powers and that Plato later, approvingly, picks this up and puts it in the mouth of the Spartan interlocutor in the *Laws*—supports this third scenario that Plato was in agreement with Xenophon about at least certain important aspects of Spartan practice.

Though the focus of this paper has not been on the *Laws*, I do want to make one further note about another instance in which it seems perfectly obvious to me that Plato in the *Laws* has drawn upon Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* in the spirit of agreement rather than with any corrective impulse. The subject again is education, and the following comments, put in the mouth of Megillus (1.633b), look very much like a succinct summary of *Lac.* 2.2–11, the main section in Xenophon's work that deals with the education of boys:

> Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἔγωγε πειρῴμην ἂν λέγειν τὸ περὶ τὰς καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγηδόνων· πολὺ παρ' ἡμῖν γιγνόμενον ἔν τε ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταῖς χερσὶ μάχαις καὶ ἐν ἁρπαγαῖς τισὶ διὰ πολλῶν πληγῶν ἑκάστοτε γιγνομέναις.
>
> Further I would like to explain the fourth thing, concerning the endurance of pain: it is very prevalent amongst us both in hand-to-hand fighting and in certain thefts always perpetrated under the threat of many blows.

Conclusion

Of the three possible scenarios offered in explanation of the striking similarities found in Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* and Plato's description of the timarchic regime in the *Republic*, the first cannot, of course, be disproved, and certainly a shared background (upper-class, Athenian, Socratic) goes some way towards explaining what aspects of Sparta Plato and Xenophon focus on, laud,

52 For further explication of this view of the *Spartan Constitution*, see Humble 2004 and 2014.

and criticise when they do set out to analyse the state. The second scenario viewing Xenophon's work as a corrective to Plato's sketch of the timarchic (Spartan) regime requires us to believe (at least on my reading of Xenophon's work) that Xenophon felt he needed to show that Plato had been too positive in his assessment.[53] Again, this is possible, but it is not perhaps the best way of explaining how they agree on such fundamental issues as the mode of educating and the private coveting of wealth. The third scenario has a few more points in its favour, not least the fact that there are other close points of contact between Plato and Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* that appear as straight borrowings rather than corrections. Plato, I would argue, then, recognised that Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* was a philosophical enquiry into the nature of Spartan power, and he both agreed with (at least parts of) Xenophon's assessment and was prepared to take from it what he needed for his own purposes, recognising perhaps that Xenophon, through the vicissitudes of his own life, was better qualified to expound on matters Spartan than he himself was.

It remains to comment on why in other instances in which Xenophon appears to be responding to Plato, or vice versa, we think that we can detect a corrective impulse of the sort that does not seem to be present here. In answer, I would refer in part to the loose parallel suggested at the beginning of the paper between the difficulty in reconstructing the historical Socrates and the difficulty in reconstructing historical Sparta. There is one aspect of this comparison that is decidedly not parallel. Xenophon and Plato grew up with Socrates, and they were emotionally invested in their relationship with him, and consequently his influence was decisive, in different ways, on both their lives.[54] This fact alone goes far towards explaining rival presentations of Socrates. They did not, however, grow up under the Spartan *politeia*, but in a regime that was at war with Sparta from the time they were born into their early adulthood, and however complex and problematic their relationship with their own polis was, their relationship with Sparta was of an entirely different nature. Neither was emotionally invested in Sparta, and so there were fewer grounds perhaps for engaging in rivalry. The fact that they agree on why Sparta was always doomed to and did decline—a too harsh and too limited education system that resulted

53 The second scenario might work better, indeed, with the traditional (and still quite prevalent) view of the *Spartan Constitution* as a work of praise and of Xenophon as a naive laconophile, pumping out propaganda for Agesilaus, since it would not require him to take cognizance of (or even to understand, as some would perhaps have it) the broader context of Plato's comments in order to set the record straight.

54 See further Humble 2018.

in secret coveting and hoarding of wealth—and that these observations are, out of all ancient discussions on Sparta, singular to Plato and Xenophon, points, I would suggest, to a certain amount of agreement and dialogue between the two men.[55]

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55 Tuplin, this volume, likewise argues that Plato engages seriously, rather than in rivalry, with certain aspects of Xenophon's presentation of Persia. Again with Persia as with Sparta, there was emotional distance. See also Atack, this volume, who argues in a different way that Xenophon and Plato participate in a shared discourse.

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Plato, Xenophon and Persia

Christopher Tuplin

The link between Xenophon and Persia is well-known. There is a life-story with strong Persian connections. The years 401–394 were spent in the territory of the empire, accompanying Cyrus, escaping the consequences and assisting the Spartan *riconquista*, though thereafter—apart from the visit of the Persian Ephesian *neōkoros* to Olympia—we know of no further direct connections. But the experience was revisited in literary output. Two works (*Anabasis*, *Cyropaedia*) are wholly or largely played out in real or fictive Persian imperial space. A third (*Hellenica*) reports Persian activities between 410 and 386, though rarely thereafter. (The conference in 7.1.33–38 is a notable exception.) There is a celebrated passage in *Oeconomicus* about the King's love of agriculture, Persian military protection of the countryside, and Cyrus' gardening activities, as well as some subsequent allusions to the royal environment. There are also two other Persian items in *Memorabilia*,[1] though both are rather passing references, and one might (at least initially) be surprised that there are not more. If one did not know Xenophon to be a Persian 'expert', one would not guess it from *Memorabilia*.

Connecting Plato with Persia is a somewhat less familiar activity. But there *are* both life-story and literary connections.

As to the former they come in both uncomplicatedly real and in more dubiously alleged forms. The uncomplicated fact is that Plato's great-uncle/stepfather Pyrilampes and his stepbrother (Pyrilampes' son) Demus had Persian connections. Pyrilampes had been an envoy to the Great King, and Demus possessed a dish (*phialē*) that was a gift from the great King (perhaps because he too had met him). More remarkably Pyrilampes owned (and Demus inherited) peacocks, quintessentially Persian birds (cf. Aristophanes *Acharnians*

1 At 2.1.10 we hear that in Asia Persians rule, and Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians are subjects; in Europe Scythians rule, and Maeotians are subjects; and in Africa Carthaginians rule, and Libyans are subjects. Which, Socrates asks, has the pleasanter life? And among Greeks do conquerors or conquered have a pleasanter life? Aristippus does not answer this question, and the conversation moves on. In 4.2.33–34 the dangers of cleverness (*sophia*) are exemplified by Daedalus (who lost liberty and a son), Palamedes (who lost his life), and people who are carried off (*anaspastous*—the same term used for mass deportations after military defeat) to the Persian king to become slaves. Euthydemus concedes *sophia* is not an unproblematic good, and the conversation moves on.

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61ff.) that were displayed to their fellow-Athenians on a regular (though it was said not sufficiently regular) basis both before and after Plato's birth. They prompted a notable court-case in (perhaps) 415–413 (Cartledge 1991), and count as a notable example of the reception of *Perserie* in late fifth century Athens—a matter with which Plato must therefore have been peculiarly familiar, though it cannot be said to leave an obvious impact in his written *oeuvre*.[2]

The other strand in life-story connections takes us to Persian religion/philosophy.

Later tradition had it that Plato learned things from *magoi* in Egypt and Phoenicia. Colotes claimed that Zoroaster, not Er, was the source of the myth in *Republic*, and Proclus knew of a copy of Zoroaster's *On Nature* in which the author called himself a Pamphylian and son of Armenius.[3] Older sources (Eudoxus and Aristotle, cited in Pliny *Natural History* 30.3) dated Zoroaster 6000 years before Plato's death—an interesting variant on views that he belonged 5000 years before the Trojan War or 6000 before Xerxes' invasion of Greece—and Speusippus (fr. 27 Lang = fr. 1a Taran) reported a story that Plato was the offspring of a virgin birth, which is a characteristic of the final world-saviour in Zoroastrian eschatology.[4] Slightly more mundanely, there are variant stories about Persians, *magoi* or Chaldaeans visiting Plato or honouring him.[5] (The association with the time of his death recalls the dating of Zoroaster in relation to that moment.) I make two observations about this material.

2 Pyrilampes' visits are mentioned in *Charmides* 158a; Demus is mentioned as beloved (*erōmenos*) of Callicles in *Gorgias* 481d, 513b. There are no peacocks. Some think the well-informed witness in *Alc.* 1 123b is Pyrilampes. No doubt such speculation *could* be extended further to anything that Plato mentions that seems distinctive or unusual (see further below).

3 Colotes ap. Proclus *in R.* 2.109f (Kroll).

4 Since that saviour appears 57 years before the end of time he is not, of course, identical with Plato. (Admittedly, Speusippus ascribed responsibility for the situation to Apollo.)

5 (1) Philip of Opus *FGrH* 1011 F1 = Philodemus *PHerc.* 1021, col. III.35–V.19: a 'Chaldaean' visited the dying Plato and, although exactly what transpired depends on interpretation of the fragmentary papyrus text, on one reading it included the Chaldaean reciting two Greek verses (of his own composition or from a tragic text) that criticized barbarians for being naturally unrhythmical. (2) Sen. *Ep.*58.31: Persian *magoi* were in Athens at time of Plato's death and made offerings to him after his death because they thought him more than mortal and were impressed because he died at 81 [= 3^6]. (3) Favorinus *Mem.* I ap. DL 3.25 (36 Barigazzi): Mithradates the Persian dedicated a statue of Plato in the Academy, bearing the inscription "Mithradates son of Rhodobates, a Persian, dedicated to the Muses an image of Plato made by Silanion". (4) *Prolegomena to Platonic Philsophy* (Westerink) 15, 6.20f: Pythagoras travelled to Persia to learn wisdom of *magoi* but *magoi* came to Athens to be initiated in Plato's philosophy. (That looks like a response to Aristoxenus; see below.)

First, there is a slight parallel with Socrates. Aristotle reported that a *magos* from Syria called Zopyrus condemned Socrates for various reasons and foretold his violent death. This Zopyrus has often been identified as Zopyrus the physiognomist, who described Socrates as stupid and uxorious and is the eponym of Phaedo's *Zopyrus*: that work included a story about a lion cub and the Persian King's youngest son, a fact that would be consistent with idea that the physiognomist was a Persian *magos*.[6] A separate claim that Socrates learned about *post mortem* judgment from the *magos* Gobryas (descendant of a homonym who was in Delos in 480) comes from *Axiochus* 371a–372b, a much later source, so whether any Socrates-Persia connection is a *precedent* for (not a by-product from) the Plato stories depends entirely on our judgment of the evidence of Phaedo's *Zopyrus*.[7]

Second, there is certainly an interaction between the Plato stories and claims made by Aristoxenus (no friend of the Academy) about Pythagoras and Zoroaster. It would be nice to be unequivocally sure who started this particular argument. Vasunia 2007 takes it to have been the Academy, with Aristoxenus' Zoroastrian Pythagoras a response. Perhaps that is correct. In any case one's impression is that fully developed fourth-century interest in Zoroaster is characteristic of writings that belong after Plato's demise,[8] so it *is* the post-Platonic Academy that is in question.[9] The relationship between this phenomenon and what is actually in Plato's own writings is a nice question.

As for those writings: the account of Persian kings from Cyrus to Xerxes in *Laws* 3 and of Persian education (and other matters) in *First Alcibiades* are perhaps the most celebrated items. The narratives of the Persian Wars and the Ionian and Corinthian Wars in *Menexenus* are an aspect of Greek as much as Persian history; and most other allusions to Persia or things Persian are comparatively isolated:[10] even a work as long as *Republic* produces only one striking

6 The name is assigned to several Persians, but its original Persian form is buried under assimilation to Greek Zopyrus: Schmitt 2011: 194.

7 Other alleged foreign encounters were with an Indian (Aristoxenus 53 Wehrli) or a Thracian doctor linked to Zalmoxis (Pl. *Chrm.*156d).

8 Zoroaster was already mentioned in Xanthus (ap. DL 1.2, probably) and Dinon (690 F5). But that he appeared in Ctesias (even as a Bactrian king: cf. Just. 1.1.9) is not to be assumed lightly. (Lenfant rejects the supposition.)

9 If one accepts the attribution of a *Magikos* to Antisthenes (a work dealing with Zoroaster's discovery of wisdom: so Suda), the situation may become more complex; but there may be a confusion with Aristotle's homonymous work. (Suda notes this as an alternative attribution, and there is no *Magikos* in Diogenes Laertius' list of Antisthenes' writings.) Phaedon's *Zopyrus*, by contrast, has no claimed status as a work about Zoroaster's philosophy.

10 The salient texts are: *Ap.* 40d, *Chrm.* 158a, *Epist.* 311a, 320d, 332ab, *Euthyd.* 274a, *Grg.* 470e,

passage—one in which the King is paradoxically an analogy for oligarchy, not tyranny—and *Gorgias* is more interested in Archelaus than the Persian King. Vasunia has nonetheless claimed with some justification that 'Plato mentions Persia more substantially than he mentions any other non-Greek people, more even than the Egyptians' (2007: 252).

Introduction: Persia and the Other Socratics

What ties Xenophon and Plato together in our present context is, of course, shared Socratic status. And if we are inspecting the impact of Persia on these two Socratics we cannot entirely ignore the others. For it might even be that the situation with Plato and Xenophon is part of a larger story that includes the others.

Only in the case of Aristippus is there a suggestion that life-history brought any of them into direct Persian connection.[11] The story was told that, when in Asia, Aristippus was taken prisoner by the satrap Artaphernes. 'Can you be cheerful (*tharreis*) under these circumstances?' someone asked. 'Yes, you simpleton', was the reply, 'for when should I be more cheerful than now that I am about to converse with Artaphernes?' In a comparable story, when Aristippus was to meet Pharnabazus, the King's satrap, someone said, 'Be of good cheer' (*tharrei*). Aristippus replied 'if you've anything else to say, say it; since I associated with Socrates (*homilēsa*) I have been not been cautious about associating with any man'.[12] Since Pharnabazus and an officer called Artaphernes are found active together in the 390s (Diodorus 14.79 at Caunus; and the name Artaphernes can be restored at *Hellenica Oxyrhyncia* 12.3 (Chambers)), these

483de, 525e, *Hp. min.* 368c, *Lach.* 191c, *Lys.* 209de, 211e, *Meno* 78d, *Phdr.* 258c, *Plt.* 264c, Resp. 336a, 553cd, 572e, *Symp.* 182a, *Tht.* 230de. Of these, *Symp.*182a speaks only of "barbarians" but must have the Persians in mind (see below 591). Unspecified barbarians in *Cra.* 397d, *Resp.* 469c, 470c and *Laws* 887e may also be or include Persians. See nn. 31, 69. There is an implicit reference to Persia in Atlantis, a land that was ruled (in effect: but the term is not used) by a king of kings (*Ti.* 25a, *Critias* 108e, 114a, 120d), had access to elephants (115a), controlled an empire as far as Egypt and Etruria (*Ti.* 25b), launched an attack on Greece, and was thwarted by the Athenians.

11 The contact Phaedon and others may have had with the putative *magos* Zopyrus (see above) is at best an indirect link, though admittedly productive of literary outcome. (I am not sure that there is any *guarantee* that Zopyrus existed outside the mind of Phaedo. But Ziegler 1972: 768 affirms his historicity.) The same might be said for the Persian connections of that most notorious (and certainly real) one-time Socratic, Alcibiades.

12 SSR IVA 107 = DL 2.79; SSR IVA 108 = Epicur. *Sent. Vat.*732.

stories could hang together,[13] and as Artaphernes is not a figure (for us at least) of comparable resonance with the likes of Pharnabazus or Tissaphernes, there is even an element of convincing circumstantiality.[14]

It is an economical hypothesis that these stories were connected with Aristippus' *Artabazus* (not least because Pharnabazus had a son of that name); the existence of a work with a Persian title is certainly striking, though of its content we can only speculate. (One view sees something analogous to Isocrates' *Nicocles*—a work of advice addressed to the satrap's son and therefore scarcely pre-dating c. 370—but that is pure guesswork.)

In the case of Phaedo's *Zopyrus* one may hypothesize a contrast between Socrates' physical features, the unflattering inferences that Zopyrus drew from them and the philosopher's true qualities of mind and soul. If so, Zopyrus the *magos* presumably did not come well out of the work.[15] Whatever important qualities later fourth-century authors professed to find in Zoroastrian *mageia* were not prefigured here. The word *magos* and the people it described (so far as they are those whom one might encounter in Greece) entered fifth-century Greek use and consciousness as charlatans rather than saints, and Zopyrus clearly fits that model. (I wonder what special implication resided for Phaedo in his having putatively come from Syria.) The role played by the surviving Persian item from the work—which concerns the love of an animal (a lion cub) for a human youth—is, alas, a matter for speculation, though David Thomas's suggestion (630 in this volume) that the story ended badly is not without its attractions, at least for those brought up on Hilaire Belloc.

With Aeschines and Antisthenes there is somewhat more to get one's teeth into. In the case of Antisthenes, it is still nothing like straightforward. I have already noticed the uncertainty about his supposed *Magikos* (n. 10). Also presumably debatable is the belief that Dio Chrysostom 13.14–28 is a fragment of Antisthenes, perhaps from his *Protrepticus*.

The passage argues that the Athenians did not defeat the Persians because of their virtue (*aretē*) and certainly not because of an *aretē* that was the result

13 The absence of the title satrap in reference to Artaphernes in the historical texts is not a serious impediment, especially as the title could apply to persons of different status.

14 Giannantoni 1990: iii 160 by contrast thinks SSR IVA 108 at least an invention based on the *Artabazus*. Xen. *Mem.*2.1.14 raises the question of Aristippus' safety from attack when travelling the world in places in which he is a foreigner (*xenos*), but I do not know if there is any particular resonance with this supposed Persian event. The apostle of a species of hedonism makes a nice visitor (especially against his will) to a Persian environment.

15 Rosetti 1980 takes a somewhat different view. On more positive evaluations of Socratic physiognomy, see Stavru's chapter in this volume, 208–251.

of an excellent education (*aristē paideia*) consisting in music, letters, and wrestling. Neither side had any useful *paideia* (all Persians could do was ride, shoot, and hunt, and they were not led by a proper general or King, but simply driven on as if by a divinity [*daimōn*] in the shape of someone in an upright tiara sitting on a golden throne), the conflict was like that between untrained wrestlers and the outcome of such conflict is pure chance, as is shown by the contrast between 480 (when the Athenians won), 404 (when they lost), and 394 (when they won again). These results are nothing to do with the Athenians having become less or more skilled at music, letters, or wrestling. If this passage does reproduce Antisthenes, we are offered a striking and subversive deployment of Atheno-Persian history. There is also, of course, an apparent inconsequence. In 394 the Athenian victory was that of a Persian fleet with an Athenian joint-commander over a Spartan one: this was not an Athenian-Persian conflict at all. That might be said to reveal the degree to which the author is more interested in the Athenian than in the Persian angle: we are not in a completely different ballpark from *Menexenus*, though the purpose of the argument is different and does depend a bit more on the Persian input. It might also be a sign that the original did indeed come into being when Cnidus was recent and the fact of Athens (or 'Athens') having won a sea-battle (any sea-battle) was more important than the identity of the adversary: in other words, it tells in favour of the view that Dio has imported this whole passage from an early fourth-century source.

But the main (and at least reliably attested) focus of Antisthenes' literary connection with Persia takes us to the figure (or figures) of Cyrus. There is much room for confusion here, but I have not found reason to dissent from the neatly simplifying conclusion of Giannantoni (and others) that Antisthenes wrote just two Cyrus works, a *Greater Cyrus* paired with a work entitled *Heracles* (subtitled *On Strength*) and a *Lesser Cyrus* (subtitled *On Kingship*) paired with one entitled *Aspasia*. Giannantoni's view that Antisthenes could not have managed two different works about the same Cyrus—so one must be about the Elder and one the Younger Cyrus—might or might not seem arbitrary. But perhaps it would have been strange to write two works with the same title about the same figure when two different figures were so readily at hand, one of them of very recent visibility. What Athenaeus calls 'the other *Cyrus*' spoke of Alcibiades' sexual misdemeanours,[16] encouraging the belief that the *Lesser Cyrus* dealt with Alcibiades' contemporary and helping to explain the pairing with

16 Perhaps even of its Persian flavour: he allegedly had sexual relations with mother, daughter, and sister "like the Persians". But some think "like the Persians" a post-Antisthenean addition. Text: SSR VA 141 = Ath. 220c / Eustath. *Od.* 1645.11–13 = Dittmar 1912: fr. 6. Rankin

Aspasia. One consequence of this is that the item subtitled *On Kingship* was connected with the Cyrus who notoriously did *not* become King, just as (one might say) Alcibiades did not, despite the accusations, ever become tyrant. So were the qualities of kingship addressed through examples of their absence? And yet the first *Cyrus* work must in some degree also have been about kingship; why else, after all, would the elder Cyrus be an object of interest in the first place? The accompanying *Heracles* is supposed to have been concerned with education and the teaching of virtue,[17] and perhaps that gives one a context to understand the remark in Diogenes Laertius 6.2 that Antisthenes demonstrated that effort (*ponos*) is a good thing by instancing the great Heracles and Cyrus, drawing one example from the Greek world and the other from the barbarians.

The further association of specific fragments with one or other of the two *Cyrus* works is a somewhat arbitrary and not necessarily very enlightening matter. The observation that it is a feature of kingship that prospering can coexist with being ill-spoken of (*basilikon, ō Kure, prattein men eu, kakōs d'akouein*) looks possible in either work.[18] Is that less true of the reported remark of Cyrus that the most necessary thing is to 'unlearn bad things' (*apomathein ta kaka*)?[19] And there is disagreement about how many other pieces of text might count as fragments or one or the other.[20]

In the end the important thing in the present context is that a Persian figure must be imagined as playing a significant role (as participant and/or object of discussion) in defining the subject matter of two of Antisthenes' works, and this was perhaps more profoundly true here than in the case of Phaedo's *Zopyrus* (assuming we are not deceived about *his* Persian status). A King or ambitious prince is a grander thing than a Levantine *magos* (charlatan?). Still, the ambitious prince was probably (like Zopyrus) being deployed as a foil to proper

1986: 122–123 (who does attribute "like the Persians" to Antisthenes) speculates that the statement about Alcibiades' sexual activity misrepresented a story (Lysias ap.Athen.534e) about Alcibiades, Axiochus, and the daughter of Medontis, which involved Alcibiades (and Axiochus) each having had sex with both Medontis and with Medontis' daughter (whose precise paternity was unclear as between the two of them).

17 SSR VA 92–98; also IV^2 321–322.

18 SSR VA 86 = Arr. *Epict. diss.* 4.6.20, M. Aur. *Med.* 7.36 = Dittmar 1912: fr. 2. That the remark is reported as addressed to Cyrus has no certain formal implications (e.g., about dialogue form) that point in one direction or another. SSR VA 88–91 also touches on praise and blame.

19 SSR VA 85 = DL 6.2 = Dittmar 1912: fr. 1.

20 For example, Giannantoni does not admit Dittmar's frr. 3, 5, or 7.

values, and, while that was not presumably true of the exponent of *ponos* (since *ponos* is presumably a good thing, if not necessarily the *only* good thing?), we simply cannot tell how far and how quickly the discourse in *Greater Cyrus* moved away from the specifics of the nascent Persian empire. The spectre of *Cyropaedia* and the threat of begged questions are ever present.

Things are simpler with Aeschines. Two works come into question, and of both we appear to have a passable general understanding (Döring 2011: 27–33). *Alcibiades* used a description of the career of Themistocles to convince Alcibiades that success is directly proportional to knowledge (though knowledge may not be *sufficient* for complete success), requires careful attention (*epimeleia*), as opposed to being dependent merely on fortune or divine dispensation and cannot be guaranteed to last, since even Themistocles ended up in exile. Socrates' arguments apparently caused the usually cocky Alcibiades to weep in shame and despair. Since Themistocles' successes (and failures) were intimately tied up with the conflict with Persia, this is an argument with a significant Persian angle, but not one that involves (as far as we can see) any specially recondite engagement with *Persika*: the situation differs from *Menexenus* only in the focus being a particular controversial Athenian rather than the whole heroic Athenian nation.

In *Aspasia* Socrates recommends that Callias send his son Hipponicus to Aspasia to learn politics. In support of this rather startling suggestion he argues that women are as capable of the military and political 'virtues' as men, a proposition supported by reference to the stories of Rhodogune and Thargelia, and that Aspasia's suitability as a teacher is proved by her formative influence on Pericles and Lysicles and illustrated by a conversation she had with Xenophon and his wife (Cicero *de inventione* 1.51–52). This conversation dealt with their love for one another but also with the awkward fact that they both knew that, if there were a better husband/wife available, each would wish to have him or her. The inference to be drawn is that they must work at self-examination and self-improvement and thus aim to get the better spouse they want by trying to be as good as possible. The Persian element here is confined to the stories of Rhodogune and Thargelia.[21] Rhodogune was a Persian queen who was in the middle of doing her hair when news arrived of a rebellion (in Armenia in one version). She broke off immediately to go to war with her hair half tied up and half hanging down. One source even says that Persian kings had a seal-stone showing Rhodogune with her eccentric *coiffure*.[22] Thargelia was, by contrast,

21 I hesitate to imagine that it is to Xenophon that Aspasia speaks because he has Persian associations.

22 *Paradoxographoi* 215–216 Westermann, Philostr. *Imag.* 2.5, Polyaenus 8.27, Dio Chrys. *Or.*

a Greek—in fact a *hetaira* from Miletus (like Aspasia)—who had many husbands, ended up as wife of the Thessalian King Antiochus, succeeded him on his death, ruled as queen for many years, was responsible for the Medism of Thessaly, and entertained Xerxes in 480 without being diminished by the experience.[23] Again, two observations.

First, the Thargelia story had already been told by (at least) Hippias; but Aeschines is the earliest known source for Rhodogune, and it is not clear that any other genuinely independent source is represented in the later allusions to the woman. Perhaps he was responsible for inventing her. Rhodogune has vague and varying resonances of the Atossa of Hellanicus (inventor of aspects of Persian imperial rule: 687A F7) or Ctesias' Rhoxane (688 F15(54)) or Semiramis. She shares a name with a daughter of Xerxes (of whom little is known independently) and one of Artaxerxes II (who became the wife of the Armenian satrap Orontes). Given the possible association of Aeschines' Rhodogune with Armenia, one might wonder whether he has borrowed the name from a prominent contemporary Persian princess.[24]

Second, as analogies for Aspasia the cases of Rhodogune and Thargelia are not entirely parallel (Rhodogune is Persian and apparently an autonomous figure with no sexual or marital entanglements; Thargelia is Greek and only influential by virtue of an existing or past relationship to a man), but neither of them might be thought likely to be entirely persuasive to an Athenian addressee—Rhodogune is a barbarian and Thargelia a medizer—even if Thargelia is a slightly less bad case. There is an air of their being mere (and in the end throwaway) preludes to the more direct arguments in favour of Aspasia as a teacher for Callias' son that derive from other examples of her being an effective teacher. And they are certainly of passing significance in relation to the eventual main point of the dialogue.[25] At best they serve, by their inappropriateness, to make Aspasia seem a comparatively suitable figure to serve as a source of wisdom and thus establish the setting for the dialogue's real business. Of course, as in *Menexenus*, there is an irreducible element of whimsicality in

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64.2. One cannot, of course, guarantee that all the details in these sources were represented in Aeschines' original telling of the story.

23 See Philostr. *Ep*. 73, Plut. *Per*. 24. Also mentioned in Hippias ap. Athenaeus 608f, *Paradoxographoi* 217 Westermann, Lucian *Eunuch* 7, Suda, *Etym. Magn*., Hesychius, Photius s.v.

24 Kahn 1994 claims that Aeschines was also playing fast and loose with Athenian historical reality in turning Lysicles into Aspasia's partner/husband after Pericles' death, thereby giving "reality" to what was originally a piece of comic satire.

25 Since love seems to have played a part in the philosophical underpinning of the work, Thargelia (who did have husbands) is marginally more *à propos* than Rhodogune.

the elevation of Aspasia. This is just one aspect of the subversive quality that attaches to Socrates and the Socratic enterprise. It is not always easy to be sure in Socratic literature where one is on the scale of serious to frivolous.

What can be *known* about all of this is strictly limited as will have been clear. With Plato we have the texts, and we can know what was there and was not there and, as well as we can ever know with any texts, why. So I turn to Platonic *Persika*, starting with a fuller summary.

Persika in Plato: Summary Description

The general history of Persia from Cyrus to Xerxes is variously addressed in *Menexenus* (Cyrus liberated the Persians from Median rule and extended their rule to the border of Egypt, Cambyses added Egypt and some of Libya, Darius made the empire reach the borders of Scythia and with his fleet held the sea and the islands, so that none presumed to be his equal and the minds of all men were enslaved by him—despite which the Athenians attacked Sardis) and *Laws* 694a–698a, which contrasts the good situation under Cyrus (a liberator and a great conqueror whose realm almost sounds like a properly constituted state) and Darius (associated with law, tribute,[26] a seven-fold division of empire, equality, sense of community, gifts for the *dēmos*, and conquest[27]) with the less good situation under Cambyses (who murdered his brother and was then displaced) and Xerxes (who endured similar, though unspecified, afflictions [*pathēmata*][28]). Some of these features recur elsewhere: *Epistles* 320d declares Cyrus outstanding in character and political management (*ethos*, *politeia*), *Epistles* 332ab again pictures Darius as creator of the empire's institutions,[29] and his association with law (the thing that kept the *arkhē* in existence according to *Epistles* loc. cit.) also appears implicitly in *Phaedrus* 258c, while—

26 Something promised by Cyrus, so there is an element of continuity here.

27 Darius was as great a conqueror as Cyrus, so another element of continuity.

28 It is perhaps odd (given the importance of fathers and sons in the passage) that there is no explicit reference to Xerxes' assassination, for which his son was at least alleged to be responsible (Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 688F13.33, Arist. *Pol.*1311b38, Diod. Sic. 11.69, Just. *Epit.* 3.1, Hunger 2001: 20–21 (no. 4), Kuhrt 2007: 306 (no. 90)). Perhaps we should assume that Plato did not believe that allegation.

29 This time there is no reference to tribute, perhaps because (although *Laws* does make a striking link between tribute and law) it does not quite suit the attempt to contrast Darius favourably with Dionysius, tribute being a more negative thing than law and friendship (especially in the parallel Athenian case also mentioned in the passage).

slightly differently—his attack on Scythia exemplifies the law of nature in *Gorgias* 483de (as does that of Xerxes on Greece).[30] *Epistles* 332a also matches the *Laws* in dealing with Darius' accession, a topic to which we shall return later. Meanwhile, so far as *histoire événementielle* goes, the Persian Wars figure *in extenso* in *Laws* 692c–693a (mentioning the revolt of Messene, Argive non-cooperation, and the unique contribution of Sparta and Athens), 698b–701c (where the focus is on Athens) and *Menexenus* (a general narrative, again with Athenian focus),[31] and the latter work also produces a version of the Ionian and Corinthian War era (242e–246a). Of any specific events within either of these periods only Plataea recurs elsewhere, in *Laches* 191c, though an allusion to Ismenias' diplomatic encounter with Artaxerxes II *may* be implicit in *Republic* 336a.[32]

But Plato's engagement with Persia is perhaps better seen not through *histoire événementielle* but through institutions and (alleged) characteristics.

The King, who is descended from Zeus *via* Perseus and Achaemenes (*First Alcibiades* 120e) and perhaps vaguely imagined as divine (*Phaedrus* 258c)[33] but is mostly only a Great King in name (*Laws* 696a), is an object of fear (685c, as the Assyrians once were[34]) and a natural enemy for Greeks (*First Alcibiades* 120a). It is often assumed that he is happy, but that is not necessarily right, since he may be unjust (*Gorgias* 470e) and is a prime example of the sort of Asiatic

30 In view of the defeats Darius and Xerxes sustained, these are rather two-edged examples of the right that consists in the stronger ruling and having more than the weaker (*ton kreittō tou hēttonos arkhein kai pleon ekhein*). Plato is using the Persians to have a little fun at Callicles' expense.

31 Comments in *Resp.* 469c, 470c about Greeks and barbarians are also primarily informed by Greek-Persian conflict. Elsewhere *Laws* 642e has the Cretan Epimenides visit Athens ten years before *ta Persika* (which is not a standard version of Epimenidean chronology) and 707b mentions Salamis, Artemisium, Marathon, and Plataea (while making a point about sea- and land-fighting and their moral content). As Farrar (2013: 36) notes, Persia (and specifically the Persian Wars) features in all the visits to "real" Greek history in *Laws* 3–4 (683e–707d)—as distinct from the post-Flood *Archaeology* in 676a–683e.

32 See Lenfant 2011. The reader of *Alc.* I 105c *may* also think of Alcibiades' association with Tissaphernes. I am less convinced that the travails of Darius II's accession would come to the mind of readers of *Grg.* 470e or that the tortures at 473c would necessarily only evoke a Persian environment.

33 But the hint is very slight by the standards of, e.g., Isoc. 4.150 or (perhaps) Antisthenes (cf. Tuplin 1996: 158).

34 The precise terms of the comparison suggest that Plato may consciously have in mind that the empire of the fourth century was less extensive than it had been before 480/479 but still represented a "united organisation" (*sustatheisa suntaxis*).

potentate Rhadamanthys judges in the underworld (*Gorgias* 525e).[35] He sits on a throne (*Republic* 553cd), normally becomes King by primogeniture (*First Alcibiades* 121c, *Lysis* 209de)—Darius is an exception; but the contrary case of Xerxes is not acknowledged—and, while heir-apparent, has his birthday celebrated throughout Asia (*First Alcibiades* 121c). He has (Greek) guest-friends (*xenoi*: *Meno* 78d), but whether Plato has a more court-oriented concept of the King's friends is doubtful.[36] (A more notable distinctive court presence would be the eunuchs of *Laws* 695a and *First Alcibiades* 121d, a category with its own internal hierarchy.) The King's interests are what drive Persian policy (*Laws* 697c–698a), and, at least from Xerxes onwards, mastery and enslavement (*to despotikon*, *douleia*) are the key notes (697c–698a, 699e).[37] At the same time it is the view of someone like Xerxes that justice is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies (*Republic* 336a)—a view that not only has some resonance with actual Achaemenid royal self-representation but also would not perhaps be thought outlandish among Greeks, for all that Plato insists on associating it additionally with Periander, Perdiccas, the Theban Ismenias, and other rich men who think they have great power (*mega oiomenos dunasthai*) and denying that it can originate with Simonides, Bias, or Pittacus.

Persians can be classified as warlike (*Laws* 637d) for the purposes of some discussions (the interplay of bellicosity, drink, and luxurious lifestyle [*truphē*]) and under 'good' kings (Cyrus, Darius) they conquered much territory, but nowadays they rely on mercenaries because their own *dēmos* (*sic*) is useless. Nonetheless, they can and do burn the uprooted cities and nations of one-time friends (*anastatous men poleis, anastatous de ethnē philia*), displaying, moreover, a reciprocated pitiless hatred (697c–698a), and Persian rule leads to an unappetising mixing of races (692c–693a). The moral weaknesses of (some)

35 Presumption about the king's power and happiness also underlie *Tht.* 230de (even the Great King needs to undergo examination [*elenkhos*] to achieve education and happiness), and *Euthyd.* 274e (Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are happier because of their acquisition of the ability to teach virtue [*aretē*] than the Great King is because of his empire [*arkhē*]).

36 Socrates' remark in *Lys.* 211e that he would rather get a companion [*hetairos*] than the gold of Darius does not really trade on such an idea. (The passage is slightly complicated by a textual issue: does Socrates additionally say that he would rather have Darius as a *hetairos* than Darius' gold, or that he would rather have a *hetairos* than Darius' gold or Darius himself? It turns on the retention or deletion of ἢ in μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον but probably does not affect the basic issue.)

37 The greed of rulers (*pleonexia arkhontōn*) in Ionia and other lands ruled by barbarians that is inimical to homosexual attachments of the sort exemplified by Harmodius and Aristogiton (*Symp.*182a) belongs here.

Persians and/or their rulers include: *anepiplexia* (supposed immunity from criticism: *Laws* 695b), pretension, *hubris*, perjury, injustice, and despotism (*Gorgias* 525e; cf. 470e). There is also the question of *truphē* and self-indulgence (525e, *Laws* 637d, 695b–d, *Apology* 40d, *First Alcibiades* 122bc), in which context it *can* be claimed that Persians are more orderly than other barbarians (drink is a particular focus here—though on that point Cambyses did not fit the model—but *allai truphai* are also mentioned), that there was a moral contrast between Persians and Medes (*Laws* 695a), and even that Persian princes are trained to resist pleasure (*First Alcibiades* 122a). There are no particular overtones of luxury in the references to the cooking of food in *Lysis* 209de, and the admiration of beauty (*First Alcibiades* 121d, *Charmides* 158a) is presumably not to be seen as an entirely bad thing.[38] The overtones of Hippias' having made a belt (*zōnē*) of the type characteristically worn by wealthy Persians (*Hippias* 368c) are less clear.[39] What underlies the danger of luxury and self-indulgence is, of course, wealth (*Menexenus* 240d–241b, *First Alcibiades* 123b, *Republic* 336a, *Lysis* 211e; and cf. *Euthydemus* 274a), something for which Persians are greedy (*Meno* 78d, *Republic* 553cd) and which they value above moral virtue (*Laws* 698a). Other topics on which Plato has something to say include royal fishponds (*Politicus* 264c), *gerrophoroi* (soldiers with wicker shields: *Laches* 191c), apparel-related estates (*First Alcibiades* 123bc), *tiarai* and necklaces (*Republic* 553CD), the possible presence of foreign experts at the royal court (*Lysis* 209de), education (*Laws* 694c–695e, *First Alcibiades* 121d–122a; contrast *Gorgias* 470e, where Socrates says he does *not* know about the King's education), and religion (*First Alcibiades* 121e).

One passage where the involvement (or degree of involvement) of Persia is open to discussion is *Republic* 572e. Those seeking to influence the son of the democratic man away from the virtues associated with his father are, we are told, *magoi* and tyrant-makers (*tyrannopoioi*). What they do is create a passion (*erōs*) that is the champion (*prostatēs*) of his idle and profligate appetites—an *erōs* also described as a great winged drone (*hupopteros kai megas kēphēn*). The other appetites buzz around full of incense and myrrh and crowns and wine and awaken in the drone [= *erōs* = *prostatēs*] a "prick of yearning" (*pothou kentron*). The *prostatēs tēs psukhēs* (soul's champion) then has madness as a bodyguard (*doruphoreitai*; the image recurs at 573e, 574d) and runs amuck, killing

38 At the same time the supposition that Charmides' (inherited) personal beauty is a satisfactory sign of his excellence is doubtless open to debate.

39 It was "the most peculiar and displayed the most cleverness" (*atopōtaton kai sophias pleistēs epideigma*) amongst the things he brought to Olympia that he had made himself, which does not sound entirely good.

any remaining good tendencies and filling the man with external madness; and this is how the tyrannical man is created. *Magoi* are *prima facie* a Persian phenomenon. *Doruphoreitai* constructs the *prostatēs* as a species of autocratic ruler. And, according to Herodotus 7.61, Persians were called *kēphēnes* or drones.[40] An explicitly Persian image (of the enthroned King) is used earlier in *Republic* 553cd in the discussion of the oligarchic man. Is a slightly more elusive one being used here?

Against such a view one might note that the subsequent discussion (573a–580c) of the tyrannical man and actual tyrant does not contain any distinctive Persian characteristics—the tyrant is contrasted with the real King or "most kingly man" (*basileus, basilikōtatos anēr*: 580bc), but that does not prompt anything Persian—and, more importantly, the fact that drones have already figured repeatedly in the earlier discussion of constitutions and the human types that correspond to them,[41] so that their appearance here is arguably simply the next step in a running idea, an idea that did not previously appear to have any Persian connections.[42] I do not know how widely known the Persian/drone association alleged by Herodotus was,[43] and it may be that we should confine

40 There are also Persia-bee associations in, e.g., Xen. *Cyr.* 5.1.24 and various parts of *Oeconomicus* (see below, n. 43).

41 (a) In 552c–e there are those in an oligarchic city with money who consume but are neither ruler (*arkhōn*) nor servant (*huperetēs*) in the city—people who end up as criminals (the drones with stings) or beggars (those without). There is further reference to them at 554b–d (the oligarchic man suffers from drone-like desires and criminality), 555de (the stings of those who become democratic revolutionaries in an oligarchy), 559c (drone-types are swayed by unnecessary pleasures, mean oligarchic types by necessary pleasures), 559d (the youth brought up as oligarchic man gets a taste of the drones' honey and is corrupted, so his internal oligarchy turns into democracy, and he becomes as devoted to unnecessary as necessary pleasures). (b) In 564b–565a they are one of three groups in a democratic society, in fact the politically dominant one (divided between political leaders and the rest who buzz in the assembly). These drones feed on the wealthy (the second group), getting honey from them, giving a bit to the populace (the third group), and keeping most for themselves. (c) In 567d they are foreign mercenaries guarding a tyrant (*kēphēnes xenikoi kai pantodapoi*). These are explicitly a new lot of drones (as distinct from the ones *passim* in 552c–565a). They are described as a tyrant's army at 568d—large and fine, but also variegated and always changing (*kalon, polu, poikilon, oudepote tauton*).

42 A similar point is made already in Brock 2013: 160.

43 A remarkable seal-impression on a later fifth-century Babylonian document (Bregstein 1993: 586 no. 189; Stolper 2001: 103–111) in which the familiar winged figure of Achaemenid iconography is replaced by an insect may be testimony, though not immediately relevant to Greek perceptions. The single reference to drones in *Oeconomicus*—a work in which there is arguably a certain indirect linkage between the Persian king, Ischomachus' wife,

any Persian associations of the present passage to the reference to *magoi*. The force of *that* reference is also open for some discussion. Some readers, having in mind Herodotus' account of the events surrounding Darius' accession, see *magoi kai tyrannopoioi* as an allusion to that context. But Plato's version of those events does not involve *magoi*, and one may wonder whether he is using the word in the present passage primarily in its Hellenized sense of charlatan or magician.

Persika ***in Plato: Purpose***

Why does Plato adduce Persian material? That is a dangerously multi-faceted question, but perhaps there are some valid comments to be made.

In some cases Persia is brought in because for whatever reason reference to the Persian Wars is in place: that is, e.g., true of *Menexenus*. The point here is not to say things about Persia but about Athens. The same is essentially true in one of the salient passages in *Laws* (698b–701c). The issue here is the character of Athens as a political community at the time and the reasons for which she resisted Persian attack. (The answer is that the excellence of their institutions allowed them to overcome their terror, a situation that Rowe 2007 argues does not qualify the city for the status of an ideal state.[44])

Among other passages in *Laws*, 685c uses the Great King to establish by analogy a bit of fictive ancient history—fear of the Assyrians in the days of Trojan War—and 637d picks Persians out from other barbarous warrior-drinkers to make a particular contrast with Spartans (abstemious warriors) because of their special association with self-indulgent luxury.[45] In *Gorgias* (470e, 483de, 525e) the King is a simple example of the immorality of power,[46] in *Apology* 40d an easy image for the enjoyment of many pleasures, in *Lysis* 211e an obvious equivalent to 'all the wealth in the world'. *Laches* 191c deploys a presumed fact about the fight between Spartans and Persian *gerrophoroi* at Plataea to settle a point about military tactics: bravery is not just standing in line and fighting the enemy because sometimes one wins by (at first) running away, as is shown

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and the queen bee (Pomeroy 1994: 240–242, 276–277)—does not *seem* to indicate Xenophon's awareness of the specific drone-Persian association (17.14–15). (Plato never speaks of drones outside this section of *Republic*.)

44 The Athens that defeated Atlantis (a quasi-Persia: see n. 10) comes closer: Rowe 2007: 107.

45 For their drinking cf. already Hdt. 1.133, Ar. *Ach*. 73–75, Xen. *Cyr*. 8.8.10, Heraclid. 689F2.

46 In *Euthydemus* 274a his acquisition of *arkhē* is a blessing exceeded only by Euthydemus' and Dionysodorus' alleged acquisition of the ability to teach *aretē*. Here no particular judgment is passed on the moral character of the *arkhē*.

by the Scythians, Homer's Aeneas, and (most pertinently) the Spartans running away from the Persians and then turning back when the Persian lines had broken up. Meno's *xenos*-relationship with the King (78d) and Pyrilampes' visits to Asia (158a) are also conveniently relevant facts. And Hippias' quasi-Persian belt is prompted by another (presumed) fact, that Hippias *had* made himself a belt: whether it was *really* a Persian-style one or Plato is having a little fun at his expense is less clear. There is an element of humour in *Lysis* 209de as well. Socrates speculates that the King would not allow his son and heir to interfere in the cooking of food or treating of illness but would willingly concede such a right to visitors from outside who were culinary or medical experts. The reference to the son picks up on earlier talk of parental control in relation to Lysis himself and bringing in the Persians allows Socrates to say that the principle the people trust experts is universal; but he gives his Persian example a rather extreme colour by saying that the King would even trust visiting experts who put huge amounts of salt in the cooking or recommended the use of ash to treat eye-disease. The passage thus has some fun at the King's expense, picturing him as a gullible user of experts. I wonder if it also has some fun at the expense of experts who had been to the Persian court, came home, and told big stories about the remarkable things they had done there. In any event, Plato seems willing to run the risk of compromising his substantive point (that one should entrust things to people with knowledge) for the sake of a little entertainment.

At *Symposium* 182a Plato needs to set up a contrast between places where it is (a) absolutely unproblematic or (b) absolutely out of the question to ask sexual favours of one's *erōmenos*, so he can leave a more nuanced space in the middle. Boeotia and Elis satisfy the first requirement on the wonderfully contemptuous ground that people there are so dim that no one can be expected even to try to construct an argument to *persuade* an *erōmenos* to meet his lover's wishes: accordingly, anything goes. For the opposite extreme Plato adapts an idea deemed intrinsic in the Harmodius/Aristogiton story, viz., that tyrants have reasons to be hostile to homosexual relationships, to produce the result that Ionia and other places where people 'live under the barbarians' (so the Persian Empire and other barbarian realms, though the word *Persian* is not used[47]) are unremittingly hostile to the possibility of sexual favours—an *a fortiori* argument based on the unremitting hostility to homosexual relations of any sort.

47 At the dramatic date of the *Symposium* conversation Ionia was not under Persian rule, but I doubt that we should worry too much about the anachronism. The concept of those who "live under the barbarians" recurs in *Cra.* 409e (Greeks in that category are apt to adopt foreign words).

My feeling is that, having come up with a brilliant argument for Boeotia/Elis, Plato was struggling a bit to find an equally good counterpart.[48]

Why did Plato decide in *Politicus* 264c to speak of the Persian King's Nile-valley fish-farms and the crane- and goose-farms of Thessaly? Their immediate purpose is to evoke the difference between the tending of aquatic and terrestrial animals, but were examples of this sort really *needed*? None of the other divisions in *Politicus* starts with such *exotica*, and the dialogue as a whole is short on colour. The division of aquatic and terrestrial herds stands at the beginning of a new and ultimately more profitable section (following a false start in which herdable things are falsely divided into human and animal), and it may be that Plato wished to mark this structural fact. Or did one actually have to go to the Persian environment to find herding of fish of the sort that the logic of the argument forced Plato to adduce? In any case, the exotic colour has no intrinsic connection with the longer-term argument.

The decision to illustrate the proposition that definition of justice as helping friends and harming enemies must have originated with people who are bad models of the conjunction of wealth and power by reference to Periander, Perdiccas, Xerxes, and Ismenias (*Republic* 336a) produces a somewhat unexpected list (even if Ismenias was, or was thought to have been, enriched by a Persian King: Lenfant 2011), but among them Xerxes is probably the least unexpected. More unexpected, in execution if not underlying idea, is *Republic* 553cd. The oligarchic man (we hear) puts greed and the love of money (*epithumētikon, philokhrēmaton*) on a throne and makes it a Great King dressed in *tiarai*, necklaces, and *akinakai*.[49] The rational and emotional faculties (*logistikon, thumoeides*) sit on the ground either side of the King as slaves, forbidden to concern themselves with anything except money-making. Thus is the transition made from love of honour to love of money (*philotimon* to *philokhrēmaton*). The underlying idea—the King's great wealth—is banal, but its use as a metaphor for the psychological state of the oligarchic man is a remarkable Platonic flight of fancy. Why does he do it? Does its use of one (bad) constitutional form to illustrate another one contribute something indirectly to the idea of the continuum between the various constitutional forms that underpins this whole section of *Republic*?[50] (Might that thought lead one to reconsider the problem

48 Back in the real world, few will believe that Pharnabazus' son sought a purely asexual relationship with the son of Eualces (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.39), or that Herodotus was wrong to suppose that Persians sometimes had sex with boys (1.135: *paisi misgontai*), whether or not it was a habit picked up from Greeks.

49 Short swords, but also objects of a potentially decorative quality, as Plato evidently knew.

50 It is perhaps an echo of the king-image for the oligarchic man that 560c uses the image

of the drones discussed above? Their recurrence certainly provides an element of continuity, and whenever drones are mentioned, one might say, the monarchic community of which they are a problematic part is potentially evoked. They are also first mentioned just before the passage we are currently considering. Even so, I remain unsure that they evoke a specifically Persian monarchic community.)

Plato is positively serious about the psychological failings of the oligarchic man, and, though the analogy of the enthroned King (*Republic* 553cd) is a flight of fancy, it is an entirely serious one. Entirely serious too is the treatment of Cyrus and Lycurgus as models for Dion in *Epistle* 320d, the contrast between Dionysius and Darius to the latter's advantage in *Epistle* 332ab, and the belief that Darius deserves to be listed next to Lycurgus and Solon as a lawgiver in *Phaedrus* 258c. Although the argument in this case is somewhat forced (and not particularly friendly to contemporary politicians),[51] it entails a genuine assumption that Darius counts as an admirable lawgiver, who can represent monarchy as Lycurgus and Solon represent oligarchy and democracy (Yunis 2011 ad loc). Above all, the long passage about the history of Persia from Cyrus to Xerxes and the subsequent comments about the current state of things is an entirely serious contribution to the argument of *Laws* about how states should be constituted and run. The educational element in the analysis is entirely in accord with the centrality of that topic from the start of the work, and the admiration for Cyrus and Darius exactly parallels that in the *Epistles* and *Phaedrus*.

The situation, however, may seem somewhat different with *First Alcibiades*. The subject of this work is an attempt to persuade Alcibiades that he needs proper education if he is to fulfil his aspirations to power, and the well-known passage about his failings in ancestry, wealth, and upbringing compared with Persian and Spartan counterparts *prima facie* makes a serious contribution to this enterprise—indeed a contribution that might be peculiarly effective. For near the start of the dialogue (105c), Socrates has concluded a summary of Alcibiades' aspirations[52] by saying that he probably thinks no one worthy of

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of a royal fortress (*basilikon teikhos*) in its account of how the oligarchic man turns into a democratic one.

51 "Well then, when an orator or a king is able to acquire the power of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius and become immortal as a *logographos* (speech-writer) in the state, does he not while living think himself equal to the gods, and has not posterity the same opinion of him, when they see his writings?" This is part of an argument that politicians do not think being a *logographos* is bad because they have their names put at the start of decrees. (The passage assumes equivalence of decrees and laws.)

52 Alcibiades wants to have the greatest power in the city and to be *megistos* there and

note has ever existed except Cyrus and Xerxes. That is hardly a good thing: we know that Cyrus can be a fine paradigm, but nobody would put Xerxes in that category.[53] But could he perhaps be brought to a better understanding by judicious application of more respectable Persian parallels? In due course he concedes that Socrates seems to have spoken the truth and that he needs to exercise *epimeleia*. But some of the truth he has spoken seems rather strange. That certainly goes for the Spartan elements: who knew that the ephors mounted guard on Spartan women to protect their virtue (contrast the normal Greek view that Spartan women were not guarded enough, expressed by Plato himself in *Laws* 637e—*gunaikōn anesin*) or that "royal tribute" (*basilikos phoros*) resulted in *Sparta* being full of hoarded gold and silver—so full that there is some point in saying that Persia is even wealthier? It is true of the Persian elements too. But before pursuing that, I shall break off to consider more generally what is unusual in the Persian material in Plato.

Persika *in Plato: Unusual Features*

There are things that do not exactly contradict other sources, but which are nonetheless distinctive.

The birth of the King's eldest son is celebrated by a party in the palace and on subsequent anniversaries by parties all over Asia (*First Alcibiades* 121c). In Herodotus we hear of the *King's* birthday party (and in a rather unpleasant context: it is the starting point of story of Masistes' wife and daughter) and in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* of various parties and symposia but none celebrating a birthday. Persians are orderly in their *truphai* (*Laws* 637d): that probably coheres with a general Greek willingness to see Persians as a better class of barbarian but is nonetheless a little striking. Persian victory would have resulted in the mixing of races, Greek with Greek and Greek with barbarian, because the empire's subjects are "split up and disastrously jumbled together" (*diapephorē-*

among Greeks and among the barbarians of Europe. Moreover, he wishes to cross into Asia and get stuck into things there (*epithesthai tois ekei pragmasin*), since his aim is to fill all mankind with his power.

53 The effect of this passage recalls Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.2, where Glaucon (also not yet 20, like Alcibiades in Plato's dialogue) is promised fame among Greeks and perhaps, like Themistocles, barbarians—another barbed suggestion, and one perhaps with overtones of Aeschines' *Alcibiades* (above 583). Denyer 2001 finds other parallels to the Glaucon conversation and those with Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* IV (see his notes on 103a1, 104a5, 104b7, 104c2, 104d7–9, 104e5, 105a7, 105d6, 106d1, 112b1, 114b6, 116e3–4,117e4, 118b6–7, 118c3–4, 120c1, 124b1, 130d6, 135c8), but they tend to be rather general in nature.

mena kai xumpephorēmena: *Laws* 693a).[54] Is he thinking of population deportations? Or miscegenation resulting from military occupation? The remark is not easily paralleled.[55] Nor in all respects is that remarkable image in *Republic* 553cd: that the King should be on a throne is not odd, of course,[56] and was even (perhaps) deployed in Antisthenes' *Protrepticus* (above 581), but the description of the slaves sitting on the ground either side of it does not recur, and it certainly does not match Persian iconography.[57] Darius is described as creating the tributary apportionment (*dasmos*) that Cyrus had promised and binding it into law (*Laws* 695d). There is a sort of resonance here with Herodotus' view that Darius regularized tribute gathering (3.89), but the precise terms of the remark are plainly different—and from a Greek point of view perhaps a touch paradoxical in associating tribute and law.[58] The suggestion that there was land hypothecated to the provision of various different sorts of apparel (*First Alcibiades* 123b) goes beyond what is asserted in any other classical source,[59] and here at least the explicit appeal to a reliable eyewitness for the size of the *zōnē*-land affects to be claiming special authority for the information. Eunuchs are apparently a good thing inasmuch as they mould the royal child's limbs to make him beautiful[60] and perhaps make other contributions to his upbringing (*First Alcibiades* 121d: there is something of a contrast here with *Laws* 695a); eunuchs are defended in Xenophon too, but on an entirely different grounds and for their services in an entirely different context.[61] Similarly, reliance on mercenaries is the result of the mutual hatred of rulers and *dēmos* (!) in Plato but of the effete character of contemporary Persians in Xenophon. The alleged shame

54 I assume a deliberate pun between *xumphorein* (jumble together) and *xumphora* (disaster).

55 Compare and contrast the perception of the empire as a united organisation (*sustatheisa suntaxis*) in 685d.

56 E.g., Aesch. *Pers.* 456, Hdt. 3.30, 4.88,5.12, 7.14–18,44,212, 8.86,90, Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.3, *Cyr.* 6.1.6, Plut. *Them.* 28.

57 Heraclides 689 F2 has people sitting on the floor at the king's drinking-party, but the king is reclining on a gold-footed couch not sitting on a throne.

58 The juxtaposition of tribute and law is oddly reminiscent of formulae in certain royal inscriptions (DB § 6–8, DNa § 3, DSe § 3, XPh § 3).

59 Plato speaks of veil, belt, and other adornment (*kaluptra*, *zonē*, *kosmos*). In Xenophon we have Parysatis' villages *eis zonēn* (*An.* 1.4.9). The phenomenon does not recur in *Cyropaedia*, partly perhaps because of the low profile of women therein.

60 Something that Greek nurses perhaps would not do: 789d–790a.

61 And they are something completely different again (though not necessarily all bad) in Ctesias: see Lenfant 2012. Xenophon's eunuch armed bodyguards have an implicit precedent in Hdt. 1.113,117.

of granting sexual favours to homosexual lovers (*Symposium* 182a) contrasts with Herodotus' belief that Persians learned pederasty (surely not an entirely chaste sort) from Greeks and Xenophon's insinuations about Menon and Ariaeus (*Anabasis* 2.6.28).

These last three cases being us closer to positive contradictions between Plato and other sources, of which there is more to report.

The claim that Cyrus met Solon and Croesus (*Epistle* 311a) is perhaps just a slip (a misstatement of Cyrus' having discursively encountered Solon-and-Croesus *via* conversation with the latter), but the report of Spartan false-flight tactics at Plataea (*Laches* 191c) contradicts all known sources. Herodotus says something similar of Thermopylae, but that would not suit the *Laches* context, because the Spartans did not win at Thermopylae. Has Plato arbitrarily adjusted the truth? Or did he actually (for whatever reason) believe it? Cambyses was maddened by lack of education and drink (*Laws* 695b), not by the sacred disease and the anger of Apis (as in Herodotus 3.33). Again Plato uses the version he needs for his argument, but does he do so honestly or dishonestly? The version of the circumstances of Darius' accession in *Laws* 695b and *Epistles* 332a[62] differs from both the Behistun text and all other Greek versions by the presence of a eunuch and the absence of a *magos* and any element of impersonation. This time it is less plain that Plato needs the version he uses because of the argument in which it is being used. Given the complaint about the role of eunuchs in the education of royal children, there is perhaps an attractive irony in Cambyses being displaced *inter alios* by a eunuch (and one who despises his stupidity). Would a *magos* be a markedly less reprehensible agent? Not perhaps on the evidence of *Republic* 572c; and when *mageia* plays an apparently acceptable role in Persian education in *First Alcibiades*, it does so in a context where eunuchs are also acceptable, so the logic of substituting one for the other gains no particular support from that direction either. The element of impersonation complicates the story. Did Plato arbitrarily remove it to keep things simple? Perhaps, but it is not obvious that he *needed* to do such a thing. Possibly, then, what Plato was actually doing was selecting an alternative existing version. Some have even claimed that the phrase 'so-called eunuch' refers to the existence in the Persian system of 'titular' non-castrated eunuchs and shows that Plato is drawing on a good source. But it must be conceded that that is an area of some controversy (Lenfant 2012).

62 Consistent, apart from the fact that *Laws* speaks of "the Medes [plural] and the so-called eunuch" while the letter speaks of "the Mede [singular] and the eunuch".

In his account of the Marathon campaign, Plato says that the land of Eretria was 'netted' after the city fell and that a message sent by Datis about these events prevented all Greeks except the Spartans from helping Athens (*Laws* 698d). The claim that Eretria was netted is not in Herodotus, but it recurs in *Menexenus* 240b and is reflected in a number of later sources.[63] Is that because people read *Laws* or because it appeared in some other now lost earlier source? Meanwhile the idea of Datis sending a message recalls Aristophanes' somewhat riddling *Datidos melos* (song of Datis: *Peace* 289) and Diodorus' rather clearer assertion (10.27) that Datis wrote to the Athenians demanding the return of the sovereignty over the city that had belonged to Medus before he was deposed and emigrated to found Media and threatening that resistance would lead to a worse fate than that of Eretria. We *could* take the view that both on netting and Datis' message Plato is an earlier testimony to a treatment of these matters that would appear in Ephorus (cf. Cagnazzi 1999: 384 n. 40), but the data hardly demand that we do this.[64] But, once again, Plato's *need* for the precise version he uses does not seem so great as to make it likely that he created it arbitrarily.

Even more tantalizing is the case of the empire's seven divisions. In the *Laws* Plato writes that when Darius became King, he divided the empire into seven sections (*merē*), of which 'small dreams' still survive—a striking phrase for which I have found no exact parallel.[65] *Epistles* 332ab adds that each *meros* was larger than Sicily, a comparison prompted by the desire to draw a contrast with Dionysius I: Darius could find six loyal associates (*koinōnoi*) with whom to share his realm, whereas Dionysius was unable to establish loyal polities (*politeiai*) composed of companions (*hetairoi andres*).

To what historical reality, if any, Plato is (or thinks he is) referring is hard to say. In his analysis of the satrapal system Bruno Jacobs (1992) discerns seven

63 Strabo *Geogr.* 10.1.10 (who actually falsely reports Herodotus as saying it), DL 3.33 (who adds that Plato wrote an epigram about the Euboeans deported to Susa), Philostr. *VA* 1.23, Aristid. *Or.* 1.102,119, 26.85, Max. Tyr. 26.3e4, Polem. *decl.* 1.30, 2.57.

64 It is not clear, for example, that Datis' message in Plato went to the Athenians at all, and it certainly went to other people—which is not the case in Diodorus. And Darius' instruction in Plato that Athenians and Eretrians be brought to him in chains does not plainly cohere with the presumed implication in Diodorus that Athenian acquiescence in the renewed rule of (a descendant of) Medus—whether that is Darius or "Datis the Mede"—will permit them to remain where they are. (The return of exile theme is, of course, analogous to the role of Hippias in Herodotus.) Raubitschek 1957 noted that Plato says of the Datis message story *eite alēthēs eite kai hopēi aphiketo* ("whether true or wherever it came from") and thought this disclosed that Plato had a literary, even a poetic, source.

65 For more conventional dream images in Plato, cf., e.g., *Symp.* 175e, *Plt.* 290b, *Lysis* 218c, *Tht.* 208b, *Resp.* 414d, 443b.

great satrapies (Persia, Media, Lydia, Babylonia, Egypt, Arachosia, Bactria), but that is not something of which he would say that only 'small dreams' remained in the fourth century. Peter Calmeyer (1987) detected seven geopolitical groups appearing in order in the list of subject peoples in the Behistun inscription, noted that in subsequent lists the order of names was disturbed by the fact that Media was promoted and detached from its original group, and declared that that is why only 'small dreams' remained. This works slightly better, though I do not know what were the more substantive phenomena (of which the lists are a reflection) that Plato might have known about. But one might be entitled to say that there is a plain choice: *either* Plato entirely invented the idea himself on the basis that (i) there were seven conspirators and (ii) he wished to believe in there having been an element of *koinōnia* in the empire of Darius that was subsequently almost entirely lost *or* he is reflecting vague knowledge of some reality that lent itself to such a representation—a reality that we cannot now identify and which had perhaps been misrepresented to or misunderstood by him.[66]

So, what we have is a very distinctive proposition, and one that (at least as articulated in *Epistles*) stands in sharp contrast with Herodotus. For there is in Herodotus no question of the empire being divided among the seven conspirators. Otanes might allegedly negotiate a special detached status (3.83), and the six helpers might appear on Darius' tomb, but there is only one King and one empire, and if the empire is divided into anything, it is 20 *nomoi* (3.89–94).

For some final distinctions and contradictions let us return to *First Alcibiades*. The statement that (unlike Spartan royal women, who are under official supervision) the wife of the Persian King is guarded (from sexual congress with someone other than the King) by nothing but fear[67] can be contrasted with the sexual profligacy ascribed to Amestris and Amytis (Xerxes' wife and daughter) by Ctesias, and the fact that Amestris herself turns up shortly afterwards in *First Alcibiades* expressing surprise at the unreasonable aspirations of the 20-year-old son of Deinomache will perhaps make the reader think of this. But strictly there is no contradiction; for one thing we do not know at what stage in her career as royal wife Amestris is supposed to have started sleeping around. At the same time—and remembering also the murderously (if justifiably) jealous Amestris of Herodotus 9.109–112—she may seem a somewhat uncomfortable figure through whom to focalize criticism of Alcibiades.

66 In Akkadian the word for seven is a logogram for *kiššatu*, a word denoting totality *inter alia* in contexts of universal rule. But any connection between this and Plato must be at best indirect and unconscious.

67 A statement that at least confirms that Plato rightly does not believe in harems.

More directly inconsonant with other sources are the statements about Persian education. In particular: new stages start at age 7 and 14 (not 5 and 20 as in Herodotus 1.136 or 16/17 and 26/27 as in Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 1.2.8,12), the curriculum startlingly does not include archery[68] but *is* based on the canonical four virtues (taught by *paidagōgoi*, a term deliberately chosen to make a contrast with Alcibiades' *paidagōgos*) and allegedly involves princes being taught to be not subject to even one pleasure—something that sits ill with the celebration shortly afterwards of the superiority conferred on Persians by wealth, luxury, robes with sweeping trains, use of myrrh, crowds of servants, and (in a word) *habrotēs*, a soft and exquisite lifestyle.[69] (Things like that *do*, of course, sit rather better with things that would be said of the adult Alcibiades.) We hear, it is true, that one of the curriculum subjects is *mageia*, and that may recall the statements in Plutarch's *Artoxerxes* 3 that the younger Cyrus learned *mageuein* and that in Nicolaus of Damascus about the elder Cyrus being devoted to philosophy because he was educated by *magoi* (90 F67). But the *mageia* in Plato is described as that of Zoroaster, son of Oromazdes. Did Plato really think that Ahuramazda was the name of Zoroaster's father? It is certainly not a proposition that we can assume he took from another source in good faith: he is either grossly ill-informed, has grossly misunderstood, or is having a laugh.[70] Since of

68 Not perhaps a suitable model for a Greek aristocrat and omitted for that reason, but the omission is bound to be noticed. Another oddity is that the horse-riding that *is* present in this Persian education is something that Alcibiades has allegedly not been taught (106e)—surely also an eye-catching absurdity.

69 Denyer 2001 ad loc. suggests that (from Plato's point of view) it should count as ostentatiously odd for moral education to be delayed as late as the age of fourteen (cf. *Resp.* 376e–377c).

70 At the same time, one might say that the conjunction of this religious education with training in kingly attributes (*ta basilika*) is as close as a classical Greek text ever comes to the peculiarly strong link between the king and Ahuramazda in Achaemenid royal inscriptions. (For the rest we have to make do with statements about Zeus, Zeus the king or ancestral Zeus.) If one were optimistic, one might say that Plato is here deliberately deforming some good knowledge of *Persika*. (Perhaps the post-Platonic interest in Zoroaster—and promulgation of stories linking him personally with Iranian eschatology or Iranian visitors: see above—follows up on some esoteric interest on the part of Plato himself.) Another possible hint at Persian religion is *Cra.* 397d, where sun, moon, stars, and heaven are regarded as gods by "many of the barbarians", among them perhaps Persians (cf. Hdt. 1.131). One should also note *Laws* 887e, which speaks of the obeisance and prostration (*proskunēseis* and *prokuliseis*) of Greeks and barbarians at the rising and setting of the sun and moon performed on the assumption that sun and moon are gods. (This is incidentally the only Platonic use of *proskunēsis* or cognates in a potentially Persian context.)

all the things covered in the comparison with Spartan and Persian education is the most substantively germane to the rest of the dialogue, it is disturbing that this is where Socrates' data seem most wayward. And there is, of course, contradiction not only with external sources but with Plato himself. In *Gorgias* he had made Socrates say that he knew nothing about the King's education, and therefore could not judge whether he was happy or just (though it does not seem likely that we are meant to suppose that he thought he was). In *Laws* he was going to insist that it was *precisely* the education given to royal princes that historically spoiled Cambyses, Xerxes, and Xerxes' successors. So to claim in *First Alcibiades* that it is part of what makes Artaxerxes I a dangerous adversary seems, frankly, frivolous.[71] It begins to look as though the absurdity of Alcibiades' aspirations (to be like Cyrus or Xerxes) is matched by the absurdism of the alternative Persian 'models'.

Xenophon and Plato

The issue of Persian education has a particular resonance, of course, for the interrelation of Plato and Xenophon, given the views expressed already in antiquity about *Laws* 3 and *Cyropaedia*. It is time to consider that interrelation a little more closely.

There are certainly Persian topics in Plato that have no presence in Xenophon, including details about the Persian wars, Darius I, the royal *xenia* of Meno (despite the appearance of Meno in *Anabasis*), Zoroaster, Ahuramazda (Oromasdes), Achaemenes,[72] the racial mixture caused by Persian conquest, the practice of netting, and the empire's erstwhile seven-way division.

There are also shared topics where treatment is different. Xenophon is very clear about royal and princely gift-giving, Plato has almost none of it—the exception of Darius' presents (*dōreai*) to the *dēmos* (*Laws* 695d) is, at the least, phrased in an un-Xenophontic fashion, at the most something substantively different. The thought-experiment in *Lysis* about a foreign visitor taking over the cooking of the King's food hardly chimes with Xenophon's famous disquisition on specialization of labour in the royal kitchens (*Cyropaedia* 8.2.5–6); and

71 The use of Persian education as a model in a context that also involves Sparta, *prima facie* a more obvious educational model, is perhaps another sign of the passage's deliberate waywardness. But perhaps Plato was conscious that (although all Spartans got the same education: 696a) the heir apparent was treated differently.

72 Incidentally, Xenophon says the elder Cyrus' father was a Perseid, but does not actually call him a descendant of Zeus.

the issue of foreign doctors does not surface in Xenophon, though Cyrus does have a medical *corps*[73]—another example of local professionalism, to go with the cooks. Xenophon *does*, of course, represent undifferentiated *sophoi* at the royal court as enslaved deportees (*Memorabilia* 4.2.33–34). Eunuchs in Plato are politically disruptive (*Laws* 695b) or contribute (well or badly) to education (695a; *First Alcibiades* 121d); in Xenophon they are Cyrus' most reliable bodyguards. Plato's Persian women are educationally negative (*Laws* 695a) or rather grand (Amestris in *First Alcibiades* 123c), Xenophon's Persian women are rather hard to summarize: the Parysatis of *Anabasis* is not (by Ctesianic standards) a particularly colourful figure, while—apart from Mandane, who is responsible for the Median element of Cyrus' education, and Panthea who is not Persian—women are not a prominent feature of *Cyropaedia* (including the 'palinode' chapter). Plato effectively identifies Xerxes' reign as the point after which good kings like Cyrus and Darius cease to exist, whereas Xenophon at first sight suggests everything unravelled after Cyrus but also allows for a more complex view in which many of Cyrus' institutions lasted, and the moral decay of contemporary Persia was of comparatively recent vintage.[74] Admittedly Plato does hedge a bit by saying that after Xerxes, 'almost' none of the kings had been great except in name, and both authors are perhaps seeking to accommodate the fact that the empire continued to be viable and to pose a threat to Greece.[75] In any case, the source of long-term weakness in Plato is an education that encourages despotic behaviour, whereas on the face of it *Cyropaedia* celebrates the virtues of education as a source of imperial power. Complicatingly, of course, in *First Alcibiades* Persian education is also allegedly a sign of strength.

So, is there an intertextual relationship between Plato and Xenophon and, if so, what is its nature?

The answer to the first question is, it seems to me, yes. Persia is at its strongest as a topic in Plato in *First Alcibiades* and *Laws*. (The Persian content of Athenian history in *Menexenus* is another matter.) *Laws* is definitely a late work, and I think we are entitled to endorse Denyer's view (2001) that that is true of *First Alcibiades* as well. In the rest of his output Persia is not that prominent—proportionately probably no more so than it is in Xenophon's Socratic works. In this respect there is a slight contrast between (on the one hand) Plato and Xenophon as writer of *Socratica* and (on the other) other Socratic writers, three of whom (Antisthenes, Aristippus, Phaedo) produced a total four works

73 *Cyr.* 1.6.15, 3.2.12, 5.4.18, 8.2.24–25.

74 Tuplin 1997: 103–105. On the differing views of Persian decline and contemporary vulnerability see Tuplin 2014.

75 Darius' institutions have kept the empire strong: *Epist.* 332c.

whose eponyms are Persian, while a fourth (Aeschines) either invented a Persian queen or recovered her from some unknown (to us) source. What exactly prompted other Socratics to do this—and (we are at liberty to believe) to do it relatively early[76]—is hard to say. Personal reasons and/or reaction to the figure of Alcibiades are possible factors, both of which certainly could have applied to Plato, but do not seem to have done so, at least initially. The 'fascination with Persia and its empire' among 'first generation Socratics' to which Clay 1994: 29 alludes did not affect them all; and the thinness of the Persian colour in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* shows how easy it could be for it not to do so, even when an author had really powerful links with the empire.[77]

But in *Oeconomicus* things were different (because there is a rather prominent and apparently central appeal to Persian paradigms), and then there was *Cyropaedia*, not formally a Socratic work, but one that (a) comes from a Socratic author, (b) deals with education and kingship and cannot *not* stand in some relationship to Antisthenes' Cyrus works, and (c) is concerned with state-formation. I suggest that both of these works had an impact on Plato, though in different ways.

Oeconomicus is at least *inter alia* about the world of the gentleman (*kalos kagathos*). The first six chapters argue that farming is the best skill and occupation (*epistēmē, ergasia*) for a *kalos kagathos* such as Critobulus. The rest of the work begins with the question of what constitutes a *kalos kagathos*, though Socrates also claims to be trying to discover how to be good. In both enterprises the research method (as we might now call it) is to use the figure of Ischomachus. Moreover, Socrates was supposed to be helping Critobulus to become richer.[78] He is going to do this not from his own experience (since he is notoriously poor) but by retailing the example of others. So *prima facie* Ischomachus is a model salient to Critobulus. The stress on wives in the brief remarks of good estate-management in chapter 3 makes a distinctive link with one aspect of the Ischomachus paradigm, and eventually Ischomachus is represented as teaching Socrates about farming (the very thing Critobulus is supposed to pursue). Nonetheless the whole thing is rather slippery.

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76 Kahn 1994 plausibly locates Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Aspasia* in the Corinthian War era, and Aeschines is supposed to have made use of Antisthenes' *Lesser Cyrus* and *Alcibiades* (DL 2.61). Aristippus' alleged personal interaction with Persians occurred in the same era. Phaedo's *Zopyrus* cannot be dated.

77 I continue to be struck by the fact the no one ironizes Callias as quasi-Persian (Tuplin 1996: 170).

78 He speaks of making him a sharp businessman (*deinos khrēmatistēs*: 2.18) and securing great surplus (*pollē periousia*: 2.10).

The largest elephant in the room is that everything else we know about Ischomachus, his wife, and the poor value of his estate at his death deeply problematizes his paradigmatic status.[79] So I take it as axiomatic that *Oeconomicus* is not quite what it seems. It is not my purpose now to unpack what is behind the surface. But the Ischomachus who (i) installs in his house a queen / queen-bee / *nomophulax* (guardian-of-law) / phrourarch / general / ship's captain / councillor (*bouleutēs*) / master (for his wife is explicitly or implicitly all of these things: she has a masculine intellect [*andrikē dianoia*] too, so perhaps she is virtually a man?), (ii) has to practice public speaking in order to be able to defend himself against attack, (iii) trains agents (*epitropoi*) to supervise his out-of-house business and rule his other slaves (in which context he acknowledges that teaching slaves is a 'beastly' business [*thēriōdēs paideia*], cites barbarian sayings and royal laws as well as the laws of Solon and Dracon, and indicates that the desire for profit and praise are the motives for justice), (iv) teaches Socrates about farming in a sententious and—since it is an avowedly easy topic and one Socrates mostly knows anyway—arguably superfluous fashion, (v) turns out to be a property developer and analogous to profit-seeking grain merchants (not a good comparison in the world of Lysias 21),[80] and (vi) winds up apparently imputing to himself the *ēthos basilikon* (royal character) and even a touch of the divine—well, *that* Ischomachus at the very least has some awkward traits: he is a warning as much as a model, all the more so because some of the features of the sixteen chapters in which he appears may seem in isolation reasonable and even concordant with Xenophontic principles. If this is a *kalos kagathos*, then to be (just) *kalos* probably involves something different.[81]

And if Ischomachus is a problematic paradigm, then perhaps the Persian King and Cyrus are as well. When one considers that (a) at the end of the relevant passage the younger Cyrus is hailed as a good man (*agathos anēr*) and a happy one (*eudaimoneis*) by Lysander and (b) the passage appears not to distinguish properly between the elder and younger Cyrus, one should be uneasy. It is

79 Lys. 19.45–46, Andoc. 1.124–127. See, e.g., Davies 1971: 265–268, Nails 2002: 176–178.

80 One recalls that his house has the orderliness of a Phoenician commercial ship (8.11).

81 The life of this *kalos kagathos* involves travel around Attica (released to do so by having a properly trained wife), training oneself for self-defence in the courts, training others to manage one's assets and even training Socrates as a farmer: this last is a simple task, one that can be taught to a mere agent (*epitropos*) and primarily requires diligent attention (*epimeleia*), though that contradicts 1.16–22! It is in fact an anti-Socratic life (Socrates is always out of doors but engaged in an educational enterprise of a different sort, in particular, one less wholly concerned with simply making other people useful to oneself). See Stevens 1994, Danzig 2003a: 73, Kronenberg 2009: 55.

far from obvious that an Athenian should consider Lysander's judgment about *aretē* and *eudaimonia* compelling, especially in the case of his association (with the younger Cyrus!) in the total defeat of Athens. And why would Xenophon of all people confuse the elder and younger Cyrus—unless as a hint that the argument that Socrates is deploying is not to be taken entirely at face value? Socrates is purportedly convincing Critobulus that farming is an appropriate activity for a *kalos kagathos*. But he is being made to do so with arguments that are ill-formulated (he cannot distinguish one Cyrus from another) and, as one might say, inappropriately appropriate: for if the assimilation of a profit-maximizing Persian ruler to Critobulus speaks to Critobulus' desire to be ever wealthier, then (perhaps) the message is that Critobulus needs better aspirations.[82]

And the relevance of this to Plato? Simply that the deployment of an inappropriately appropriate Persian analogy (and one worked out in some detail: Socrates affects a deal of circumstantiality in his picture of Persian garrisons and landscape-management in chapter 4) is exactly what is going on—again with some circumstantial pseudo-detail and at least one deliberate mistake (Zoroaster, the son of Oromazdes)—in *First Alcibiades*. In that case, of course, there is a further flourish, in the pairing of Persia with Sparta: if the model of *Oeconomicus* did have an impact on *First Alcibiades*, it would be nice to think that the Spartan angle is also a (different) tribute to that Xenophontic hinterland.[83] In *Oeconomicus* we never discover what ultimate impact the whole discourse is supposed to have had on Critobulus. (That complete open-endedness is another sign of the work's tricky character.) In *First Alcibiades* the young man *is* persuaded out of his complacent assumptions about his own capacities (in particular that they ensure his superiority to his uneducated Athenian peers and that that is all that matters) and will become Socrates' disciple and seek the virtue that is required by those who would rule. The final sentence of the dialogue, wherein Socrates expresses the fear that the power of the state will get the better of both of them, is a reminder of how well that turned out.

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82 One may contrast Critobulus wanting an abundance of what he needs (6.11) with Socrates' view that wealth is never needing more than you have (2.2). Critobulus is established in *Symp.* 4.10–28, 5.1–6.1, *Mem.* 2.6 as someone in thrall to material wealth, external beauty, physical pleasure. (Stevens 1994 also notes some interesting interplays between Aspasia, Critobulus, Callias, and Ischomachus. There are probably more intertextual jokes than we can now clearly see.)

83 There is some interplay of Sparta and Persia in *Laws* as well (637c, 696a etc.). For a different account of the Xenophontic hinterland to *Second Alcibiades*, see Altman's chapter in this volume 99–114.

And so finally and briefly to *Cyropaedia*.[84] My view of *Oeconomicus* and *Alcibiades* does not pitch Plato as hostile to Xenophon, and the same is true in the case of *Cyropaedia* and *Laws*.[85] I think it likely that the linkage between education and political power that is played out in *Cyropaedia*—where Cyrus is the distinctive product of *two* educational processes, Persian and Median, ends up creating for himself an imperial realm that transcends both (and is intrinsically not unproblematic), and bequeaths an uncertain inheritance to immediate and distant future generations—prompted Plato's reflections on the pattern of Persian history and the idea that such reflections could be deployed within a larger investigation of the ways in which states might be constituted and ruled, an investigation in which education is an important thread.[86] In

84 Briefly in part because Dorion 2003 and Danzig 2003b have established some basic points. It was true that (despite *Cyr*. 7.5.86, 8.7.10) Xenophon's Cyrus is not represented as paying a lot of heed to his sons' education and that, if he applied the principles of domestic management [*oikonomia*] to the running of the empire (8.6.14–16), he does not engage much with *oikonomia* in its more basic sense. Incidentally 8.1.16 (Cyrus had more leisure than someone who has care of one *oikia* or one ship) looks almost like a reference to *Oeconomicus*, where Ischomachus' wife induces an order in the house that resembles that of a Phoenician merchant-ship (8.11).

85 It is also true of *Politicus* and *Cyropaedia* (as analyzed by Carol Atak in this volume 510–543) and of the two authors' treatments of Critias expounded in Danzig 2014 (personal animosity is not, I think, a necessary part of that story); and David Thomas's interpretation of *Cynegeticus* only reveals hostility (at least of Xenophon towards Plato) at an early stage in their lives. All of this is compatible with the broader dynamic of the shaping and reshaping of Socrates and the Socratic legacy envisaged in differing ways in the chapters of William Altman, Louis-André Dorion, David Johnson, and James Redfield—and, indeed, with what emerges in the whole of the present volume.

86 I am also tempted by the idea that the extensive use of fictive history has a bearing on Plato's adoption of that discursive mode in *Timaeus* and *Critias*. (The presentation of those works as following on from *Republic*—and cf. Crantor F8 Mette [Procl. *In Timaeum* 1.75.30 Diehl; FGrH 665 F31] on contemporary comment about Egypt and *Republic*—might have a bearing on the willingness to see *Cyropaedia* as interconnecting with *Republic*.) And the fictive history was taken seriously too: in Plato the Egyptian priest says that proto-Athens is 1000 years older than Egypt. Callisthenes (124 F51) and Phanodemus (325 F25) made Athenians the ancestors of Saites, whereas Theopompus (cf. Anaximenes *Tricaranus* 72 F20b) and Hecataeus (Diod. 1.28 = 264 F25 [28]) said Athens was a colony of Sais, with Hecataeus adding that the origins of eupatrids, *geōmoroi*, and *dēmiourgoi* lay in Egypt. It is as though Plato had sparked a controversy. For a different Platonic response to the historicity of *Cyropaedia*, see Carol Atak's discussion of *Politicus* in this volume, 510–543.

Plato's *Laws* we are, of course, a long way from the world of Cyrus as living law (*blepōn nomos*) that we find (perhaps uneasily) in *Cyropaedia*; Plato's precise version of later Persian history is different from Xenophon's (though his summary of Cyrus' rule is reasonably consistent: Danzig 2003b), and, where Plato's Cyrus benefits from not being educated as a royal prince, Xenophon's benefits (it might be said) in being so educated twice over. But Plato has taken Xenophon seriously and his alternative view on things represents an intelligent (if speculative[87]) engagement with, not a malicious or contemptuous rejection of, his predecessor's analysis.

Conclusion

This chapter deals with the appearance of historical data (both *histoire événementielle* and knowledge of a foreign society's institutions) in philosophical texts. A prime purpose is simply to log the relevant material, Persian-related data in Plato and (the Socratic writings of) Xenophon, in a reasonably systematic fashion. The devil—or (one may hope) angel—is in the details. But I should not end without a couple more general observations.

1. A plain message is that historians should not accept historical data in Xenophontic *Socratica* or in Plato without taking at least a moment to think about how those data (i) function in their immediate context and (ii) sit in relation to the general historical record. Perhaps that is not so very different from what is prudent when dealing with any salient Greek literary *genre* (historiography, forensic or political rhetoric, tragedy, comedy, lyric poetry), but Socratic literature represents a special category inasmuch as, whatever the philosophical agenda (variable from author to author), the entire enterprise is founded upon fictive historical narrative. These are *not* writers who, just because they are engaged in philosophy, can be trusted to have an ingenuous relationship with historical fact. At the same time those reading Xenophon or Plato for philosophical reasons—whether in pursuit of an understanding of fourth-century Greek views about issues of morality or epistemology and so forth or even in pursuit of the actual truth about those issues—should remember that they are dealing with literary works and be just as sceptically attentive to the way historical data are deployed as part of the rhetoric of analysis and proof as they are (or should be) to other parts of that rhetoric.

87 It is figured as divinatory (*manteia*: 694c). There are other verbal indications of conjecture in 694b–d, 695cd.

2. In the case of specifically Persian material, one author (Xenophon) looks at first sight more obviously an expert than the others. That impression might be misleading: the stories about Plato's Persian contacts and the probability that *First Alcibiades* contains the earliest surviving Greek allusion to Zoroaster are arguably independent signs that Plato had a special, if largely esoteric, interest in Persian religion/philosophy—a Persian hinterland that perhaps carried with it more than average engagement with other more secular Persian data. (He certainly supplies a far larger number of discrete pieces of information and/or evaluation than the Socratic Xenophon or the others.) But, whatever the truth about that or about the possible impact of any contacts Aristippus actually had with Persian grandees in Anatolia, it turns out not to matter much: for there is little to choose between Xenophon, Plato, and the others as purveyors of Persian historical data in the context of Socratic discourse. What any of them asserts as fact has to be evaluated. This does not necessarily lead to sceptical conclusions. But, even when that *is* so, it does not follow that simple fact is being used entirely straightforwardly.[88] And, when it is *not* so, one can reasonably assume that something more or less devious is going on.

3. The material presented here includes (in my estimation) two particularly devious cases, involving Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and Plato's *First Alcibiades*, cases in which the reader is expected to see that things are not to be taken at face value and that this affects one's reaction to a whole composition, not just an odd paragraph or two. Such claims by modern interpreters are apt to be viewed with scepticism (the suspicion being that the modern reader is being overly clever in a fashion no ancient reader would have contemplated), so it is worth reiterating their validity.

From the point Ischomachus enters *Oeconomicus*, the notoriety of the real facts about him ensures that any Athenian reader should be puzzled by his ostensibly paradigmatic role and sensitized to the various other (not particularly recondite) indications pointing in the same direction. The Persian strand here is not particularly aggressive, but the overt and ostensibly paradigmatic Persian material in the pre-Ischomachus part of the text cannot fail to have caught an Athenian reader's attention: when a Greek author praises a Persian and offers him as a model, any Greek reader will surely ask why this is happening, and this will ensure that the hints in the Ischomachus section are not missed. Meanwhile, the discovery that the bulk of the work (the Ischomachus

88 Hippias' Persian belt is not necessarily admirable; experts at the royal court turn it into a joke at the king's expense; mercenaries are used because of the untrustworthiness of the *dēmos*.

section) offers a paradigm that is not (quite) a paradigm—in fact, a rather devastating picture of the supposed *kalos kagathos*—must make the reader realize what should actually have been obvious anyway and have helped prepare for the Ischomachus section, that Socrates' invitation to the greedy Critobulus to imitate Persian kings and princes cannot really be meant straightforwardly. A game is being played, of course. The enormity of the invitation is initially masked by the association of these potentates with farming: that sounds like the sort of socially respectable thing Critobulus might reasonably be asked to approve of, and the game works best (and was most likely to have occurred to Xenophon in the first place) if the association has some broad historical validity.[89] But, at the latest when the discourse moves from an anonymous Persian King to the named Persian prince and his Spartan friend who between them had brought down the Athenian empire, the Athenian reader must surely go back to that fundamental question (why is a Greek author praising Persians?) and conclude that Socrates is spinning a tale to which Critobulus ought to object. That Socrates also confuses King Cyrus and Cyrus the younger is, in a sense, icing on the cake. If the confusion were not there (or were removed by heroic amendment of the text), nothing substantial would be lost. But, as it is, it can be regarded as an additional little joke (one perhaps that not all readers *would* notice) whose purpose is to underline for those with particularly historical sensitivity that Socrates is talking nonsense—and Critobulus does not notice.

Plato, I have suggested, did notice, though the conjecture is not perhaps a necessary condition for explaining the genesis of *First Alcibiades*, for which other intertextual provocations were certainly available, including, for example, Aeschines' *Alcibiades*. In any event, we are once again dealing with the presentation of Persian institutions in an ostensibly good light, although this time they are not so much a paradigm for imitation as a model that Alcibiades (as things stand) cannot match. Plato *can* treat Cyrus and Darius as admirable figures, but in the most extensive treatment (in *Laws*) they are, after all, a foil to the more expected depiction of Persia as a morally challenged environment (these paragons of the past have no relevance now), and in general Plato does not make a habit of using Achaemenid history in a positive fashion. In that respect *First Alcibiades* sticks out like a sore thumb. And it also sticks out for the startling quality of some of its factual assertions. Most of Plato's

89 The overlap between some of the details in 4.5–11 and similar material in *Cyropaedia* 8.6.1–3,9–10,16, where the overall agenda is different, helps confirm this validity for us: what the original reader of *Oeconomicus* could make of it is another matter.

assertions about Persian history or institutions (including some in *First Alcibiades*) are either broadly true or things he probably believed to be true, even if they look unfamiliar to us. Occasionally there are what look like *ad hoc* inventions. But *First Alcibiades* has a peculiar concentration of strange statements or silences in its treatment of Persian education, a topic about which Plato's Socrates had once declared he knew nothing. The interaction of education and political power was a well-established theme, and I think we can reasonably expect there to have been readers familiar enough with treatments of the Persian angle on that interaction to be aware that Plato is behaving oddly. The fact that Socrates' methodology in the dialogue involves a three-way comparison of Athens, Persia, and Sparta is also relevant here. Sparta figured in the education/power debate as well, of course; but here Spartan education is not an issue. Instead we find astonishing statements about the public oversight of women and the wealth that Sparta derives from the *basilikos phoros*. This is (so to speak) an Ischomachus moment: no ancient reader or modern historian would take these seriously as evidence about historical Sparta, and those who have read this far into *First Alcibiades* without any unease are duly warned that they have not been paying proper attention. Socrates is seeking to persuade Alcibiades with falsehoods about Sparta, and he is doing the same with what look like falsehoods about Persia. From our perspective the oddest falsehood is the reference to the *mageia* of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes. This is something of an acid test. Some will believe that Plato did not really know anything about Zoroaster/Zarathusthra or Oromazes/Ahuramazda, and that the statement was for him a true one. I am reasonably confident that he precisely *did* have enough knowledge and interest to know that the statement was absurd, and that there will have been others in academic circles for whom this was also true. In the wider Athenian readership the matter might be more debatable. We have here the equivalent of the confusion of Cyrus the Elder and Younger in *Oeconomicus*—a proof that Socrates is talking nonsense that is blatant to the more select part of the audience and thus (for them) resolves all possible doubt about the status of a discourse that otherwise uses true material but does so in a suspect cause. In *First Alcibiades*, by contrast, there are already other indications that Socrates is presenting an invalid case: so, if Plato *was* following Xenophon's lead, he also went a step further.

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The Enemies of Hunting in Xenophon's *Cynegeticus*[*]

David Thomas

Xenophon's *Cynegeticus* falls into three sharply differentiated sections.[1] The proem (section 1) is written in a highly ornate style, reminiscent of what we know of Gorgias,[2] with many mythological allusions. The main body of the work (sections 2–11), written by contrast in a very plain and workaday style, at least ostensibly deals with the practical details of hunting.[3] The epilogue (sections 12–13) is a rhetorical defence of hunting both in its own terms (12.1–9) and against opponents (12.10–22), followed by an attack first on sophists (13.1–9) and then on those who want to get on too much in the state (13.10–16), with the whole being rounded off by a brief final remark (13.17–18).

The opponents of hunting (*kunegesia*) are not clearly defined, though they are said to object to it on the ground that it interferes with 'domestic affairs' (12.10); they are also said to have made enemies by their frivolous words and to

* This paper develops and partly modifies suggestions and hints made in L'Allier 2012, a paper that he originally delivered at the 2009 Xenophon Conference in Liverpool which I attended. The conference also included a paper by Frances Pownall on Critias (not included in the conference volume but to be found now as Pownall 2012), on which I have drawn for bibliography but not for argument. I am grateful to both of them and to the 2009 conference organizers and also to Gabriel Danzig for his stimulating discussions about Xenophon, Plato, and Critias both during and after the 2009 conference and for his comments on the first two drafts of this paper. None of them, of course, share any blame for what follows.

1 Gray 1985 shows that the whole work is genuine despite the doubts of earlier scholars, in particular Radermacher 1896/1897 and, as regards the proem, Norden 1898: 431–434. Nevertheless, Xenophontic authorship continues to be challenged. Labiano 2012, while accepting that Gray has successfully rebutted Radermacher's arguments, denies that the work is Xenophon's on the basis of statistical analysis of "its syntactic pattern of distribution of sentences", specifically the much higher degree of parataxis in *Cynegeticus* than in the four technical treatises undoubtedly by Xenophon. But to draw the conclusion requires it also to be shown that the stylistic feature in question could not be the product of a conscious choice that might have changed over time. Xenophontic authorship is also more briefly denied by Moore, this volume 159.

2 Norden 1898, as previous note; Gray 1985: 164–167.

3 Though some have questioned its practical usefulness and seen it rather as an account of a way of life, permeated by ideology: Körte 1918, especially 318; Schnapp 1973: 317.

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have brought plagues, losses (or fines), and death on themselves, their children, and their friends, so that it would be inappropriate to employ them to save the state (12.12–13). The attack on sophists, eventually differentiated from 'philosophers' at 13.9, erupts abruptly into the text at 13.1 and comes as a surprise. The final attack, on greedy political operators, proceeds by contrasting them with huntsmen, so it is more obviously integrated into the argument, but it again rather oddly emphasizes that greedy politicians attack their friends (13.12, 15) and claims they exhibit rashness, malice, avarice, disgraceful language, and impiety (13.15–16), a headier mixture of accusations than being an opponent of hunting might in itself seem to warrant.

The thesis of this paper is that the seemingly disproportionate strength of Xenophon's language and the surprise caused by the dislocation in the argument were intended to put the original audience on their toes about the targets of the attack, leading them to tease out Xenophon's quarry for themselves. For us, however, some of the external clues that were available to the original audience have been lost, making reconstruction of the hunt a speculative business.

The Date of *Cynegeticus*

Cynegeticus is usually reckoned to be early in Xenophon's literary career. The two main reasons for believing this are the awkwardness of the transitions among the three sections and the absence of characteristic features of Xenophon's mature style, such as the low incidence of particles in the work. Precision is more difficult to come by with certainty.

Luccioni went so far as to ascribe the work to the late 400s, before Xenophon joined Cyrus' expedition:[4] but this does not seem very likely. The reference at 13.1 to οἱ νῦν σοφισταί ('the sophists of today') suggests the second generation of sophists, after the figures of the Socratic period. The introduction of Palamedes as a pupil of Cheiron at 1.2 and especially its underlining at 1.11 creates an embarrassment, as notoriously he was falsely accused by Odysseus and Diomedes, also pupils of Cheiron, and this has to be awkwardly explained away; furthermore, the emphasis on the wickedness of those who put him to death is irrelevant to the subject in hand: but both features are readily explained if the passage postdates the execution of Socrates, whom Xenophon compares to Palamedes at *Ap.* 2.6 (cf. Plato *Ap.* 41b2). True, the relative absence of Persian

4 Luccioni 1947: 23. Hence Luccioni argued (25–26) that Xenophon's target at 12–13 was Athenian democrats generally.

hunting is discomfiting for a date after Xenophon's march through Asia Minor to Mesopotamia, but there is reference at 11.1 to Mysia and Syria and to hunting animals rarely, or in the case of cheetahs probably never, still found at that time in Greece or Macedonia.[5]

It has been more common to follow Delebecque[6] in his argument that the piece dates from around 390, pointing to parallels in the third section with Isocrates *C. Soph.*12, which was written at the outset of Isocrates' career as a teacher (*Antid.*193). Most, if not all, of the parallel passages between the two works seem to me to be explicable as the commonplaces of the genre rather than firm evidence for direct dependence one way or the other. But an early date is probably right enough.[7]

At any rate, as Delebecque also argued, *Cynegeticus* looks to be earlier than *Mem.* 3.11.8, for it knows only of using a single pack to hunt the hare in the day by scenting her line to the form and then, once she has been flushed out, pursuing her into nets, whereas *Memorabilia* knows also of specially trained night hounds (which do not need to track down the form, because at night the hare is up and about feeding) and of a reserve pack to be used in hot pursuit once the trackers have flushed the hare out, and which, Xenophon now envisages, will usually itself catch the hare rather than merely drive her into nets.[8] That in itself does not get us very far in pinning down *Cynegeticus*' date further, as *Memorabilia* 3 is usually dated after 370 on the strength of the discussion of frontier defences against Thebes in 3.5.[9] But if the explanation of this new information is that there was a difference between Athenian and Peloponnesian techniques of beagling, *Cynegeticus* must have been composed either before Xenophon was settled at Skillous or very shortly after he arrived there. That does not allow total precision, but it strongly suggests a date before 388, the likeliest date for Megabyzus to have visited him at Skillous (*An.* 5.3.7).[10]

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5 See Phillips and Willcock 1999 ad loc. But Lane Fox 2011: 10–18 emphasises the evidence that lions and (especially) bears continued to roam the Macedonian uplands.

6 Delebecque 1957: 173–181; followed by Phillips and Willcock 1999: 21.

7 L'Allier 2012: 480–481 seems to have reservations, to judge from the caginess with which he states the argument from the text's infelicities.

8 Delebecque 1957: 479, following Delatte 1933: 160–161.

9 Delebecque 1957: 488–489; and many others, e.g., Breitenbach 1967: col. 1809.

10 Lipka 2002: 4 n. 10. At any rate, the visit should not be as late as 384, because it occurred when Xenophon *was living as an exile* (for this interpretation of *An.* 5.3.7, see Tuplin 1987). The King's Peace of 386 provided for the recall of exiles (Cawkwell 1981: 80–83), so Xenophon will have ceased to be an exile at that point, and instead was living abroad not as an

The 390s or shortly before therefore seem to be the likeliest place to cast around for the people that Xenophon sees as the enemies of hunting.

The Opponents Targeted in *Cynegeticus* 12

As the first objection of the enemies of hunting, at 12.10, is that it interferes with 'domestic affairs' (τὰ οἰκεῖα), the reader's immediate thought is that Xenophon has in mind nagging wives and censorious elderly relations, a natural circle of killjoys which is then widened at 12.15 to include lazy pleasure-seekers who cannot stand the toil of wholesome exercise. However, scholars have not allowed the matter to rest there, and rightly so, for the idle and the killjoys hardly explain the more dramatic aspects of the characteristics imputed to the opponents. Readers may start by thinking of the family circle and the wastrel overly addicted to symposia, but they are rapidly moved beyond those groups into the public realm.

In their commentary, Phillips and Willcock, following Delebecque, suggest that the opponents of hunting are the politicians who brought about Xenophon's exile.[11] However, this seems unlikely, for three reasons. First, Xenophon never elsewhere complains about his exile, which he seems therefore to have accepted as fair enough. Second, there is no other evidence that his exile was brought about by people whom he had a right to regard as friends. Third, it seems exaggerated to accuse any politicians who might have been responsible for Xenophon's exile as being motivated by greed, let alone as having brought plagues, losses, and death on themselves and their children; furthermore, in this passage Xenophon avoids saying that one of the things these people have brought on their friends is exile. On top of all this, on Phillips and Willcock's interpretation, the further attack on sophists in 13 is not integrated into the argument.

Delebecque himself is not open to this last criticism, as he made the further suggestion that the people Xenophon had in his sights were those who had attacked Socrates, both politicians and sophists, and, in particular, Polycrates, the sophist who composed a 'prosecution speech' against Socrates (Isoc. *Bus.* 1, 4–6), which is universally taken to be the target for the arguments of *Mem.*1.1–2. And it is true that Polycrates was a sophist and that Xenophon had a reason

exile, but out of choice, as he had been prior to the decree or judgement exiling him (so, more tentatively, Cartledge 1987: 61).

11 Phillips and Willcock 1999: 164, following Delebecque 1970: 27–29.

to attack him, but, nevertheless, beyond these two facts, there seems no reason to suppose that Polycrates was the target here.

In the most recent study, Louis L'Allier takes the opponents of *Cynegeticus* 12 to be people who are—or, more accurately, are shortly going to be—jealous of Xenophon's literary production, i.e., fellow-writers, aka sophists (in their own eyes philosophers).[12] In other words, he conflates the targets of chapter 12 with the targets of chapter 13, distinguishing the two chapters instead as two different criticisms anticipated from the same set of opponents, the first against hunting as a physical activity and the second against Xenophon's defence of it as an intellectual occupation. This is one of the few things in his paper that I find unconvincing. At 12.12 the envy (φθόνος) spoken of there does not cause those rendered irrational by it (the ἀλόγιστοι) to make malicious comments, but instead has the much more serious consequence that they choose to be ruined (αἱροῦνται … ἀπολέσθαι). It is difficult to see how jealousy of Xenophon's writings could have such an effect. And note that this envy is not said to be exhibited by the sophists when they come explicitly on the scene a page of text later and carp at Xenophon's style at 13.5–7. To my mind we should be looking elsewhere for those he has in mind at 12.12 as inspiring envy or being inspired by it.

Especially on Delebecque's date, but also on any date in the first quarter, perhaps the first half of the fourth century, the most obvious Athenians who had recently brought ruin on themselves, their children, and their friends (12.13) by rashness, malice, avarice, disgraceful language, and impiety (13.15–16) would have been the Thirty and their closest henchmen. The Thirty had plainly ruined themselves, and no child of any of them is known to have played any significant part in Athenian politics or displayed any signs of material wealth: in fact, there is not one person in the fourth century who can be securely identified as a child of one of the Thirty.[13] The Thirty had also involved their friends in ruin, in two ways: first by directly attacking various natural supporters of restrained pro-Spartan government in the interests of the rich, such as Niceratus son of Nicias; subsequently, by destroying the prospects of those who had tried to steer clear of involvement in criminality but who had supported the regime in combat (like Xenophon) or simply by staying in the city (like Socrates). It would be natural for Xenophon of all people to emphasize the evil effects on their (former)

12 L'Allier 2012: 484.

13 The evidence is set out in Németh 1990, with Whitehead 1980 (especially 212). It will be seen that I take a bleaker view of it than Németh: the most nearly convincing cases are Charicles and Aeschines, but these are, as Whitehead points out, very common names.

friends.[14] The Thirty may also be supposed to have acted in part out of envy, that is, envy of those rich and highly respectable citizens who had nevertheless been able to live at peace with the democracy, such as Niceratus, Leon of Salamis, and Callias, as well as through resentment of their own treatment at the hands of the people's courts and in pursuit of grudges against the instigators or instruments of old wrongs.

So if the Thirty, or prominent members amongst them such as Critias, had added condemnation of hunting to their other crimes, it would be rhetorically effective to bring them to mind as the sport's opponents. In a similar spirit to the occasional triumphant emphasis by modern advocates of hunting on Hitler's hostility towards it, awakening such a thought might give pause to nagging wives and effete idlers as to the company they were keeping in their opinions. But is it possible that the Thirty could have condemned hunting?

In *Cynegeticus*, the type of hunting that Xenophon chiefly advocates is hunting for hares on foot—beagling—but unlike modern beagling, it involved setting up nets into which to drive the hare. Without nets, beaglers do not often catch hares even with carefully bred and expertly trained hounds. The use of nets is condemned by Plato at *Leg.* 7. 824a3,[15] who evidently regards them as detracting from hunting as a trial of strength: furthermore, when he goes on to describe the kind of hunting that alone is to be permitted in his second-best state, it appears to be boar-hunting rather than hare-hunting, since his permitted hunting involves the huntsman himself striking and hurling weapons at the prey, which is true of hunting boars and deer but not of hunting hares.[16] It appears also to be mandatory for the huntsmen to ride. So it is likely enough that at least some of the top drawer of Athenian society turned their noses up at individuals going beagling, the practice of the gentry perhaps rather than

14 See Bevilacqua, this volume 476–477 for the suggestion that, despite the picture Xenophon paints of (almost all) the Thirty in *Hell.* 2, he continued to share their ideology. That is perhaps compatible with seeing them as under attack in *Cynegeticus*, since he could have retained their doctrines even if he denounced the harshness of their methods. But in any event, I prefer her third option that in later life Xenophon sought changes in the way politics was practised at Athens rather than seeking fundamental institutional changes.

15 As it was later by Arrian (*Cyn.* 2.5), though he does not make his reason clear. Xenophon himself had no qualms about the use of nets, despite recognizing the deceit and trickery involved, since he makes Cambyses, Cyrus the Great's admirable father, use netting and trapping animals as a ground for employing deceitful methods of warfare against known enemies, *Cyr.* 1.6.28 (see further on this passage Danzig 2007: 28–31).

16 If the pack catches the hare in the open, the hounds will kill her; if the hare is driven into the nets, the net-keeper will cudgel her (*Cyn.* 6.18).

the aristocracy, while still regarding other forms of hunting as meritorious. It would not have suited Xenophon's rhetorical strategy in defending the form of hunting he had personally practised the most to make clear that (some of) its opponents distinguished between it and other forms of hunting that they allowed as manly, so his silence about the distinction here carries little weight. Critias criticised other upper-class activities, such as playing the lyre rather than the flute (Critias DK 88 B1) and participating in the game of *kottabos* (Critias DK 88 B 1, 2, cf. Theramenes' final words at Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.56).[17] He may well have regarded beagling as just as much a waste of time and effort as *kottabos*, at least for adults, and could have said so in one of his poems, though it is also possible he made his contempt for Xenophon's beloved pastime clear to Xenophon in person.

But hunting was characteristic of Sparta (Xen. *Lac.* 6.3–4, *Hell.* 5.3.20; Pl. *Leg.* 1.633b1–2, cf. Plato *Resp.* 8.549a8 of the timocratic man).[18] How could Critias have attacked it, seeing he was a zealous Spartanophile (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.34, Philostr. *VS* 1.16, Critias DK 88 B 6–9, 32–37)?[19]

The hunting that was ideologically characteristic of Sparta was not *kunegesia* but *thera*, the word used in all four of the passages about Spartan hunting just cited. The point of *kunegesia* is the skill of the hounds in tracking the quarry, which in turn reflects well on their owner and trainer and gives him opportunities to demonstrate his cross-country stamina. This is brought out even more strongly by Arrian than by Xenophon: Arrian (*Cyn.* 16.6) says the rapture of hunting is derived solely from observing (note, not from participating in) the quarry's being tracked, located, and chased, and not at all from witnessing the capture, whereas Xenophon (5.33) included all four elements, though still in terms of the pleasure of observation rather than participation. The point of *thera*, beyond pest control and obtaining meat, is the skill and bravery of the huntsman when he kills the quarry, preferably a naturally fierce animal such as a boar, but at any rate, a large one that the huntsman himself spears with only assistance from the hounds, such as (in ancient practice) deer. Hence Xenophon himself uses words in the *thera*-range only in connection with hunting deer (9.1, 7), boar (10.3) or foreign wild animals (11.1–2). Only *thera* in this sense is permitted by Plato in *Laws*.

17 Iannucci 2002: 69–77, 141–157; Pownall 2008. Contrary to Usher 1979, who thinks Theramenes is accusing Critias of hypocrisy, Theramenes' subsidiary point was rather that Critias was so much of a fanatic that he did not know how to act like a good fellow at a party—the main point, of course, that hemlock was the appropriate love-gift for him.

18 David 1993.

19 Krentz 1982: 64–67; Whitehead 1982–1983; Ostwald 1986: 484–487; Munn 2000: 225–227.

Schnapp[20] emphasizes further ideological differences between the two types of hunting (individual versus collective, chosen versus traditional, ruleless versus rule-bound), but the evidence does not line up quite so neatly. Xenophon's mentions of Spartan hunting in *Lakedaimoniōn Politeia* seem to envisage it as a freely chosen activity participated in by a group of friends rather than a practice ordained by society on a socially defined group. Nevertheless, Schnapp is right to see an ideological divide here, between the skill of the individual who trains his own hound or private pack which he takes pleasure in watching and the bravery of the man who faces the fierce beast and so proves his manhood to his comrades who witness his feat. It should come as no surprise that Spartan vase-paintings frequently depict boar hunts but quite possibly never depict hare hunts. Hares are found on Laconian vases, but only either as incidental decoration, not part of a specific scene,[21] or in scenes that, where they are clear enough to make out, are not about hunting, but in which the hare appears to represent the soul.[22]

So there is no difficulty in seeing the laconophile Critias as someone who admitted hunting, especially actually or potentially fiercer quarry, as an element in traditional collective practices, especially perhaps for ephebes, but who nevertheless regarded as unacceptable beagling by individual adults, as advocated by Xenophon in *Cynegeticus*. It may be that he was not, in fact, greatly enthusiastic about *thera* either, since it is said in the *Sisyphus* that when man was a hunter (θηριώδης):

> ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος ...
> ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἆθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν
> οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίγνετο.[23]
>
> The life of men lacked discipline ... when there was no reward for the good, nor was there any punishment forthcoming for the evil.

20 Schnapp 1973; Schnapp 1997: 153–163, esp. 158.

21 Lane 1933–1934: 157–158.

22 Stibbe 1994: nos. 291, 303. The miniature vase painting catalogued as no. 378 in Stibbe's supplement (Stibbe 2004), which includes a hare under a horse, is too fragmented and worn to make out the composition.

23 Critias DK 88 B 25.16–19 (= Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.54). One did not have to have this conception of hunting as typical of life before justice: cf. Plato *Prt.* 322b, where, according to Protagoras, the tables can be turned on the wild beasts only after the art of politics is acquired, depending on a sense of justice.

But, putting aside the counter-argument that the attribution of the *Sisyphus* to Critias has been suspected,[24] even so Critias could well have been an opponent of Athenian *kunegesia* without actually going on to attack Spartan *thera*. Even if Spartan *thera* was by his time more individualistic than such a model would allow, Critias may either have been unaware of the fact, not having lived as intimately with Spartans as Xenophon; or even if he was in some sense aware, he may not have admitted it, since clearly he was idealizing the Spartans, for example in extolling as especially sober their preference for drinking only from each man's own cup (Critias DK 88 B 6, 33 = Ath. 10.433d).

Leaving aside the passage on sophists for future examination, almost everything in *Cyn.*12–13 about the opponents of hunting either directly suggests Critias and his associates or fits readily enough with them. There are three apparent exceptions, but they are only apparent.

The first of these is that the opponents of hunting are said (12.13) to have brought not only ζημίας (losses or fines) and θανάτους (death) on themselves and their friends and relations, but also νόσους (*nosous*), translated in the Loeb as 'diseases'. Sooner than think of the Thirty, the modern reader may conjure up the image of the obese idler, a poor role model to his children. But the range of *nosos* is a lot wider than physical disease, or even than physical and mental disease. That is why when paraphrasing the passage in the opening section of this paper, I translated it as 'plagues' rather than 'diseases'. Moving on from madness (e.g., Soph. *Aj.* 271) and literally insane opinions (Eur. fr. 1070 Nauck), it is also applied by extension to shamelessness (Eur. *Med.* 471–472, Pl. *Leg.* 11. 919c2), jealous lustfulness (Eur. *Andr.* 220), envy (Isocrates *Antid.*13), lack of philanthropy (Epicharm. fr. 274 Kaibel), and stupidity (Isoc. *Antid.* 248), and to that and temperamental faults more generally (Pl. *Ti.* 86–88). Especially relevant to the issue of whether the Thirty might be being referred to in *Cynegeticus* is Xenophon *Symposium* 4.37, where Antisthenes is made to use *nosos* of a greedy appetite for riches leading to criminal behaviour (especially if one takes it that Xenophon is here echoing the sentiments and vocabulary of the real Antisthenes, as that might make the usage predate *Cynegeticus*). Undoubtedly, therefore, the Thirty could be described as exhibiting *nosoi* in the extended sense. Furthermore, when a previously just man begins to engage in bad actions, he will soon enough fall into bad habits and thereby eventually acquires bad states of character. Therefore, Xenophon can suitably say (*Cyn.* 12.13) that those rendered irrational by envy 'pick up *nosoi* from their bad deeds' (ἀναιροῦνται … ἐκ τῶν κακῶν ἔργων νόσους, *Cyn.* 12.13). So friends and allies of the unjust, even if

24 The attribution is defended by Obbink 1996: 353–355, with bibliography.

not previously of bad character, can have their virtuous dispositions spoiled by being encouraged or even compelled to engage in such wicked actions as the execution of the men of Eleusis (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.8–10), which bring the plague of unrighteousness upon them despite themselves. Xenophon, I would suppose, feared that he himself had been contaminated by what the Thirty had made him do.

There are also a smaller number of examples where the *nosos* is not a state of the person's body or soul but is extended further to cover external tormenting calamities: poverty (Soph. fr. 1137 Radt), foreign origin, and bastardy (Eur. *Ion* 591—and this looks like a normal, rather than poetical usage), defeat in civil war (Eur. *Phoen.* 1014), the calamities of war (Eur. fr. 728 Nauck), war itself (Eur. *Tro.* 1042), violence generally (Eur. *Andr.* 1044—admittedly, in lyrics). Sometimes the precise nature of the evil in question is not clear (Soph. *OC* 544, Eur. *Ion* 320). In these instances, and perhaps in some of the others, 'calamity' might be a better translation than 'plague': we have moved a long way from the core sense of physical disease. The climax of these examples is Plato *Sophist* 228a4, where the Eleatic Stranger proposes, and Theaetetus enthusiastically agrees, that *nosos* and στάσις (factional strife) are the same. Because of these parallels, I paraphrased *nosos* as 'ruin' when initially suggesting above that the Thirty should come to mind here, and I suggest that the *nosoi* Xenophon has most in mind are violence, civil war, and military defeat.

Admittedly, in most of these cases, the reader or audience is alerted by express words, or by clear implication in the context, that we are not talking about physical diseases. That is absent here. But the deaths (θανάτους) that the opponents of hunting have brought upon themselves were hardly meant by Xenophon to refer to premature heart attacks caused by idleness-induced obesity, as if he had had a prophetic indication of the concerns of the twenty-first century of our era. The violence of Xenophon's language indicates to the reader that something more is intended than physical ailments brought about by lack of exercise, namely, the moral sickness and the all-pervasive calamity which the Thirty brought upon the aristocratic cause.

The second point that is also apparently not pertinent to the Thirty is that the very first words put into the mouths of the opponents of hunting at 12.10: the ground they give for why people should not love *kunegesia* is 'lest they neglect their domestic affairs' (ἵνα μὴ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελῶσιν). As we said earlier, at first blush this looks more like censorious friends and relations than like the Thirty, and while one might jocularly imagine Critias giving the young Xenophon unwanted avuncular advice about his teenage obsession, even the first readers of *Cynegeticus* could hardly be expected to supply this background information.

However, warning against neglect of one's 'domestic affairs' might well have been especially characteristic of Critias. Critias seems to have said that σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (translated by Jowett as 'temperance is doing our own business') (Pl. *Chrm.*161b6–c1, 162c5–6 = Critias DK 88 B 41a). The phrase no doubt goes wider than merely 'minding one's own business', but at least encompassed and suggested this. Charmides, clearly represented in this dialogue by Plato as being heavily under Critias' influence in his youth, eschewed public life under the democracy, to the disapproval of the Xenophontic Socrates (Xen. *Mem.* 3.7.1). So in his elegies, Critias might well have acted as ideologue for the mugwumps (ἀπράγμονες): only in a good polis, or where there is an immediate opportunity of producing a good polis, is it worthwhile attending to public affairs; otherwise, better cultivate one's garden and hope for better times; then at least one can avoid being one of the unjust (ἄδικοι) (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1381a25). Furthermore, for an ideological oligarch this must also be true for most people even in the good polis: only a very few should devote themselves to rule (perhaps thirty might be the right number). Even those who can appropriately be given *some* share in public decisions should almost all the time leave debate to their betters and get on with their own lives, as the Thirty no doubt intended should be the case with the three thousand Athenians they permitted to retain the status of citizens. That was, after all, the position in Sparta: there was an assembly of the citizen body, but it only occasionally came into session, and constant immersion in public affairs might without obvious falsity have been imagined, especially by an idealist, as true only of a much smaller number, the Kings, ephors, and elders. So Critias probably did think that domestic matters are what all good people most of the time and most good people all of the time should attend to. Admittedly, if that is what he indeed thought, it seems he ignored his own advice when he moved the decree for Alcibiades' recall (Plut. *Alc.* 33.8); but if that is to be assigned an early date within the possible period for it (411–407), perhaps he believed, if only for a short time, that the Five Thousand did indeed offer a serious prospect of creating the good polis, much more so than not only the democracy but also than the Four Hundred that had immediately preceded them, a regime many of whose leaders were blatant opportunists. Similarly, perhaps when Critias meddled in Thessaly a few years later, he imagined that he could engineer a good polis there. Or perhaps, like many other people, his theories and his practice diverged when the prospect of power beckoned. This interpretation gives extra point, not only to the Xenophontic criticisms of politically quiescent Charmides, but also to Xenophon's insistence at *Cynegeticus* 12.11 that, on the contrary, there is no division between those who manage their domestic affairs appropriately and those who are

useful to their country in the most important matters, which similarly suggests that it is inappropriate to abstain from democratic politics on principle.

As noted above, Critias certainly objected to drinking rounds and *kottabos*: it is not attested that he did so because excessive indulgence in them might well lead to neglect of τὰ οἰκεῖα, but it is quite plausible that this was one of his reasons, since it is obviously true that, taken to extremes, they might indeed lead to the undermining of the estates of the careless young aristocracy. *Kunegesia* might well have been added to the list alongside them partly for the same reason. Therefore, that the objectors to *kunegesia* attack it because it distracts people from τὰ οἰκεῖα does not argue against an identification of Xenophon's primary target here as Critias, and there is some ground for thinking that Critias' elegies would have stressed safeguarding τὰ οἰκεῖα (domestic affairs) at least until the revolutionary opportunity arrived.

The third feature of the opponents of hunting that might be argued to be irrelevant to the Thirty is that Xenophon says at 12.13 that the opponents have made enemies ἐκ τῶν ματαίων λόγων, 'because of their empty words': for in the case of the Thirty was it not rather by the violence of their deeds? The objection in itself is not very strong, especially standing alone: the words could refer hyperbolically to Critias' elegies, or to other loose talk that made him an object of suspicion to the democracy and helped lead to his banishment. But, in fact, in some ways it is this objection that is the most revealing to pursue. For the word ματαίων is picked up at 13.1, περί … τῶν ματαίων πολλὰ αὐτοῖς γέγραπται ('much has been written by them on useless topics'). Thus, consideration of the point being made by it at 12.13 brings us on to the attack on the sophists in 13.1–9, the relevance of which requires to be explained.

Some Previous Theories about the Attack on the Sophists

The principal thesis of L' Allier's paper is that Xenophon attacks sophists mainly in order to show that he himself is not a sophist. It is a pre-emptive strike, getting his blow in first against criticism of *Cynegeticus* itself that he regards as sure to come from certain quarters. *Cynegeticus* will be accused of being sophistic, starting as it does with a highly wrought Gorgianic passage and ending with a rhetorical display of another kind; and certain style-snobs will say it is badly written. But since Xenophon has more or less openly invited the imputation by adding the offending features to the sober core of the work, his underlying purpose is to flag that *Cynegeticus* is not a mere handbook with a flowery introduction but is intended to make a contribution to intellectual dis-

cussion. It is this that especially makes it liable to be called 'sophistic' by those who disagree—and, Xenophon can therefore hope, 'philosophic' by those who agree.

That is true enough, and a valuable insight into the work. However, it does not explain the violence of the attack or its intrusion between passages criticizing the Thirty. That is more likely to be a result of the particular sophists or 'sophists' that Xenophon has in mind. For although Xenophon may appear to express himself with complete generality, it is not likely that he was really aiming at all those who might in some sense be regarded as sophists, or even at all amongst them who could be described as concerned with words (13.5). He says at 13.1 that his target is the sophists of today (οἱ νῦν σοφισταί), which should mean he acquits the sophists of the older generation, Protagoras and Thrasymachus and so forth. That conclusion is reinforced in the case of Gorgias by the Gorgianic style of the work's proem: Gorgias was, furthermore, the teacher of Xenophon's friend Proxenus who, if not wise, was (according to Xenophon) at least virtuous (*An.* 2.6.16–20). Another sophist of the older generation who was evidently congenial to Xenophon was Prodicus, whose defence of virtuous toil in Virtue's speech to Heracles as he contemplates what life to choose Xenophon flatteringly paraphrases at length in *Memorabilia* (*Mem.* 2.1.21).[25] Indeed, Xenophon shows that there are some intellectuals he exempts from his criticisms when he advises his readers to avoid the behests of the sophists but not to despise the conclusions of the philosophers (13.9).

As we have seen, Delebecque suggested that Xenophon had Polycrates particularly in mind,[26] but we know nothing of Polycrates' views that can be tied up with Xenophon's remarks.

With greater reason, E.C. Marchant proposed Aristippus as Xenophon's target:[27]

> In at least two parts of the epilogue, it is highly probable that Aristippus is attacked, first as objecting to toil, and further on as a self-seeker (xii.10; xiii.10); Aristippus was in fact, the first of the Socratics to take fees from his pupils (Diogenes Laertius, ii.65). Now we know that Xenophon had an aversion to Aristippus, whose opinions and conduct naturally jarred

25 For both reasons, Phillips and Willcock 1999: 164–165 seem wide of the mark in identifying Prodicus as a prime target. That is not to say that Prodicus' position was as simple as Xenophon presents it as being: see further n. 34 below.

26 Seemingly regarded with sympathy by L'Allier 2012: 478.

27 Marchant 1925: xli–xlii.

> on him. What is more likely than that Xenophon should warn his young readers against such an alluring but dangerous teacher?

The third of these grounds should be dismissed as a mere extrapolation from the fact that in the conversation between Socrates and Aristippus that Xenophon recounts (*Mem.* 2.1), he causes Socrates to criticise Aristippus for intemperance and to warn him to pay more attention to the long term. The passage is critical but does not suggest personal antipathy. Xenophon states unambiguously that Aristippus was one of Socrates' companions (2.1.1), so he does not seek to deny his status as a Socratic. He shows him as defending himself against Socrates' initial attack on him by giving his response an unexpected and at least initially successful turn when he disclaims any desire to rule, and he fairly permits Aristippus to expound his view that he treads the middle way of liberty between rule and slavery. Xenophon even presents Socrates as admitting that there may be something in what Aristippus says (*Mem.* 2.1.11–12), though Socrates goes on to argue that the liberty of which Aristippus speaks is in practice unattainable by those who will not put in the necessary effort to be able to defend themselves effectively against wrongdoers. The dialogue between Socrates and Aristippus has none of the spirit of indignant anger that drives the attack on the sophists and other opponents of hunting in *Cynegeticus*.[28]

Marchant's claim that it is Aristippus whom Xenophon has in mind in his remarks about the value of toil has obvious attractions (though rather than citing 12.10, which says nothing of toil but represents opponents of hunting as criticizing it for leading to neglect of domestic affairs, the reference should be to *Cyn.*12.15–19, where he speaks of those who prefer to live among untimely pleasures instead of toiling for the sake of Virtue). In *Memorabilia* Xenophon depicts Aristippus as wishing to leave all trouble to his servants and instead live a life of ease and pleasure (*Mem.* 2.1.9) and as objecting that those trained to rule are no better than oppressed slaves, since they have to endure hunger, thirst, cold, and sleeplessness (*Mem.* 2.1.17). To this Socrates responds first by specifically holding up the example of hunters (οἱ τὰ θηρία θηρῶντες ἐλπίδι τοῦ λήψεσθαι ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι, 'those who hunt wild animals toil gladly in the hope of catching them'). Then—as we have already seen—he recounts Prodicus' myth of Heracles, who accepted Virtue's offer of toil in preference to Vice's offer of pleasure. Nor is Xenophon alone in emphasizing Aristippus' hedonism, for so too do, for example, Athenaeus (12.544a–b = SRR IVA 174) and Diogenes Laer-

28 For Xenophon's fair presentation of Aristippus here, see Tsouna McKirahan 1994: 380–381.

tius (2.66, 85, 87).[29] And it is likely enough that Aristippus was amongst those whom Xenophon was criticizing for writing for their own gain (*Cyn.* 13.8). But things are not quite as straightforward here as Marchant makes out.

Marchant agrees that in identifying the people indicated by *Cynegeticus* 13.1–9, which is expressed to be aimed at sophists but does not say that they attacked hunting, one should look to other *Cynegeticus* passages (*Cyn.* 12.10–22 and 13.10–16) that are aimed at opponents of hunting but do not specify sophists as amongst them. For it is to the latter passages that he looks when citing evidence that the target is Aristippus. Marchant reasonably supposes that the attack on the sophists and the attack on the opponents of hunting must be related to one another, and that the sophists are not being dragged in gratuitously. But it is the Thirty, not Aristippus, who are primarily in mind when Xenophon refers to those who yield to pleasure at 12.12 and are said to be especially perceptive of pleasures at 12.13, for, as we have seen, these people are also said to bring *nosoi*, losses and death on themselves, their children, and their friends: this fits the Thirty and their associates, not Aristippus. Thus one should not assume that Aristippus must be Xenophon's prime target at 12.15–19, or for that matter at 13.2 when he attacks the sophists for writing books that offer the young empty pleasures. Similarly, Marchant must be wrong to include Aristippus amongst those who recklessly seek their own advantage at 13.10, since these people rob private individuals of their property and plunder the state, accusations nowhere made against Aristippus and difficult to make relevant to him. At 12.13 Xenophon sneeringly asks, in relation to the opponents of hunting, οἷς τίς ἂν χρήσαιτο εἰς πόλεως σωτηρίαν; ('Who would employ these people for the salvation of the city?'). But this would be an inept thing to say of Aristippus, who expressly and notoriously disclaimed any aspiration for such a role. Nor does Xenophon attack his opponents for cosmopolitanism, a feature of Aristippus' doctrines and attitude (*Mem.* 2.1.13), though it would have been very much grist to the mill of his argument that hunting benefits the city and the citizens (*Cyn.* 12.11, 15, 13.11, 15, 17). Indeed, it is not even clear that it could be said of Aristippus' writings, as it is of those of the sophists under attack at 13.3, that nowhere are there sound maxims by which the young might be educated and trained in virtue (ὅτι … γνῶμαι … ὀρθῶς ἔχουσαι, αἷς ἂν παιδεύοιντο οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπ' ἀρετήν,

29 That is not to say that Athenaeus is right to see Aristippus as placing pleasure above happiness, a thesis denied by Tsouna McKirahan 2002, though still defended (with reservations about Aristippus the Elder himself) by Irwin 2007: 45–56; and also, in a less extreme way and without reservations about Aristippus the Elder, by Zillioli 2012: 149–170 esp. 163–164. O'Keefe 2002 offers alternative interpretations of the Cyrenaics' position (though at 406 n. 34, he too expresses reservations about Aristippus the Elder).

οὐδαμοῦ). For Aristippus was perfectly capable of coining maxims (γνῶμαι); for example, Diogenes Laertius 2.70 reports him as saying: 'It is better to be a beggar than to be uneducated: the one needs money, the other needs to be turned into a human being'. And although Xenophon might well think that some of Aristippus' maxims were inappropriate for the young, such as his remark that it was not going into brothels that was dangerous, but not being able to go out again (DL 2.69); others surely met with his approval, such as the insistence that one should not be mastered by wealth (Plut. *De Cupiditate Divitiarum* 3.524a–b = SRR IVA 73), and that one should bear the loss of possessions with equanimity (Plut. *De tranq. anim.* 8.469c = SRR IVA 74). Xenophon liked a good banquet as much as the next man, and was not always a model of sobriety (*An.* 7.3.29). He also evidently enjoyed sex and did not mind making that clear to his readers (*Symp.* 9). He might be expected to have derived comfort from Aristippus' emphasis on how the sage can preserve his self-respect amidst changing circumstances, even if he finds himself far from his native city, beholden to a powerful patron in a way that is potentially humiliating (DL 2.67, 78, 82). Aristippus' self-presentation as a free man even at the court of the mighty[30] might well have appealed to Xenophon.

Finally, one can't be sure that Aristippus disapproved of hunting, for the Cyrenaics are on record as holding that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue (DL 2.91). Aristippus wouldn't have agreed with Xenophon's argument for hunting in *Cynegeticus* 12 precisely because it is toilsome, but the pleasures of the chase are just as much pleasures, for those who appreciate them, as the pleasures of the table and the bedchamber, which Xenophon accuses Aristippus of enjoying too much (*Mem.* 2.1.1). Indeed, as we have seen, Xenophon makes Socrates cite hunting to Aristippus as an example of toil that is sweet (*Mem.* 2.1.18), which would be inept if Aristippus denied that hunting could be pleasurable, even for those who like that sort of thing.

Two Further Suggestions

A better candidate than Aristippus for a hedonist philosopher who was Xenophon's target in *Cynegeticus* 13 would be Phaedo of Elis.[31] Phaedo was probably a hedonist, since he is associated with Aristippus in a fictional letter purporting

30 Mann 1996: 105–110.

31 Mentioned by L'Allier 2012: 492 n. 52 as a possible philosophic interlocutor of Xenophon's, but without further discussion.

to be from Xenophon in the pseudepigraphical Socratic letters (*Socraticorum Epistulae* 18 = SRR IVA 21), though his precise doctrines are unknown. It is true that he is not likely to have been a straightforward follower of Aristippus; otherwise we might have expected to have been told so since tracing such connections is an interest of the likes of Diogenes Laertius. And furthermore, Plato's *Phaedo* contains hints that his views were not those of Aristippus: at 58d he says that to be reminded of Socrates is the greatest delight to him, but according to the Cyrenaics, pleasure is not derived from the memory of the good (DL 2.89). If Phaedo had been an Aristippean, it would have been inappropriate and distasteful if Plato, having chosen him to be the narrator of Socrates' last hours, had then made him recount contemptuous attacks on himself, as would be implied by such passages as 64e–65a (non-philosophers regard indifference to bodily pleasure as virtually equivalent to death) and 82c (true philosophers abstain from fleshly lusts). However, we need not suppose that Phaedo would have agreed with the *Phaedo* in its entirety: he might have rejected Aristippus' emphasis on immediate and bodily pleasures, while still laying himself open to Socrates' more temperately expressed objections.

There are five reasons for thinking that Phaedo and Xenophon might have been enemies. In increasing order of speculation, they run as follows:

1. Phaedo was a noble Elean who was taken captive 'on the fall of his city' and consigned to a brothel in Athens as a slave, from which he was rescued by an associate of Socrates at Socrates' request (DL 2.105); as he seems to be still a youth in Plato's *Phaedo* (89a–b), the likeliest explanation is that he had been taken as booty in Sparta's war against Elis at the end of the fourth century.[32] As such, he would have had a natural animosity to Xenophon, who was settled by Sparta in what had been Elean territory at Skillous.
2. Phaedo's dialogue *Simon* included a purported refutation on Simon's part of Prodicus' account of the choice of Heracles (*Socraticorum Epistulae* 13 = SRR IVA 224). Different scholars have different views on what aspect of Prodicus' account he objected to (which in turn partly depends on what one thinks Prodicus was trying to convey), but it may well be that he was attacking Prodicus for treating Pleasure and Virtue as necessarily opposed, which Prodicus had done by depicting Pleasure as solely car-

32 Kahn 1996: 9 n. 17 doubts the historicity of Phaedo's capture, on the ground that the city of Elis was not taken by the Spartans. This is strictly speaking true, but the Spartans occupied a good deal of Elean territory short of the city itself.

nal[33] and perhaps also by emphasizing the militaristic aspects of Virtue.[34] Xenophon is likely to have been upset by any attack on what was evidently a favourite passage of his.

3. *Simon* was named for the real or imaginary archetype of the cobblers with whom, in both Plato and Xenophon, Socrates says he often conversed.[35] Simon was the type of the Plain Man who punctures intellectual conceit: it is not an accident that he does not appear in Plato or Xenophon, since the point of him is to be a commonsensical opponent of toffs, proof that the ordinary man's opinions are worth listening to. Hence (it may well be) the appearance of the outspoken young man who makes mincemeat of Prodicus in [Plato] *Eryxias* 398c–399d;[36] this comes just after Prodicus has been represented at 397e as someone who, like the dialogue's Critias, believes that only true gentlemen (*kaloikagathoi*) know how to use money properly: as this is an opinion the dialogue rejects, the author may have considered it snobbish. So it would be in character for Simon to be shown attacking upper-class pursuits like beagling, and it would be a suitable thrust for Phaedo to aim at Xenophon, the very model of the *kaloskagathos* (DL 2.48, perhaps from Aeschines of Sphettus?), as he complacently hunted in his paradise in Skillous.
4. Diogenes Laertius 2.123 tells us that Simon declined to be supported by Pericles, saying he would not part with his free speech for money. Several Socratics laid themselves open to attack on this score because of their dealings with Syracusan tyrants or their relatives, but so too did Xenophon by accepting Agesilaus' patronage.
5. According to the first century CE rhetorician Theon, Phaedo's *Zopyrus* recounted how the youngest son of the King of Persia was given a lion

33 This was the view of Hirzel 1895: col. I, 112–113.

34 Cf. the view of the passage taken by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1879: 191. Rossetti 1973: 372–378 suggests that Prodicus' original, unlike Xenophon's rewrite, was ambivalent between Pleasure and Virtue, and it was this ambivalence that Phaedo attacked. It is quite possible that Prodicus' original was indeed more ambivalent than Xenophon's rewrite: for possible ambivalence see also Mayhew 2011: xviii–xxi, 201–221; and it may go further, as I do not see why we have to believe that the squalid appearance of Virtue in Philostr. *VA* 6.10 and elsewhere must be due to subsequent Cynic development, *pace* Mayhew 2011: 221–223. But, as Mayhew also implies (221), it's difficult to believe Prodicus' version was totally ambivalent, since after all, Heracles must in the end have chosen Virtue rather than Pleasure (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.34).

35 See Kahn 1996: 10, with doubts about the archaeological evidence in n. 19.

36 The outspoken young man is associated with Simon by Gaiser 1959: 62–63, accepted by Rossetti 1973.

> cub. The lion cub was brought up with the boy, whom it followed around devotedly (Theon *Progymnasmata* 3 pp. 74, 21–75, 9 Stengel (= p. 34 Patillon) = Fedone fr. 1 Rossetti = SRR IIA 11). We do not know what then happened, but it should not simply be assumed it was happy.[37] As Xenophon tells us at length in the first book of *Anabasis*, the brave and lordly younger son of a very recent King of Persia had been seized by an insatiable desire for mastery and a determination not to abide real or imagined insults—and it had led him to treason and death on the battlefield of Cunaxa despite having an army of Greeks in his service, including Xenophon himself. So perhaps what the lion cub eventually did was to eat the prince.[38] If so, Xenophon might well have been further upset; perhaps he was meant to be.[39]

But even if all this is accepted, Phaedo is not likely to be the sole target for Xenophon's remarks, for *Cynegeticus* refers to 'the sophists of today' (οἱ νῦν σοφισταί) in the plural. He is not even likely to be the main target, as that should be someone who can be imagined as within range of *all* the fulminations of *Cynegeticus* 12 and then has the finger pointed at him specifically by the further barrage against sophistry. Accordingly, we need to identify a second-generation sophist who was (i) prolific in written works which are (ii) devoid of moral maxims and who (iii) could be appropriately smeared by being implicitly associated with Critias. Phaedo was of the correct generation, he was arguably a sophist, and he did leave written works; it does not seem likely that they were devoid of moral content, but they might perhaps be devoid of moral maxims; but he surely fails the third test, for any association between him and Critias seems wide of the mark.

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37 Rossetti (1980) gathers 22 fragments of Phaedon's *Zopyrus*. Our fragment is discussed on 184–185, where Rossetti rightly warns that as we don't have the context, we don't know whether the complacency of the Persian onlookers is right or wrong.

38 The lion is the type of the man of noble but potentially misguided passions. Hence, a man overcome by a desire to look at corpses at Pl. *Resp*. 4.439e is called Leontius: such a desire is a mark of the brave man who is not yet properly trained in virtue (Xen. *Cyr*. 1.4.24). So even if we accept the plausible theory of Kahn 1996: 11–12 that the point of the dialogue is the victory of training over nature (a theme of the fragments from it that concern Socrates' physiognomy), it does not follow that the lion cub demonstrates this. Just as, or more, likely, the story went on to demonstrate that the training in question must be based on reason if it is to be successful.

39 Of course, as remarked by Tuplin, this volume 580, any theories about the story of the lion cub are necessarily speculative.

There is, however, one candidate—and I think only one—who readily meets all three criteria: Plato. In suggesting this I do not appeal to the tradition in later antiquity that Plato and Xenophon were enemies.[40] It is likely enough that this had no independent authority, but was simply an inference from other features of the writings of the two: for example, Xenophon's attempted capping of Plato's *Apology* and the manner of his riposte to Plato's *Symposium* in section 8 of Xenophon's own work of that name. But this inference is one to which at least to some extent we should follow the ancients in drawing.[41] I have to admit that the inference is unsound as regards the apparently most striking example, for while Plato's objection to Cyrus as an educator in *Laws* (*Leg.* 3.694a2 ff. esp. 694c5–9) shows him responding to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, he explicitly accepts that Cyrus was himself well-educated and pursued good policies;[42] thus he takes Xenophon up here in a spirit of discussion between colleagues rather than as an enemy to be scorned and rejected—at any rate, he no longer ignores him.[43] But calm give-and-take in mellow old age is quite compatible with active enmity in the hotness of youth; it does not require much imagination to suppose that in the last decade of the fifth century, Plato had made clear his opinion that Xenophon was merely a brainless hearty, and Xenophon had hated Plato as a Most Superior Person. Speculation aside, Plato was certainly Critias' first cousin once removed; Xenophon surely remembered him as a master of the negative elenchus, and already by 390 or so, on the orthodox chronology of his work, he was a prolific author of sceptical, inconclusive, nitpicking dialogues. Furthermore, he was, as we have already seen, an opponent in his old age of *kunegesia*, an opinion he presented in writing only in *Laws* and with no obvious reference to Xenophon, but which there is no reason to suppose he did not equally hold in his youth and every reason to imagine he would then have voiced scornfully and quite probably with a personal application.[44]

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40 The passages are well known: Ath. 11.504e–505b, DL 2.57, 3.34; Marcellinus *Life of Thucydides* 27. Gell. *NA* 14.3.9–10 attests the tradition by denying it.

41 Holford-Strevens 1988: 198–199. Nevertheless, I would read Xen. *Mem.*3.6.1 as showing a slackening of hostility; and the evidence for Platonic hostility to Xenophon is not as strong as it is for Xenophon's hostility to Plato. Even if Danzig 2006 is right to see Plato's *Symposium* as capping a first draft of Xenophon's work, Plato may not have intended to give the offence that he evidently did.

42 See Dorion 2003, Danzig 2003.

43 For more on the ancients' claims of rivalry between Xenophon and Plato, see Altman, this volume 99–113; and on friendly interplay between *Cyropaedia* and late Platonic works, Atack, this volume 510–539 (especially *Politicus* but also, more briefly, *Laws*).

44 Plato is twice referred to by L'Allier 2012: 492 in this connection. 'Here one inevitably

Plato had been invited by Critias to join him in the activities of the Thirty, an invitation to which he was at least initially responsive (*Seventh Letter* 324d). Perhaps his participation in the purging of Athens was more active and went on for longer than he subsequently let on. But one does not have to accept this to note that Xenophon's charges against the sophists—that they engage in wordy and frivolous eristic and are devoid of useful moral maxims—fit the Plato of the early dialogues well once one has imagined oneself into a Xenophontic frame of mind. Xenophon also criticizes sophistic writings at 13.3 because τὰ … ῥήματα αὐτοῖς ἐζήτηται, which is translated by Phillips and Willcock as 'they have engaged in a search for words' and glossed with reference to Prodicus' procedures, but the expression might equally well point to the hunt for definitions in early Platonic dialogues. Marchant more plausibly interprets the phrase as an accusation that the sophists have a far-fetched style (a cheeky accusation for Xenophon to make, given his proem), but this too could fit Plato: Aristotle is reported to have said of him that his style was halfway between prose and poetry (DL 3.37). Xenophon further suggests that sophists are liable to make unpleasant attacks on their contemporaries' works for being poorly composed (13.6): one can readily suppose that Plato adopted superior airs about the literary productions of his fellow Socratics, and he could well have been prone to poke fun at overdone purple passages *à la* Gorgias. Antisthenes at any rate seems to have hated him (Ath. 5.220d–e, DL 3.35 = *SRR* VA 147–148),[45] which Platonic arrogance might have provoked. We do not know that Plato was physically unfit (cf. *Cyn.* 13.11), but he certainly puts less emphasis on Socrates' asceticism and the desirability of sweat and exercise than Xenophon does.

There are, therefore, plenty of reasons why Xenophon could reasonably anticipate that, after the initial bemusement caused by the apparent—but only apparent—change of tack at 13.1, the reader of *Cynegeticus* who had decoded § 12 as aimed at the Thirty, in particular Critias, would manage to work out that 13.1–9 was primarily directed at Plato.

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thinks about the supposed rivalry between Plato and Xenophon …. Xenophon defends his right to write philosophy using a style that has nothing in common with the Platonic dialogue'. But L'Allier does not make the connection with Critias which as argued here establishes the especial suitability of Plato as the target sophist among 'the sophists of today'.

45 It is also possible that Antisthenes attacked Plato for airy-fairy speculation under the name of Prometheus, rival of the hunter Cheiron for Heracles' attention: see the material in SRR IV 310–314. If this is the case, it would have more point if Plato was known to be contemptuous of huntsmen. Other Socratics' dislike of Plato is also noted by Redfield, this volume 122–123, who further remarks briefly on Plato's nit-picking.

An obvious objection to seeing Plato as especially in mind in *Cynegeticus* is that if he is the prime target, it was not appropriate for Xenophon to place such an emphasis on pleasures throughout the discussion of the opponents of hunting, an aspect also touched on within the attack on the sophists at 13.2. However, there was one particular point in Plato's career when Xenophon had reason to regard him as unsound about pleasure. If he had just read Plato's *Protagoras*, he might well have been shocked, not only by the frivolous and dishonest arguments perpetrated by Socrates in the course of it, but also and even more so by its ascription or apparent ascription of hedonism/hedonistic eudaemonism to Socrates.[46] That will have been far more upsetting to Xenophon than advocacy of hedonism/hedonistic eudaemonism by Aristippus *in propria persona*. Socrates is apparently made to advocate the theses:

1. That when people do things that they know to be wrong as a consequence of being overcome by the pleasures of food and drink and sex, the only reason these things are bad is that they result in pains and deprive one of other pleasures (353c–354a), a doctrine put forward not merely as that of the common man but as one that 'Protagoras and I maintain';
2. That health, good bodily condition, the safety of the city, rule over others, and wealth are good only for the reason that they result in pleasures and the relief from and avoidance of pains (354b–c);
3. What is pleasant is good, and all actions are good that lead to a painless and pleasant life (358a–b).

Xenophon would have recoiled with horror from these propositions. He did indeed believe that virtuous action, while sometimes bringing pain and toil along with it, is ultimately seen to be productive of greater pleasure in the long run, and indeed, even in the short run, the effort it involves brings its own kind of pleasure (*Mem.* 1.6.8–9). The virtuous toil gladly and live a joyous life (*Mem.* 2.1.19); their food, sleep, and memories are pleasant (2.1.33); the

46 A controversial subject, of course: while the hedonism asserted by Socrates is taken seriously by, e.g., Taylor 1991: xviii–xix, 226 and Irwin 1995: 78–94, others regard the arguments as presented merely *ad hominem*, e.g., Guthrie 1975: 231–235, Russell 2005: 239–248, or as designed to provoke the reader rather than teach doctrine, e.g., Denyer 2008: 9. But my argument here is compatible with Plato's real intentions not being hedonistic: all that it requires is that the dialogue can be read as an exposition of hedonism, and there are ample examples of modern scholars who do just that to show that Xenophon could have done so too.

self-controlled get more pleasure from food, drink, and sex than the incontinent (4.5.9); and the knowledge they possess yields very great pleasures (4.5.10). Socrates believes that no man has lived a pleasanter life than he has, for he has been continually conscious of growing in goodness (4.8.6). All these points provide good reasons for the unvirtuous hedonist to cultivate virtue instead. But none of them even begins to commit Xenophon to believing that virtue and the natural goods are to be valued *only* as productive of pleasure, that wrong action is such *only* because it is ultimately productive of pain, or that the good and the pleasant should actually be identified.[47] On the contrary, he specifically distinguishes between the enjoyment gained from virtuous pleasures and the hopes they provide of lasting benefit (1.6.8). The fact that the virtuous toil gladly is mentioned only in passing in a passage that is summed up with the maxim that strenuous effort leads up to good and noble deeds (2.1.20), which appear to be regarded as ends in themselves. Their goodness makes them pleasant, rather than their pleasantness making them good, for the virtuous are said to take pleasure in their good deeds because they make them dear to the gods, beloved by their friends, and honoured by their countries (2.1.33). The knowledge that the self-controlled possess yields not only very great pleasures, but also very great benefits (4.5.10). The pleasantest sensations come to those who are conscious that they are growing in goodness; therefore, those who actually attain the maximum possible goodness do not thereafter have such pleasant sensations, but that is still what one should strive to do, for that is the best life (4.8.6).

Even though Socrates in the *Protagoras* does not argue for short-term or carnal pleasures, Xenophon's shock that Plato has apparently identified Socrates with those who advance pleasure as the end would make him naturally anxious to undermine Plato's credibility as a proponent of Socratic ethics by pointing out his indulgence in unworthy pleasures. (In a similar spirit, Xen. *Symp.* 9.7 emphasizes the uxoriousness of the participants, surely intending to contrast Plato's personal proclivities with his own.)[48] It is possible that Plato himself came to realise that the *Protagoras* had laid him open to this kind of attack: again on the orthodox chronology, the Socrates of the *Gorgias* could be taken as emphatically clarifying his distance from the position many might think was being assumed by the Socrates of the *Protagoras*: whether or not Plato did in

47 *Pace* Gosling and Taylor 1982: 13–15, 38–40.

48 Though there is controversy over whether Xenophon or Plato first composed a *Symposium*, the main proponents of Xenophontic priority still regard Xen. *Symp.* 8–9 as reacting to Plato: Thesleff 1978, Danzig 2006.

fact hold that position for a time, and whether or not the two dialogues would be seen by more careful readers as entirely, or at any rate largely, compatible.[49]

This line of argument will admittedly not commend itself to those who see *Protagoras* as postdating Plato's first visit to Sicily in the early 380s, since as we have seen, *Cynegeticus* looks to come from around 390, and therefore the argument just advanced implies a date for *Protagoras* in the very late 390s. But proponents of the orthodox chronology of Platonic dialogues may be more receptive to seeing *Protagoras* as influencing Xenophon's choice of target in *Cynegeticus* and the venom with which he pursues it.[50]

Finally, it may be objected that Plato was not a sophist, partly because of his expressed distaste for sophists and partly because he did not teach pupils for money.[51] However, those who express dislike for sophists may perfectly well be considered sophists by others, given the word's connotations of 'dishonest quibbler'. As for teaching pupils for money, the description of Eros as a sophist at *Cyropaedia* 6.1.41, while metaphorical, shows that monetary reward is not the distinguishing feature of being a sophist in Xenophon's eyes. It's true that those who claim to offer wisdom in return for money are said to be sophists at *Memorabilia* 1.6.13, but it does not follow that the converse is true, that sophists necessarily claim to offer wisdom in return for money, though it was presumably true of Socrates' interlocutor here, Antiphon 'the Sophist', and was certainly true of Xenophon's more general target at the beginning of *Memorabilia*, Polycrates. At any rate, teaching pupils for money is not an accusation that Xenophon makes

49 As argued by Gosling and Taylor 1982: 69–82. For further discussion of the unique position of *Protagoras* within Plato's Socratic dialogues, see Weiss, this volume 277–315, especially 283 n. 18, 292–294, 305.

50 For the orthodox chronology, e.g., Guthrie 1975: 214 (with earlier bibliography on both sides in n. 1); Gosling and Taylor 1982: 61; Schofield 2008: 45. The contrary is, of course, asserted by Thesleff 1989 and strongly argued by Kahn 1981, Kahn 1988. According to Kahn, a series of dialogues in which everyone is reduced to complete perplexity, climaxing with assertions that virtue is not teachable, was seen by Plato as just the thing to encourage people to join the newly founded Academy, where he secretly had up his sleeve something else completely, like the apparently atheistic academics of C.S. Lewis' *That Hideous Strength*, who were really not atheists at all, but devil-worshippers. For more detailed criticisms, see, e.g., McPherran 1990.

51 For detailed discussion of the objections to the 'habit' of sophists to require to be paid for their teaching made by Plato and by Xenophon in his Socratic dialogues, see Van Berkel, this volume 391, 401–425. But note that this way of putting it avoids saying or implying that being paid is a conceptually necessary, as distinct from a very frequent, element in being a sophist.

against sophists in *Cynegeticus*. He does contrast himself with his adversaries at 13.4 by describing himself as an ἰδιώτης, but this does not mean 'unpaid'.[52] It means, as usual, someone who is not an expert or otherwise possessed of special status. It is also true that Xenophon says (13.8) that sophists talk to deceive, and they write for their own gain (κέρδος) and do not help anybody, but κέρδος is not restricted to monetary gain (cf. Ar. *Nu.* 259–260). Xenophon might well think that Plato's main object was to gain prestige rather than to attain truth. Xenophon further says that while sophists hunt the rich and young (οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφισταὶ πλουσίους καὶ νέους θηρῶνται), philosophers by contrast are friends to all alike (13.9): however, by this I suggest he means not that sophists take money for their lessons, but that, according to him, Plato is a snob and a predator on late teenage boys.

It is relevant here that when at *Sophist* 231d2 Plato sums up the first guise of the sophist in words reminiscent of *Cynegeticus* 13.9, he describes or defines him not simply as a hunter of the rich and young but as a hunter of the rich and young *for pay* (νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής). This neatly encapsulates a point already clear from the longer analysis at 221d8–223b9: that for Plato, unlike Xenophon, taking money for lessons is a vital element in being a sophist. Plato is implying, 'Perhaps, as Xenophon suggested, I do try to associate with the rich and young, but I am not a sophist because I'm not paid for it'. Furthermore, when Plato reaches the seventh guise of the sophist, where he succeeds in finally tracking him down, he again associates him closely, like Xenophon, with a type of unsatisfactory politician. But whereas Xenophon's unsatisfactory politicians were greedy men aiming at victory over friends, capable of existing under any particular constitutional regime and therefore potentially corrupt oligarchs as much as corrupt democrats, Plato is specific that the relevant type of politician is a δημολογικός (*Soph.* 268b9), a speaker in the democratic assembly. Plato deflects the suggestion that the natural partners of the morally predatory sophist are greedy oligarchs who came to ruin and points the finger instead at the mercenary expert and the demagogue.

As things turned out, Xenophon was tempting providence by trumpeting his own pretensions as a huntsman before trying to fix opprobrium on his supercilious rival Socratic. For the sophist proved 'a very troublesome sort of creature to hunt down' (Pl. *Soph.* 218d3). Especially in the light of Plato's own wariness and wiliness, as evidenced in this connection in *Gorgias* and *Sophist*, Xenophon's methods proved altogether too indirect, and he evidently failed to convince the next generation that Plato was a sophist, while subsequent generations did

52 *Pace* L'Allier 2012: 489.

not even notice his attempts. Plato evaded the nets Xenophon had set up and doubled back on his tracks, while a different hare, in the shape of Aristippus, came into view to confuse those in pursuit in more modern times.

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